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The Movement for a Limitation 
of Armaments to 1907 



New York 




The Bureau of International Research has aided the author 
in publishing the results of her research. The Bureau 
assumes no responsibility for the statements or views exprasHcd. 

First; Printing 




JUL 8 


WHEN the fabric of a durable peace is finally woven, there 
will be seen running through it from the beginning the design 
of man ? s aspiration to< be freed from the crushing burden of 
armament. In this book the faint early outlines of this design 
are clearly traced. By disarmament, the author explains, she 
means not the total abolition of armaments implied in "lay 
down your arms," but the more practical limitation of arma- 
ment and the gradual reduction of military and naval budgets. 

The study falls into two parts, the first covering the period 
which led up to the calling of the First Hague Conference in 
1898, the second, the period from 1899 to the Second Confer- 
ence in 1907. The historical background is sketched in skill- 
fully to prepare for the surprise and excitement caused by the 
Tsar's Manifesto in 1898- The chapters dealing with the First 
Hague Conference are admirable in showing how impossible it 
is to separate the problem of disarmament from political impli- 
cations. Evidence is piled up to prove that "disarmament is 
not a moral, not a mathematical, but a political problem." The 
philosophers, writers, even the statesmen, who had a vision of a 
peaceful world could make no headway in the midst of the 
fears and hatreds growing out of an unorganized and insecure 
political system. 

To publish a treatise on the limitation of armaments in a year 
in which all the world Is arming itself more desperately than 
ever before, may seem paradoxical The publication is well 
timed, however, for the book is filled with incident and com- 
mentary which explain, at least m part, how the world has come 
to Its present grievous pass. Furthermore, the book Is a hope- 
ful one. Although there Is no example of effective limitation of 
armament to be cited in the long period tinder review, there are 



indications of a vastly improved outlook for permanent peace 
over the outlook of, say, one hundred years ago. The author 
points out that with the coming of the radio, the movies, the 
daily newspaper, and above all, more nearly universal suffrage, 
the public, after understanding the issues involved in war and 
peace, may succeed in making itself felt on the positive, con- 
structive side. 

The Atlantic Charter expresses the belief that "all of the 
nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, 
must come to the abandonment of the use of force 77 (for aggres- 
sion), but recognizes that this is dependent on the establish- 
ment of a wider and permanent system of general security. 
There are many who will argue that this implies making perma- 
nent the status quo and that such a proposal is doomed to 
failure. Certainly no status quo will ever suit the ambitions of 
all parties. Given an informed public and a widespread will to 
peace, is it not possible that the framework of a secure society 
can be built which will provide within itself ways and means 
for effecting changes in whatever field of human welfare change 
may be indicated? 


Graduate School 
Radcliffe College 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 


IN THIS study, The Movement for a Limitation of Arma- 
ments to 1907, the writer has dealt with the movement only in 
its broadest aspects, in the proposals for a general, simul- 
taneous reduction or non-augmentation of armies and navies or 
of military budgets. "Limitation" abstention from increase of 
armaments and "reduction" the general and simultaneous 
decrease or curtailment of armaments may be differentiated 
from "disarmament" the reduction of armaments to the lowest 
point consistent with domestic safety which implies sufficient 
arms not only for internal policing but for the protection of 
territory against invasion. The word disarmament has not been 
used to signify the complete abolition of armament as implied 
in the phrase "lay down your arms," but in the wider signifi- 
cance given to it in popular language, as meaning "limitation 
and reduction of armaments." 

The writer has not included proposals for neutralization, 
non-fortification or demobilization, nor prohibitions and re- 
strictions upon the use of particular kinds of military or naval 
forces or equipment, nor plans for regulating the manufacture 
and trade in war materials* Attention has been concentrated 
upon the movement for the general, simultaneous reduction or 
limitation of armaments; the underlying reasons or ulterior 
motives for the proposals made by statesmen, kings and em- 
perors; the influence of economists, international jurists, novel- 
ists, pacifists, peace societies, international congresses and 
associations and the press upon governments; and the official 
attitude towards and the proceedings and results of the Hague 

This book Is not peace propaganda; neither is it a mere 
enumeration of the resolutions, proposals and suggestions for 



a limitation of armaments. Rather, it is a critical historical 
treatment of the pre-World War efforts towards a limitation of 
armaments, for in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
history of the movement for arbitration and disarmament be- 
came an integral part of international relations. Since the 
movement cannot be dissociated from the policies of the states, 
the writer has not dealt with the limitation of armaments as 
an isolated subject. Disarmament is not a moral, not a mathe- 
matical, but a political problem. Too often this fact has been 
ignored. The available treatises on the subject were prepared 
before the German and British official documents were pub- 
lished and also before the appearance of several revealing 
memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, and are, therefore, 
often incomplete and incorrect in their approach to the subject. 
For this reason, it appears that there is a need for such a study 
as the one submitted, one in which the writer has attempted to 
present an objective, impartial, complete and authentic account 
of the movement for a limitation of armaments to 1907. 

This study was commenced in January, 1933, when the 
"Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments/ 1 

for which five years of elaborate preparation had been made 
by the Preparatory Commission, was already a year old and 
had just reassembled with the professed object of granting tier- 
many and other disarmed powers "equality of rights in a ays- 
tern which would provide security for all nations." It was 
revised in 1939 and completed in July, 1940, whan most of 
central and western Europe lay war-torn and crushed, con- 
quered by the armaments of the country which had been denied 
equality of arms by the states supreme in 1933. Although this 
thesis is concerned only with the pre-World War movement for 
a limitation of armaments, the conclusions drawn from the 
study are applicable to the seven-year period 1933 to 1940; 
for no enduring security can be found in compulsory unilateral 


disarmament or in competing armaments and alliances. There 
is no security for any state unless it be a security in which all 
its neighbors share. No great power seriously considered limit- 
ing its armaments; no one nation was exclusively responsible 
for the competition in armaments, but the failure to check the 
intense armament rivalry made war inevitable. 

To the following organizations from which I received finan- 
cial assistance I wish to express my gratitude: the Alpha Kappa 
Alpha Sorority for its third foreign fellowship; the Phelps- 
Stokes Fund for grants and loans; the Julius Rosenwald Fund 
for a generous research fellowship; and the Bureau of Inter- 
national Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College 
for financing the publication of the finished study. 

To the several persons who have advised me in preparing 
this book I am deeply grateful. My appreciation is first of all 
due to Sir Alfred Zimmern, Montague Burton Professor of 
International Relations in the University of Oxford, who sug- 
gested research on the movement for a limitation of armaments 
to satisfy a partial requirement for the B.Litt. degree and 
whose kindly interest, advice and assistance served as an in- 
spiration throughout my period of study in England. During 
Sir Alfred's absence from Oxford in the autumn and winter of 
*933*~34? James Lu Brierly, Chichele Professor of Inter- 
national Law, gave helpful supervision, and he, together with 
Professor C. A. W. Manning of the London School of Eco- 
nomics and Political Science, criticised the manuscript in the 
form of the BXitt. thesis* To Miss Agues Headlam-Morley of 
St. Hughes College, Oxford, Is due credit for valuable sugges- 
tions in limiting the subject and in emphasizing the nature of 
the Liberal, Radical and Nonconformist opinion in the move- 
ment for disarmament* Finally, without the assistance, advice 
and encouragement of Payson S. Wild, Jr., Professor of Gov- 
ernment at Harvard University, this study would never have 


reached the form of a doctoral thesis. I also wish to thank 
Philip Ireland of the Department of Government of Harvard 
University for his critical reading of the dissertation and his 
pertinent suggestions; Youra T. Quails of Radcliffe College for 
cheerful aid in typing; and Edith D. Haley, Secretary of the 
Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and 
Radcliffe College, for efficient assistance in proofreading and 

None of the individuals mentioned above is answerable for 
the opinions, interpretations or conclusions expressed in the 
following pages. For these, right or wrong, I alone am re- 


Bertram Hall, 
Radcliffe College, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
July, 1940. 



I. Resum6 of the Movement for Disarmament to 1870 . 3 

Part I 

DISARMAMENT 1870-1898 

II, Liberal and Radical Influences on the Movement for 

a Limitation of Armaments . ..., 31 

III. The Movement for Disarmament Within the Universal 

Peace Congresses, 1889-1898 69 

IV. The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Question of 

Disarmament 85 

V, The Churches and Arbitration Alliance .... 98 

VI, The Jurisconsults' Approach to the Disarmament 

Question no 

VII. Official Opinion and the Limitation of Armaments . 133 

VIII. Conclusion: The Influence of Public Opinion Upon 

the Movement for a Limitation of Armaments 151 

Part II 

IX. The Origin of the Rescript; Influences Which May 

Have Moved the Tsar , . 167 

X, The Origin of the Rescript: Motives Which May 

Have Actuated the Tsar's Ministers . . i8a 

XI. The Pacilsts and the Tsar's Rescript . . . . * 197 




XII. Public Opinion and the Tsar's Rescript . . . . 217 

XIII. The Opinions of International Jurists on the Dis- 

armament Problem 2 39 

XIV. The Attitude of Governments Towards the Tsar's 

Rescript 2 49 

Part III 

XV. The First Hague Conference 267 

XVI. The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments Be- 
tween the First and Second Hague Conferences . 294 

XVII. The Second Hague Conference 3** 

XVIII. Summary and Interpretations 346 


INDEX 379 




"THE PRESENT is the creation of the past and is big with the 
future." The great movements in history are not accidental, 
not casual; they have their roots in bygone ages. Thus the 
germ of the movement for disarmament can be traced to the 
individual peace plans advocated by Alberoni, Sully, William 
Penn, John Sellers, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham; for these 
philosophers and statesmen envisaged a society in which large 
armaments would be unnecessary, Sully's Great Design of 
Henry IV 1 called for an international force, and the exact 
quota of horses, foot soldiers, cannon, galleys, etc., was stipu- 
lated therein. But the proposed armament was so inconsider- 
able when compared with the forces which princes had usually 
kept on foot to awe their neighbors that, had the plan actually 
been inaugurated, it would have marked a step towards success- 
ful disarmament, William Penn wrote an Essay towards the 
Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of 
an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates; 2 in this he advo- 
cated a permanent international congress and proposed the use 
of sanctions of joint force to compel members to submit their 
differences to the congress and to accept Its award. Penn not 
only philosophized, he put his theories into practice in the wilds 
of Pennsylvania, where, without a soldier, he founded a colony 
among savage tribes. Penn built no fortifications; he planted 

1 Edwin D, Mead, Tk$ Great Design of Menry W from the Memoirs of the 
Duke of Sully (Beaton, 1907) , 

fl Reprinted to Old South Leaflets, Vol. Ill, No, 75 (Boston, 1894-96), 



no cannon; he displayed no pikes, no muskets, no swords; and 
for upward of seventy years, during his administration and 
that of his successor,, the colony never lost a man, a woman or 
child through violence, nor had a war. 

In 1710, after the War of the Spanish Succession had for 
nine years consumed lives and treasures, John Sellers, a Quaker, 
published his peace tract, Some Reasons for an European State? 
He proposed that at the next peace there should be established 
by universal guarantee an annual congress of all the princes 
and states of Europe, in one federation "to prevent any dispute 
that might otherwise raise a new war In this age or the ages to 
come; by which every Prince and State will have all the strength 
of Europe to protect them . . ." Sellers laid great stress upon 
the economic arguments against armaments and by a strangely 
modern use of statistics he estimated the waste of labor and 
wealth expetlded on the war. The limitation of armaments that 
he suggested would prevent the peace from degenerating into 
an armed truce which would crush the peoples under new 

The Abb6 de Saint-Pierre, like Henry IV and William Pcnn, 
proposed in his M&moires pour rendre la Paix Pcrpfowtta en 
Europe 4 to establish a confederation of Europe based upon a 
perpetual alliance between the sovereigns. Moreover, he made 
the first coherent plan for an international tribunal. The 
powers in time of peace were only to maintain weak forces far 
the preservation of civil order, That was real disarmament, a 
source of economy. If it should be necessary to proceed against 
one of the powers which refused to submit to an award or to 
regulations made by the Grand Alliance, or entered Into 
incompatible with It, or made war preparations, 
would have to furnish a contingent of special troops, which 

John Bellers, Some Reasons for m European State (17*0), reprinted in: 
A, Hutli Fry, John Belters, xitsir'tW, QtMker, economist and 

(London, 1935). 

4 C. I* Cartel de Saint-Pierre, Mimoires pour fo Patlx en 

(Cologne, 1632). 


would be placed under a generalissimo, appointed by the Senate 
of Peace, and having no existence in normal times. 

Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1756 revised and redressed Saint- 
Pierre's writings in an attractive fashion and in his Jugement 
sur le pro jet de Paix Perpltuelle 5 found economic arguments 
for disarmament. He wrote that great wealth would accrue to 
the people and to princes from a continual peace, "from the 
enormous savings effected by the reduction of the military 
establishments with a multitude of fortresses and an enormous 
quantity of troops, which swallow up their revenues and be- 
come daily a heavier charge on their people and themselves." 
The confederative army to enforce the necessary decrees of the 
Diet would place the State "in a much more perfect state of 
safety than it could obtain by means of its armies and all that 
machinery of war which is incessantly exhausting it in the 
midst of peace." 

Following Rousseau, Immanuel Kant in 1795, when Europe 
was already in the third year of a war destined to last for an- 
other twenty years, published his philosophic essay on Per- 
petual Peace, which laid the foundation of the modern peace 
movement. Kant deprecated armaments as a perpetual menace 
of war to states, through their readiness to appear armed for it, 
For the realization of world disarmament, Jeremy Bentham, in 
Ms Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace, advocated the 
conclusion of general and perpetual treaties limiting the num- 
ber of naval and military forces to be kept by each state. 

The problem of large armaments is not one recognized only 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 7 Montesquieu, in 

8 Jean Jacques Rousseau, L'MM de Guerre and Jugement sur le Projet de 

Paix Perpttuette (New York, 1920), 

^Iramanuel Kant, Perpetwt Peace (*79S)* Translated by Benjamin F, True- 
blood, Boston Peace Society, 1897. 

7 Certain Chinese states made a disarmament treaty In the sixth century B.C. 
Mr* Liimg-ChiChao In a pamphlet, China &nd the League of Nations (Pekfa 
Leader Office), relates that between the eighth and fourth centuries B.<X "there 
were in the Hwango*ho and Yang4se valleys no less than five or six thousand 
small states with about a don powerful states dominating over them. 11 The land 


his Esprit des Lois, published in 1748, referred to u a new dis- 
ease" which had spread throughout Europe, taken hold of the 
princes, and led them to maintain an "inordinate number of 
troops." Vattel, his contemporary, also criticized the large 
military forces of the day. "Formerly, and without going 
further back than the last century," he said, "they seldom 
failed to stipulate in treaties of peace, that both parties should 
disarm that they should disband their troops. Why is not this 
salutary custom continued? These large armies maintained at 
all times, deprive the earth of its cultivators, arrest the progress 
of population, and can answer no purpose but to oppress the 
liberties of the people who nourish them." B 

Washington, Jefferson and Franklin also looked upon the 
enormous armaments of Europe as folly. Benjamin Franklin in 
his "Observations on War," remarked upon the fact that 
Europe until lately had been without regular troops. He laid 
his finger on the reason for the portentous growth of armaments 
and the great difficulty of disarmament save in concert, "One 
powerful prince keeping an army always on foot makes it nec- 
essary for his neighbours to do the same to prevent surprise," 
He lamented the frightful loss to the world of the labor of all 
men employed in war and noted that the soldier loses habits of 
industry to such a degree that he Is rarely fit for sober business 
afterwards. 9 Franklin was convinced that standing armies 
diminish not only the population but even tlia breed ami the 
size of the species, for, he observed,, the army in every country 

was subjected to perpetual warfare during this "Age of Confiwion. 11 In the 

century B.C. the great powers in conflict were Trt and IVIi^ northern Hwang- 
ho states, and Ch'u, which was a vigorous power in the YanKtws 

valley. A confederation against Ch>u kid the foundation for u leaptt that ktftt 
the peace for a hundred years j the league subdued and incorporated Cli'n and 
made a general treaty of disarmament, It became tb<s foundation of ft new 
pacific empire. Cf. H. G, Wells, The Outlim of History (New Ywk, f 9"K * ** 

8 Peace Society Publication^ Modern PhUosopkers and 0* 

mints, p. i. 

e Edwin D, Mead r Washington^ Jeffmon nd Franklin m War (&0t0n 
1913), p, 10, 


"is in fact the flower of the nation all the most vigorous, stout, 
and well-made men in a kingdom are to be found in the army. 
These men in general never marry." 10 Jefferson, in a letter to 
Sir John Sinclair in 1789, expressed his abhorrence of the war 
system and concluded that "a war would cost us more than 
would cut through the isthmus of Darien; and that of Suez 
might have been opened with what a single year has seen thrown 
away on the rock of Gibraltar." n President Washington, in 
his Farewell Address, spoke with the deepest feeling of the 
danger of enormous armaments to democracy. "Overgrown 
military establishments are," he said, "under any form of gov- 
ernment, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as 
particularly hostile to republican liberty. 77 12 

Eighteenth century propositions for a limitation of arma- 
ments were not exclusively confined to philosophic peace plans. 
An official proposal was made a short time after the Seven 
Years' War (1766) by Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chan- 
cellor, who proposed to Frederick the Great of Prussia reduc- 
tion of thr^e-fourths of the effectives of the two countries; 
Frederick declined the proposition. Joseph II of Austria re- 
newed the suggestion in 1769, but Prussia again refused to 
accept it. 18 On August 30, 3:787, England and France actually 
entered into a reciprocal engagement not to augment their naval 
armaments over and above a peace establishment and not to 
launch upon the ocean more than six war vessels. In case one 
of the powers found itself obliged to assume some other arrange- 
ments in this respect, it could only do so after having advised 
the other party. 14 

10 John Bigelow (Editor), The Works of Benjamin FmnkUn (New York, 
1888), VIII (1782-85), 320 and 430. 

" Edwin D, Mead, op. clt,, p. xo, 

***&, p. , 

m Alfred Fried, Hmdbuch der Frfefynsbewgung (Lelpdg and Berlin, 1:913), 
Purt II, pp, 33-33; Edward Krehbiel, WaiionaUm, Wat and Society (New York, 
1916), pp. 155 and 3x4. 

i4 runj! Hofto&o, MM0$r du Mwmament (Paris, 199)1 pp, 7-8. 


PEACE became the watchword of both reactionary and pro- 
gressive forces after the Battle of Waterloo closed the long 
Napoleonic Wars. The enthusiasm for peace was strong among 
the powers, yet it proved incapable of inaugurating a general 
disarmament. The whole of central and western Europe wanted 
it, and Prussia and Austria even reduced their armies without 
waiting for an agreement. On March 21, 1816, Alexander I of 
Russia addressed a letter to Castlereagh concerning the Holy 
Alliance, which also contained a proposal for the "simultaneous 
reduction of the armed forces of every kind" a proposal which 
raised the limitation of armaments to the level of interna- 
tional relations. Lord Castlereagh was sceptical, for the Tsar 
was the only monarch in Europe who was still keeping his army 
upon a war footing while all other nations were disarming. 
Realizing the difficulties in the way of an international agree- 
ment on arms, the British Government advocated the collateral 
disarmament of each state in accordance with its necessities and 
full publicity for the action taken. The Prince Regent, how- 
ever, developed Alexander's project by suggesting that an In- 
ternational Conference of military men vested with full au- 
thority by the European powers should determine the figures 
for the normal peace footing of the armies of each power* 15 
Austria and France expressed their sympathies with the idea. 
Metternich, in view of the deplorable condition of Austrian 
finances, promised to support the project and used the occasion 
to announce, in a special memorandum, his opinion upon perma- 
nent armies. In spite of the favorable dispositions of the gov- 
ernments and the exhaustion of the European nations after 

18 F, de Martens, "La Question du dtarmemcnt dans lo relation* wire lit 
Russie et L'Angleterre," Revue de droll, International e U^hti&n Mmpttrfo t 

XXVI, 573-85; also F, de Martens, RMU*# d^y traitts tt cwotntionx frwlni 
par la Russie avec le$ Puissances Atranglres (St. Petersburg: Vol. IV, 187* J Vtl, 
XI, 1893), IV, 36; XI, 258, et stq. C. K. Wtbiter, "Dtarmamimt In 

iSi6/' The Contemporary Review f CXXII (November, 193$), (Sa*-a7, Wtto* 

ster's article is based on documents taken from the foreign Office Record* in the 
Public Record Office and the Foreign Office Archives at Petrograd Holland A. 
t) Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (London* 1935)1 Pi 4|* 


twenty-five years of war, the question was not seriously con- 
sidered. Count Metternich and Lord Castlereagh were sus- 
picious of Russia, Alexander had his eye on the unsolved 
Eastern question, and Europe in general was agitated and ex- 
cited by French militarism; consequently, the proposition was 
dropped. But the Tsar's and the Prince Regent's proposals of 
1816 had no chance of success, for they presupposed a far more 
united Europe, with far better established institutions for com- 
mon action than the vague system of alliances and conferences 
then in existence. 

Although governmental action did not lead to disarmament, 
the numerous congresses which followed Waterloo laid the 
foundations of international co-operation and prepared the 
ground for the work of societies and individuals interested in 
peace, arbitration and disarmament. Meanwhile there devel- 
oped the idea of regarding the state as a "moral person endowed 
with a collective will' 7 and capable of being educated by an 
enlightened public opinion. In this atmosphere, simultaneously 
and quite independently, the American and British Peace 
Societies arose (1815-16). Similar societies developed on the 
Continent. These organizations were primarily interested in 
extending the use of arbitration as a means of preventing war, 
while disarmament was considered as a secondary issue regard- 
ing which they proposed only a gradual, mutual and simul- 
taneous limitation. The most successful period of these early 
Peace Societies was the decade 1843-53; an( i a ^ their Con- 
gresses held in 1843, 3:848, 1849, I ^S? ^S* and 1853, dis- 
armament resolutions in one form or another were passed, but 
these had very little, if any, influence on responsible statesmen. 
By 1854, the Crimean War in Europe and the question of the 
extension of slavery in the United States were occupying the 
center of attention, and the Peace Societies, already weakened 
by internal dissension, declined without having affected the 
course of history in either Europe or America, 

Public petitions supplemented the Peace Societies' resolu- 


tions. Christina Phelps finds that between 1845 an d 1853 the 
British Almanac Companion or Year Book reported 2117 peti- 
tions in favor of disarmament and against raising the militia 
were presented to the House of Commons and they carried 
over 600,000 signatures. The 249 petitions of 1848 were for 
arbitration and disarmament; the 213 petitions of 1850 and 
1851 were for the promotion of general disarmament and re- 
trenchment; the 1400 petitions of 1852 were against the Militia 
Bill and the proposed enrolment of the Militia. 16 

Some pacifists believed that nothing practical could be done 
to advance the cause of peace without a general reduction of 
armaments; while others, recognizing the evils of large peace- 
time armaments, were convinced that reduction would be im- 
possible until peoples and their governments had been con- 
verted to peaceful policies, "The case for reducing arma- 
ments/' writes Christina Phelps, "rested on two kinds of argu- 
ments: one a compound of morality and expediency, the other 
economic and financial." 17 

Against any disarmament proposal was ranged an implacable 
opposition. This opposition was based on distrust of the peace- 
able intentions of governments; on fear lest the country that 
reduced its war establishments should find itself defenseless 
and at the mercy of its neighbors; OB disbelief in the efficacy 
of any peace plan; and frequently on scorn and contempt for 
the whole peace movement. 18 

Miss Phelps concludes that if a general criticism of the early 
international reformers' tactics may be ventured upon, "it Is 
that they attempted more than was practicable and that their 
creed was complex instead of simple. They did not sufficiently 
clarify the issue, and they failed to present a united front 
against the forces of militarism and anti-pacifism." ** 

During the first half of the nineteenth century 

"Christina Phelpg, The Angl^Ammcan ftw; Mwmenl in tkt 
Nineteenth Century (No. 330 In Columbia Studies In History, iinil 

Public Law, Nuw York, 1930), pp 8a 171-72, 

17 iflKtf., p. 166. /6W. f p. 164, w 7*tf ,, p* 40, 


tions were occasionally made for a consideration of the reduc- 
tion of armaments, but as will appear on a later page 20 in only 
one case, and that not in Europe, was definite action taken 
which led to permanent results. In 1831 King Louis Philippe, 
as reported by Prince Metternich, made a specific proposal. 
On May 22 of that year he invited the Ambassadors of Eng- 
land, Austria, Prussia and Russia to a conference on the sub- 
ject of reciprocal disarmament. The Plenipotentiaries expressed 
their lively satisfaction with the proposition and their readiness 
to forward a measure in regard to which the Courts of Austria 
and Prussia had already made confidential overtures to the 
French Cabinet. The draft submitted by Count Apponyi, Aus- 
trian Ambassador in Paris, to Metternich after the conference 
of September 29, 1831, provided for the reduction of the land 
and naval forces of the five great powers to their ordinary peace 
footing and that the necessary measures for carrying out the 
disarmament should begin on January i, 1832, and be com- 
pleted by May i of the same year. 21 According to Metternich 
the French Government had two motives for inviting disarma- 
ment. The first was the inadequacy of its finances to meet the 
immense and continuous strain made upon them by the main- 
tenance of any army out of all proportion to its political needs, 
the second, the "serious danger, for a Ministry that aims at 
stability, necessarily involved in the existence of an armed 
force far more liable to be influenced by the parties who dis- 
tract the country than by the shadow of royal authority," n 
The allied powers were influenced only by the first of these 
considerations, and whether armed or disarmed they were in a 

** Infra., $. a6. 

ai Memoirs of Prince Metternich (New York; 1882), V (1830-35), no et $eq 
No. 1008, Metternich to Apponyi in Paris, June 3, 1831; cf. M. Arthur De&jar- 

dins, "Le diwmement 6tude cle droit international," Revm de$ deux mondes, 
October, 1898, pp. 67O-7X ; Hans Wehberg, Die Internationale Be$ckr$kun& der 
Rftstungen (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), p. x?o; Ren6 Heard, La Question de la 
limitation d$$ armaments de nos joun (Paris, 1911), pp. 29-30* 

m Memoirs of Prince Mettemick) loc* cit., p, 144. No. ioai, Metternich to 
Apponyi in Paris, October a8, 1831. 


better position than revolutionary France. Prince Metier nich 
was convinced that Louis Philippe, by the mere fact of dis- 
arming, "would not acquire a spark more of the vitality he 
lacked." The protocol, on being made public, would draw down 
virulent attacks upon his Government; and the immense ma- 
jority of persons in France would unite in blaming the signal 
weakness of a Cabinet which, oblivious of what it owed to its 
country, followed in the wake of the Holy Alliance. 23 Although 
Ambassador Apponyi was authorized to append his signature to 
the draft of the protocol, there is no evidence that the project 
was pushed to a successful conclusion. 

Ten years later, in 1841, Sir Robert Peel drew attention to 
the problem of heavy armaments in a well-known speech in 
which he said: 

Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should 
reduce those military armaments which they have so sedulously 

raised? Is not the time come when they should be prepared to 
declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishments? What, 
is the advantage of one power greatly increasing its army and navy? 
Does it not see, that if it proposes such increases for self protection 
and defence, the other powers would follow its example? The con- 
sequence of this state of things must be, that no increase of relative* 
strength will accrue to any one power, but there must he a universal 
consumption of the resources of every country in military prepa- 
rations. 24 

In Sir Robert PeePs opinion, the true interest of Europe was to 
come to some common accord, so as to enable every country to 
reduce those military armaments which belong to a state of 
war rather than of peace. 

Lord Aberdeen also looked upon the increasing military es- 
tablishments of Europe as dangerous to peace and aafety. By 

1849 he was disposed to dissent from that maxim which h HO 
generally accepted, that <f if you wish for Peace you must pre 

W /M1, pp I44-4S- No, 102 1 Mctterntch to Apponyi In Paris, October alt, 

M Parliamentary Debates, Third tortts, LIX (August ay, 1841), col* 403. 


pare for War." He was convinced that heavy armaments, far 
from being a security, are directly the contrary, and tend at 
once to war. Lord Aberdeen believed that a stable peace could 
not come until the armaments of European countries were 
greatly reduced. Thus by 1850 statesmen were becoming con- 
scious of the new era of military and naval preparations which 
had begun as a result, first, of a "panic" in England (1847-48) 
caused by Louis Philippe's Government extending the dock- 
yards of France, especially those at Toulon; and second, of 
the revolutions of 1848. But no definite proposals were made 
to solve permanently the problem before it reached an acute 

The period from 1815 to 1853 was one of comparative peace 
for most of Europe, and during the first twenty-five of those 
years the expenditure on armaments was not extraordinary. In 
general, the nations were so happy to enjoy peace after the long 
Napoleonic Wars that they devoted their attention to repairing 
the ravages of the long period of strife and to paying off debts 
incurred by it. Considering those years in retrospect we might 
say today that then the nations of Europe should have disarmed 
and thus laid the basis of a permanent pacification. They were 
enjoying years of comparative peace and prosperity, and every 
year added to the time of peace should have rendered the prob- 
ability of war more remote. But no general limitation of arma- 
ments was attempted. The reason for this lies in the diplomatic 
tension of the period. The two states which might have taken 
the lead, England and France, though at peace, did not trust 
each other's policy. From 1830 to 1853 th er ^ were rea l ai *d 
imaginary fears in both countries, and on several occasions 
Anglo-French relations were strained almost to the breaking 
point. The Government of France was anything but stable and 
every coup d'ttat furnished an occasion for a "panic" in Eng- 
land and an increase in her army and navy, which France 
answered in a similar manner. Nor were the relations between 
Great Britain and the United States during the "roaring forties" 


conducive to a limitation of armaments. In addition, dissatis- 
fied elements within the European countries whose agitation 
culminated in the revolutions of 1848-49 on the Continent and 
the Chartist Movement in England, caused governments to 
increase their armaments for protection from internal disturb- 
ances. Furthermore, there was nothing like an educated public 
opinion in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
None of the devices for the rapid diffusion of information the 
telephone, the telegraph, the cable, the radio, the film, cheap 
daily newspapers were known. The people, the great masses 
of the people, knew little about the affairs of their own country 
and still less about those of other lands. But if they had known 
and had wished to change the course of events, they would have 
been helpless, for very few were privileged to vote. Those who 
were in power and might have brought about a gradual limita- 
tion of armaments devoted most of their time to other issues. 
Agrarian and social reforms, amelioration of the conditions of 
the industrial classes and extension of the suffrage were the 
burning questions of the day. 

The whole situation, however, was altered by the revolutions 
of 1848 and the outbreak of the Crimean War, which sent arma- 
ment expenditure on that upward trend that has continued to 
the present day. The revolutions of 1848, emphasizing liberty 
and self-determination as means of settling European questions* 
resulted in a new era of military preparations and unrest in 
Europe. The territorial problems of Italy and the Balkan^ new 
assumed an acute form, thus making permanent peace and dis- 
armament visionary; for voluntary European disarmament 
always has been and always will be impossible until every power 
not only accepts but is satisfied with and willing to maintain 
the territorial status quo, 

The Crimean War brought innovations in fighting methods 
which proved the value of iron-plating battleships and started 
the rivalry between armor and projectile that in responsible for 
the superdreadnonght of today and for the tremendous expend!* 


ture on naval armaments. At about the same time Prussia 
began to reorganize her army and the other great powers fol- 
lowed her. Universal compulsory service was copied from Ger- 
many after 1870, when the world had seen demonstrated in 
three short wars how successful could be large conscript armies 
which were well trained and quickly mobilized. Furthermore, 
by applying the latest achievements and inventions of science to 
warfare on land, on water, under the water and in the air, 
modern war became infinitely more expensive than wars in past 
centuries and so devastating that serious thinking men feared 
that it would eventually threaten civilization itself. 

Consequently, in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
there was increased interest in the subject of disarmament. 
The great augmentation of military and naval budgets caused 
disarmament, or at least the limitation of armament expendi- 
ture, to be treated as a question within the sphere of practical 
politics. No doubt Richard Cobden's championship of the issue 
did more than anything else to make the cause honorable. The 
fact that a person of his reputation as economist and man of 
affairs advocated disarmament removed the subject from the 
realm of the Utopian. 

Two outstanding official attempts to limit armaments were 
made during the 'sixties and 'seventies: 25 Louis Napoleon's 
proposal for a Congress in 1863 and Lord Clarendon's approach 
to Prussia in the early months of 1870, On November 4, 1863, 

88 In her Memoirs (Authorised translation, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 

1910) , 1, 358, and II, 112-13, Baroness Bertha von Suttner refers to a manifesto- 
inspired toy General Stefan TUrr, one of her pacifist acquaintances, and sent by 
Garibaldi in 1860 to the Princes of Europeproposing an alliance of all the Euro- 
pean states. Then there would be no more fighting on land and sea and the enor- 
mous funds saved "might be made available for ends that would improve property 
and lift the level of humanity/ 1 The Baroness reports that General Tto handed 
a copy of this manifesto to her at The Hague during the Conference of 1899 
Edward B, Krehbiel in his No&ioiutifom, Wor and Society* p, a 14, and Hans 
Wehberg, Die tfntern&tionale B$$ckri,nkun$ $er &$$kun%m t pp. xx, 172, also 
refers to Garibaldi's manifesto j but the latter cites the Suttner Memoirs, The 
writer, however, has been unable to discover any official reference to the "mani- 


the Emperor Napoleon 20 made overtures to the governments of 
the great powers to bring about an International Congress for 
lightening the burdens imposed on the nations by dispropor- 
tionate armaments. The Treaties of Vienna that had been 
"destroyed, modified, disregarded, or menaced 77 on almost all 
points were also to be considered. 27 The Emperor set forth his 
intentions at the opening of the Chamber of Deputies in these 
words : 

Have not the prejudices and rancours which divided us lasted long 
enough? Shall the jealous rivalries of the Great Powers unceasingly 
impede the progress of civilization? Are we still to maintain mutual 
distrust by exaggerated armaments? Must our most precious re- 
sources be indefinitely exhausted in the barren display of our 
forces? 28 

Napoleon invited the nations to meet in Paris, which would 
thus, he declared, "become the seat of Conferences, destined to 
lay the basis of a general pacification/ 7 

Austria and Russia appeared to be in favor of the Congress; 
Prussia desired an exchange of views. The British Government, 
however, was suspicious of the intentions of the French Em- 
peror* Earl John Russell, in writing to the British Ambassador 
in Paris, expressed the view that nearly half a century had 
elapsed since the treaties of 1815 had been signed Half a cen- 
tury from the Peace of Westphalia, or from the Peace of Utrecht 
found great changes in Europe, but it was not thought necessary 

30 In 1853 Napoleon III stated his design to call a European Oonft*rt*wrc to 
reduce armaments, (Edward B, KrehMel, op, ctt., p. 215), In 185*) hi* again 
referred to the subject, (Albert Fingaud, "NapoKon 111 et lo d^rmtftiMmt," 
R&VW de Paris, Mai 1899 (Vol. Ill), p. aS&) 

^Parliamentary Papers, LXV1 (1864), C 3339* <l Carw*powli i neft Rewpwitlng 
the Congress Proposed to be Held at Paris/* N0 i, pp. i-st. Mis Majwty tht* 
Emperor of the French to Her Majesty the Queen; alw Anhtow dlplom&tlittifiSt 
V (1863), 1899. Identical letter* were sent to the other powers, t Albert 
Pingaud) op, cit.f pp, 326-90, 

m Tke HenM of Peac*, December i, 1863, p. sS4; Albert IHnpiid, up, dL f 
p* 390; Hans Wehberg, op. cit p, ijfo. 


to make a general revision of either at the end of fifty years. 
Though a certain portion of the Treaty of 1815 had been modi- 
fied or disregarded, the greater number of its provisions had 
not in any way been disturbed, and on those foundations rested 
the balance of power in Europe. He stated that, 

Her Majesty's Government would be ready to discuss with France 
and other Powers, by diplomatic correspondence, any specific ques- 
tions upon which a solution might be attained, and European peace 
thereby more securely established. But they would feel more appre- 
hension than confidence from the meeting of a Congress of Sovereigns 
and Ministers without fixed objects, ranging over the map of Europe, 
and exciting hopes and aspirations which they might find themselves 
unable either to gratify or to quiet. 29 

In a second communication to the British Ambassador at 
Paris, Earl Russell definitely rejected Napoleon's proposal. 
He was certain that the mere expression of opinions and wishes 
would accomplish no positive results, that the deliberations of 
a Congress would consist of demands and pretensions put for- 
ward by some and resisted by others; and, there being no 
supreme authority in such an assembly to enforce the decisions 
of the majority, the Congress would probably separate, leaving 
many of its members on worse terms with each other than they 
had been when they met, 80 Thus the British declined the in- 
vitation, although Lord Derby said, "if there was a country in 
all Europe which had less interest in sending a blank refusal 
to have anything to do with the Congress it was England. 7 ' 
The project was accordingly dropped. 

Nevertheless, in France an agitation was continued by So- 
cialist deputies and, though it seemed that the Emperor had 
renounced his plan by proceeding to increase his forces, he 
turned again to the idea In 1867. It appears that In this year 

m P&r liamentwry Papery op* cit^ No. 3, pp, 3-5. Earl Russell to Earl Cow- 
ley, November xa, 3:863, 

/WdL, Earl RusseE to Cowby, November a& 1863, p. xx. 


Napoleon discussed the subject with Tsar Alexander II and 
William I of Prussia, 31 but the plan was soon abandoned. The 
proposal was, however, taken up by the Journal de St. PSters- 
bowg, which on June 21, 1867, reproduced an article of The 
Voice upon general disarmament expressing the wish that after 
the pacific solution of the Luxemburg question England or the 
French Emperor would propose a general disarmament. That 
question once solved, it would be possible to settle amicably 
another one more complex the Eastern question. 32 The Em- 
peror Napoleon was not deterred from making still another 
attempt; for on December 20, 1869, the Times published a 
telegram from its Berlin correspondent announcing that "France 
had proposed disarmament at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Florence, 
Berlin, and, it is supposed, at London. 3 ^ This proposal* like 
many before it, led to nothing. 

The next official proposal for a limitation of armaments came 
from England in 1870. By 1868 the relations between Prussia 
and France had become strained, and preparations for war 
were made on both sides. In April of that year, France, real- 
izing that difficulties were ahead, suggested that the British 
Government should "give advice" ("donncr des consults'*) to 
Prussia on the subject of disarmament. But Lord Stanley, the 
Foreign Secretary, unwilling to draw Great Britain into a 
Franco-Prussian entanglement, declined to take the initiative 
in approaching Prussia. 34 Still, early in 1870^ before the out- 
break of the war, secret correspondence took place between 
the Governments of Great Britain, France and Prussia con- 
cerning a limitation of armaments* Mr* Gladstone was in 
power, and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, was engaged 
by Comte Dara, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to act 

"Ham Wchberg, op, cit., p* 173; Edward Krdhblel* op. tit*, p, a*$j GunJI 
Hosotto, op. dt., p, 7$. 

m Tke Herald of .Peace, August x, 1867, p. 244, quoting the Journal fife #* 
Pftersbourgf June ai 1867, 

m The Times f December 20, 1867, p* w. 
84 Sir A. T. Ward and G. P. Gooch, CambMg$ Shiery of 
Policy > 1783-1919 (Cambridge, 1923), 111, 33. 


as a middleman In sounding Berlin. 35 It appears that France in 
order to conciliate the peasants and retain their support against 
the Socialists, really wanted to reduce her army. Though Lord 
Clarendon had little faith in the success of his adventure, he 
wrote Lord Loftus, British Ambassador in Berlin, asking him 
to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to the enormous 
standing armies in Europe, which constituted a state of things 
that "is neither peace nor war, but which is so destructive of 
confidence that men almost desire war with all its horrors in 
order to arrive at some certainty of peace." He pointed out 
that Prussia, better than any other power, might undertake to 
modify this system. She would not only earn herself the grati- 
tude of Europe, but her effort would be a fitting complement of 
the military successes she had achieved. 86 

The forebodings entertained by Lord Clarendon were shortly 
realized. Bismarck wanted to know what guarantees Great 
Britain could give or proposed to give for the maintenance of 
peace. "You," Lord Loftus reported the German Chancellor 
as saying, "live in a happy island and have not to fear an in- 
vasion. For 250 years Germany has been exposed to and suf- 
fered French invasion; no one can accuse tis of being aggressive, 
Germany as now constituted, has all that she wants, and there 
is BO object of conquest for her. But our position is an excep- 
tional one. We are surrounded by three great Empires with 
armies as large as our own ? any two of whom might coalesce 
against us/ ? 8T 

Lord Lyons, British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to 
inform Comte Baru of the result; whereupon the French Min- 
ister announced that Bismarck's arguments did not at all end 

88 For a complete story of these negotiations see Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, 
A Record oj British Diplomacy (London, 9x3), Vol. I, Chapter VII; also 
Maurice Raoul-Duval, "Projets de d&amcment franco-Prussia* en x&7o," 

JRevue de Paris* f6vrler 1914 (I 727-39); Albert Pingaud, "Napoleon III t le 
d&annemcnt," Revue de Paris, mai 1899 (Vol. Ill), pp, 304-8. 

m Lord Newton, op* eto., I, 3$x~$, Lord Clarendon to Lord A, Loftus, Feb- 
ruary a, 1870; also Ward and Gooch* op* dl., Ill, 23-06. 

m Lord Newton, op. dt, f I, 354; Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon, February 

S 1870; cf, Hans Wehberg, ap* dk* f pp. 


the matter. He was determined to disarm whether Prussia did 
or not, and resolved to ask the Emperor at once to sanction a 
considerable reduction of the French army. Of course he could 
not make this reduction as large as he might have done if 
Prussia's attitude had been more satisfactory. But he did pro- 
pose to reduce the annual contingent from 100,000 to Qo 7 ooo. S8 
As the French term of service was for nine years, this was to 
effect eventually a reduction of 90,000 men a real absolute 

In Cornte Dam's opinion the question of disarmament was a 
very simple one. The military forces of the great Continental 
powers bore a certain proportion to each other, a proportion 
maintained by imposing heavy burdens upon each country; but 
if, by common agreement, each state reduced its army by a 
certain number of men, the same proportion would be pre- 
served, while the burdens would be alleviated. He hoped that 
the British Foreign Secretary would not acquiesce in a first 

Lord Clarendon's second attempt to win Bismarck was made 
on March 9, 1870, in the form of a lengthy letter to Lord 
Augustus Loftus, in which the arguments for disarmament were 
reiterated and endeavors made to convince Count Bismarck 
that Prussia had really no cause for uneasiness. 110 His corre- 
spondence was translated and laid before King William, who 
viewed the proposal as favoring France without regarding the 
safety of Prussia. To use Bismarck's own expression, "It wa 
the act of a cool friend" 40 The Chancellor remarked to the 
British Ambassador: 

It is all very well for you, living In an island, where no one can 

attack you, to preach disarmament, but put yourself Into our akin. 

m Ibid, t p. 258; Fr6clMc Pawy, Pour la pai* (Park, 1909), pp* 39 -40; J%r* 
Uotmetttaty DebaU$ t Third eriea> CCLHI, col 104* Gladstone flfw*ktoff la tins 
House of Commons, June 14, iBBo; Hani Weliherg, of, dt t , p. a$6, 

80 Lord Newton, o. ell., I, 367-70, Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftita, 

March 9, 1870; Lord A. Loftua to Lord Clarendon, Berlin, March u, pp* 

, p. a?$. 


You would then think and act differently. What would you say if we 
were to observe to you that your navy was too large, that you did 
not require so many ironclads, that you lavished too large a portion 
of the taxation of the country in building ships, which in the peaceful 
disposition of Europe were not required? If we recommended you to 
diminish your naval armaments? 41 

To this home thrust Lord Loftus made the somewhat uncon- 
vincing reply that, as evidence of her pacific disposition, Great 
Britain had just sold an ironclad to the Prussian Government 
and was ready to sell others a reply which was received with 
irreverent merriment. 42 

The utmost that could be obtained from Bismarck was a 
vague statement that the whole question would be discussed by 
the Parliament "in a year or so," and that a decision must then 
be taken as to what was required for the safety of the country. 

Thus ended an attempt in whose success, from the first, no 
one probably felt much confidence. There seems to have been 
no doubt that the French Government was anxious for a partial 
disarmament, and the promise to reduce her annual contingent 
by 10,000 men was evidence of good intentions. What in reality 
precluded any real settlement was the essential difference be- 
tween the French and Prussian views as to what constituted 
aggression, Prussia held it was not aggression or conquest to 
take possession of any German state, while France considered 
that the annexation of any of the states south of the Main would 
be as much aggression on the part of Prussia as it would be on 
the part of France to annex them herself. The Prussians in 
1870 found proposals for disarmament and permanent peace 
extremely distasteful, because their fulfillment would have 
meant that the then existing political situation would become 
stereotyped, that the nations must be content with their exist- 
ing boundaries and proportion of power, Prussia would remain 
one of the many German states and the weakest among the 
great powers; Germany would still be divided and helpless. 

41 loc, ci*. 4a /Ml, pp, 


Prussia, however, Intended to complete the unification of Ger- 
many; France refused to declare that she would not interfere 
with this aim. Thus any proposition for a reduction of arma- 
ments was predestined to failure. 

Until all the leading states are approximately content with 
the world distribution of power, territory, wealth and resources, 
efforts to change the status quo are inevitable. Here is the chief 
thesis of this study; here is the crux of the problem of disarma- 
ment. No plan for a limitation of armaments based upon the 
acceptance of the status quo will ever be generally welcomed, 
No dissatisfied state will agree to perpetuate indefinitely the 
conditions prevailing at a given time. Dissatisfied powers may 
not actually want war, may even dread it, and may be quite as 
unwilling to run the risk of an appeal to arms as the satisfied 
states; but in spite of this, they will not voluntarily shut off all 
possibility of obtaining a state of things which will be to them 
more acceptable than the present. Satisfied powers are equally 
determined to retain by force what arms have BO successfully 
gained for them. This is the simple explanation of the failure 
of most disarmament proposals. 

During the negotiations of 1870 Prince Bismarck found con- 
venient arguments against disarmament, but whatever we may 
think of his attitude towards the subject, we cannot accuse him 
of hypocrisy. Seven years later, when lie paid an official visit 
to Italy, Count Crispi, who had been instructed by Gambetta 
to approach the German Chancellor on the question of a reduc- 
tion of armaments, 48 broached the matter. Crisp! fully under- 
stood that an alliance between France and Germany wan impos- 
sible, but he suggested that there was one point on which they 
might agree, and on which Italy would be with themand that 
was disarmament. To this the Prince replied; 

An alliance with republican France would be of no im to tut. The 
two countries could not possibly disarm* This question was into 

43 Robert Coulet) La Limitation fas armemnn&s (Paris, 1910), p, ft\ 
Wehberg, op, cit. t p. a$7 


with Emperor Napoleon before 1870, and, after long discussion, it 
was proved beyond doubt that the principle of disarmament can never 
succeed in practice. There are no words in the dictionary that accu- 
rately define the limits of disarmament and armament. Military in- 
stitutions differ in every state, and even when you have succeeded 
in placing the armies on a peace footing, you will not be able to 
affirm that the conditions of offence and defence are equal with all 
the nations which have participated in disarmament. Let us leave 
this question to the Society of the Friends of Peace, 44 

In March, 1870, the question was left to the Peace Societies, 
and a few months later the Franco-German War burst upon 
Europe. Out of this struggle grew new hatreds, further dis- 
satisfaction with the status quo, a new imperialism which en- 
couraged a tremendous increase in armaments; and the actual 
conflict checked, for the time being, proposals for disarmament. 


The only voluntary and mutual disarmament achievement of 
the nineteenth century was carried out in the New World. 
The Founding Fathers realized the hazard to the new Republic 
in the British and American fortifications and armaments on 

the western frontier and the Great Lakes. Thomas Jefferson, 
General Knox and Alexander Hamilton were all willing to agree 
to a mutual limitation of armaments on the lakes. 45 Wheu it 

was decided to send Jay to England to negotiate a treaty of 
commerce and amity, both Hamilton and Randolph advised that 

among the objects of the proposed treaty there should be in 
time of peace no armed force upon the lakes nor troops within 
a certain distance of them. 40 Jay, on September 30, 1794, 

44 Francesco Crtopi, Memoirs (London, 19x3), II, 37; Hans Wehberg, op, dt*, 

p. W 

48 Samuel Flagg Bernls, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy 
(Macmfllaa, New York, 1934)1 p. xaa. 

4 */W&, p* a is; also Henry Cabot Lodge (Editor), Tke Works of Akmnder 
ffamttton (Constitutional Edition), V, xxy-xS. 


tendered a proposal for a complete demilitarization of the lakes. 
Grenville rejected it. 47 

The proposition for a limitation of armaments on the Great 
Lakes was again considered at Ghent in 1814. Castlereagh was 
convinced that Great Britain as the weaker party should have 
military command of both shores of the lakes, though he was 
disposed to leave the sovereignty of the soil undisturbed pro- 
vided the American Government would stipulate "not to pre- 
serve or construct any fortifications upon or within a limited 
distance of the shores, or maintain or construct any armed 
vessels upon the lakes in question or upon the rivers which 
empty themselves into the same." 48 This unilateral proposal 
for disarmament was naturally unacceptable to the American 
Commissioners, but it may have suggested to their minds the 
idea of mutual disarmament. The first definite approach was 
made by Mr. Gallatin on September 6, 1814, who, when it 
seemed that negotiations could not proceed, proposed to refer 
to the United States Government a stipulation for disarming 
on both sides of the lakes. Gouverneur Morris also favored dis- 
armament, for he considered both ships of war on the lakes and 
forts on their shores as idle and useless expense. John Quincy 
Adams, however, objected to this as not being in accordance 
with positive Instructions, The matter was dropped, 

The problem was again taken under consideration when, on 
November 16, 1815, James Monroe, Secretary of State, in- 
structed John Quincy Adams, Minister of the United States to 
London, to bring before the British Government a proposal to 
limit the number of armed vessels on the lakes, "or to abstain 
altogether from an armed force beyond that used for the 
revenue." 40 Mr, Adams brought the matter before Lord Castle- 
reagh in January, 18x6, and again In March renewed the pro- 

4T Bemis, op. d*., Appendix III, 289* 
48 J* M. Callahan, Tke Neutrality of the Amerlmn and 
Relations (John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1898), p* <5t, 
4t John Btwett Moore, of International law (Gov't, Printing Oflfcr, 

Washington, D. C., 1906), I, 691-93, 


posal to "mutually and equally disarm upon the American 
lakes." Negotiations were transferred to Washington and for- 
mally opened on July 26, 1816, when Sir Charles Bagot, the 
British Minister, stated in a letter to Monroe that in relation to 
the naval armaments on the lakes, the Prince Regent was ready 
to "adopt any reasonable system which would contribute to 
economy, to peacefulness and the removal of jealousy." 50 

The final and definite reduction of the naval force on the 
lakes was brought about in April, 1817. On the 28th and 2gth 
of that month a formal agreement was entered into by an 
exchange of notes between Sir Charles Bagot and Mr. Richard 
Rush, who was acting as Secretary of State until Mr. Adams 
could arrive from London. It limited the naval force to be 
maintained upon Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain "to one 
vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with 
one eighteen pound cannon 77 and "on the upper lakes, to two 
vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like 
force. 77 All other vessels were to be forthwith dismantled and 
no other vessels of war should there be built or armed. This 
agreement could be annulled by either party giving six months 7 
notice. 01 

The impossibility of getting the vessels from the lakes to 
the sea made it necessary to dismantle them on the lakes. This 
work appears to have been done promptly. By 1820 the feel- 
ing of danger had decreased so far that the House of Repre- 
sentatives refused to consider a resolution which proposed a 
western depot for arms "convenient to those points which are 
vulnerable to the enemy," By 1825 public vessels had prac- 
tically disappeared. Temporary difficulties between 1837 an d 
1841 and again during the Civil War threatened to subvert the 
friendly agreement, but in spite of numerous vicissitudes the 

80 G. P. de T. Glozebrook, Sir Ckarks Bagot in Cmadct, A Study in British 

Colonial Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1929), Bagot to Monroe, 
July 26, 18x6, pp, 4-S* 

81 Callfthan, op. c#*, pp. 84*85, quoting from the Nation^ Intdtt&ncer, April 

30, 1818. 


Rush-Bagot Agreement survived for more than one hundred 
and twenty years and, with the passage of time, assumed a 
symbolic importance in the eyes of Americans and Canadians. 
Shortly after the first World War modification of the Agree- 
ment with a view to making its provisions conform more closely 
to modern conditions was studied in the United States and 
Canada and a stage was even reached where the Governments 
exchanged drafts of suggested changes; but these were never 
accepted. 52 

When, however, feverish naval construction in Canada inci- 
dent to the second World War caused congestion at the Atlantic 
seaboard shipyards, the Canadian Government expressed a 

desire to have the vessels constructed on the Great Lakes in 
the most complete form practicable while still on those waters. 53 

On November 2, 1940, the United States Government agreed 
that a further interpretation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement 
might be made in conformity with the intent of the provision 
that important naval vessels should not be built for service on 

the Lakes. This involved recognition that armament might be 
installed on naval vessels provided that a the vessels are not 
intended for service on the Great Lakes"; that "each Govern- 
ment furnish the other with full Information concerning any 
vessels to be constructed at Great Lakes ports"; that "the 
armaments of the vessels are placed in such a condition as to 
be incapable of immediate use while the vessels remain in the 
Great Lakes"; and that the "vessels are promptly removed from 
the Great Lakes upon completion." M 

Thus, contrary to the letter but in harmony with the spirit 
of the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the present temper of pub- 

**Tke Department of State BulMn t Vol IV: No* 92, Publication 158^ 

(Washington, B. C, March 29* 1941), "Naval Vessels m the Orett takta," 
p. 366; Daniel C. Roper to 0. D. Skelton, Canadian Under Secretary for Rx 
tcrnal Affairs, June <; t 1939. 

"fbld., pp. 37*"-W 0. IX Skelton to Pfcrrtpont Motfat, October jo, 11140, 
64 Ibid* p. 372, Pierrepont Moffat to O. I). Skdton November J P 1940. 


lie opinion, the construction of small fighting craft on the Lakes 
proceeds apace. But the vessels which slide down their ways 
are used only against a common menace. The Agreement was 
never intended to obstruct the efforts of the two contracting 
powers in mutual defense. 

The Rush-Bagot Agreement was the greatest achievement 
up to the Tsar's Rescript of 1898 to which the pacifists could 
proudly point. The unarmed Canadian-American boundary of 
3,800 miles, the longest unarmed frontier in the world and the 
safest of the British Empire, they argued, stands as a rebuke 
to the militarism of the Old World and a challenge to the cour- 
age and faith of every nation. Peace enthusiasts often refer 
to this treaty as an illustrious example of successful disarma- 
ment which should be copied by Europeans. In so doing they 
fail to take into consideration the differences in geographic, 
demographic, political, economic and strategic factors and cir- 
cumstances in central Europe and in the northern part of North 
America. (Even the United States has made no similar arrange- 
ment for the Rio Grande boundary.) At the time of making 
the agreement the region of the Great Lakes was in a large 
measure an uninhabited wilderness without the pressure, as 
in Europe, of dense, antagonistic, nationalistic peoples. 

Although it must be conceded that in 1817 there was danger 
from an expensive and explosive race in armaments, there were 
no extremely serious or apparently insuperable issues at stake, 
no "irredentism," no burning desire for revenge on either side. 
The policies of Great Britain and the United States were not in 
collision; each could agree to a limitation of armaments on the 
Great Lakes at a saving in expenditure and without a sacrifice 
of national interests. The salutary results from the agreement 
have been due to the fact that there has been no serious clash 
of national policies between two peoples linked together by 
race, language, political institutions and geographical proximity, 
Armaments, like tariffs and embargoes, are merely the means 
by which a state seeks to give effect to its national policies in 


a system of "Power Politics. 77 What is of primary importance 
in history is the policies of the states; if these are dynamic 
and therefore aggressive, then their armaments, whether mili- 
tary or naval, are a matter of concern for those nations men- 
aced by their policies. 55 

"It is apparent, therefore, 77 conclude Frank H. Simonds and 
Brooks Emeny, "that agreement in the matter of armaments is 
possible only when the policies of states do not clash. If their 
policies are in collision, no progress can be made in the adjust- 
ment of armaments without a previous accommodation in the 
matter of policy. With political agreement once achieved, more- 
over, the question of arms loses most of its importance, because 
dangers of conflict have already been largely removed." r>($ 

55 Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics 
(American Book Company, New York, 1937), p. 594. Reprinted by permission. 

Part I 




THE LIBERAL, humanitarian, rationalistic movement for a 
limitation of armaments in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century was promoted by the members of the European Liberal 
and Radical political parties; in Great Britain it was led pri- 
marily by the Nonconformists. 

The agitation for peace, arbitration and the limitation of 
armaments formed a synthesis, a community of interest for 
diverse groups of men who in politics were designated as "Con- 
servative Liberals," "Moderate Liberals, 77 "Liberals," "Radical 
Liberals/ 7 "Radicals," "Social Democrats," "Socialists," and 
"Radical Socialists." Though they might differ on forms of 
polity and ways and means of accomplishing reforms, they were 
all agreed in advocating peace and governmental retrenchment. 
The Liberals and parties of the Left were distrustful of mili- 
tarism and the resurgent emotionalism of the romanticists who 
were spreading the glory of romance over the realities of war. 
Although friends of large military budgets argued that one- 
third of all taxes paid for army expenditure was returned to the 
taxpayer in some form, the Liberals and Socialists maintained 
that they benefited little by the forms of returns of taxation; 
that military expenditure flowed not to the middle urban groups 
but to a bureaucracy, to certain industries and to agriculture* 
In contrast to the urban-socialist attitude was that of the 
agrarians who were won over to militarism by the policy of the 
French and German Governments in making generous pay- 



ments for horses, feed, grain and meat and for actual or pre- 
tended damage to crops during maneuvers. 1 

"It is the essence of Liberalism/ 3 writes L. T. Hobhouse, "to 
oppose the use of force, the basis of all tyranny. It is one of its 
practical necessities to withstand the tyranny of armaments. 
Not only may the military force be directly turned against 
liberty, as in Russia, but there are more subtle ways, as in 
Western Europe, in which the military spirit eats into free insti- 
tutions and absorbs the public resources which might go to the 
advancement of civilization." 2 As apostles of peace and as 
opponents of swollen armaments, the Liberals recognized that 
the expenditure of the social surplus upon the instruments of 
progress was the real alternative to its expenditure on the in- 
struments of war. 3 

In nineteenth century England the agitation for a limitation 
of armaments came from the Manchester School of economists 
and free traders who looked forward to a period of laissez- 
faire, free trade and peace throughout the world. The chief 
exponents of these doctrines were Richard Cobden ancl John 
Bright, whose championship of a reduction of armaments prob- 
ably did more than anything else to give the subject prestige. 
Cobden was the first person of note to denounce the armaments 
of Europe as a whole* He made a special study of them on a 
continental tour in 1847, and in a letter to the Peace Congress 
of 1848 he furnished various statistics on the subject in the 
hope that the Congress would open the eyes of European gov- 
ernments to the excessive waste and expense of their war estab- 
lishments. The great Free Trader looked upon the problem 
from the economist's point of view and did not leave the agita* 
tion to the Peace Societies alone. Moreover* he usually coupled 
his plea for disarmament with one for retrenchment. As early 

1 Alfred Vagt, A fftetory of (New York, 19^7), p. 359, 

*L, T, Hobhouse, Ub&albm (Henry Holt, New Yurie, *jn) pp. 44*45* 
pp. 35~a6. 


as 1848, speaking on taxation in the House of Commons, Cob- 
den pointed out that unless direct taxation were increased ex- 
penditure would have to be decreased, and a decrease in 
expenditure could only be attained by reducing armaments. 
He took the initiative in introducing in a European parliament 
the first resolution calling for a reduction of armaments. 
Speaking in the House of Commons on July 17, 1851, Cobden 
urged the "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into 
communication with the Government of France, and endeavour 
to prevent in future that rivalry of warlike preparations in time 
of Peace, which has, hitherto been the policy of the two Gov- 
ernments, and to promote, if possible, a mutual reduction of 
armaments." 4 He believed that if the French and English 
reduced their fortifications, other countries might also limit 
their armies. Lord Palmerston answered in a friendly and 
complimentary speech; while approving the object, he did not 
like to be "sent bound and fettered into a negotiation" through 
which he confessed he could not see any practical way. 5 In 
consequence of the Prime Minister's conciliatory attitude it was 
thought advisable not to press for a division; therefore, nothing 
came of the proposal. 

Although Richard Cobden was the first outstanding advo- 
cate of a limitation of armaments, he was neither a radical nor 
a fanatic; he considered the navies of Great Britain and the 
United States essential to national existence and favored an 
adequate naval "police force/' He emphasized this point at 
the Edinburgh Peace Conference in October, 1853, when he 
announced, "we don't say 'Disband your army, sink your fleet, 
and place yourself prostrate before any enemy that may come 
to attack you' but what we say is this, that if England and 
France have each ten ships of the line in commission watching 
each other from opposite ports, then their relative strength 

4 Parliamentary Abates, Third series, CXVII (June 17, 1851), cok 928-29* 


towards each other would be precisely the same if they would 
each reduce the number from ten to five." 6 

Nor was Cobden a "peace at any price man" an opponent 
of all war. Some wars and some preparation for war he re- 
garded as hateful necessities for a country living in a world 
where moral force had not everywhere been recognized as 
supreme. He did not advance the opinion that war is never 
justifiable except when undertaken for self-defense; he ad- 
mitted that a case might arise where a powerful nation was 
rightly called upon to take up arms for the protection of 
a weaker nation, or to assist the liberation of a subject and 
oppressed people. But Cobden would have insisted that such a 
case must be extremely rare. 7 

The Manchester School's program of retrenchment attracted 
the sympathy and attention of William E. Gladstone, who, in 
his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was anxious to 
reduce government expenditure and saw the best means of 
accomplishing his aim by limiting the outlay on armaments. 
After the Crimean War had sent military expenditure soaring 
both in Great Britain and in France as well as in Russia and 
Turkey, Mr, Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli and Lord John Russell 
supported Mr. Cobden in his efforts to induce Parliament to 
return to a more moderate disbursement. But in spite of the 
agitation of this great combination, the naval estimates for 
1857 and 1858 were fifty per cent higher than in 1853, In the 
years 1859 to *86i, distrust of Napoleon caused a "Third 
Panic" and a large outlay on Royal dockyards. This fear did 
not, however, deter Mr* Disraeli from proclaiming the follow- 
ing in the House of Commons on July ax, 1859; "Let UH ter- 
minate this disastrous system of wild expenditure by mutually 
agreeing, with no hypocrisy, but in a manner and under circum- 

9 Report of the Proceeding* of the Peace Conference at Edinburgh (Kdht* 

burgh, 185,$), Oct. 12*13, p. 55* 

7 J. A* Hobsoa, Mcl^fd Cobden: The International Mm (London, 1*1111), 
P. 3*7- 


stances which may admit of no doubt by the reduction of 
armaments that peace is really our policy." 8 

Throughout the negotiations of 1859-60 which led up to the 
Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, Gladstone was brought into 
close touch with Cobden and through him closer to John 
Bright. 9 The conclusion of the Commercial Treaty with France 
did not close but only marked the beginning of the relationship 
between Gladstone and the Free Traders, who were convinced 
that if any real and permanent good was to come from the 
Treaty it must be followed by a reciprocal agreement to limit 
naval forces. Gladstone's financial policy opened the way to 
permanent friendship and co-operation between him and them, 
for economy was the thread woven close into the texture of 
Gladstone's finance. The great Chancellor of the Exchequer 
persistently deplored the increase in the military estimates and 
criticized a "system of ubiquitous naval armaments" which 
seemed to mean that "wherever there are British subjects and 
British trade, there shall be British force to protect them." He 
wished to establish as the true principle "that there shall be 
ships where there is service." 10 

Although Gladstone started his political career as a Tory, 
his financial policy marks his entrance into the field of Liberal- 
ism. He became the champion of Liberal progress in England 
between 1859 and 1867, during which time he waged a cease- 
less battle with traditional views and policies. From Cobden 
and Bright, Gladstone received support and advice on the gen- 
eral question of national expenditure and the particular one 
of the folly of huge armaments. But even during his battle for 
economy, when the friendship between the Financier and the 
Free Traders was formed, Gladstone refused to be associated 
with all their political ideas. 11 

n Parliamentary Debates, Third series, CLV (July 21, 1859), col 179, 

F, W. Hirst, Gladstone as financier md Economist .(London, 1931), p. 202. 

11 John Morley> ZJ/i of Gladstone (London, 1903), I 683. 


About 1860, Great Britain and France were beginning to 
spend millions of pounds on ironclads. Bright wrote to Glad- 
stone that he could see no end to the rivalry so long as the 
great intellects were absorbed in the question of how to build 
more deadly instruments of defense and destruction. Hoping 
to see this competition checked, he proposed, in January, 1861, 
that the Government should allow Cobden to supplement his 
treaty success of the previous year by negotiating with the 
French Emperor for a mutual reduction of armaments. He 
was convinced that Mr. Cobden could arrange the whole matter 
with the Emperor in one-tenth the time he spent on the Com- 
mercial Treaty, if he knew he would be supported by the 
British Government. Bright believed that "never before, in 
any time" had there been a government in France more willing 
to act amicably with England. He pointed out that at least 
fifteen millions a year might be saved to the two countries by 
such an agreement. 12 

Mr, Bright had reasons to believe that the French would 
favor this plan, while it also had the support of Disraeli, then 
leader of the Opposition. The latter statesman saw clearly 
that the strength of this country lay, not in increased arma- 
ments, but in its growing resources; and that if these resources 
were squandered in time of peace, they would not be available 
in time of war. He was of opinion that the power to raise the 
income tax in an emergency was a far more formidable weapon 
than any which increased fleets or armies could supply. The 
wish for an understanding had been "candidly expressed^ by 
France as early as January , 1849, when Napoleon , then Presi- 
dent of the French Republic, had offered to make almost any 
reduction England might suggest in naval armaments, pro- 
vided that the reduction were reciprocal, 18 Mr. Disraeli, 

" G. M. Trevelyan, The life, of John Bright (London, 1935), pp. 
Mr, Bright to Mr, Glaelfttonc* January, i$6i 

19 Ibid., p. 293. In a footnote, p, 293, Mr, Trevelyan write*: "This 
clearly in the F.O. papers, as has been pointed out to me by Rev, F. A, Slmpwm 
of Trinity College, Cambridge, author of T he Jto of Loub Napoleon? 9 The wib- 


speaking in the House on July 26, 1861, drew attention to the 
willingness of the French Government to discuss with Great 
Britain the question of limiting the naval armament compe- 
tition. 14 

In October of the same year, Richard Cobden laid a memo- 
randum before the Government, pointing out that the "peculiar 
and exceptional state of the English and French navies, the 
result of scientific progress in maritime armaments, offers an 
opportunity for a reciprocal arrangement between the two 
Governments of the highest interest to both countries." Since 
war vessels were being constructed of iron in order to keep out 
explosive shells, and the old line-of-battle ships, by which 
naval force had hitherto been measured, were about to be 
superseded, the obvious course, he thought, was for the two 
Governments to come to an agreement by which the greater 
portion of these ships might be withdrawn and rendered in- 
capable of being employed again for war purposes. He 
suggested an arrangement which would preserve to each 
country precisely the same relative force after the reduction 
as before. 10 

When, on June 23, 1862, a member in the House asked why 
the English Government did not come to an understanding with 
the Government of France to limit to a certain relative amount 
the naval forces of both countries, Lord Palmerston replied 
that this "is not a proposition which one independent country 
could make to another," Even if England and France were 
the only powers in the world that had navies, it was a proposal 
which neither would think of accepting. He explained that 
Great Britain was not the only naval power, that others were 
creating ironclad navies as fast as they could. 16 Consequently, 

ject, however is neither mentioned in Simpson's Rise of Louis Napoleon (Lon- 
don, 1924), nor in his Loui Napoleon And The Recovery of France (London, 

14 Parliamentary Debates, Third series, CLXIV (July a6 1861), col 1679. 

l * Richard Cobden, Political Writings (London, 1867), n, 434* 

w Parliamentary Z>6ot0j, Third series, CLXVII .(June 123, 1862), col. 953. 


Mr. Bright's suggestion and Mr. Cobden's proposal were not 
entertained by Lord Palmerston's government. 

The Free Traders 7 recommendations on the subject were 
supplemented by a considerable agitation for disarmament 
from a body of peace enthusiasts and Socialists. In the 'sixties, 
'seventies and 'eighties numerous resolutions in favor of a limi- 
tation of armaments or calling for a study of the problem were 
passed in Peace Society meetings and Congresses and proposed 
in national legislatures by pacifist members, Giuseppe Mazzini, 
the great Italian Liberal patriot, speaking at the Geneva Peace 
and Liberty Congress of 1867, expressed the opinion that the 
standing armies of all the states must simultaneously be dis- 
charged. He doubted, however, whether this could be accom- 
plished without revolution. 17 

The recognized leader of the disarmament movement in 
England during the period was Henry Richard, Liberal M. P. 
and Secretary of the London Peace Society, who used his posi- 
tion in Parliament to urge the British Government to study the 
problem. On the Continent a group of Liberals, Socialists 
and Social Democrats, including Dr. Virchow, Baron Pucker 
and Herr von Biihler in Germany; Dr. Sturm, Dr. Fischhof, 
Dr. Heilsberg and Herr Fux [also Fuchs] in Austria; 18 
Fr6d6ric Passy in France; the Marquis de Marcoartti in Spain; 
Professor Sbarbaro, Signor Ricciardi and E. T. Moncta in 
Italy, supported and encouraged the movement, 

The first socialist-pacifist resolution came from the French 
Peace Group In the Chambre des Dput& when, in 1867, the 
Minister of War proposed the creation of a "garde mobile,'* 
On the occasion M. Gamier-Pages, a Socialist, urged France 
to set the example of disarmament, and all the nations would 
imitate her. In support, M, Jules Favre added his conviction 

17 Amak$ dtt Gongrls de Guniwe, (Mr* w#*., 1867 (Oenivc, t86#) P* JU9* 

w Ham Wehberg, Dk Mermlwmk BexMnkun^ def Rftstunswtt p 104* 
et w0. 


that the most powerful nation ought to be the one the most 
ready for disarmament. 19 

In 1868 Bright visited several of the capitals of Europe, 
including Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Berlin, Munich, Vienna 
and Florence, in order to ascertain by communication with the 
members of the different representative assemblies, whether 
some concerted action for a reduction of armaments in the 
respective legislatures could not be promoted. His first visit 
bore fruit in Prussia where, early in 1869, Dr. Virchow moved 
a resolution in the Reichstag of the North German Confedera- 
tion requesting the Royal Government "to use all its influence 
with a view to reduce within the narrowest practical limits, 
the expenses of the military administration of the Northern 
Confederation, and to seek to bring about, by diplomatic nego- 
tiations, a general disarmament." 20 A lively debate followed 
this resolution before a division took place and, although Dr. 
Virchow did not succeed, he was sustained by no fewer than 
ninety-nine votes. 

A little later in the same year a similar motion was made in 
the Chamber of Saxony and carried. In Austria, Dr. Fischhof, 
a distinguished political writer, published some important 
articles on disarmament in the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna, 
which led to the matter being taken up there. But for the 
Franco-German War, which set all Europe to considering new 
means of destruction, further resolutions would probably have 
been put forward in other legislatures. 

The interruption in the disarmament movement caused by 
the war was only temporary, for after the conflict proposals 

w Georges Dubois, Des Charges de la paix armtie et de la limitation des 
armemcnts '(Caen, 1909), p, 80, citing "Assemble Nationale, Annexe an prods- 
verbal de la stance du a a dtembre 1872, no. i4i6D," 

fl Parliamentary Debates, loc* cfa. 9 col. 92, Henry Richard speaking on "The 

Reduction of European Armaments," June 15, x88<x Also Lewis Appleton, Fifty 
Years of Dimrm&ment (London, 1900), p, 3, Deputy G$tz had moved a similar 
motion in the Reichstag of the North German Union in 1867; (Krehbiel, 
Nationalism t War and Society, p, 315; Hana Wehtowg, op. dt t> p. 40 et $eq,) 


and resolutions for a limitation of armaments became par- 
ticularly numerous in the parliaments of Europe. In March, 
1875, Sir Wilfred Lawson, a Liberal, presented to the House 
of Commons a motion to reduce the British Army. His pro- 
posal was rejected by 244 votes to 61, but the occasion was 
valuable at least in having given the Peace body in Parliament 
an opportunity to express its views. Disarmament proposals 
were likewise submitted to the Austrian and German Lower 
Houses in the 'seventies. Ritter von Schmerling declared be- 
fore the Austrian Chamber in October, 1875, that the Dual 
Monarchy should "take the initiative in a general disarma- 
ment." This proposition was repeated by Herr Fux in the 
Austrian Parliament in February, 1876. Although because of 
the lateness of the session the motion was not discussed, it 
resulted in thirty-six members of both Chambers meeting in 
April to discuss disarmament and arbitration. A similar motion 
was also made in the Hungarian legislature. Moreover, nego- 
tiations were opened between certain German deputies, led 
by Baron Diicker and the Austrians under Herr Fux and Dr. 
Fiscbhof, for an International Conference on the Reduction 
of Armaments. 

Dr. Fischhof, in his treatise entitled Zur Rednktion der 
Kontinentalen Heere, published in 1875, proposed a propor- 
tional reduction of the peace effectiveness of the European 
countries. In the same year he propounded a scheme for an 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, his primary objective being to 
secure a gradual disarmament throughout Europe* The first 
meeting was actually planned for 1877, when the quota of 
reduction was to be discussed and agreed upon* Than arrange- 
ments were to have been made for the Introduction of a dis- 
armament resolution into each Parliament, Unfortunately f the 
Bulgarian atrocities and the outbreak of the RugftoTurki$h 
War checked temporarily the efforts of the pacifists* 

So far, the campaign for disarmament was not organised on 
the entire Peace front; but there was concerted activity in 1878 


with the assembling of the Paris Peace Congress, which was 
comparable to the famous one of 1849. Randal Cremer, a 
"Radical Liberal," in 1875, proposed that his Workmen's Peace 
Association should form a new International by means of a 
Conference in Paris. In the autumn of that year he took fifty 
British delegates across to inaugurate plans by conferring with 
French workingmen leaders under Auguste Desmoulins. This 
gathering, which passed resolutions in favor of arbitration and 
against "bloated armaments/' established a Workmen's Peace 
Committee in Paris for the purpose of preparing a Congress. 21 
In September, 1878, during the Exposition Universelle the 
Peace Congress assembled with representatives from the Lon- 
don Peace Society, La Soci&ti jrangaise des Amis de la Paix, 
la Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Libert&, the Universal 
Peace Union of Philadelphia, the Netherlands League of Peace, 
and the Rome and Milan Peace Societies. The Congress occu- 
pied itself with three categories of problems: (i) the best 
means of fostering peace, (2) the furthering of the serious con- 
sideration of arbitration by the governments, and (3) the codi- 
fication of international law. It made an international approach 
to the problem of large armaments by submitting the following 
resolutions on the subject of disarmament: 

No. 10. That an International Commission, composed of repre- 
sentatives of each nation, be appointed to secure a reduction of the 
armaments of each nation. 

No. n. That the Governments of civilized peoples should open as 
soon as possible negotiations to arrive at a proportional and simul- 
taneous disarmament in each country. 22 

The first European Parliament In which the question was 

raised after the Congress was the German Reichstag, where the 
Alsatian Deputy, Jean Dollfus, delivered a speech in con- 
demnation of the enormous military budgets, the withdrawal 

ai A. C, F, Beaks, The History of Peace (George Bell, New York, 
P> W- 

aa Lewis Appletcm, Eenty Rkhard (Landau, 1886), p, 173, 


of millions of men from labor, and especially of the murderous 
character of modern warfare. In March, Herr von Buhler 
followed up this appeal by proposing a resolution on the sub- 
ject. 23 His proposal was supported by only twelve members, 
but undaunted by his defeat, Herr von Buhler addressed to 
Prince Bismarck a letter enclosing the resolution in which he 
reminded the Prince of their meeting on the battlefield of 
Gravelotte, and of the determination made there to prevent a 
repetition of the horrors of war. To this communication 
Bismarck replied that Germany could take the responsibility 
for such projects only after having reconciled her neighbors 
to her views. Von Buhler re-submitted his motion in 1880, 
but it was again defeated. 

These protests in Germany against enormous armaments en- 
couraged Drs. Sturm, Fux and Fischhof in their activities in 
Austria, and Signor Ricciardi, Professor Sbarbaro and E. T. 
Moneta in Italy. On January 26, x88o, Herren Fux and Heils- 
berg presented a resolution to the Austrian Reichstag expressing 
the hope that "the united Imperial and Royal Government may 
take into consideration the plan of such a general proportionate, 
and simultaneous reduction of arms, as shall not alter the 
respective position of the states of Europe and that the Govern- 
ment will not withhold such efforts as may be necessary for the 
attainment of this object/' 24 This motion was supported by 
forty-nine members and, subsequently, the Austrian Minister 
for War declared that he regarded it as practical In Italy, on 
May n, 1879, a Peace Congress at Milan organized largely 
by four thousand delegates from Workingmen^s Associations, 
passed resolutions recommending disarmament and arbitra- 
tion. In October of the same year a Conference for promoting 

m Lewi* Applcton, Fifty Yews &f Disarmament, p, $ ; Lewis Appleton, fltnry 

Rkhard, p. 174; also Tke HerM of Peace md Arbitration (Organ of the liritWi 

Peace Society, published by the London Peace Society, Hereafter: Tk$ Iff raid 
of Peace), XV-XV1, p. 223, 

m Parliamentary Debates* Third series, CCLHI, col, oj, Henry Richard 
Ing Juno 15, 1880; Lewis Applcton, Menry Richard? p, x?6. 


general disarmament was held at Naples, and a Memorial on 
the subject was adopted and presented to the Italian Govern- 
ment. 25 

Meanwhile, in England, Henry Richard was preparing for 
the submission of a disarmament resolution to Parliament. He 
brought the question before the International Law Association 
at its conference in London in August, iSyp. 26 In October and 
November Mr. Richard addressed meetings at Warrington and 
Swansea on the subject of International Disarmament. He 
invoked the help of his countrymen in the arduous task he had 
undertaken, as he firmly believed that if the British Parliament 
adopted his resolution in favor of disarmament, other European 
legislatures would follow its example. In order to stimulate 
activity and arouse public attention throughout the country, 
petitions were circulated in favor of the forthcoming resolu- 
tion, a circular letter was issued to his supporters, and several 
conferences and public meetings were held, the most impor- 
tant of which was a demonstration in the St. George's Hall, 
Liverpool. On June is 27 Mr. Richard brought forward his 
resolution in the House of Commons praying Her Majesty's 
Government "to enter into communication with other Powers, 
with a view to bring about a mutual and simultaneous reduc- 
tion of European Armaments.' 7 28 In a form amended by Mr. 
Bright this proposition passed unanimously. The speaker used 
the occasion to stress the crushing burden of armaments and 
to review various disarmament proposals. 

Other resolutions were proposed on the Continent. In the 
summer of 1883, a motion was introduced in the Riksdag at 
Stockholm urging the neutralization and disarmament of 

M The Herald of Peace, XV-XVI, 268. 

30 Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, Report 
of the Seventh Annual Conference Held at the Guildhall, London, xi-itf August, 
x8?g (London, 1880), pp, 334-45* 

87 By that date noo petitions in its favor totaling 85*000 signatures had been 
sent to the Prime Minister. 

m Parliamentary Debates, Third series, CCLIII (January 15, 1880) , coi So. 


Sweden as an example to the world. It failed by a surprisingly 
large minority of 70 to ii2. 29 M. Frederic Passy, the leader of 
the peace movement in France, brought the subject before his 
Government when, in 1887, he made a plea in the Chambre des 
Deputes for arbitration and the limitation of armaments. 30 
At the same time a colleague, M. Antide Boyer, proposed a 
meeting of an international conference where the delegates of 
the powers could discuss the question of a limitation of arma- 
ments and search for a means of arriving at an understanding/ 11 
In addition to these pacifist proposals in national legisla- 
tures, an International Conference, convoked by the Interna- 
tional Arbitration and Peace Association of Great Britain and 
Ireland, was lield in Brussels in October, 1882. Its object was 
to arouse and direct a movement of public opinion in favor of 
the abolition of war, the establishment of codes of laws and 
international tribunals, the adoption of international treaties 
on all questions, and the lightening of the burden of armaments. 
The Conference examined the problem of international disarm- 
ament, and Mr. Hodgson Pratt, the founder of the International 
Arbitration and Peace Association, sponsored a resolution to 
the effect that "the Governments of civilized peoples ought to 
open as soon as possible some negotiations in order to arrive 
at a proportional and simultaneous disarmament in each 
country." 82 This proposition was considered inopportune, 
premature and platomc, M. Godin argued that it could lead to 
no result because public opinion and the Governments were 
not prepared for it. "We have not clone anything," he said. 
"We cannot reasonably decide what the Governments* ought to 
do when we do not know what we can do," ** In consequence 
of this view, Hodgson Pratt withdrew his resolution* 

m A, C F, Bcaka, op. cit., p. x8a. 

ao Georges Dubois, Limitation des armements (Caen, 1909), pp. 114-5, citing 
Documents parlementaires de la Chambre t 1887, No, 1416* 

M Prods Verbal de la Conference Internationale, tenm & Bruxttt**, 15% if, 

e,t ao octobw, x88* (Bruxcllea, 1882), p. 69* 


Although public opinion on the subject had not yet crystal- 
lized, there was, throughout the 'eighties, an inchoate move- 
ment for peace, arbitration and a limitation of armaments. 
Numerous pamphlets were distributed by organizations inter- 
ested in peace. The Times, the Daily News, the Daily Tele- 
graph, the Leeds Mercury, the Figaro, the New York Times, 
the New York Herald, the Neue Freie Presse and many other 
newspapers published articles and leaders on disarmament. 

As Mr. Gladstone's financial policy while Chancellor of the 
Exchequer brought him into touch with the Manchester School 
of Free Traders and laid the strong foundation of Liberalism 
in England, so later when he was Prime Minister, his measure 
for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church welded that 
remarkable alliance between him and the Nonconformists 
which lasted until the end of his life. The "Dissenting Inter- 
ests," composed of the Baptists, Congregationalists, a section 
of the Presbyterians, some of the smaller Methodist communi- 
ties and the Wesleyans, slowly but ultimately placed their con- 
fidence in Gladstone. The Nonconformists had early admired 
his financial policy, but not until the agitation prior to the 
election of 1868 did they take an active part in his support. 
Disestablishment drew all Dissenters to Gladstone, yet, on the- 
ological and ecclesiastical questions he and they stood at oppo- 
site poles. 34 

The British Liberal Party of the past century proved flexible 
and adaptable enough to incorporate and retain all those ele- 
ments which stood for peace, economy and reform in all their 
aspects political, economic, social and religious* Many of the 
Liberal Party leaders and organizers were the officers, the min- 
isters and lay preachers of the Free Churches, the hereditary 
enemies of the Church of England and consequently of the 
Tory Party, Among these were the Reverend Hugh Price 
Hughes, the most active of the Wesleyans; the Reverend Rob- 

84 J, Guineas -Rogers, "Mr, Gladstone and the Nonconformists," The Nine* 
ieenih Centufy> XLIV (July, 1898), 36. 


ert Forman Horton and the Reverend J. Guiness Rogers, Con- 
gregationalists; the Reverend Silvester Horne and the Reverend 
Dr. Clifford, Baptists. Not they alone, but a large majority 
of the Dissenting Ministers remained true to the traditional 
policy of peace handed down from Cobden, Bright and Glad- 
stone. By 1894 their support was being eagerly sought by 
Lord Rosebery, the Liberal Prime Minister. As the Free 
Traders advocated a limitation of armament expenditure as 
part of their program of peace and retrenchment, it was the 
heterogeneous Liberal Party, and primarily the Nonconformists 
within it, who furnished the impetus for the disarmament 
movement in England during the decade 1888-98. The agita- 
tion did not involve the entire Party it was strongest among 
the rank and file who, however, received sympathy from the 
Party leaders. But when the Liberals were in power, they did 
not succeed in reducing the outlay on armaments- Although 
the Party stood for peace and economy and a limitation of 
armament expenditure was cpnsidered the best means of reduc- 
ing expenses disarmament was not a plank in the Liberal 

Throughout this period, as in previous years, numerous ques- 
tions concerning armaments were asked and several resolutions 
proposing a limitation or the convening of a conference to 
study the problem were introduced in the European parlia- 
ments. At the same time, a number of Liberal authors, editors 
and journalists furthered the agitation, but the discussion of 
the problem was more wide-spread and the campaign for a 
limitation was better organized in Great Britain than in any 
other country. 

On May 30, 1889, Mr, A. IlKngworth, Liberal M,P, for 
Bradford^ questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr, 
W. H, Smith, if Her Majesty's Government had "recently made 
any proposals to the Governments of the Continental 
to bring about a material and prompt reduction of warlike arma 


ments, and with what result"; and, if not, whether they would 
without loss of time enter into such negotiations, with a view 
to lessening the burden of military expenditure and the dangers 
which threatened the peace of Europe? In reply, the First 
Lord of the Treasury said that if any favorable opportunity 
presented itself, Her Majesty's Government would be most glad 
to avail themselves of it to use their influence in the direction 
referred to, but to interfere in matters of that kind was fre- 
quently to defeat rather than forward the object desired. He 
assured Mr. Illingworth that Her Majesty's Government were 
as deeply sensible as he and had often expressed the view in 
the House that the state of armaments was a great misfortune 
to Europe and a danger to the peace of the world. 35 

In 1894, the Liberal agitation in England for a limitation of 
armaments reached its climax and on several occasions during 
the year, the question was brought forward by the Peace Group 
in the House of Commons. On January n, Mr. Byles asked 
Mr. Gladstone whether, "before embarking in new and costly 
expenditure, the Government could see its way to open com- 
munications with other European Powers with a view to a 
policy of mutual disarmament?" 80 The First Lord of the 
Treasury informed Mr. Byles that Lord Clarendon, some time 
before (1870), had made an attempt at progress in that direc- 
tion but had failed. Gladstone was "not of opinion" that the 
moment was "one at which any such representation could be 
advantageously made." 87 Thus the subject was dropped. In 
fact, Gladstone throughout his career never favored the British 
Government's taking the initiative in any general limitation of 
armaments. As early as June, 1870, he expressed his belief 
"that if you could gather the Plenipotentiaries of Europe round 
a table to hear a discussion on disarmament, their meeting 

m Parliamentary Debates, Third series, CCCXXXVI (May 30, 1899), col 


#,, Fourth series, XX (January n, 1894), cols, 1347-48, 


would end in no positive and substantial result, and that the 
only way in which a measure of disarmament can be initiated 
is in detail." 3S 

Only two months later, March 16, 1894, when speaking in 
the House, Sir James Carmichael, a Liberal, asked the Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government 
would "consider the possibility of coming to an international 
understanding, either by a Conference or otherwise, as to the 
relative strength at which the armaments of the respective na- 
tions should be maintained." 39 Sir Edward Grey answered 
that "Her Majesty's Government would be quite ready to sup- 
port any practical proposal for arriving at such an under- 
standing," but they feared that an invitation on their part would 
have no useful result. 40 On the 3oth of the same month, another 
Liberal, Sir J. Whitehead, asked the Chancellor of the Ex- 
chequer whether, "looking to the reported expressions of the 
King of Denmark to the effect that he knows that Russia, 
Austria, and probably Italy, are willing to enter into negotia- 
tions with other nations for a general reduction of armaments, 
the Government are now prepared to take a step with the 
object of bringing about a Conference on the subject." 4l Sir 
William Harcourt replied that he could not answer for reported 
statements by the King of Denmark, but he would only repeat 
that the Government would take every opportunity which ap- 
peared to them favorable to promote the object indicated in the 
question. He considered it not possible at that time to make 
any further statement on the subject, 42 

In addition to these several questions concerning a limita- 
tion of armaments which were asked in the House in the early 
months of 1894, plans were made for introducing a motion on 
the subject. On April 16, Sir Joseph Pease, a Liberal MJ% a 

**Xbid., Third series, CCL11I (June 16, 1880), col 104. 

,, XXII (March 16, 1894). col 436, 

41 Ibid (March 30! 1894), cot 1008* 

oJ. 1009, 


member of the Society of Friends and President of the Peace 
Society, gave notice that on the earliest possible day he would 
move "that a humble address be presented to Her Majesty, 
praying that she may be graciously pleased to communicate 
with the Powers of Europe with the view of ascertaining how 
far they are prepared to consent to representatives being sent 
to a Conference of European Powers for the purpose of con- 
sidering the International Reduction of Armaments.' 7 43 In 
consequence of the pressure of business for the remainder of 
the session, this motion was not brought forward. 

The press references in the early months of 1894 to Emperor 
William's interest in a limitation of armaments led Mr. Byles, 
on April 20, to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs whether he had observed the statement in the public 
press that the German Emperor had submitted a scheme of 
disarmament to the King of Italy, the Emperor of Austria and 
the Tsar of Russia, and proposed a conference of the powers; 
whether any communications of that nature had reached the 
Foreign Office; and whether any such suggestions, if they 
should be addressed to this country, would be favorably enter- 
tained by Her Majesty's Government? 44 Sir Edward Grey 
answered that he had seen some statements in the press, but 
no communications on the subject had reached the Foreign 
Office. He assured Mr. Byles that the Government would give 
their best consideration to any practical proposals that should 
be made, 

By the spring of 1894, the English peace advocates were 
convinced that there were numerous indications of the growth 
of a current of public opinion on the question of a limitation of 
armaments and that it only needed the proper touch to make 
it crystallize. On May 9, M, Jules Simon, in a letter to W. T. 
Stead endorsing the suggestion of the National Memorial, said 
that he had not the least doubt but that France would be dis- 

48 The Gerald of Pme> May x, 1894* P< 62, 

Debates* Fourth series, XXIII (April ao, 1894)) col 980, 


posed to enter into an international agreement having for its 
end the arrest of any increase of military or naval expenditure 
until ipoo. 45 Moreover, the Times correspondent in Paris had 
written that he believed if any one power would begin by sug- 
gesting a European Conference to discuss the question of dis- 
armament, or reducing the forces, France, Germany, Italy and 
Russia would be glad to participate. Since all Europe was 
professing ardent devotion to the cause of peace, the pacifists 
thought that Great Britain should take the lead and give the 
European powers a chance of proving that they were in earnest. 
If any one state, or several of them, chose to meet her with a 
rebuff, as the Government said it feared might happen, then 
the world would know where to place the responsibility. In 
consequence of this general feeling, Mr, Byles, in addressing 
the Annual Meeting of the Peace Society on May 22, 1894, 
thought appropriate to move a resolution to the effect that: 

This Meeting regards with deep interest the recent numerous indi- 
cations of a marked change in the public opinion of Europe, with 
regard to the burden and perils of vast armaments; and it urges upon 
Her Majesty's Government the pressing expediency of inviting other 
Governments to consider the practicability of adopting sonic imme- 
diate and effective means of checking the growth of these burdens, 
and of reducing those armaments which are a danger to Peace and 
carry with them many of the evils of actual war. 46 

The British pacifist agitation for a limitation of armaments 
led to a similar action in the Continental parliaments* Oft 
June 28, 1890, during the military debate in the German 
Reichstag, a member of the Center^ Hcrr Reichenberger, ex- 
pressed the wish that Germany should set in motion a general 
disarmament. Although he approved the Government Bill for 
adding i8 3 ooo men to the peace footing of the army, he wished 
to say that as the Emperor's decision In summoning a confer- 

4& Tk Revkw of Reviews, VXII, a4* The NerdU of Pwe t July a, 1*94, 
p. 84* 

**The Herald of Peace, June i, 1894* p. 78. Annual Report of the 



ence of worklngmen from all parts of Europe had been greeted 
with applause, so would the civilized world with even greater 
enthusiasm greet the tidings that William II had advocated a 
general disarmament. 47 In a debate in the Reichstag on Feb- 
ruary 28, 1890, Dr. Earth, a Social Democrat, introduced the 
subject of the desirability of establishing a permanent tribunal 
of international arbitration. Herr Bebel, the leader of the 
Social Democrats, took the opportunity to urge a general union 
in favor of arbitration, as tending to afford some relief from 
the existing intolerable burden of armaments which, he said, 
was crushing Europe as under the weight of piled-up Alps. His 
proposition was not favorably entertained. 48 

Mr. Byles's motion of January n, 1894, in the House of 
Commons, inspired two Belgian deputies, MM. de Brocque- 
ville and de Ramaix, to* express in the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives the wish that their country associate itself with 
all the manifestations made in favor of disarmament, arbitra- 
tion and peace. 49 On the 2oth of the same month, M. Janssens, 
one of the Chiefs of the Roman Catholic Party in Belgium, 
again brought the question before the Chamber, when he ex- 
pressed the opinion that the Powers, in order to bring about 
a general disarmament, should appoint the Pope as arbitrator 
of all their differences. 50 

On November 10, 1894, during the debates in the Austrian 
Lower House on the increase of the army, Herr Scheicher, a 
Social Democrat, invited the Austrian Government to approach 
other governments friendly to the idea of disarmament and 
the creation of an international arbitral tribunal. The Minister 

47 K. P. Arnoldson, Pax Mundi: Progress of the Movement for Peace by 
Means of Arbitration, Neutralisation, International Law, and Disarmament 
(London, ,1909) , p, 86, 

48 Archives diplomatiques, xSoo t detixi&me $$ne (Paris, 1890), Nos, 4-5, p. 
ao6; The Serald of Peace, April, 1893, p, 214. 

40 Revm gMrale de droit international public, I, 1894, 161, citing Les Annales 
parlementaires de la Belgiqm, Chambre des repr^sentants, stance du 20 f6vrier 
1894, p, 638, 


of Defense replied that the colossal armaments of Europe were 
an evil of the time against which Austria could take no initia- 
tive. "It is certainly not Austria," he said, "who is at the head 
of the movement of armaments <a outrance/ and she would 
only be delighted to see the end of the enormous charges which 
they impose upon her." 51 After some discussion the Chamber 
voted the total of the contingent asked for by the government. 

Finally, on December 19, 1896, a group of French Socialists 
led by M. Dejeante, proposed that the Chamber invite "the 
Government of the French Republic to summon a conference 
of all nations in order to proceed to a general, progressive, 
organized disarmament, in such a manner that up to its com- 
pletion the general forces of the nations will remain the 
same. 77 52 M, Dejeante solicited a vote of urgency in favor of 
his resolution and asked that it should be sent to a special 
committee for study, since he was certain that a discussion in 
the Chamber would be suspended. M. Gauthier (de Clagny) , 
a member of the Right, raised objections to the proposition and 
expressed the opinion that it should be rejected outright. He 
drew attention to the fact that on the French frontiers there 
were three powerful, armed states which were a menace to the 
independence of the country. It was Utopian to believe that 
they would disarm. When the declaration of urgency was put 
to a vote it was rejected by 490 votes to 35,^ 

These questions asked and resolutions introduced in the 
European Parliaments during the decade 1888-98 occupied 
an infinitesimal amount of time as compared with the treat- 
ment of other subjects. They were propositions brought for- 
ward by individual members or small pacifist groups working 
separately, rather than in conjunction with members of other 

81 Le TempS) November 12, 1894, p. i col a. 

ca Annales de la Chamhre des Diput&s, Dthats ParttamtntttireSt Stwltm 
extraordinaire, 19 dtembre, 1896, p* 1300, This resolution wan signed by MM, 
Dejeante, Groussicr, Sembat, Contant, Toussant, Renou* Vaillant, Faberot, 
Walter and Bonard. 



parliaments. There was no simultaneous international approach 
to the problem, and these isolated efforts were therefore doomed 
to failure. 

During the decade 1888-98, however, the question of dis- 
armament claimed more attention from Liberal writers and 
the press than at any previous time in history. The most out- 
standing woman pacifist of the period, Baroness Bertha von 
Suttner, made a tremendous literary effort for the cause of 
disarmament. Simultaneously with the unification of the peace 
movement through the organization of the Universal Peace 
Congresses and the Inter-Parliamentary Union appeared her 
Die Waff en Nieder (Lay Down Your Arms'), 54 perhaps the 
greatest peace novel of all times. The book took the world by 
storm and was soon available in many languages and hundreds 
of editions. W. T. Stead reprinted it in English in 1896 for a 
penny. The novel brought its author world-wide renown, for 
it shares with Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress and Swift's 
Gulliver's Travels the distinction of having been translated 
into almost every known tongue. 

Die Waffen Nieder was written as an autobiography of 
Martha von Tilling, a young woman whose fate was closely 
involved in the wars fought during the 'fifties, 'sixties and 
'seventies. Bertha von Suttner hoped to build up a healthy 
public opinion against war by depicting the horrors and suf- 
ferings that had attended the great conflicts of her day. This 
she thought she could do more successfully through an emo- 
tional novel than a formal treatise* The great literary value 
of her book consists in the vivid description of the battle scenes, 
based on accurate historical research. A. C. F. Beales, in his 
History of Peace, writes of the novel: ^Psychologically the 
book was the most trenchant propaganda that Peace had ever 
had, for its appeal was at once ethical, rational, emotional, and 
universal Though its critics scoffed at the author as 'Peace 
Bertha/ and at the book itself as 'emotional silliness/ 'obtrusive 

84 Die Waffen Nieder wa$ first published in Prussia in 1889, 


inartistic didacticism/ and 'feminist sentimental pacifism/ there 
remains its circulation to testify to its world-wide popularity and 
its overwhelming success. Few books have a more enduring 
record as both propaganda and literature." 55 

After the appearance of her novel; Baroness von Suttner was 
sought out by Secretaries of Peace Societies and Arbitration 
Leagues, and for the rest of her life she worked untiringly for 
world peace. She inspired the creation of both an Austrian 
Parliamentary Peace Group and Peace Society. In a periodical 
of her own, Die Waffen Nieder, named for her book, and in 
the Vienna Neue Freie Presse, she appealed for recruits for 
an Austrian Inter-Parliamentary Group, which she proposed 
to found. Simultaneously she planned a society to popularize 
the cause of peace. This materialized in October, 1892, when 
the Oesterreichische Friedensgesettschaft was organized with a 
membership of 2000. Her warmest friend in the movement, 
Alfred Fried, took over the publication of the periodical Die 
Waffen Nieder. This peace enterprise flourished from the start, 
and after 1892 it was largely financed by Alfred Nobel. In 
1893 Bertha von Suttner founded a sister peace society at 
Budapest with the novelist Maurus Jokai among its noo mem- 
bers. 66 After 1890 the Baroness attended every Universal Peace 
Congress until her death, as well as several Inter-Parliamentary 
reunions and the First Hague Conference. In 1905 she was 
the recipient of the Nobel Peace Award. 

Through the instrumentality of Baroness von Suttner, Alfred 
Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, became devotee! to the peace 
movement, and at her suggestion became its promoter. 07 Nobel, 
from the beginning of his conversion, was aware that the 
peace movement needed not money but a program. To demand 
disarmament, he thought, was almost to make one's self ridicu- 
lous without profiting any one. To succeed one ought to be 

80 A. C. F. Beaks, op. c*t, t pp. 201-2, 

**lbidp. a 10. 

87 Bertha vo*i Suttner, Memoir^ II, 374. 


content with modest beginnings. He was of opinion that gov- 
ernments would not refuse to take into consideration for a 
two- or even a one-year period a modest proposition to refer to 
a tribunal formed for the purpose any differences arising be- 
tween them; or, if they should refuse to take this step, to 
defer every act of hostility until the expiration of the stipulated 
period. This would be apparently little, but by being content 
with little we arrive at great results, and the most blustering 
minister would tell himself that it is not worthwhile to break 
by force a convention of such duration. At the expiration of 
the period all the states would make haste to renew their peace 
compact for another year. Thus, without a shock and almost 
without realizing the fact, they would come to a period of pro- 
longed peace. Then only would there be any use to think of 
proceeding little by little to disarmament. 58 

Alfred Nobel believed that scientific progress and technical 
discoveries were destined to regenerate mankind. Once in 
expressing his views on armaments to Bertha von Suttner he 
said: "Perhaps my factories will put an end to war even sooner 
than your Congresses; on the day when two army corps 
may mutually annihilate each other in a second, probably 
all civilized nations will recoil with horror and disband their 
troops." 59 

Nobel died December 10, 1896, and established by his will 
a fund for annual awards to five different categories of people 
who should make contributions to "the good of humanity." 
The fifth prize goes "to that man or woman who shall have 
worked most effectively for the fraternization of mankind, 
the diminution of armies, and the promotion of Peace Con- 
gresses." 00 

The amount of space devoted by the Liberal and moderate 
press during the period 1888-98 to a limitation of armaments 
was insignificant compared with the interest lavished on arma- 
ments, soldiers and militarism* None the less, for the first time 

" Md., I, 3S7-S, w JW,, p, 437- w /W* II, 143, 


in history the dally newspapers and periodicals published 
articles written by their leading correspondents and contribu- 
tors on the subject of disarmament which would have been an 
object of derision a few years before. Audiences with kings, 
rumors of emperors 7 intentions of tackling the problem, 
speeches by prime ministers, resolutions proposed in parlia- 
ments were reported in the press. Articles appeared in the 
London Times, the Daily News, the Daily Telegraph, the 
Standard, Le Temps, Le Figaro, Le Soir f the Spectator, the 
Contemporary Review, McClure's Magazine and the Review 
of Reviews. M. de Blowitz, the Paris correspondent of the 
Times, and W. T. Stead, the Editor of the Review of Reviews, 
rendered a great service to the cause by their numerous re- 
marks favoring peace and disarmament. 

On January 20, 1894, M. de Blowitz made his first reference 
to the problem of armaments by reviewing the effects which 
Mr. Byles's question in the House of Commons C1 had pro- 
duced on the Continent. The mania of armaments was an epi- 
demic of which all, without publicly admitting it, would bo 
gladly cured. Leading statesmen, and even sovereigns, he said, 
were reflecting on it. Some were thinking of remedying the 
state of things by disarmament, but in a way offering^the advan- 
tages of disarmament without its affecting the principles on 
which armaments were being increased. The idea was the 
adoption of twelve months' service obligatory for all. He was 
aware that technical difficulties would be raised which, how- 
ever, could be overcome. Blowitz concluded: 

Universal service has been considered compatible only with a reduc- 
tion of the seven or five years to three thus materially lessening the 
expense. After years of experience it is now seen that three years* 
service is also incompatible with universal service. Nothing therefore 
is more logical, humane, and conformable with economic exigencies 
than to reduce by two-thirds, burdens which are getting intolerable, 
and from which before long the only way of escape will be the utilising 

01 January xx* 


of the engines of destruction accumulating for years, so that war will 
have to be made for its own sake, and it will be better to perish in 
action than in peace. 62 

Only ten days later, on January 30, Mr. William Tallack 
wrote a letter to the Times?* pointing out two methods by 
which the burden of European armaments might be lessened. 
The first was by a proportionate but considerable disarma- 
ment brought about by reviving the medieval principle of the 
"Truce of God." If the Great Powers would solemnly bind 
themselves in the event of war to allow from three to six 
months or more of guaranteed truce before entering on hostili- 
ties, this would give time for re-assembling forces, and would 
also intensify the motives for one more attempt at reconcilia- 
tion or arbitration. Without some such truce he did not see 
how disarmament on any large scale was practicable. Secondly, 
Mr. Tallack suggested that the governments take some prac- 
tical steps towards the realization of Sir Edmund Hornby's 
proposal for a permanent High Court of International Arbitra- 
tion. An international tribunal, composed of arbitrators ren- 
dered independent of any government by means of handsome 
salaries and pensions, and by a guaranteed position of exalted 
rank and honor, would eliminate the imperfections of ad hoc 
tribunals. After the establishment of such a court a large 
extension of general disarmament might follow. 

The idea of a "Truce of God" in a more expanded form was 
also recommended by the Spectator as a means of limiting arma- 
ments. The March 31, 1894, issue pointed to rumors that the 
great powers were secretly discussing the possibility of some 
arrangements that would secure an enduring peace, and it 
stated: "We believe that at this moment if any one Sovereign 
proposed any reasonable scheme for postponing the Great 
War for a definite term of years, or for reducing the expense 
of armaments by one third, the others would study it care- 

63 The Times, January 20, 1894, p. 5, col 3. 

, January 30, 1894, p. 3, col, 6. 


fully, and with a wish that it might be possible to accept 

it." 64 

The Spectator advocated a scheme under which the desired 
results could be attained. This was a treaty openly declaring 
a truce for ten years, and withdrawing all but necessary troops 
two hundred miles from the frontier of each state. Such a truce 
would involve no interference with the internal government 
of any country, and it would permit in each very considerable 
reductions, especially on the outlay for rapid mobilization. For 
nine years, if the nations respected the treaty, this special 
expenditure would not be needed. Although a ten year period 
would not be sufficient for Europe's internal industrial develop- 
ment, for her canalization and the extension of her railway 
system, a twenty years' truce would not be accepted by the 
governments, nor did the Spectator deem it expedient to antici- 
pate the future for so long a time. No one could foresee what 
conditions would prevail in 1915, and if circumstances changed 
violently the respect felt for treaties would change with them. 

The second clause of the treaty decreeing a "Truce of God" 
for ten years would limit the term of services in each European 
army. There would be technical difficulties, but once a treaty 
was made and the sovereigns pledged, the experts would be 
able to work out the details. The Military Staffs of Germany 
and France were already considering it possible to make up by 
intensity of teaching for reduction of time, thus rendering 
fifteen months with the colors a sufficient period of instruction. 
The Spectator was certain that, although Continental kings and 
statesmen were concerned with the problem of armaments, 
nothing would be accomplished except by the most definite 

Following the same line of agitation, M. Jules Simon, a 
French philosopher, historian and statesman, in the May num- 
ber of the Contemporary Review, advocated the reduction of 

64 The Spectator, LXXI (March 31, 1894), 426. 

"The Contemporary JReview was tfaen edited by Mr, Pcy Bunting, A 


the three years' service to one, and the acceptance of a "Truce 
of God 7 ' to last from then until the Exhibition with which the 
twentieth century was to open. 66 He asserted that Italy, Austria 
and Germany, who were supposed to be allied for war, were 
really bent upon peace; at the same time France and Russia 
also aimed at insuring tranquillity. Still, in Europe, where 
everyone "from the monarch to the mendicant" was in love 
with peace, he found nothing but war, for, during the last quar- 
ter of the century the armed peace had, in reality, been war. 

M. Simon described the demoralizing effects of three years' 
service on the youth of France, and what he said also applied 
to Russia and the nations of the Triple Alliance. While, on 
the economic side, one half of the revenue of the State was 
used for military purposes, bankruptcy was ahead for the 
European nations, and the end, he said, must come either by a 
war of extermination, in which humanity would be set back 
six generations, or by disarmament. The French statesman 
recommended the convening of an international conference to 
decide on the reduction of the term of service everywhere from 
three years to one. In, reply to the military argument that it 
would be impossible to produce expert soldiers in twelve 
months, M. Simon pointed out that, if the rule were made uni- 
versal, all would be equally inefficient. For the infantry the 
objection was obviously meaningless, but he would make excep- 
tions for the cavalry, the artillery and the engineers. 

M. Jules Simon's suggestion of a a Truce of God" was in 
harmony with the National Memorial proposal initiated in Eng- 
land in May, i894. 07 In that month's issue of the Review* of 
Reviews, W* T, Stead asked why the powers should not agree 
to regard their military budgets as a maximum beyond which 

Contemporary Review, Vol. LXV, No, 341 (May, 1894), pp. 609-15, 
At the dose of 1893 Don Arturo da Marcoartu, a Spanish Senator, wrote to 
M, Jules Simon, then In the French Senate, asking him if it would not be pos- 
sible to obtain a truce up to and after the Universal Exposition of 1900. Simon 
expressed his opinion of a Truce of -God in Le Figaro; "Three hours of Con- 
ference and a leaf of parchment would suffice to give it to us." (Z<j Conference 
InterparUmeniawe, January i 1894, pp. 
67 Infr& f Chapter V* pp* 104*08, 


they would not go. All other questions were insignificant com- 
pared with the problem of checking the automatic growth of 
the cost of the European armies and navies. He considered the 
whole social question bound up with it. "Were it possible/' 
Stead wrote, "for the Great Powers not merely to agree to 
arrest the growth of their military and naval expenditure, but 
to reduce it all round, say by ten or twenty per cent., there 
would be liberated a fund available for the purposes of social 
improvement which would in the course of a few years trans- 
form the whole social position." 68 

In June the Contemporary Review published an anonymous 
article entitled "Halt." The author, generally considered to be 
W. T. Stead, wrote: "Europe is waiting for one word. It is in 
the air. It is being muttered everywhere. But as yet the word 
is not spoken. That word is, 'Halt!' J? Since by a process of 
continual experiment the European powers had that year ar- 
rived at the highest expenditure ever made, and since it was 
reasonable to suppose that after so many years they had suc- 
ceeded in establishing to their own satisfaction what amount 
of armor they could afford to carry, he entreated them to agree 
to regard the War Budgets of 1894 as the high-water mark of 
military and naval expenditure for the closing years of the 
century. 69 The question of the hour was not disarmament, "it 
was simply an arrest, temporary, and positive, peremptory, and 
universal, of all fresh armaments." After checking the down- 
ward plunge the second step might be taken. 

Close upon Mr. Stead's plea for a halt in armaments came 
another message from M. de Blowitz on "The Peace of 
Europe/' published in McClure*$ Magazine for June, 1894. 
The writer maintained that it was the duty of the nations to 
reduce the term of service from three years to one and a quar- 
ter, and Insisted that only by adopting the shorter term could 

CB The Review of Review, IX (May, 1894), 
"The Contemporary Review t Vol LXV No-. 341 (June, TBM), 763-64; 
also The Review of Reviews, IX (June, 1894), 580, 


peace be preserved. "It is impossible to keep under the flag 
during three years the entire able-bodied population of a 
country. It is impossible to paralyse during this time all its 
capable hands, all its brains, all its productive forces. It is 
impossible to cast every year into the same gulf milliards after 
milliards. For I maintain that if they persist in this course, 
the nations groaning in time of peace under the burdens of the 
war budget will one day say to themselves, 'All this must have 
an end,' Whereupon this or that nation, and it may be the 
smallest, will in a moment of exasperation, unmuzzle its cannon, 
and, before we have had time to ask whence comes the boom- 
ing of the guns, all Europe will be in a blaze and be strewn 
with ruins." 70 

By reducing the effective service from three years to one 
year and a quarter, there would be two contingents under the 
flag during a quarter of the year, and the old contingent would 
be able to instruct the new. After a year and a quarter of 
service the older contingent would return home while the con- 
tingent trained by them would in turn be able to instruct the 
newest. If this principle were introduced, he argued, it would 
immediately effect a reduction in the war budgets of at least 
35 per cent* At the same time millions of young men would 
be restored to civil pursuits after only fifteen months' interrup- 
tion in their normal lives instead of three years, thus saving 
two years and nine months spent in the barracks. 71 

After quoting pacific statements of the Pope, the Tsar, the 
Emperor Francis Joseph, the German Emperor, the King of 
Denmark and Prince Bismarck, M. Blowitz added that he 
believed it to be absolutely true that France, without giving 
up any of her hopes, would put no obstacles in the way of 
pacific solutions, nor handicap any measure of peace upon 
which Europe might agree. He was of opinion that Great 
Britain and the United States could best take the initiative in 

70 MeClnre's Marine, 111 (June, 1894), 65, 

71 loc. cto. 


appealing to the other governments to study the idea of a 
reduction of the military expenses in time of peace. 

Simultaneously with this press agitation, the Churches and 
Arbitration Alliance Memorial, and the National Memorial, all 
in the spring and early summer of 1894, the British and For- 
eign Arbitration Association, founded by Hodgson Pratt, raised 
a protest against ever-increasing armaments in the following 
Memorial addressed to the British Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs: 

That in the opinion of this Association the increasing armaments 
of France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy, have now arrived at 
such a point that unless disarmament, simultaneous and propor- 
tionate, takes place, the only escape from the self-imposed and grind- 
ing tyranny of the burdens laid upon the people, by the present 
frightful taxation, will be war with all its horrible consequences. 

This Association protests in the name of humanity against the 
means taken to prevent war, which now in reality fosters and pro- 
motes war; while in the name of "Liberty" all freedom is destroyed; 
in the name of "Equality" one man is made very rich and another 
very poor; and in the name of "Fraternity" every man is armed 
against his brother. 72 

Another proposal for lessening the burdens of militarism 
came from an American in December, 1895. Mr. N. S, Shaler, 

in an article entitled "The Last Gift of the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury" published in the North American Review suggested 
that the United States invite the great powers to appoint an 
international commission of peace for the purpose of avoiding 
the dangers of war. Three delegates from each first-class power 
would meet in Washington in January, 1897. The Conference 
might advise the institution of a permanent international peace 
commission, composed of delegates from the several national 
authorities, which should hold annual sessions and which could 
be called together whenever it became evident that there was 
danger of a warlike contest between any of the contracting 
7a Lewis Appleton, Fifty Years of Disarmament, p. 5. 


parties. This permanent commission would have no actual 
powers except those of mediation preceding or during a con- 
flict, and of making suggestions concerning the reduction of 
standing armies and navies. It might agree to make recom- 
mendations for the progressive disarmament at some definite 
and proportional rate, or for the replacement of standing armies 
by an organized militia, say of the Swiss type. 73 This commis- 
sion might submit its proposals to the legislatures in charge of 
the budgets, but there would be no guarantee that the govern- 
ments would approve the propositions recommended to them. 

Finally, on March 13, 1896, an "Increased Armaments Pro- 
test Committee" of British Liberal pacifists was formed "for 
purposes of agitation and education by literature and lectures 
as an antidote to the jingo and sham-patriotic sentiment pre- 
vailing." Dr. Spence Watson, M.P. and President of the 
National Liberal Federation (1890-1902), and A. H. Ferris, 
M.P., headed the Committee. In the following April, the Com- 
mittee of the British Peace Society issued a further protest 
against the enormous expenditure, actual and prospective, upon 
the navy. 74 

In the last decade of the nineteenth century efforts were 
made to enlist the support of labor in the movement for a limi- 
tation of armaments. Early in 1890 a Committee of the British 
Peace Society addressed a Memorial to the International Con- 
ference on the Labor Question, inviting the consideration of 
the injurious influences of the great armaments of Europe upon 
the working classes in particular, and suggesting the special 
relief to those classes which would be secured by a mutual 
disarmament. Mr. W, Evans Darby, the Secretary of the 
Society, journeyed to Berlin in order personally to promote a 
favorable reception of this Memorial and to interest influential 
persons in Germany in peace and arbitration. 75 

* 3 The North American Review, CLXI (December, 1895), 678-79, 
174 The Bvrdd of Peace, XXV (Apr0, 1896), 41. 
. (April, 1890), p. . 


Most of the European Socialist and working class congresses 
during the period 1888-98 passed resolutions moving the aboli- 
tion of standing armies. American labor had already placed 
itself on record as favoring a limitation of armaments. At the 
conventions of the labor organizations in the United States held 
in 1846, 1850 and 1868, protests were made against foreign 
wars, and resolutions were passed demanding disarmament in 
foreign countries, so that republican institutions might develop 
and great problems might be solved peacefully. 70 In the early 
months of 1894, Randal Cremer ; founder of the English Work- 
men's Peace Committee (1870), obtained the signatures of 
about 500 representatives of workingmen and leaders of Trade 
Unions to a Memorial to Mr. Gladstone, protesting against an 
increase of armaments. In the same year the Universal Peace 
Congress at Antwerp agreed that the Peace Societies should 
call for co-operation from the Workers 7 Associations. At the 
Socialist Congress in London in 1896 considerable attention 
was devoted to the subject of peace and disarmament. Resolu- 
tions were passed demanding (i) the abolition of Standing 
Armies and the establishment of a National Citizen Force; 
(2) the establishment of Tribunals of Arbitration to regulate 
peaceably disputes between nations; (3) the final decision on 
the question of War and Peace to be vested directly in the 
people in cases where the governments refuse to accept the deci- 
sion of the tribunal of arbitration. The Congress, however, 
while sympathizing heartily with the objects of the Peace and 
Arbitration Societies, urged them to bear constantly in mind 
that until the antagonism of social interests which produces 
conflicts between capital and labor be dissolved, international 
solidarity would remain impossible. 77 

The persistent Liberal and Radical protest against increas- 
ing armament expenditure and the agitation for a limitation In 

70 The Advocate of Peace, LXI (May, 1899) m, 

7t Agenda for the International Sodalist Workers and Trade Union Congress, 
London, x8g6 (London, 1896) . 


the late nineteenth century bore little fruit. It was a dream 
to suppose that any great reform like disarmament could be 
accomplished by any one party. Even if a limitation of arma- 
ments had been inserted as a plank in the party scheme it 
would have been very different from having it embodied in an 
Act of Parliament, or accepted internationally, as any disarma- 
ment proposition, if effectual, must be. It is, in fact, a long 
cry from one to the other. The only reforms which are likely 
to prove successful and permanent are those which command 
the assent of a decisive majority of the people. Disarmament, 
or even a limitation of armaments in the nineteenth century, 
was not supported by an all prevailing and pervasive public 
opinion. All propositions, therefore, were bound to fail. 

Many pacifists were of opinion that the initiative in calling 
a disarmament conference could best be taken by the United 
States and Great Britain the United States because she was 
far removed from Europe and, consequently, less likely to be 
drawn into participating in a European conflict; Great Britain 
because she was separated from the Continent by the Channel, 
which in the nineteenth century appeared to render her invul- 
nerable. But the very reasons which peace advocates advanced 
for Great Britain and America taking the lead would have made 
disarmament proposals coming from them less acceptable to 
other powers. Great Continental states, less favorably situated 
geographically, would have objected that it was easy for Eng- 
land and the United States to propose sacrifices which would 
cost them nothing; they would not be willing to limit arma- 
ments if their independence were only guaranteed by the pres- 
tige of their defensive forces, Nor could Belgium suggest 
propositions for putting an end to the "armed peace," for her 
permanent neutrality placed her in an entirely different situ- 
ation from that of other states. Reasons of national pride and 
hopes of revanche prevented the initiative being taken by 
vanquished France, If Germany had proposed a limitation she 
would have been accused of wishing to stabilize the status quo 


at a time when it was most agreeable to her. Likewise, a pro- 
posal from Austria-Hungary would have been opposed by the 
Balkan Slavs as forever sealing their fate. Any proposition 
coming from invulnerable Russia on the periphery of the armed 
camp, with only one European border to defend, would not 
have been regarded as sincere. Consequently, there was little 
hope of any one power successfully initiating a proposition for 
a limitation of armaments. 

Moreover, the idea of a guaranteed truce of three to six 
months before entering on hostilities was not acceptable to the 
military powers of the late nineteenth century; the Austro- 
Prussian and Franco-German Wars had demonstrated what 
large well trained and well equipped armies quickly mobilized 
could accomplish in a short time. After 1870 every nation 
studied ways and means of shortening the period of mobiliza- 
tion in order to gain an Initial advantage over its adversary. 
What in Napoleon's day took weeks and even months to per- 
form in preparing for campaigns could, after 1870, be done in 
as many days. A truce of three to six months would only have 
worked to the advantage of the weaker and less efficient nations. 
Nor were the great powers any more willing to agree to a 
"Truce of God" for ten years or a shorter period, because BO 
great state wished to bind itself in advance not to go to war 
in any circumstances; for conditions might arise quite different 
from those at the time the agreement was made. 

An understanding not to add to the military and naval ex- 
penditure for a period of years, although it appears on the 
surface perfectly harmless, was considered with scepticism by 
states whose finances were sound and who could still afford to 
compete in the race. In their opinion it gave an advantage 
to states with exhausted treasuries but large populations, like 
Italy and Russia, These countries could still maintain huge 
armed forces through conscription; which was cheap in com- 
parison with the building of modem battleships and the perfec- 
tion of the instruments of war* Moreover, during a breathing 


spell due to relief from excessive armament expenditure, a 
state might substitute money that would otherwise be used for 
military purposes for the building of railways and canals, which 
possess great strategical value and play an important part in 
the speedy mobilization of large armies. 

The proposal for limiting the term of military service from 
three years to one or one and a quarter was, perhaps, the most 
practical, but technical difficulties in making the transition 
could always be magnified. Some nations with a large illiterate 
population, Italy and Russia for example, would have grum- 
bled that the educational effects of military life would be 
seriously impaired and Russia would have added still another 
objection based upon the immense distances in her country. 
Besides, the reduction of the terms of military service would 
not have affected the naval budgets in the least; in fact, the 
money saved on military expenditure might have been trans- 
ferred to the navies. 

But if the naval powers had come to some agreement to limit 
the number or the tonnage of their battleships, the question of 
naval personnel would still have remained. Experienced sea- 
men have always held it to be as important to provide crews 
as to build ships; the training of officers and men takes longer 
than the building of battleships, and it cannot be delayed until 
hostilities threaten, "In any event/' writes Sir Archibald Kurd, 
"it must be evident that the number of officers and men who 
are 'borne,' to use the naval phrase, reacts on a country's 
expenditure, and affects its fighting power at sea quite as much 
as the building of men-of-war. Calculations of strength which 
are based on 'tons and guns' only are misleading. A navy is 
a matter of steel, but of steel mastered by brain and brawn." 78 

Finally, any one of these propositions, to be effective, must 
have been accepted simultaneously by all the great powers, for 
no state could disarm in the midst of heavily armed neighbors. 

78 Sir Archibald Hurd, "Navies of To-Day . . . Ships and Men Compared," 
The Qbwwer (London), Sunday, April 14, 1935, 


The question arises, which among them would have been will- 
ing to take the initiative in making the proposal? If an official 
proposal had been made and if we accept the hypothesis that 
the powers would have agreed to a limitation, then we must 
conclude that after the engagement they would have probably 
evaded the spirit of the limitation by devising new and more 
powerful means of destruction. A qualitative race would have 
superseded the quantitative competition in armaments, and, 
with the astounding inventions of the late nineteenth and twen- 
tieth centuries, the qualitative factor has developed a new and 
overwhelming significance. 



THE PACIFIST movement, which before 1889 had manifested 
itself in numerous, isolated resolutions on peace, arbitration 
and disarmament, in that year became united in a common 
effort. This integration was accomplished through the organi- 
zation of two international peace bodies: the Universal Peace 
Congresses and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. On May 19, 
1889, at a Peace Demonstration in St. James's Hall, London, 
invitations were issued to the Peace organizations of the world 
to inaugurate a series of annual World Peace Congresses which 
should be held in the same city as the Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference, either immediately before or after it, whereby the 
whole of the Peace Movement might be represented every year 
in the same capital. 

The work of the Universal Peace Congresses and the work 
of the Inter-Parliamentary Union have always been more or 
less complementary, but the two organizations have had dif- 
ferent methods of attacking the peace problem. The Union, 
from its very nature, can approach governments from within; 
moreover, it has a higher official standing than any Peace 
Society or Arbitration League. The organizations represented 
in the Universal Peace Congresses, on the other hand, can 
address Parliaments only from without. They find their most 
important field of action in propaganda among their several 
national publics* Indirectly, they can bring some pressure to 
bear in Parliaments by encouraging the electorate to vote for 
those candidates only who axe pledged to a peace program. 



The Universal Peace Congresses were In effect a revival of 
the series of 1848-53 which had been curtailed at the outbreak 
of the Crimean War. In one respect, however, they differed 
from these earlier Congresses: They represented not one but 
four distinct types of peace organizations or groups of pacifist 
and international thought. 1 The first was that of the British 
and American Peace Societies, together with those of Scandi- 
navia, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Italy and the 
Swiss branch, Schweizer Friedensgesellschaft, founded at 
Lucerne in 1889. These societies were both pacifist and reli- 
gious in their outlook. The second group was composed of the 
societies modelled on the French Ligue de la paix founded by 
Passy in 1867, pacifist also, "but from the standpoint of human 
and international interdependence." The third was more politi- 
cal and social in outlook and was formed of associations based 
on the "League of Peace and Liberty" founded by Lemonnier 
at Geneva in 1867. M. Charles Lemonnier envisaged peace 
through the creation of an international political organisation 
which would substitute a "juridical state" for a state of war 
by combining the three principles, arbitration., neutralization 
and federation. He advocated the substitution of democracy 
for monarchy everywhere, the separation of church and state 
and the formation of a United States of Europe, The fourth 
group was entirely secular and practical, concentrating its atten- 
tion on arbitration. It was made up of bodies inspired by 
Hodgson Pratt after 1880, like the "International Arbitration 
and Peace Association of Great Britain and Ireland/' and the 
Comit& de Paris de la P&d6ration Internationale de I* arbitrage 
et de la paix, founded in 1883, which, after it absorbed Passy's 
Peace Society, became known as the SodM Prangam de 
^arbitrage entre nations. 

The Universal Peace Congresses of the 'nineties devoted 
much more attention to the problem of armaments than did 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union during the same period, Every 

* A. G. F. Beales, The History of Pe^c0 t P 195, 


Congress which convened throughout the decade passed in one 
form or another a resolution on the limitation of armaments. 
The first Universal Peace Congress, which sat in Paris from 
June 23 to 27, 1889, placed its chief emphasis on arbitration. 
Dr. Evans Darby, the newly installed Secretary of the British 
Peace Society, read a paper entitled "A League of Peace, or 
How May Arbitration Lead to Disarmament? 372 This Con- 
gress considered the practice of arbitration to be the best road 
towards universal peace and disarmament. 3 

The next July the second Universal Peace Conference met 
at London and thoroughly examined the question of a limita- 
tion of armaments. Mr. David Dudley Field, an American 
jurist, speaking of disarmament at the inaugural meeting, em- 
phasized that arbitration and disarmament supplement each 
other. "If nations disarm," he said, "they do so because of 
their belief that they can settle their disputes in a manner dif- 
ferent from a resort to arms. They have found another and 
better way. If they agree to arbitrate, and believe in the invio- 
lability of the agreement, they will of course disarm, inasmuch 
as armaments will then have become useless." 4 

The statement, "If they agree to arbitrate, and believe in 
the inviolability of the agreement, they will of course disarm," 
is the crux of the whole problem of the relationship between 
arbitration and disarmament. The essence of arbitration is 
that it results in an award which is both authoritative and 
final. As Sir James Headlam-Morley writes: "A State which 
has agreed to accept an arbitral award, thereby, so far as the 
award goes, definitely surrenders its own free will, and irrev- 
ocably condemns itself to passive submission." 5 This fact, 

a W. E. Darby, "A League of Peace, Or How May Arbitration Lead to Dis- 
armament?", The fflerM of Peace, September 2, 1889, pp. 279-83. 

Bulletin du x* Congress Universel de la Paix t Paris, xSSp (Berne, 1901), 

P. 3- 

4 Report of the Universal Peace Congress held at London, 1890 (London, 
1890), p. ii. 

5 Sir James Headlam-Morky, Studies in Diplomatic History (London, 
1930), p. 14. 


together with the one that arbitration means a settlement in 
accordance with existing treaty rights, is the reason that on 
the vital questions which disturbed Europe in the nineteenth 
century states were reluctant to adopt the method. So long as 
they regarded war as the normal method of settling their im- 
portant disputes, they could not possibly disarm. 

During the morning session of July 17, the Reverend R. B. 
Howard of Boston presented a paper on disarmament and 
moved a resolution of four parts, the third of which suggested 
that "the Government which should first dismiss any consid- 
erable number of soldiers would confer a signal benefit on 
Europe and mankind, because it would oblige other Govern- 
ments, urged on by public opinion, to follow its example." The 
Congress recommended that the Peace Societies "carry on an 
active propaganda among the people, especially at the time of 
Parliamentary elections, in order that the electors should give 
their votes to those candidates who have included In their pro- 
gram, Peace, Disarmament, and Arbitration." 6 

In his paper Mr. Howard said that it seemed to him before 
governments could be brought to change the ancient for the 
modem policy of determining the questions at issue between 
them, they might enter upon disarmament with no sacrifice of 
either principle or pride if the conditions suggested in the 
program of the Congress were met. These were; 

1. Disarmament should be gradual* This is to save the sudden 
shock of the dismissal to civil life of millions of men now under 
discipline untrained to labour, and thus unprepared for citizenship. 
There is danger that sudden disarmament would at once augment 
the idlers, the strikers and the mobs. . . . 

2, Disarmament ought to be simultaneous* As nations are now con- 
stituted it must be. One nation, if both are equally armed ? will be 
slow to lead another in disarming. , * . Simultaneousness can then 
be secured only with the co-operation of two, possibly three, leading 
Powers, ... in this, one nation must take the initiative. 

Report o/ the Universcl Peac Congresses kM at London* iBgo 9 pp. 


3. It must be mutual. Neither France nor Germany would con- 
sider disarmament except as a mutual act. If thus entered upon the 
lesser Powers might easily follow their example. ... As soon as a 
mutual agreement could be made between the leading Powers a gen- 
eral disarmament would naturally follow. 

4. The disarmament must be proportional. This is in the interest 
of equity and the balance of forces. 7 

At the same Congress, Signer E. T. Moneta of Milan read 
a paper, "Le Desarmeinent," in which he described the mili- 
tary condition of Europe in iSgo. 8 Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood 
followed him with her dissertation, a ls Any Scheme For Dis- 
armament Practical at The Present Time? 37 9 Her main thesis 
was that "the way is open for Treaties of Arbitration by the 
nations of the World, and under its disarmament becomes 
easy.' 7 10 

The third Universal Peace Congress in session at Rome in 
November, 1891, decided to invite all the Peace Societies, the 
societies of workers and all the friends of peace to pursue 
simultaneously in all the countries a popular and parliamentary 
agitation to obtain: 

1. The conclusion of permanent arbitration treaties between the 
people, under the reciprocal guarantee of the autonomy of the con- 
tracting nations, and the constitution of a Tribunal of International 

2. The election, as members of all the Parliaments, of partisan 
representatives of reforms advocated by the Congress; 

3. A Conference of European Powers in order to bring about a 
mutual, proportional and simultaneous disarmament. 11 

In August, 1892, Dr, Darby presented the question of the 
limitation of armaments to the Berne Peace Congress in 
another paper, "Armed Peace or the Value of the Principle, 

17 Ibid., p. 168, 
Ibid., pp. 169-71. 
, pp.X7X~73- 

11 Bullion Official du Ttoiilme Congr&$ Internationale d$ let Paix tenu & Rome, 

Novembr x8$x (Rome, 1891), pp. 173*74* 


Si vis Pacem, para Bellum, as Illustrated by the Present Con- 
dition of Europe," and in the name of the Peace Society of 
London he proposed three resolutions, the first of which was: 
"Inasmuch as the policy based on the principle 'Si vis pacem, 
para bellum ? has proved to be ineffectual to prevent the great- 
est wars of modern times, this Congress invites the Euro- 
pean Powers to substitute for this policy that of definitive 
disarmament." 12 This resolution was adopted by a large 

A disarmament proposition with definite provisions was also 
submitted to the Peace Congress at Berne by M. H. William 
Blymyer, who in his Mimolre sur la sanction des arbitrages 
(second part) proposed: 

1. That beginning with January, 1895, each of the signatory na- 
tions of the treaty shall have reduced the number of its soldiers to a 
figure which shall not exceed one for every 1,000 inhabitants and 
that this figure shall be maintained during the duration of the treaty; 

2. That soldiers of every class be included in this figure; but that 
it shall be permitted to retain officers on condition that the afore- 
mentioned proportion shall not be exceeded; 

3. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct, within one 
year, more vessels of more than 3,000 tons of displacement which 
may, with or without modifications, be used as vessels of war; 

4. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct fortifica- 
tions, unless they be more than 20 km, distant from its frontiers; 

5. That the fortifications which now exist in this zone may be pre- 
served, but not improved. 18 

Discussion of the limitation of armaments ran throughout 
the sessions of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress convened in 
Chicago in August, 1893. On August 18 the Reverend G. Dana 
Boardman, speaking on the "Relation of Nationalism to Inter- 

** Bulletin Offickl du IV m& Congrls de la Poix, tenu & Bern@ f i<fpa (Berne, 
1893), p. 88. 

li} Bulletin Offickl du IV** Congrfa Univeml de fa Pfcix, tenu & Berne t 

Annexe VII, j>, axo; also reprinted In the Bulletin Ojiciel du JO7* 
Universal d$ la Paix, tenu & Rouen $t au Hawe, xgo3 (Berne, 1903), Annexe 

IV, pp. 261-62, 


nationalism or Mankind one Body," stated his belief that the 
Divine Master was summoning the nations to a policy of dis- 
armament. He suggested that America should propose disar- 
mament to other nations, substituting arbitration, or some other 
pacific policy for armaments. 14 

A second appeal for disarmament was addressed to the Con- 
gress by the Reverend Philip S. Moxon, D.D., of Boston, at 
the Sunday service on August 20. At the ninth session on 
August 1 8 a paper by Mme. Griess-Traut 15 containing argu- 
ments and reasons for the conversion of destructive armies into 
productive ones, and a scheme for disarmament by W. H. Bly- 
myer were referred to the Business Committee. 16 Finally, on 
August 19 there was adopted a resolution urging the mainte- 
nance of the Rush-Bagot Agreement between the United States 
and Great Britain, a treaty practically prohibiting the keeping 
of armed vessels on the Great Lakes and thus dedicating them 
to permanent peace, 17 The Congress appealed to the press of 
both countries to use its great influence on behalf of the main- 
tenance of this important agreement. 18 

The Sixth Universal Peace Congress met at Antwerp in 
August, 1894* Before the Conference gathered, the Peace 
Societies expressed in a special report their diverse ideas upon 
the subject of a truce or a suspension of armaments; this report 
was followed by a text of an address of the Committee of 
"International Arbitration and Peace Association' 7 to the Gov- 
ernment of Great Britain in order to engage it to take the 
initiative of a proposition tending to disarmament, 

u Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress Held at Chicago, August, 
xS$3 (Boston, 1893), pp. 222-23, The Reverend Boardman, President of the 
Christian Arbitration and Peace Society, made a similar proposal in his address, 
"The Disarmament of Nations," before the annual meeting: of the society in 
Washington, D* C., March 4, 1890, Public Opinion, VIII (1889-90), 535. 

18 Mme. Gress-Traut was one of the organizers of the Paris Peace Congress in 

10 Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress, pp. 260, 262. 

17 Ibid., p. 293, Resolution No, 3, 

ia An agitation among the Great Lakes Shipbuilders for the right to build 
and launch warships on the lakes called forth this resolution, 


Two motions, however, deviated a little from the responses 
to questionnaires sent previously to the Peace Societies. The 
Unione Lombarda desired that there should be a discussion of 
the support that the Peace Societies ought to give to the gov- 
ernments which had "proved by some acts their intention of 
transforming as much as possible the costly and dangerous 
armed peace into a durable peace based upon law." 19 At 
Zurich La Sodete acad&mque de la paix proposed that the 
Swiss Peace Societies make use of the initiative procedure to 
enable the Swiss Federal Council to call a Congress of Euro- 
pean powers, where the question of disarmament would be 
conscientiously discussed; and that the other Peace Societies 
of Europe support this initiative by a mass petition which could 
be considered as the expression of the popular wish. 20 

Dealing with the question of a truce in armaments, the 
International Bureau of Peace had addressed a circular to all 
the pacifist societies of the world, the responses to which were 
summarized in a report of May 10, 1894. The Legislative 
Section, taking this report as a basis, formulated a resolution 
attempting to embody the various opinions. In this proposi- 
tion the Congress expressed its conviction that the conclusion 
of the treaty of permanent arbitration advocated by it would 
permit the European Powers to decrease their armaments. The 
hope was voiced that a favorable response would be made by 
all the European Powers to an invitation which could be issued 
by any one of them, to an international conference relative to 
a truce in armaments. Finally the Congress entreated the gov- 
ernments to claim no new increase of their war budgets or of 
their navies in the meantime, and invited the Parliaments to 
reject entirely all demands which would have for result the 
direct or indirect augmentation of the military charges weigh- 
ing upon their people. The Bureau of the Congress was charged 
with transmitting the resolution to the Inter-Parliamentary 

w Bulletin Offickl du V>X m Congrh de fa Paw, Unu & Awvers, 1894, p. g* 


Conference at The Hague. 21 This proposal was adopted 

The same question was placed on the agenda of the Peace 
Congress which assembled at Scheveningen in 1895. Moreover, 
the German Peace Society formulated the proposition that 
parliamentary delegates be invited to oppose all augmentation 
of the military charges so long as no negotiations for a general 
disarmament have taken place. 22 

The problem of a limitation of armaments also occupied the 
attention of the Budapest Peace Congress of September, 1896. 
Mme. Griess-Traut again presented a proposal for the trans- 
formation of unproductive and warlike armies into pacific 
and productive ones. 23 Mr. W. P. Byles, a former British 
Liberal M.P., moved a resolution to the effect that the Con- 
gress protest against the constantly increasing expenditure on 
armaments and urge the members of the various legislatures 
throughout the world to vote against any further increase, and 
also call upon the voters in every country to vote only for 
those candidates who would support this policy. 24 Mr. Byles 
proposed only to prevent new armaments; he did not advocate 
disarmament. 25 The proposition was opposed by Dr. Kolben 
on the ground that the projected resolution was only a repeti- 
tion of the one passed at the Congress of 1894. Nevertheless, 
the resolution was accepted, and on its being embodied in the 
report, it was unanimously adopted by the Congress. 26 

sl Bulletin Offidel du VI m& Congres de la Paix, tenu & Anvers, pp, 98-99, 
32 Bulletin Qfficel du F//^ Congres Universel de la Paix, tenu a Budapest, 
1896 (Berne, 1896), pp. 84-85, 

p. 65-68, 
*., p. 84. 

26 No doubt it was the action of the seventh Universal Peace Congress on 
the limitation of armaments that M, Basili, Russian Consul-Oeneral in Budapest, 
reported to St Petersburg instead of the supposed Inter-Parliamentary resolu- 
tions and reports of 1896, as was claimed by Stead, the St. Petersburg corre- 
spondent of the Times f a special correspondent of the Daily News, de Lapradelle 
and Nicholas Notovitch, Cf, Infra, Chapter IV, p. 95 et seq* and Chapter IX, 
p. 173 et $e 


During the interval between the 1896 meeting and the Con- 
gress at Hamburg, a committee studied the idea of the trans- 
formation of destructive armies into productive armies. A re- 
port and mSmoire of M. Raoul de la Grasserie, La Transfor- 
mation des arm&es destructives en armies productives, was 
prepared and transmitted to the various Peace Societies before 
the Congress met. He recommended the reduction of the 
national armies to a minimum. The army should be an inter- 
national army of peace, for so long as armies remain national, 
they would of necessity be armies for war. The end desired 
by La Grasserie was the substitution of an international army 
reduced to the necessary minimum and recruited by voluntary 
enlistment. This army should be used for great public works, 
with the result that the people would lose their military idolatry. 
Thus through a gradual transformation, the army of labor would 
become an army of peace. His pamphlet of thirty-two pages 
concluded by advocating the adoption of a system recom- 
mended by Mme. Griess-Traut in 1893, namely, that during 
the suppression of the armed peace, an army of labor should 
serve as the intermediary between the present army of war 
and the future army of peace. 27 M. Gaston Moch ? also a mem- 
ber of the Committee, drew up and distributed at the opening 
of the Congress a memorandum entitled, "Comment se fera le 
disarmament" The Congress took note of the pamphlets of 
M. Moch and M. La Grasserie and requested the Committee 
to continue its labors? 8 

Thus every Universal Peace Congress between 1889 and 
1898 passed a resolution either protesting against increasing 
armaments or proposing a limitation of them or a study of the 

at Raoul de la Grasserie, De h Transformation des armies destructives en 
armies productive* (Paris, 1894), P 33. 

38 Bulletin Offidel du Vlti* Congrit Universel de k Pato, tentt 
(Berne, 1897), pp. Sy and 99. 


problem. All the members of the Peace Congresses were more 
or less agreed in sentiment, and if passing their propositions 
would have saved the world from the heavy burden or arma- 
ments, they should have done an immense amount of good at 
their conferences and at home. But after their resolutions were 
voted they were faced with a much greater problem: how to 
carry them into effect. Peace congresses are not official; they 
are merely meetings of unauthorized persons who are not 
elected by the citizens of their respective states. The work of 
peace societies and peace congresses is to create and develop 
an enlightened public opinion on questions of peace, arbitra- 
tion and disarmament. Judged from the actual results achieved 
during the 'nineties, the deliberations of the Universal Peace 
Congresses on the subject of disarmament must appear a little 
disappointing. In spite of their resolutions urging a limitation 
of armaments and the convening of an International Confer- 
ence to study the problem, they do not seem to have greatly 
impressed governments, for when at last the initiative was 
taken, it happened not in one of the countries which might have 
been expected to be influenced by the agitation of pacific or- 
ganizations, but in an autocratic land where all peace propa- 
ganda was carefully censored and where no peace society 
existed until 1899. 

These Congresses also advocated the general use of arbitra- 
tion; for their members looked upon it as the best means of 
securing disarmament and, eventually, peace. They hoped to 
build up a complete and water-tight system which would neces- 
sarily, without equivocation, provide a peaceful settlement of 
every kind of international dispute. 

The theory that disarmament will come through the adop- 
tion of arbitration is irrational, for governments refuse to ac- 
cept it for the settlement of all their differences. The limited 
sphere of operations to which it must be confined renders arbi- 
tration a partial substitute for war in international relations. 
Arbitration is useful to decide only certain types of cases. "Dis- 


putes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of 
international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if estab- 
lished, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, 
or as to the extent and nature of the reparations to be made 
for any such breach/ 7 are declared, in Article 13 of the Cove- 
nant of the League of Nations, "to be among those which are 
generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial set- 
tlement." Arbitration is not applicable when one party or the 
other wants to change existing law, to revise a treaty or to 
alter the status quo. There is territory on the Continent of 
Europe to which more than one state considers it possesses an 
indefeasible national right; thus there will be in the future, as 
in the past, some power or group of powers dissatisfied with 
the territorial arrangement. No territorial settlement can ever 
be permanent; change is necessary from time to time. Yet, if 
arbitration means the enforcement of the existing law and the 
acceptance of the status quo, It is obvious that either some 
efficacious method of peaceful change must be devised or states 
will have to rely on war for its accomplishment. To a certain 
extent the League of Nations attempted to solve this difficulty 
by providing machinery, as yet imperfect, for the settlement of 
political, as distinct from judicial, disputes. But in interna- 
tional society, if peace is to be maintained, there is need for a 
legislature, an executive, and an armed force as well as a judica- 

Arbitration is inapplicable to a question which has reference 
to the existence of a state or its relative position amongst other 
states. "Arbitration can only declare relations which already 
exist, whereas war brings about new relations, or converts 
relations in posse Into relations in esse" War Is a process of re- 
adjustment and as such is one of advance or retrogression; It 
does not deal simply with accomplished facts as Is the case with 
litigation in all its forms. It accomplishes the fact n James 

m James Lorimer, Studio National and International (Edinburgh, 1890), 

Chapter VIII, "The 'Three Rules of Washington* Viewed in Their Relation to 

International Arbitration/ 1 p. ioo 


Lorimer, Professor of Law in the University of Edinburgh in 
the 'eighties, states that in so far as the Franco-German War was 
a fight for the hegemony of Europe, it did not admit of arbitra- 
tion. The "Eastern Question," being a question of the pre- 
ponderance of Russia in the west of Asia and the east of 
Europe, he considered also beyond the reach of arbitration. 30 

These questions, along with many others which divided 
Europe in the nineteenth century, were incapable of adjust- 
ment along juridical lines; they involved considerations dis- 
tinctly beyond and higher than law, as international law then 
existed; whereas a Permanent Tribunal, to take cognizance 
of all cases, must perforce be governed by law as it exists. 
States were unwilling to submit to a tribunal the general prin- 
ciples of which had not been crystallized into a code. They 
were only willing to arbitrate legal disputes and insisted on the 
exclusion of all political issues that could not be reduced to 
legal terms. These "nan- justiciable" disputes were interwoven 
with questions of "national honour" and "vital interests," and 
on these points most states even today prefer to fight rather 
than arbitrate. 

Since "Arbitration is a contract by which two parties agree 
to abide by the decision of a third," 31 it is possible only be- 
tween two parties, both of whom possess a rational and con- 
senting will This eliminates arbitration as a means of settling 
disputes between civilized nations and barbarians. The latter 
could not appoint arbitrators whose decision civilized nations 
could trust, nor could civilized nations trust to the acceptance 
of their decisions by barbarians* Professor Lorimer writes: 
"If opinion, moreover, be but a slender compulsitor in the case 
of civilized men, in the case of barbarians it is no compulsitor 
at all Arbitration is a proceeding which makes very high 
claims on the intellectual and moral qualities of the parties 
as well as of the judges. It consequently Is applicable only be- 
tween civilized nations probably of a somewhat dispassionate 

80 toe. d*. 


temperament." 32 For this reason it has proved most success- 
ful between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations, Great Britain 
and the United States. 

Further, the fact that arbitration results in an award which 
is authoritative and final makes states reluctant to adopt it 
for the settlement of their most important questions. Reference 
to a mixed commission is, however, radically different from real 
arbitration; for by the former procedure, each of the govern- 
ments concerned knows that an adverse decision cannot be 
given against it, except with the consent of at least one of its 
own representatives. This type of investigation provides se- 
curity that the commissioners will not be guided by rules of law 
which are not recognized by one or another of the contending 
parties. The settlement of disputes by a mixed commission, 
therefore, eliminates the danger which many governments fear 
in arbitration; namely, that they may be compelled to sur- 
render interests of real importance, by virtue of a judgment, 
the justice and impartiality of which is not convincing,' 13 

Nonetheless, where vital interests are concerned, something 
may be accomplished by conciliation and mediation. But if 
these fail, Sir James Headlam-Morley writes, "then arbitration, 
compulsorily imposed, involving as it does a final and definite 
decree from which there is no appeal, might easily do more 
harm than good. Far better leave the problem unsettled, 
hoping that, as has often happened in the past, time and delay 
may help to bring a solution. 77 M Moreover, compulsory arbi- 
tration, if it is to be effective, presupposes the creation of an 
International Army, charged with executing the decrees of an 
International Tribunal upon a recalcitrant state, But this will 
only come when the nations are ready for the intermediate step 
of moral compulsion, imposed by a self-assumed obligation- 
by a promise. Captain A, T. Mahan of the United States Navy 
wrote as follows in 1899: 

** loc, cti. 

m Sir James Headlam-Morlcy, op. c&., pp* 14-15. 


Compulsory arbitration as yet means only the moral compulsion of 
a pledge, taken beforehand, and more or less comprehensive, to sub- 
mit to arbitration questions which rest still in the unknown future; 
the very terms of which therefore cannot be foreseen. Although there 
is a certain active current of agitation in favor of such stipulations, 
there is no general disposition of governments to accede, except under 
very narrow and precise limitations, and in questions of less than 
secondary importance. 35 

Thus international arbitration is to be regarded as an aid to 
diplomacy rather than as a substitute for war. It has proved 
extremely successful in removing causes of irritation which 
have disrupted international cordiality and which eventually 
might have led to war. But voluntary arbitration must always 
be of the nature of a friendly suit, and the first condition of its 
possibility must be that both parties have determined not to 
go to war. 36 Even in the minor matters where it has been most 
successful, Headlam-Morley states, investigation seems to show 
first of all that the two states In controversy have decided that 
it is to their common advantage to arrive at a peaceful settle- 
ment. 37 There is an absolute indisposition on the part of most 
states to promise beforehand that any arbiters other than them- 
selves shall be accepted in questions of the future, the import 
of which cannot be discerned. For the settlement of their most 
serious differences governments rely on the arbitrament of war. 
Although they "trust In God," they "keep their powder dry" ; 
consequently, general disarmament for the great powers will 
always remain an idle dream* 

History proves that the mere passing of resolutions, even 
unanimously, by peace conferences, will not suffice to bring 
about peace and a limitation of armaments. Many of the 
nineteenth century pacifists did not seem to realize that the 
only way to stop war is to remove its causes. But these causes 
He far deeper than arbitration can reach, and if war is to 

m Captain A, T. Mahan, "The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspects of 
War," Tk* North American Review* CLXIX (October, 1899), 438. 
m James Lorimer, op* eft,, p. xox. 

m Sir James Hwdlam-Morley, op. di>, p. 36, 


be averted it must be by other means. Peace cannot be com- 
passed by an enforcement of or half-hearted acquiescence in 
the status quo. It will be realized only with time and progress 
which will lead to a juster conception of international relations 
and with the establishment of a rational international political 
system under which each nation feels that its reasonable de- 
mands have been met. Until then war is to be expected; 
although it may be avoided on one occasion, it will inevitably 
occur on some other. 




THE FIRST person to draw attention to the necessity of closer 
contact being established between Members of Parliament in all 
countries was undoubtedly the Austrian Deputy, Robert von 
Walterskirchen. 1 Certainly the idea of an Inter-Parliamentary 
Union was mooted as early as 1874 when Dr. Lowenthal 2 of 
Berlin expressed his views in favor of an international parlia- 
ment. In the autumn of the next year Dr. Albert Fischhof 3 of 
Austria brought the subject forward at a meeting of the Austro- 
Hungarian Delegations, his primary object being to secure a 
gradual disarmament throughout Europe. He proposed the 
calling of an annual Conference of the deputies of all nations, 
whose main task should be the endeavor to reduce the heavy 
burden of standing armies. This proposal was communicated 
to a number of French and Italian Deputies, who warmly ap- 
proved it. Baron Diicker 4 laid it before members of the Ger- 
man Reichstag, of whom nearly fifty expressed their adhesion. 

1 Professor L. Quidde, "The Creation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union," The 
Inter-Parliamentary Union from x88$-xgsg (Lausanne, Geneva, 1939), p. 3, Cf, 

p 3 et seg. 

a In January, 1874, Edward Lowenthal formed a Peace Committee in Berlin, 
and a year later he began the publication of a pacifist journal, Deutsche Laterne. 

3 In 1875 Adolph Fischhof published an article entitled "The Reduction of 
Continental Armies," and early in 1876 introduced a motion for the reduction of 

arms in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies, 

4 Baron Diicker also 'pursued the idea of establishing contacts between mem- 
bers of Parliaments but with arbitration, instead of the reduction of armaments, 
in the foreground* 



The first Conference was to have been held in 1877, when the 
quota of reduction was to be discussed and agreed upon. Ar- 
rangements were to have been made for the introduction of the 
following resolution into each Parliament: 

The House expects with confidence that the Government will 
shortly declare to all continental Powers, or at least to all the great 
Powers on the Continent, their readiness to reduce their standing 
armies by the quota arranged by the Conference in case the respec- 
tive Powers do the same. 5 

This movement proved abortive, for the Bulgarian atrocities 
and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War for the time para- 
lyzed the efforts of the friends of peace. It was utterly useless 
to discuss a reduction of armaments while Russian was invad- 
ing Turkey, while Austria was pouring troops into Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the British Fleet lay anchored in Besika Bay ; 
only awaiting instructions for an advance through the Dar- 
danelles to Constantinople. 

Four other men, Don Arturo de Marcoartu, Dr. Virchow, 7 
M. Edmond Thiaudifere and Henry Richard also suggested or 
elaborated plans for an Inter-Parliamentary Peace Party or 
Union. Marcoartu examined the idea In his Internationalism 
published in 1876, and mentioned it to Italian and Austrian 
delegates in the same year. Finally he incorporated the notion 
in his scheme of International Arbitration of 1885, He pro- 
posed that, pending the building up of a code of international 
law and the appointment of an International Assembly and 
Court, a system of inter-parliamentary conferences should be 

Howard Evans, Sir Randal Cremer (London, 1909)* P> *35- 
Marcoarlu, the pioneer of the peace movement in Spam, secured, in 1870, 
the insertion of an arbitration clause in a treaty conducted by Spain with the 

Republic of Uruguay. In 1885, fee elaborated a scheme of Internationa! Arbitra- 
tion noteworthy for the manner in which it provided for gradual evolution us 
against direct creation. Throughout his senatorial career he regularly introduced 
motion* for a Permanent International Tribunal 

7 Dr* Virchow, a Social Democrat, attracted notice whew, on November $, 
1869, he proposed in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies that the North German 
Confederation should give a lead to Europe in the matter of disarmament* 


resorted to for the settlement of international problems. 8 In 
1878, before the Paris Peace Congress, Dr. Virchow advocated 
that members of the different European Parliaments should 
also meet in Paris to examine the question of disarmament. 9 
While at this Universal Peace Congress, M. Thiaudiere pro- 
posed to convoke "an annual Congress composed exclusively of 
members of parliaments belonging to the different nations/' He 
believed that the influence which the decisions of such a Euro- 
pean Parliament were bound to have upon public opinion would 
reverberate upon the Governments and orientate their politics. 
In addition, these reunions would have the immense advantage 
of accustoming Europe to the federal mechanism. 10 Henry 
Richard, Secretary of the London Peace Society, who for years 
before the birth of the Inter-Parliamentary Union corresponded 
with various statesmen with a view to bringing about its crea- 
tion, wrote, in January, 1882, as follows to his French colleague, 
Fr6d6ric Passy: 

You know that the idea of a certain number of members of differ- 
ent Parliaments coming together has often been expressed. It is evi- 
dent that if one such project could be wisely conducted to a good end 
it would result in considerable advantages. Do you wish to make 
known to me your opinion on this subject, and tell me if we can 
count upon the participation of a certain number of your colleagues 
of the Chamber? n 


The formation of the Union Interparlementaire was the 
result of a concerted movement in Great Britain, France and 
the United States in favor of the conclusion of treaties of 
arbitration between the United States on the one hand and 
Great Britain and France on the other. But the practical initia- 

8 Herald of Peace, 1885, p* 153, 
Fr6dMc Passy, Pour la Paix (Paris, 1909), p. 94, 

10 Gaston Moch, Autour de la Conference Interparlementaire (Paris, 1895), 
pp. 9io, 

u Frdric Passy, op. cit p* 94. 


live in founding the organization came from an Englishman, 
William Randal Cremer (later Sir), 12 who was assisted by a 
Frenchman, M. Frederic Passy, the well known economist and 
philanthropist. Beyond the comparatively small circle of social 
reformers and peace enthusiasts Cremer's name is almost for- 
gotten. Nevertheless, "for nearly forty years/' writes Ms biog- 
rapher, "he set before himself a task which might have daunted 
the greatest statesmen of Europe. ... He said, 'This one 
thing can I do' and to this one thing every other consideration 
was subordinate." In 1870, he founded the Workmen's Peace 
Committee, out of which grew, in 1883, the Workmen's Peace 
Association, which in turn, in 1888, became the International 
Arbitration League; 13 in 1887, his association initiated an ad- 
dress to President Cleveland in favor of a treaty of arbitration 
between the United States and Great Britain. This address, 
signed by 223 members of Parliament, was delivered to Presi- 
dent Cleveland by a deputation headed by Mr. Andrew Car- 
negie, on October 31, 1887, exactly a year before the preliminary 
meeting of the "Conference interparlementaire pour ^arbitrage 
international" which subsequently was called the Union Inter- 
parlementaire. 14 

Mr. Cremer knew that if his project were to be a success, 
it would be necessary to enlist the co-operation of representa- 
tive fellow- workers in other lands; he therefore communicated 
with an old colleague a veteran in the cause M* Fred6ric 
Passy. Cremer went to Paris in June, 1888, interviewed some 
French deputies, and was received by M, Goblet, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. A nucleus of devoted men, Simon, C16mcnccau, 
Siegfried, Perm and others was formed in France, while Cremer 
occupied himself with organizing the participation of the Eng- 
lish. Later, the French Committee addressed an invitation to 

13 In 1903 Sir Randal Cremer received the Nobel Peace Prize of 7,000 poundn 
which he devoted to the cause of peace and arbitration. 

in Howard Evans, Radical Fights of Forty Years (London, 1913), p. 113, 

14 Christian L, Law, Mistoirc documenlaire de L f Union 

Conference dc 1888 (Bruxellca, 1915), pp. 1-2 


the British group to come to Paris. Accordingly, on Sunday 
morning, October 31, 1888, in the Salle du Zodiaque of the 
Grand Hotel, a meeting was convened under the presidency of 
M. Jules Simon, an ex-Premier of France. 15 The thirty-four 
men assembled, nine British and twenty-five French, 16 resolved 
to call a conference for the following year to which peace advo- 
cates in other Parliaments should be invited for a special dis- 
cussion of the most practical means of organizing world peace 
by simultaneous concerted action in the national legislatures. 
The invitation was issued in the spring of 1889, and the first 
Inter-Parliamentary Conference opened in Paris on June 29, 
1889. About one hundred delegates attended, nearly all French 
or English, with a small number from six other parliaments. 
Although the early advocates of an inter-parliamentary peace 
organization considered that it should deal with the question of 
disarmament, the Union was actually founded with a rather 
limited scope that of promoting the practice of arbitration in 
the settlement of international differences. In the words of 
Lord Weardale, who as the Honorable Philip Stanhope assisted 
in organizing the Union, its basic principle was the "co-opera- 
tion of the Parliaments of the world in the maintenance of 
Peace by the promotion of the principles of arbitration and the 
establishment of international courts of justice." The Union 
Interparlementaire has contributed more than any other agency 
to the extensive use of arbitration. It exercised a great influ- 
ence upon the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
by the First Hague Conference and took the initiative in re- 
questing the convening of the Second Conference at The Hague. 
Moreover, it elaborated the model treaty of arbitration which 
served as a basis of deliberations for the Second Conference. 17 

18 Fr6d6ric P'assy, op, cit,, p, 92. 

16 Twenty-four deputies and one senator. 

17 Annuaire Xnterparkmentaire, 1931, p, 630; also Compte Rendu de la XIM 
Conference t&nue & BntxeUes, September, 1905, pp. 153-67. I&ngHsh and French 
texts of Draft of A General Arbitration Treaty suggested for approval of the 
XIII Interparliamentary Conference and for submission to the Second Hague 
Conference, by Eichard Bartholdt, President of the American group. 


In the Union Interparlementaire are representatives of all 
types of political opinion, all the religious faiths as well as free 
thought, all the social institutions monarchies as well as re- 
publics. But a vast majority of its early members were 
"Liberals," "Advanced Liberals/ 7 "Radicals," "Democrats" 
and "Social Democrats" in politics; and, as far as British repre- 
sentatives were concerned, Nonconformist in religion. Many 
were pacifists in the strict 'sense of the term and attended and 
took a leading part in the Universal Peace Congresses. Sir 
Randal Cremer was a "Radical" as were his colleagues, the 
Honorable Philip Stanhope (later Lord Weardale), Thomas 
Burt, Thomas Snape and Charles Fenwick. Sir Joseph Pease, 
Wilfred Lawson and W. P. Byles were Liberals. In the early 
records of the Union one finds the names of the most outstand- 
ing liberal, progressive and democratic figures in European af- 
fairs: M. Frederic Passy, French economist, pacifist and phil- 
anthropist; Jules Simon, ex-Premier of France; MM. Gaillard, 
Siegfried, Arnaud, and Moch, French deputies; M. Gobat, 
Swiss National Councillor and Chief of Public Instruction in 
the Canton of Berne; M. Charles Lemonnier, Swiss deputy and 
founder of the League of Peace and Liberty; M. Beernaert, 
President of the Belgian Chamber; M. Henri La Fontaine, Bel- 
gian Senator and author of Histoire documentairc des arbi- 
trages] M, F. Bajer, member of the Danish Folkething and un- 
tiring advocate of the neutralization of Denmark; M, Horst, 
President of the Norwegian Odelsthing, and M. Lund, Presi- 
dent of the Storthing, the first person of the Kingdom after the 
King; Marquis Don Arturo de Marcoartu, Spanish Senator and 
pioneer advocate of arbitration; Marquis Pandolfi, Italian 
deputy; and Count Apponyl, Hungarian deputy. 

Inasmuch as the Inter-Parliamentary Union is chiefly com* 
posed of British Liberals and members of the Continental 
Parties of the Left, it is not completely representative of the 
nations. The Conservatives and parties of the Right do not 
appear to take an important part In its work. As the qualifica* 


tion for membership in the Union is membership in a national 
parliament, any Member of Parliament or deputy who feels 
inclined may join the organization. Representatives to the 
Conferences are chosen by each national group, but any mem- 
ber of the Union who wishes may attend the reunions and take 
part in their proceedings. The Inter-Parliamentary Union has 
received valuable assistance from the governments. The Nor- 
wegian Storthing set the first example; after about sixty of its 
members had joined the Union, and had chosen three repre- 
sentatives to the Conference in London in 1890, it voted (July, 
1890) 1,200 krone for the traveling expenses of the delegates. 18 
In 1906 the British Parliament voted 500 towards the ex- 
penses of receiving the Inter-Parliamentary Conference which 
met in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. 19 After the 
establishment of a permanent Secretariat of the Union on a 
satisfactory basis, Mr. Lloyd George decided, in 1908, to pro- 
pose to Parliament the provision of an annual grant to the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union of a sum not exceeding 300. Other 
countries also have made contributions to the Union. 20 

Each national group has its Council and its Secretary and is 
represented in the Inter-Parliamentary Bureau, 21 or Council, 
as it was afterwards called. When finally organized in 1892, 
the Union could assail governments from within. Its work is 
positive and practical, while its declarations have a recognized 
standing which is higher than that of any peace society or 
arbitration league petition. The members, although belonging 
to numerous countries and representing various shades of polit- 
ical thought, meet in conference for one purpose only to 
foster peace. The special significance of the Inter-Parliamen- 
tary Conferences lies in the fact that they are composed of 

18 K. P. Arnoldson, Pax Mundi (London, 1909), p, 132. 

w Parliamentary Debates, Fourth series, CLXII, col. 1048, 

M Jbid. f CXCIV, cols, 303-9. 

a * The headquarters of the Union were first fixed at Berne, but in 1909 were 
transferred to Brussels. During the World War they were temporarily moved 
to Christiania, and now Geneva has become the permanent seat of the Union 


legislators chosen by the people; they speak with authority be- 
cause they are supported by millions of electors in many lands. 
The national groups carry the resolutions passed by the Con- 
ference to the knowledge of their governments and parliaments 
and endeavor to bring about action along the lines indicated. 

The beginnings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union movement 
were modest. At first the chief discussion was on the theme that 
"the differences between States shall be submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal to be definitely settled." But the deliberations ulti- 
mately spread to other questions of public international law, 
with the purpose of maintaining peace. The Union has occu- 
pied itself with questions embracing the organization of a 
Society of Nations and an International Tribunal, neutrality, 
armaments, the laws of war, prizes, the treatment of foreigners 
and private international law. 



The Inter-Parliamentary Union has not devoted so much 
attention to the question of the limitation of armaments as it 
has to that of arbitration. In fact, its primary purpose is evi- 
dent from its first name, "Conference interparlementaire pour 
Parbitrage international" This does not mean that the burden 
of military and naval armaments has not been considered by 
the organization; on the contrary, there has hardly been a 
single conference where the overwhelming burden of arma- 
ments has not been pointed out. But the Union in its early 
years concentrated its activity on the problem of Inter-State 
Arbitration and only rarely studied the possibility of an arrest 
of the armament competition. 22 A Secretary General, Christian 
L. Lange ? writing in 1911, states that "one cannot say that the 
question of a limitation of military charges has yet found on 

aa Christian L. Langc, "The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of 
Armaments," The fnfor-Parli&mtnttLry Union from x8$^xg$g t p. 61; nlw, 
Chr&tian L, Lange, Union $nterparlemeiairc t Resolution des conferences e^ 

decisions principals du conml (Bruxelles, 1911), p. 20, 


the part of the Union, all the interest that it merits." 23 This 
was, indeed, true of the first ten years of its history. At the 
Conference in Paris in 1889 M. Jules Gaillard, a French deputy, 
submitted the following propositions signed by severel members 

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, for the purpose of exciting 
in Europe a current of opinion favorable to disarmament, takes note 
of the declaration of several of its members affirming their intention 
to propose and support, in their respective Parliaments, a motion 
tending to a simultaneous and proportional disarmament. 24 

This proposition gave rise to a lively discussion. M. Georges 
Perm opposed it, while several observations were made by MM. 
Sabbatier, Wickersheimer and Marquis Pandolfi. 25 The proces- 
verbal of the session does not report the objections and observa- 
tions ; but on being put to the vote, the resolution was rejected 
and, it is said, so strongly ran the current of feeling that the 
proposer withdrew from the Conference. Subsequently, how- 
ever, a better understanding was reached, and the temporary 
alienation was removed. 26 

At The Hague in 1894, another attempt was made to have 
the Conference consider the question of a limitation of arma- 
ments. On September 5, Mr. Snape introduced the following 

Considering that the excessive and always increasing armaments 
crush the peoples, considering that these armaments are frequently 
regarded as a menace towards other nations and have a provocative 
rather than a preventive character, considering that the mutual, pro- 
portional and simultaneous reduction of armaments would extenuate 
this evil, without disturbing the relative force of the different powers 
for their national defence, 

The Interparliamentary Conference desires that the European 
Governments appoint a commission to resolve or conclude the meas- 

^ Ibid., p. 29. 

a4 Christian L. Lange, JXistoire documentaire de V 'Union Inter parkmentaire, 
proG$$-v6rbat, premiere conference intefpwtementoMre f p. 115. 
m LOG, cit. 
a The Herald of Pwc& September a, 1889, p. 277. 


ures as a means by which the reduction of armaments could be accom- 
plished. 27 

The next day a group of deputies, MM. Byles, Clark, Lund, 
Fyre, Wavorinsky, Stanhope, Cremer and Caldwell, proposed 
that the different parliamentary groups invite their governments 
to take the initiative of an international conference charged 
with arresting the increase of military and naval expenses in 
Europe and of formulating some propositions, tending to the 
mutual, simultaneous and proportional reduction of arma- 
ments. 28 This proposition does not appear to have been con- 
sidered, but when the Conference passed to the discussion of a 
motion concerning the reunion of an International Congress 
whose object would be to study the process of arbitration as a 
means of solving pacifically all conflicts arising between the 
states, Mr. Snape proposed an amendment to the effect that the 
Congress should also study the question of disarmament. The 
President observed that Mr. Snape's proposition was not a 
simple amendment but an additional proposal. After a discus- 
sion the latter withdrew his proposition but reserved the right 
to reintroduce it. 29 Consequently, the Conference of 1894, like 
that of 1889, regarded itself unable to take the question into 
consideration. 30 

Before the next meeting of the Union, Mme. Griess-Traut 
sent a letter to the Bureau advocating the progressive trans- 
formation of the destructive, warlike armies into pacific, pro- 
ductive armies. While combating the argument that the release 
of a great number of troops would be a danger from the eco- 
nomic point of view, she earnestly asked that the Conference 
examine this question with all the attention that it merited. 01 

27 La Conference Inter parlementuire, No. 15 (Berne, November x, 1894), 
proems-verb aux des stances de la conference inter parUinentttire t La Hay a, 1894, 
p. 236- 

. f p. 237. 

30 Ibid., p. 240. 

31 La Conference Inter parlementuire, No. 20, May, 189$. 


But the assembly of delegates, for some motives of opportune- 
ness, eliminated the question of disarmament from the provi- 
sional agenda, 32 and it was not introduced again until the 
Vienna Conference of 1903. 

After the appearance of the Tsar's Rescript, some among 
whom were Mr. W. T. Stead, Nicholas Notovitch, the St. 
Petersburg correspondent of the Times, and M. A. Geouffre de 
Lapradelle of the Law Faculty of Grenoble, a special commis- 
sioner of the Daily News traced its origin partly to the pro- 
ceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1896 at 
Budapest. They state that M. Basili, then Russian Consul- 
General in the Hungarian capital, sent a copy of the Union's 
resolutions to the Minister in St. Petersburg and reported to 
his government strongly in favor of action in the stay of arma- 
ments. Two years later, in consequence of a discussion over 
high expenses on armaments, a report of the Conference at 
Budapest, which was calculated to suggest a remedy, was sent 
to the Emperor. This was supposed to have greatly interested 
Nicholas II, and in a short while he issued his Eirenicon. 33 

Nicholas Notovitch, a Russian pacifist, who, in his own lan- 
guage, was "a modest collaborator of the first days of the 
preparation of the imperial message for world pacification com- 
municated by Count Mouravieff," and author of the Pacification 
of Europe, published at that time to set forth the opinions and 
reasoning of both sides of the question, claims that he drew 
Muraviev's attention to the Budapest Inter-Parliamentary 
Congress report, the presentation of which before the Emperor 
"produced a very great Impression." 34 

M Xbid., No. 24, September, 1895, La VI Conference inter parlementaire, 
p. 344. 

03 F. Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead (Jonathan Cape, London, 1925), II, 
123; Howard Evans, Sir Randal Cremer, p, 179; The Times, December 16, 1898, 
p. 5, col. 6j A, Geouffre de Lapradelle, "La Conference de la Paix," Revue 
g&n&rale de droit international public, VI (1899), 662-63. 

34 Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
May 26, 1933, p. 7, enclosure in a letter from the Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D. C, to the writer, RJP. 116,3/4445, November 18, 1939. 


The above accounts appear to be unsupported by Inter- 
Parliamentary documents. An examination of the proceedings 
of the Budapest reunion does not reveal a single reference to 
disarmament or a limitation of armaments; no resolution on the 
subject was passed, and there is no evidence of a special report 
having been prepared. The Conference considered the question 
of creating a Permanent International Court of Arbitration, the 
protection of foreigners and the right of expulsion, the develop- 
ment of the principle of neutrality, and the organization of a 
central information service. 35 It is possible that M. Basili 
submitted the proceedings of the Conference concerning inter- 
national arbitration and suggested its adoption as a path lead- 
ing to disarmament; it is still more probable that he reported 
the action of the Universal Peace Congress meeting simul- 
taneously at Budapest. At that Congress Mme. Griess-Traut 
presented her proposal for the transformation of unproductive 
armies into productive ones, 30 and Mr. Byles of England pro- 
posed a resolution to prevent the further increase in armament 
expenditure, 37 The Russian Consul-General certainly could 
not have forwarded an Inter-Parliamentary Conference report 
or resolution on the limitation of armaments. 

Furthermore, responsible officials, like Christian L. Lange, 
assert that after ten years of intense work the Inter-Parliamen- 
tary Union had the satisfaction of seeing the First Hague Con- 
ference act upon its repeated resolutions and proposals by 
creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration and by recom- 
mending the conclusion of arbitration treaties; 38 but, so far as 
the writer has been able to determine, they do not assume the 
least credit for having swayed the Tsar in any way. 

In its early years, the Inter-Parliamentary Union found itself 

35 Cample Rendu de la Vll Conference Jnterparkmentaire de Budapest, 
Session de iSg6 (Budapest, 1897). 

30 Bulletin Offidel du VII Congrh Unwersel de la Pai%, tenu 4 Budapest, 
1896, pp. 65-68. 

37 /&*., pp. 83,84. 

38 Christian L. Lange, "The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of 
Armaments," The Inter-Parliamentary Union from i^^p-jpjp, p 61, 


unable to deal with the question of disarmament or to propose 
a scheme for a limitation or even an arrest of armaments. It 
was much more interested in extending the use of arbitration 
as a means of preserving peace. Being a practical body, it dealt 
with only those problems on which it believed it could make 
recommendations to the governments with some chance of their 
being seriously considered. Therefore, it concentrated attention 
on the elaboration of a General Arbitration Treaty and a project 
for an International Court of Arbitration and other problems of 
international law. It appears during the first twelve years of 
the Union's history that the consensus among its members was 
that there could be a serious study of disarmament only after 
the liquidation of the causes of pending conflict. Then the 
states would have sufficient confidence to consent to a diminu- 
tion of their military contingents. 



THE GREATEST moral success in the movement for disarma- 
ment in the decade preceding the First Hague Conference was 
achieved In definitely enlisting the organized co-operation of the 
churches of England, a large part of the Continent and America. 
The person most responsible for this was Dr. W. Evans Darby, 
the Secretary of the London Peace Society. 

The question of engaging the churches in the work of peace 
was the bitterest problem the religious pacifists had to solve. 
The lack of support from the Christian churches had been one 
of the strongest grievances of the early peace societies. The 
revived Societies also condemned the political servitude of the 
churches. In the Herald of Peace for January, 1907, we read: 
"The whole aim and method of the Christian Church, in all its 
directions, seems to be to adapt itself, its teachings and its con- 
duct to its temporal conditions. And the result is a hybrid, 
emasculated form of Christianity, in which the fundamental 
assumptions and seeming necessities of the temporal state are 
accepted as axioms and truisms of the Christian faith. ?? l 

This was not only true of the Established Churches, as could 
be expected, but also of the Dissenting Churches. The Society 
of Friends, which had been the core of the first Peace Societies 
set an example to all other Christian organizations. But only 
the Friends and a few minor sects in America, the Hennonites 
and the Moravians, for example, could point to an uncompro- 
mising ruling on the subject of war and peace* Only occasion- 
ally could a voice be heard from the churches in England and 

1 The Herald of Peace, January, 1907, j>, 7. 


America. In an annual report of 1885 the Committee of the 
British Peace Society referred to the little help they received in 
prosecuting what they claimed to be their eminently Christian 
work, from the churches of the land. Apart from the activity of 
the British and American Friends, they complained there was 
no organized peace effort within any church. 

Perhaps the first protest from a religious body, outside the 
Society of Friends, came in 1889. On July n at a meeting of 
the Canterbury Diocesan Conference held at Lambeth Palace, 
Canon Westcott took the opportunity to discuss the Church's 
duty to promote the peaceful settlement of international dis- 
putes. Seven million men in arms, he argued, constituted a 
great calamity, and he pointed to the use of arbitration as a 
means of furthering peace. 2 At the Methodist Conference held 
at Sheffield in August of the same year, the Reverend Hugh 
Price Hughes moved a resolution expressing strong sympathy 
with all reasonable proposals to substitute arbitration for war. 

After 1889, Methodist opinion on the peace question grew 
rapidly. The annual conference of the Primitive Methodist 
Church meeting at Sunderland on June 14, 1890, carried 
unanimously a resolution of the Reverend T. Mitchell to the 
effect "that national controversies ought to be settled by 
friendly Arbitration, and that the huge armaments of our time 
should cease to exist." 3 

But these isolated utterances from the Methodist Churches 
were not enough: the religious pacifists wished to direct the 
way in which all the Dissenting, if not the Established 
Churches, in all countries might help in the work of peace by 
moral encouragement. Many of the Dissenting bodies were in- 
ternational organizations; they met in international confer- 
ences, which could be used for pacifist purposes and their 
message conveyed to large numbers through a channel of 
national, provincial, state, county and parish gatherings. Dr. 

3 The Herald of P&ac% 9 August i, 1889, p. 257, 
3 Ibid. t July i 1890, p. xoi. 


Darby realized that to enlist the sympathetic co-operation of 
the churches of England and America was to secure for peace 
the greatest force in the social and political life of these coun- 
tries, and he labored for four years, amid the opposition even 
of his own allies, until eventually he organized the "Arbitration 
Alliance/ 7 which officially described itself as an "Association of 
British Christians in behalf of International Arbitration." As 
early as 1889, Dr. Darby had urged that the Universal Peace 
Congress should consider the question of propaganda in the 
churches, but to no avail. At the Paris Congress of that year, 
religious issues were excluded from the agenda. In London, 
however, a resolution was passed urging ministers to recom- 
mend the third Sunday in December in each year as Peace Sun- 
day. At Rome, in 1891, when members were invited to give 
notice of new business, a resolution was handed to the Bureau 
of the Congress resolving that the Christian churches co-operate 
in securing the prevention of war and its final abolition from 
earth. 4 The next year, at Berne, a similar resolution was handed 
to the President, but the Congress was not permitted to con- 
sider even whether it would receive the resolution. It was 
passed on to the Bureau without having been read to the Con- 
gress, and the resolution appeared only on the pages of the 
Report without the Congress having the opportunity of deter- 
mining its own business. It was not until 1893 at Chicago that 
the Universal Peace Congress for the first time recommended 
the churches to support and forward the cause of arbitration, 6 
The "Arbitration Alliance" was the outcome of the movement 
which was endorsed in a resolution at Chicago. But it had its 
rise still earlier in the endeavor among the Presbyterian 
Churches of the United States "to bring to bear the combined 

4 Bulletin du Tromtime Congr&s International de la Paix, Rome f rpi (Rome, 
1892), p. 158. 

5 Report of the Fifth Uniwnd Peace Congress, Chicago, August, xS$3 
(Boston, 1893), p. 294; cf. W, Evans Darby, "The Arbitration Alliance and the 
Universal Peace Congress," A Paper Presented to the Peace Congress at Antwerp, 
August, 1894, published in The Herald of Peace, September and October, 1894, 
p. 109. 


influence of the religious bodies of Christendom upon the Gov- 
ernments of Christian nations, by means of petitions, with a 
view to securing the substitution of arbitration for war in 
settling international disputes." 6 The Presbyterians adopted a 
petition to be addressed to the several governments and asked 
the representatives of other churches to concur with them. 
The petition was drawn up in the respective language of each 
government and the representative bodies of leading Christian 
denominations were requested to authorize its signature on their 
behalf. A number of them did so; and their delegates consti- 
tuted a conference held in New York City in December, 1891, 
at which steps were taken for the further prosecution of the 
work, and arrangements made for another conference at Chi- 
cago in 1893. This conference met on August 16 and 17, at 
the same time as the Universal Peace Congress. The latter 
body passed a resolution approving the work of the Ecclesiasti- 
cal Peace Conference and appealing to the "Christian Churches, 
everywhere, to give their hearty and undivided support to this 
special work, and also to use the great influence which God has 
given them, in promoting the permanent peace of the world." T 
In order to carry out the main design for which it was called, 
the Chicago Conference empowered the Executive to organize a 
Committee in each country to represent it in the accomplish- 
ment of its purpose, the Executive being instructed to place the 
respective petitions in the hands of these several Committees 
with the twofold object of getting them properly signed and 
then suitably presented to the governments. In fulfillment of 
these instructions the Executive invited a number of prominent 
and representative ministers of the churches in Great Britain 
to act as a Committee for the proposed object, and appointed 
Dr. Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society (who was present 
and took part at the Chicago Conference), as Chairman and 
Convener. Up to this point the object of the Committee was 

The Herald of Peace, July i, 1895, p. 227, 
7 Ibid., September and October, 1894, p. 109. 


simply the completion and presentation of the proposed Inter- 
national Petition on Arbitration, but soon it was asked to 
undertake a new task. 

On April 17, 1894, a Conference of the leading members of 
the various churches, convened by the Society of Friends in 
conjunction with the Peace Society, was held at Devonshire 
House, London, for the purpose of considering their duties and 
responsibilities in reference to the militarism and armaments of 
Europe. Mr. Joseph S. Fry presided and was supported by Sir 
J. W. Pease, M.P., Mr. J. A. Bright, M.P., Mr. M. T. Snape, 
M.P., and Secretary of the Friends' Association, Mr. Percy 
Bunting (Editor of the Contemporary Review), Mr. W. T. 
Stead, Dr. W. Evans Darby, Reverend Canon Benham, Ma- 
dame Novikoff and Reverend J. P. Gledstone. There was a 
lengthy discussion as to the form their resolution should take. 
W. T. Stead objected to the body urging the British Govern- 
ment to call a Conference" to promote the reduction of arma- 
ments. He considered it a danger to dictate to the Foreign 
Minister, who should be left perfectly free as to the way he 
approached the powers of Europe. Stead thought that the 
Church Conference should only endeavor to make it quite plain 
that it wanted the Government to make a move and that it 
trusted that they had the common sense to make it and to await 
the issue. Mr. Bright was strongly of the opinion that they 
should urge the calling of a conference of the powers. He could 
not conceive how an agreement could be reached without an 
International Conference; there was no danger in that method 
of procedure; it merely meant that the powers would meet and 
talk things over. Mr. Bunting raised objections to the resolu- 
tion including two distinct points disarmament and arbitra- 
tion; he thought it would be wise to keep these two things 
distinct. Mr, Snape offered a solution by suggesting that the 
body should adhere to the one point of approaching the govern- 
ment on the question of a limitation of armaments and that the 
churches should be urged to continue their agitation in favor of 


arbitration. His suggestion was eventually accepted and em- 
bodied in two resolutions. 8 

On April 24, a meeting of The Committee of the British 
Churches on Arbitration was held for the purpose of consid- 
ering the request, and, after considerable discussion, it was 
resolved to undertake the new duty; but inasmuch as that would 
involve an enlargement of its objects, the Committee decided to 
adopt the title of the "Arbitration Alliance, being an Associ- 
ation of British Christians in behalf of International Arbitra- 
tion. 77 Without a single exception the churches agreed, by 
formal action of some kind, to "the duty of unitedly approach- 
ing the Government, and also of promoting some system of 
International Arbitration. 77 9 

In the majority of instances the churches appointed repre- 
sentatives to take part in a proposed deputation to the Premier 
and the Foreign Secretary. Lord Rosebery at first showed some 
reluctance to receive such a deputation at that period of the 
session of Parliament, but gave the assurance that the question 
which interested the Alliance was constantly engaging the atten- 
tion of Her Majesty 7 s Government, and that they would not fail 
to take any opportunity which might present itself of further- 
ing the principle of International Arbitration. On receiving this 
reply, the representatives forwarded the Memorial, which had 
been prepared for presentation by the deputation, on August 18 
to both Lord Rosebery and Lord Kimberley, with an intimation 
from the Executive that they would be asked to receive the 
deputation at some future time. The Memorialists felt that the 
initiative in mitigating the burdens of militarism could be best 
taken by Great Britain. They stated: 

. . . The neutral policy of this country, the smallness of her 
offensive armaments, her insular position, the commanding personal 
influence of Her Majesty and the friendly relations in which she finds 

8 Ibid,, May i, 1894, p. 63. 

Ibid. f July i 1895, p. 227, from the "Annual Report of The Arbitration 
Alliance, 1894-1895." 


herself with all European Powers, appear to give her a unique oppor- 
tunity, and to impose upon her in this matter a unique responsibility. 
While not presuming to suggest the precise line of action which may 
be expedient, we desire earnestly to ask Her Majesty's Government 
to propose to the other Powers the adoption of some practical step 
designed to promote the international reduction of armaments and 
the establishment of some permanent system of International Arbitra- 
tion. 10 

Among the signers of the Memorial were the Bishops of 
Durham and Ripon, the two Archbishops of Dublin and the 
Bishop of Killaloe, the Deans of Winchester, Hereford and 
Canterbury, and the official representatives of twenty-seven 
religious denominations. 11 

The Memorial was suitably acknowledged by Lord Rosebery, 
and Lord Kimberley sent a reply through his Secretary stating 
that "the objects advocated in the Memorial have the sym- 
pathy of Her Majesty's Government, who will not neglect any 
favourable opportunity of promoting them." But his Lordship 
considered that no useful object would be served by the formal 
presentation of the Memorial, by a deputation, at that time, 12 

Meanwhile, W. T. Stead had set on foot another and a wider 
movement in favor of a National Memorial addressed to the 
British Government urging it to open negotiations with all the 
European powers as a first step towards an agreement on arma- 
ment limitation. After the Devonshire House Conference, he 
had interviews with Lord Rosebery, the Russian Ambassador 
and Cardinal Vaughan on the subject of action to bring about 
a European disarmament. 18 In the month of May Stead sub- 
mitted various proposals to the Executive of the Arbitration 
Alliance in favor of promoting an agreement among the powers 
as to an arrest in the increase of armaments, and to the organiz- 
ing of public meetings throughout the country, A special meet* 

10 Review of Reviews, X (August, 1894), *33- 

" The Herald of Peace, September and October, 1894, p. 105, 

lu Loc, cit. 

10 /*<*., May i, 1894, P* 53- 


Ing of the Executive was called to consider these proposals. In 
the interim, however, Stead ascertained that while Lord Rose- 
bery was in sympathy with the proposed Memorial, he was 
strongly opposed to public meetings. This part of the scheme 
was therefore abandoned; but a Memorial was drawn up and 
submitted to Lord Rosebery, Lord Salisbury and Mr. A. J. 
Balfour for approval before publication. The following is the 
text of the National Memorial which appeared in the Review of 
Reviews for June: 

The continuous and unchecked growth of European armaments has 
now reached a point which necessitates some concerted action to 
secure relief. The pressure of military and naval expenditure threatens 
States with bankruptcy, cripples the industries and impoverishes the 
homes of the people, and diverts to wasteful preparation for slaughter 
funds that would otherwise be available for purposes of social ameli- 
oration and reform. 

This ruinous rivalry in armaments is the inevitable, although 
deplorable, result of the absence of any international understanding. 
It can only be arrested by an international agreement. 

We would, therefore, respectfully but earnestly suggest that com- 
munications should be opened with European Powers, in order to 
ascertain whether it may not be possible as a first step towards 
arresting the further growth of national armaments, and reducing 
burdens almost intolerable, to secure a common and general agree- 
ment that, until the close of the century, no State will sanction any 
increase of its military and naval expenditure beyond the maximum 
of the estimates of the present year. 14 

This practical proposal was intended only to call a halt in 
armaments. It proposed to introduce a law of maximum for 
six years, and it involved no interference with the absolute 
liberty of every power to fix its own armaments according to 
its conception of its requirements- Each power was to be abso- 
lutely free to vary to any extent the sums devoted to each 
branch of service, subject to one limitation only the total war 

14 Review of Reviews, IX, (June, 1894), $80; The Herald of Peace, July 2, 
1894* P 83. 


budget was not to be increased beyond the point at which each 
country had fixed it for that year. They could, of course, reduce 
their expenditure as much as they pleased; there was no law of 
minimum. The aim of the National Memorial was not imme- 
diate disarmament but the maintenance of the existing condi- 
tions. It was believed that after the powers had shown a will- 
ingness to abide by the law of the maximum they would be in 
a much better position to consider the question of the possi- 
bility of a simultaneous modification of the status quo. 

The energies of the Arbitration Alliance were devoted to 
obtaining signatures to the Memorial, which commanded the 
sympathy of the leaders of both political parties, and was put 
forward on the distinct understanding that it would strengthen 
the policy which Her Majesty's Ministers were determined to 
adopt. Tens of thousands of sheets, and thousands of single 
forms for signature were sent out from the office of the Alli- 
ance. The Memorial secured the enthusiastic support of the 
representatives of labor, of religion, of the municipalities, of 
the professions, of the bench, of the press, of literary men and 
scientists, of members of both Houses of Parliament and a 
large number of others of position and influence. 15 

At first it was proposed that the signatures should be gath- 
ered and the Memorial presented to Lord Rosebery without 
delay. "The close of the Parliamentary Session, however, made 
that impracticable, and it was decided to utilize the recess in 
collecting further signatures. On the re-assembling of Parlia- 
ment, Lord Rosebery expressed his willingness to receive the 
Memorial through the delayed deputation from the Associated 
Churches, but his illness caused further delay, OB his return to 
Downing Street, the Prime Minister wrote to Dr. Darby ex- 
pressing his regret that pressure of business compelled him to 
postpone making an appointment for a deputation, but he 
promised to keep the matter in mind. The Memorial, which had 
involved much labor, was then quite ready for presentation, 

30 The Merald of Peace^ August i, 1894, P- 95- 


and the Alliance was only awaiting an intimation of Lord Rose- 
bery's convenience. 

No opportunity occurred during 1895 and 1896 of present- 
ing the National Memorial; and in the meantime a change of 
government took place and the times grew more unsuitable 
than ever. But the effort was not lost. Through the press, in 
which the results were published, the Memorial was virtually 
and effectively presented to both the Government and the 
people. Nevertheless, those who had worked hard to obtain sig- 
natures naturally felt and expressed disappointment that their 
labor seemed wasted. Practically, the work of the Arbitration 
Alliance was completed. That it was not so actually arose from 
circumstances beyond the control of the Committee. 

Finally, to the gratification of those who had labored so per- 
sistently, an opportunity for the presentation of the National 
Memorial came in November, 1897. On the 9th of the month. 
Lord Salisbury, in his speech at the Guildhall, proclaimed as the 
one hope of the nations "the coming together of the Powers for 
the purpose of giving effect to the consciousness of solidarity 
which had been fostered by all the distinctive discoveries of the 
century. He went on to declare that the competition in arma- 
ments, unless curtailed, would end in a terrible effort of destruc- 
tion, fatal to Christian civilization. The one hope that sustained 
him in face of this menacing catastrophe was this: "that the 
Powers may gradually be brought together, to act together in 
a friendly spirit on all questions of difference that may arise, 
until at last they shall be welded together into some inter- 
national constitution which shall give to the world, as the result 
of their great strength, a long spell of unfettered commerce, 
prosperous trade, and continued peace." 16 

The next day, November 10, the Arbitration Alliance pre- 
sented the National Memorial and the Anglo-American Arbitra- 
tion Memorial (which also had been promoted by W. T. Stead) 

19 The ffemld of Peace, XXV (December, 1897)* 326; Review of Reviews, 
XIX, 7. 


to Lord Salisbury. In a covering letter, Dr. Darby reminded 
the Prime Minister that the wording of the Memorial relating 
to an arrest of armaments was the same which Stead had sub- 
mitted to him three years before, when Rosebery's government 
was in power; although a little out of date in form of expres- 
sion, it was still valid, as it conveyed a strong expression of 
opinion on the subject. The National Memorial, when pre- 
sented, bore 34,390 separate signatures. 17 

Lord Salisbury acknowledged receipt of the two Memorials 
and assured Dr. Darby that they would "receive his best con- 
sideration." 18 Thus the work of the Arbitration Alliance was 
completed, except the raising of the sums necessary to balance 
its accounts. 

The movement for disarmament within the churches which 
reached its zenith in the years 1894-97 was primarily confined 
to the dissenting bodies. The leaders in the movement were 
Nonconformists in religious tenets and "Liberals" or "Ad- 
vanced Liberals" in politics. It will be recalled that the Presby- 
terian Churches of the United States were the first to urge 
religious bodies to petition governments with a view to securing 
the substitution of arbitration for war in settling international 
disputes. The Society of Friends furnished the chief impetus to 
the movement in England, for it was they who, in conjunction 
with the Peace Society, convened the Devonshire House Con- 
ference of April 17, 1894, which definitely launched the cam- 
paign. Mr. Joseph Fry, Sir J. W. Pease, Mr, John Bright and 
Mr. M. T. Snape, who took an active part in the agitation, were 
all Friends. The Wesleyans, Methodists and Congregationalists 
gave their assistance to the project. Dr. W. Evans Darby, Hon- 
orary Secretary of the Arbitration Alliance and an indefatigable 
worker for peace, was a Primitive Methodist; while W. T. 
Stead, who used his journalistic talents to further the cause, 
was the son of a Congregationalist minister. The moral sup- 

17 The Herald of Peace, July i, 1895, p. 228. 
lB Ibid, f December i 1897, p. 333- 


port which these pacifists received from the government, the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons, came chiefly but 
not exclusively from Liberal and dissenting members. After 
1898 the interest of the churches in peace and disarmament 
lagged and was only revived in 1914 when the World Alliance 
for Peace through the Churches was founded, but the chorus 
of 1894-97 transcended that of later years. 



ALTHOUGH the Institute of International Law as an organ- 
ized body refrained from expressing definite opinions on the 
question of disarmament or a limitation of armaments, the 
International Law Association and individual jurists from time 
to time during the period 1875-98 turned their attention to the 

At the Hague Conference of 1875 the International Law As- 
sociation, composed of jurists, economists, legislators, politi- 
cians and others interested in the reform and codification of 
public and private international law, adopted a resolution depre- 
cating the ever-increasing armaments of Europe and stating 
that it was "the duty of Governments, in the interest of human- 
ity and civilization, and for the welfare of their own subjects, 
to enter into communication with each other, with a view to 
effect a mutual reduction of those armaments which, far from 
being a security for peace, are a perpetual menace of war." 1 

The subject was again considered by the International Law 
Association at its London Conference in August, 1879, when 
Henry Richard presented his paper, "International Reduction 
of Armaments," a comprehensive statement of facts embracing 
numerical, financial and political aspects of armaments. a At 
Its close an important debate followed, but owing to some dif- 

1 Transactions of the International Law Association, x8?3~x$34 (London^ 
1925), pp. 33-24. 

2 Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, Report 
of the Seventh Annual Conference Held at the Guildhall, London, u-jtf 

(London, 1879), PP. 234-45. 

1 10 


ferences of opinion in regard to the resolution submitted, the 
subject was referred to a committee for investigation and report 
the next year. 

Meanwhile, in 1876, David Dudley Field, an American jurist, 
published his Outlines of an International Code, in which he 
advocated that the number of persons employed in the military 
service of a nation in time of peace should not exceed one for 
every thousand of inhabitants. After pointing out the economic 
burden entailed by the military establishments of Europe, he 
writes : 

A large standing army is not only the enormous burden that it has 
been described, but it is a provocative to war. The arming of a nation 
should be looked upon very much as the arming of individuals. A 
man may keep arms in his house, to be used on occasion, but if he 
walks abroad, always armed to the teeth, he speedily gets into a 
quarrel. So with a nation. The peace of society would certainly be 
endangered by the general practice of wearing arms. It was once so. 
And since social manners have been benefited by a general disarma- 
ment of individuals, it should seem that, for a similar reason, national 
manners would be benefited by a like process. 3 

Field would, however, have retained and especially encour- 
aged the militia, or a large body of drilled citizens, for home 
defense. But this body, consisting of men not restricted, as 
were regular soldiers, in regard to marriage, not subjected to 
demoralizing barrack life, and not permanently maintained at 
the cost of the country, would have furnished a relief from the 
great immorality and excessive expenses which necessarily 
accompanied the European system of standing armies. 

Count Kamarowski, Professor of International Law in the 
University of Moscow and a member of the Institute of Inter- 
national Law, turned his attention to the problem in a pamphlet 
entitled Les Tendences des peuples & la paix et la question du 
d&sarmement. Later writing in the Revue de droit interna- 

3 David Dudley Field, Outlines of An International Code (New York, 1876), 
Article 528, pp, 367-68. 


tional et de legislation comparee, lie pointed out the danger to 
the world of the competition of armaments which was threat- 
ening civilization in general. 4 Simultaneously, Professor James 
Lorimer, of the Faculty of Law of the University of Edinburgh, 
advocated the idea of proportional disarmament. 5 

Also in 1887, M. G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, 6 a Belgian jurist and 
ex-Minister of State, published a pamphlet entitled Limitation 
conventionelle des dispenses et des effectijs militaires. The 
object of his essay was to commend to his colleagues in Parlia- 
ment the consideration of the possibility of limiting, by specific 
treaties between two or more of the chief states of Europe, the 
extent of their respective armaments, and also the best means 
of bringing about and rendering effective so desirable a result. 
He asserted that the indefinite increase of armaments must 
result in the general ruin of Europe, and, therefore, it had 
become the manifest duty of all jurists and statesmen at least to 
attempt measures to obviate such a catastrophe. 

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns communicated his ideas on the subject 
to members of the Institute of International Law, of which he 
was at the time president. At their conference at Heidelberg in 
September, 1887, he pointed out that the public debt of the 
states had been augmented by 80 per cent from 1866 to 1886 
and proposed that the Institute examine "from the point of view 
of international law, whether and to what extent, and by what 
means, it would be possible to restrict the effective forces of 
European States and the amount of their military expenses in 
time of peace within certain proportional limits to be determined 
by treaties between those States." 7 

*Revw de droit international et de legislation compare, XIX (1887), 481. 

s lbid., p. 474- 

Gustave Henri Ange Hippolyte Rolin-Jaequemyns (iS^a-igoa) was a 
founder of the Institute of International Law and of the Rei)w de droik 
international et legislation compare, of which he was editor in chief for many 
years. He served as Minister of the Interior of Belgium (1878-84), general 
adviser to the Siamese Government (1892-1901), as that Government's delegate 
to the First Hague Conference, and later was a member of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, 

7 Revue de droit international et de legislation compare f XIX (1887), 398* 

M. Rolins-Jaequemyns raised three pertinent questions: 

1. From the point of view of the principles of international law, is 
it possible for two or more States to engage themselves reciprocally 
by treaty to limit their respective armaments? 

2. To what extent could such a mutual agreement be made by the 
different European States, and, if it were made, would it bind them? 

3. What would be the means of assuring an efficacious sanction 
to such a treaty? 8 

He asked the Institute to consider how far the generally admit- 
ted principles of international law oppose or support tfre fixing 
of such a limit by treaty, and in case of necessity, the adoption 
of the necessary measures to guarantee the observation of such 
a treaty. Rolin-Jaequemyns was aware that the greatest diffi- 
culty to be overcome in any plan for limiting armaments is the 
maintenance of the complete sovereignty of the state, and as a 
corollary thereof, the right and duty which it has to defend its 
existence by every means within its power. But he asked 
whether there is not, 

. . . alongside the individual right to exist and defend oneself, a 
right, and a common right and duty, for all States forming part of 
one and the same group, to prevent the constant increase of the means 
of defence from becoming the cause of exhaustion, decadence, eco- 
nomic and social disorganization, for the entire group. . . . If it is 
suicidal for a nation to remain unarmed in the midst of armed neigh- 
bors, is it not another method of suicide for a group of nations, united 
by a common civilization, to allow themselves to be carried away in 
a body, in a mad rush to cast each year a constantly increasing pro- 
portion of their money, credit, physical and intellectual activities into 
the ever expanding gulf of military expenditures and armaments. 9 

It appeared to M. Rolin-Jaequemyns that the Institute ought 
to be free from all suspicions of partiality and, therefore, a 
better place than any other for discussing the question of dis- 
armament. Professors Lorimer and Kamarowski supported the 
project; but several members of the Institute declared that it 

8 Ibid., p, 400. lbid>, pp. 402-3. 


would have no result, it was a question foreign to international 
law, and It would be ridiculous to discuss it. They argued that 
such proposals might carry them beyond the bounds of strictly 
legal considerations and introduce political partisan discussion, 
and especially bring down upon themselves the danger that 
"their Institute might thus possibly become confounded with 
some other Societies, whose ideas are more generous than prac- 
tical 7 '; consequently, the proposition was withdrawn. 

Professor James Lorimer of Edinburgh University, who sup- 
ported Rolin-Jaequemyn's proposal, examined the question of 
disarmament and the difficulties which it raised from the point 
of view of international law in the Revue de droit international 
et legislation compare for 1887. He considered three points as 
the premises from which he derived the final solution. Lorimer 
was of opinion that: i. No free State will consent to a change 
whatever in its relation to other States, if this change is to result 
in diminishing its defensive strength, or hindering its future 
development, A modification of the status quo or a reestablish- 
ment of the balance of power, he thought, could not be attained 
by peaceful negotiations. To impair the then existing conditions 
in this regard nothing less than war would have been required. 
If, however, the jurists' purpose was to diminish the chances of 
war, they must accept the equilibrium as established, however 
unstable or unsatisfactory it might seem, 2. If the preceding 
proposition is correct, it follows that jurists' efforts in the direc- 
tion of disarmament should inevitably be based upon the prin- 
ciple of proportionality. By following this principle, whatever 
may be the absolute reduction in the effective force of a state, 
its relation to other states will remain the same, because corre- 
sponding reductions will have been made in the effective forces 
of all other states with which it might come in conflict. 3. No 
independent State will submit to any supervision of the admm** 
istration of its revenues or of its domestic affairs, 1 ^ 

Each state ought to be left free to decide for itself the man- 

10 Ibid,, pp. 473-74- 


ner in which it should proceed to reduce its armaments, either 
by the decrease of the strength of the armies (standing armies, 
volunteer troops or others), or by the abandonment of fort- 
resses, of war vessels, gunboats, torpedo boats and so forth. The 
requirements for the defense of the different states as between 
themselves vary so constantly that Professor Lorimer thought 
it neither possible nor desirable for them to agree upon a uni- 
form application of their military expenditures. It seemed to 
him that all the jurists could reasonably hope for was to per- 
suade the powers to agree to a uniform reduction of expendi- 
tures. He recommended a treaty by which they would engage 
themselves to reduce by 25 or 50 per cent their actual war 
budgets, or, in view of the inevitable changes which must occur 
in the basis of taxation, to diminish the fraction of their total 
revenue which they would devote to military expenses. Such a 
fractional reduction of their total military expenditure would 
result in the maintenance of the actual relation between the re- 
spective forces of the states, while leaving them free to organize 
them according to their own needs. The risk of war would be 
diminished by the limitation of combustible material in each 
country, while the relief from taxes and the burden of obligatory 
service would augment the wealth and direct the attention 
of each generation more towards the occupations of civil 
life. 11 

Professor Lorimer, on the question of the employment of 
chemical discoveries and of 'mechanical inventions, was con- 
vinced that no state would consent to limit itself as to their use, 
or, if it did, judging from the manner in which treaties had been 
respected in the past, it would not observe its engagements in a 
war & outrance* 12 In the absence of an international executive 
there would be no power to enforce engagements entered into. 
Therefore the final problem of international politics, as Lorimer 
conceived it, was the formation of an international legislature, 

., pp. 474-75- 
Ibid., p, 476. 


judicature, and executive. 13 But the question of disarmament 
was too urgent to await the creation of an international organiza- 
tion, which he believed could not be dreamed of, however desir- 
able or even indispensable it might be in the final analysis. 14 

From the economic point of view and in consideration of the 
disadvantage of a partial disarmament upon the labor market, 
Lorimer recommended a gradual reduction, limiting it, for ex- 
ample, to 5 per cent per year until the agreed limit was attained. 15 

Count Kamarowski also considered that disarmament is a 
question that can be solved only along international lines, that 
is, with the formation of a juridical organization. No one single 
state can diminish its forces in the presence of neighbors better 
armed. 16 Although the question ought to be placed on an inter- 
national plane and studied by all states, he thought it incumbent 
upon the great powers par excellence to take the initiative in the 
direction of this reform because they, by their military pre- 
ponderance, menaced general peace. The first example of sin- 
cerity and good will should come from those powers which were 
most responsible for keeping Europe in constant fear of war, 
namely, Germany and France, and after them, England and 
Russia. If the governments were in reality, as they pretended, 
animated by the love of peace, they ought to be ready to make 
some sacrifices and to renounce many of their prejudices to 
secure peace for their people, which is the first and fundamental 
condition of all human progress. They should be willing to 

13 In Volume II, Chapter XVI, pp. 279-87 of his Institutes of the Law of 
Nations f published in 1884 (Edinburgh and London), Lorimer elaborated a 
"Scheme for the Organization of an International Government," He proposed 
a treaty for the establishment of an International Government In which all 
recognized States should be invited to participate, to be negotiated in Two Parts ; 
Part I. "An undertaking by the parties to reduce, simultaneously and propor- 
tionally, their national forces to the limit which they may reciprocally recognke 
as necessary for municipal purposes, but so as to preserve the relative power of 
each State unchanged." Part II, "An undertaking by the parties to establish 
a government for international purposes exclusively, consisting of a legislature, 
judicature, executive, and exchequer," 

14 Revue de droit international) XIX (1887), 476-77. 

10 Ibid., p. 482, "Quclques Reflexions sur les armaments croissants de 


examine first in some preliminary conferences and later in a 
definite Congress the causes which fostered the most antagonism 
and enmity among the European nations. 17 

Kamarowski envisaged disarmament not in the absolute sense 
of the word, "but as a simultaneous and gradual measure, exe- 
cuted by all the European States conforming to the ordered prin- 
ciples of a common accord." 18 He pointed out that the numbers 
of the armies should be regulated according to the states' popu- 
lation, the exigencies of their internal security, and the extent of 
their territories and colonies outside Europe. In view of the 
complexity and novelty of the reform, Count Kamarowski recom- 
mended its application for a certain term, in order to accustom 
the governments and the peoples to its full realization in the 
future. For guaranteeing the execution of the arrangements, 
he looked to the "collective safe-guard" of the states adopting 
them, and later to a more efficacious protection that of an in- 
ternational organization. A state which violated the conditions 
set forth in the act of disarmament would by that very fact 
excite all the other states against it. On this point there might 
be provided in the act of progressive disarmament a complete 
system of repressive measures carefully worked out. Subse- 
quently, an international police force might be organized, com- 
posed of part of the forces concentrated in the different armies 
but which, acting in all its fields, according to the strict prin- 
ciples of international law, would become the guardian of gen- 
eral peace and justice upon earth. Although the organization of 
such a force would be a difficult task, its exponent was convinced 
that the benefits which would emanate from it would be so great 
that the internationalists ought to work with zeal for its reali- 
zation. 19 

Such were the views of Professor Lorimer and Count Kama- 
rowski on the subject of the limitation of armaments; but their 
opinions were of an individual character as they neither repre- 
sented nor committed the Institute of International Law. 

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Secretary-General of the Institute, 

17 Ibid,, p. 483. 18 lUd,, p. 484- * 9 IW., p. 485- 


after it had rejected Ms proposition of 1887, made no further 
attempt to encourage the international jurists to consider the 
problem of disarmament. But in a summary review of the year 
1888 from the point of view of peace and international law, he 
pointed out that one of the most striking contradictory phe- 
nomena in regard to pacific protestations was the continued in- 
crease of armaments. Quoting figures from the Daily News of 
January, 1889, Rolin-Jaequemyns stated that the total war effec- 
tives for Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy and Russia 
were 9,610,000; the second reserves 7,860,000; and the final 
reserves 8,660,000, making a total of 24,63o,ooo. 20 The States- 
man's Year Book and HazelFs Annual Cyclopaedia of 1889 gave 
generally more moderate figures, approximately 16,000,000. 
But even these large numbers prepared for war represented a 
contradiction between armaments and the sincere desire for 
peace which the governments and people professed to entertain, 21 
In 1894, M. F. de Martens, Professor of International Law at 
the University of St. Petersburg and a member of the Institute, 
published an article in the Revue de droit international et llgis- 
lation comparle entitled, "La Question du desarmement dans 
les relations entre la Russie et PAngleterre." At the outset he 
stated: "We have no intention of solving this problem which so 
highly interests the life of civilized nations. We confine our- 
selves to placing under the eyes of our readers some data, found 
in the archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs atid up to the 
present unpublished." 22 This material related to the 1816 pro- 
posal of Alexander I to Lord Castlereagh for a simultaneous 
reduction of the armed forces and the Prince Regent's project 
of an International Conference of military men to decide on 
an exact quota for the normal peace footing of the armies of 
each power. 2a 

20 G, Rolin-Jaequemyns, "La Ann<e 1888 au point de vue do la paix et du 
droit international," Revue de droit international et de legislation compar&e, 
XXI (1889), 98. 

m Revue de droit international et legislation compare, XXVI (1894), 573. 
23 Ci supra, Chapter I. 


Three French jurists, however, Raoul de la Grasserie, A. 
Souchon and A. Merignhac, turned their attention to the prob- 
lem of disarmament and made definite suggestions for solving 
it. In 1894, Raoul de la Grasserie, Doctor of Law and judge 
in the court of Rennes, published his monograph, Des Moyens 
pratiques pour parvemr a la suppression de la paix armee et de 
la guerre. He spoke of the inertia of the people and urged 
public opinion to formulate a popular wish clearly expressed to 
the governments of the different countries. This he deemed 
necessary in order to constitute a vast international society. In 
his project of an International Convention for the suppression 
of war and the armed peace he advocated the formation of a 
United States of Europe and a United States of America for the 
purpose of assuring perpetual unarmed peace. He envisaged 
three steps in the creation of this international society: first, the 
preparatory period or the organization of the international 
army; second, the transitory period or disarmament; and, third, 
the definitive period or period of international government. 
Under Title IV he provided for a period of extension during 
which the United States of Europe and the United States of 
America might, while remaining distinct, unite in a world 
federation for lending mutual assistance in certain cases. Asia, 
Africa and other parts of the world might adhere either to one 
or the other of the federations under the same conditions as 
other member states. 

La Grasserie was of opinion that we ought not to have force 
without law and law without force. He was convinced that 
no state will or should take the initiative in disarming, for na- 
tional disarmament before international armament is a danger. 
Moreover, an international tribunal without an international 
force is a vain word; and finally, the abolition of war without 
the abolition of the armed peace is Utopian, while an inter- 
national tribunal, with an international army to support it, is a 
reality. National disarmament after international armament 
cannot victimize nor endanger any state, not even the one which 


disarms first. The abolition of wax after that of the armed 
peace would come of Itself. 24 

The jurist took for the basis of his Convention the accept- 
ance of the status quo. Although he realized that the map of 
Europe ought to be remade according to the objective principle 
of nationality, he knew that would be possible only by cession 
of territory which would not be yielded except as the result of 
a series of wars. In virtue of his Convention there would be 
created at once: (i) an international tribunal, (2) an inter- 
national army, and (3) an international administration. 25 

The international tribunal, composed of delegates of the 
parliaments of each state, would reside permanently at the seat 
of the delegation, located in some small country. Each state 
would send a number of delegates proportional to its population 
but decreasing following a progressive scale in order not to 
leave the decisions to the great powers. Each state, regardless 
of its size, would have a minimum number of delegates. 

The international army would have its seat also in one of the 
small countries in the union. Each state would furnish a con- 
tingent proportioned to its population, and a contribution of 
money in advance. The army would be raised by voluntary 
engagement, and in default of sufficient numbers volunteering, 
by recruitment. The duration of service would be five years, 
with facilities for re-engagement for two years. At the expira- 
tion of this term the men would be sent to their homes, there to 
form an international reserve which could be called up to 
increase the international force in case of need. As soon as this 
force was organized all the states would disarm their individual 
armies. They would no longer have to fear the inconvenience 
and danger resulting from having disarmed before the others, 
for the army of peace would come to their aid before their 
neighbors could attack them. The mere existence of this force 

24 Raoul de la Grasserie, Des Moyens pratiques four parvenir & la suppression 
de la paix armie et de la guerre (Paris, 1894) , p, 60, 


would suffice to impose silence upon all. The chief argument 
raised against disarmament would disappear; for the inter- 
national administration, possessing the right of inspection and 
of visiting all ports and arsenals and the federal force, would 
stop armaments in the process of formation. 26 

The international administration, with its seat at the same 
place as that of the international army and tribunal, and com- 
posed of emissaries of the different parties, would supervise the 
disarmament or the non-armament. The President, named by 
the members of the Administration, would have the role of 
Minister of Public Affairs and the title of President of the 
United States of Europe. 27 

As soon as the tribunal was formed, all the differences be- 
tween states which could not be settled by diplomacy would 
be submitted to it. War between federated states would be for- 
bidden, for the international government would take up the 
cause of the menaced party, while war against a non-federated 
state might be declared only with the consent of the tribunal. 
In a war between states or against savages, if it were "just" 
(and the tribunal would decide that point), the federated 
nation interested would not wage it; the international army 
would do the fighting with contingents from other countries. 
Each nation would be free to colonize at will, but it might main- 
tain only a defensive force in its colonies. Colonial wars would 
only be authorized after investigation. 28 

The battle fleet of each state would cease to exist. But the 
international army would be assisted by an international navy, 
of which the contingents would be furnished in the same man- 
ner by the states possessing a navy. This fleet would be suf- 
ficient to protect the operations of the army and to combat the 
national marines which might be armed in defiance of the 
federal pact. 20 

20 La Grasserie, op. dt,, p. 61. 

Ibid,, p. 64, and Appendix, p, 93, 
Ibid*, p. 64, and Appendix, p. 89. 

28 Ibid, 
580 Ibid, 


With the establishment of the international army, each state 
would start immediately to disarm; this disarmament should 
be, as much as possible, simultaneous, or should commence with 
the parties most strongly armed and finish with the small 
powers. But disarmament could not be absolute, because each 
state would have need of a certain contingent of armed force 
to preserve domestic order. La Grasserie recommended a na- 
tional gendarmerie composed of all the men who had once been 
part of the army of peace and had been dismissed. In case of 
an emergency they would be supported by all the armed 
citizens. 30 

The diminution of the national army would commence im- 
mediately by the contingent detached for the international army 
not being replaced. At the end of two years, the national army 
of each country should be reduced by one-fifth; two years later, 
by another one-fifth; two years later, by a third one-fifth, and 
so on. The international administration would supervise this 
successive disarmament by means of emissaries visiting each 
country. 31 

Under Title II La Grasserie proposed that ten years after the 
initiation of the convention the international government would 
order by decree the disarmament of all the contracting states. 
This would affect both military and naval armaments and 
should be carried out in a period of six months. Each state 
would, however, preserve effectives in the form of a land army 
and sea forces for the purpose of maintaining internal order; 
and the size of these forces would be fixed in each case by the 
international tribunal which would also determine the amount 
of arms and ammunition of every kind that should remain in 
the arsenals. 32 

This organization accomplished, that is to say, general dis- 
armament effected, especially after it had been sincerely prac- 

30 Ibid., pp, 58, 63, and Appendix, p, 90. 

31 Ibid., Appendix, pp. 90-91. 

32 Ibid.) Appendix, pp. 91-92, 


ticed during a certain time, La Grasserie thought that the army 
of peace could be decreased. It would, however, always main- 
tain a figure necessary to assure that the decisions of the inter- 
national tribunal would be respected. 33 

Such was La Grasserie's project for abolishing war and 
compassing disarmament: an international tribunal for judging 
disputes between states, an international army capable of exe- 
cuting decrees by force, an international administration to 
supervise the disarmament; once the disarmament were effec- 
tive, the international army, called the army of peace, could be 
reduced to the figure necessary to constrain any one of the dis- 
armed states. His proposal suggested a more complete system 
than that established under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, for he was aware that there can be no law of peace 
without force an international force. He believed moral com- 
pulsion alone inadequate; hence, his proposal for military sanc- 
tions to be carried out by an international army. Thus he over- 
came one great obstacle to national disarmament; namely, that 
an unprotected state may be left at the mercy of neighbors 
better armed. The jurist's proposition, insofar as it did not 
advocate the complete abolition of war and total disarmament, 
was not Utopian. His aim was to diminish the causes of war, 
to make it when waged a "just" war, and then only to punish 
a recalcitrant state with an international army in strict con- 
formity with the international rules of war. 

Certain features of La Grasserie's plan were, however, bound 
to be unacceptable to the great powers. The first, and no doubt 
the greatest, difficulty would have been to secure the acquies- 
cence of all the states in the then existing status quo, thus re- 
nouncing the right to obtain by war new territorial limits. They 
could only hope for a modification of frontiers by international 
accord. Would Germany have ever agreed to reopen a ques- 
tion which she considered definitely closed by treaty? Can one 
imagine that France, with Alsace-Lorraine in mind, and Russia, 


with a protective eye on the Balkan Slavs, would have accepted 
the status quo of 1894? Yet, without this condition there was 
no basis for the proposed convention. La Grasserie's proposal 
to abolish all battle fleets would certainly have raised serious 
objections on the part of the naval powers. Can one imagine 
Great Britain, at any time since the days of, the Spanish Ar- 
mada, agreeing to abandon her battleships? Can we visualize 
the greatest imperial power voluntarily relinquishing the right 
to wage a colonial war or to dispatch a punitive expedition? 
Moreover, few great powers would have been willing to submit 
all their differences, regardless of their "justiciability," to the 
international tribunal, for most states prefer to fight rather than 
run the risking of having to surrender "vital interests. 77 Fur- 
thermore, the tribunal, as conceived by La Grasserie, was to 
be composed of delegates of the national parliaments. He did 
not specify that they should be jurisconsults learned in national 
and international law; which omission, in view of the gravity of 
the disputes that might have to be referred to the Court, seems 
fatal. In addition, Title IV, or the Period of Extension, pro- 
viding for a world federation in which the United States of 
America might in certain cases come to the aid of the United 
States of Europe and vice versa, would, no doubt, in the light of 
the fate of Article jo of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
have been considered impracticable. Finally, the basis of La 
Grasserie 7 s project was federation a United States of Europe 
and a United States of America. But a federation with its 
central power imposing itself upon all states is a possibility only 
between homogeneous people, of a common origin, having simi- 
lar traditions, customs, ideas, and one would like to say related 
languages, for different languages are the greatest intellectual 
frontier between nations. Thus one can conceive of Latin 
American Federation, a federation of the Scandinavian States, 
and, perhaps, a federation of the British Dominions, although 
here the great distances which separate them and the diversity 
of their problems act as handicaps. Autonomy, rather than 
federation, has proved the means of realizing the British Com- 


monwealth of Nations. Federation is unrealizable between 
peoples who are not united by at least some of the above- 
mentioned ties. Strong national sentiment is in itself a potent 
contradiction of federation; to think of universial confedera- 
tion is to dream the impossible. 

In the first volume of the Revue generale de droit inter- 
national public for 1894, M. A. Souchon, a Fellow in the 
Faculty of Law at Lyon, examined the problem of disarma- 
ment. Replying to the arguments of some that a limitation of 
armaments could be brought about by regulating two or three 
particularly irritating European questions, he stated his belief 
that the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the death of 
the "sick man of Europe" would not necessarily mean that 
there would be no more causes of war. 34 Neither did he wish to 
subordinate the success of disarmament to that of arbitration, 
which would mean retarding it for a long time. 35 International 
jurists should not confine their efforts to working for a general 
peace in a far distant time which would lead to the disappear- 
ance of military expense. They should look for a method by 
which the nations, without renouncing anything of their rivalry 
or their ambition, could conclude treaties limiting the perma- 
ment forces of each of them. A good convention, in M. Sou- 
chon's opinion, ought not to demand of the states sacrifices of 
a nature to compromise their national defense; at the same time 
its mechanism should be simple enough for frauds to be easily 
prevented. He outlined three types of agreements: 

1. A disarmament convention fixing the maximum number of 
permanent troops for each of the great States. 

2. A .system to consist in establishing an age limit (30 years, for 
example) beyond which States would engage themselves never to call 
their subjects under the flag. 

3. A general agreement to limit the service in all the active armies 
to a minimum duration of one year. 36 

84 A. Souchon, "La Question du disarmament," Revue gentrah de droit 
international public, I (1894), 514-15. 
~" I., p. 515. 


The first two propositions M. Souchon considered unrealiz- 
able, for how could the number for each state be determined? 
How could it be guaranteed that a state would not augment 
the appearance of its population in order to give it a right to 
stronger effectives? How could the system be supervised? 37 
The second, he indicated, is completely contrary to the true 
conception of disarmament. It would not have a serious effect 
during a war, when it would become inapplicable. During 
peace it would not diminish the permanent armies nearly ex- 
clusively composed of men from twenty to twenty-five years. 
Such a system of limitation must remain ineffective against the 
evils of the armed peace. 38 

There remains, however, the third idea. This he recom- 
mended by reason of its reducing to a minimum the sacrifices 
required of the powers. Yet, in time of war they would have 
recourse to armies just as numerous, composed of men who 
would have served with the colors. "It is true," writes Souchon, 
"they would have remained there only a year, but this should 
offer no difficulty when one recalls with what facility France 
passed from the seven years 7 service to the five-year period and 
then to the three-year period. Let us also remember that Ger- 
many dismisses her contingents after two years of service. It 
must be admitted that the reduction of military service to one 
year would not seem to anyone an excessive sacrifice," S1) 

The French jurist did not intend that the limitation to a year 
of service would be absolute. In each country it would be neces- 
sary to admit that the officers, the non-commissioned officers, 
such as the gendarmerie or the colonial garrison, would remain 
in training more than one year. The great problem here would 
be to determine the execution of the exception. Whether such 
a proposition for a limitation of armaments would have an 
early success, M. Souchon thought depended entirely upon 
public opinion, i.e., on the people seeing clearly the necessity 
for disarmament. 

37 Ibid., p. $17. as Ibid., p. 5x8, a0 loc. cit. 


In 1895, M. A. Merignhac, Professor of Public and Private 
International Law at the University of Toulouse, published his 
Traite theorique et pratique de V arbitrage international. In this 
treatise he expressed the opinion that there could be a detente 
which would permit the substitution of pacific solutions for war 
only after the liquidation of the causes of pending conflict. Then 
only would the states have sufficient confidence to consent to a 
diminution of their military contingents. After the settlement 
of outstanding questions one could think of disarmament, which 
would be the natural consequence of their disappearance, and 
of the establishment of a juridical state which would prevent all 
new causes from developing, or would settle them pacifically as 
they arose. 40 

Professor Merignhac did not examine the practical ways and 
means by which disarmament could be effected after the actual 
disappearance of the causes of war. He believed that a general 
Congress, called to alleviate the dangers which threaten peace, 
would have to take the necessary measures, it being understood 
that the question interested the whole of Europe and that spe- 
cialists would arrange the numerous technical details. He con- 
fined himself to indicating the general rules along which dis- 
armament should, in his opinion, be carried out. In the first 
place it should be simultaneous and collective, because, as such, 
it would become a possibility. Otherwise, it must constitute a 
trickery and an imprudence of such gravity that no nation could 
take the responsibility. In the second place, disarmament could 
only be partial^ since an internal force is necessary for each 
state. Finally, it ought to be proportional and progressive.* 1 

M. Merignhac considered universal confederation or even 
European federation a dream. 42 An international state, with 
legislative, judicial and executive powers, the last supported by 
a permanent army, appeared to him to excite the same fears 

40 A. Merignhac, Traite theorique et pratique de V arbitrage international 
(Paris, 1895), pp. 508-9, Paragraph 545. 

41 Ibid., p, 5x2, Paragraph 549. 

42 Ibid., p. 406, Paragraph 438. 


as the principle of universal federation, the same defiance in 
respect to a central power which might become tyrannical. To 
pursue the creation of an international state was, in the French 
jurist's opinion, to set back indefinitely international reform. 
The conception of such a state, coming to complicate problems 
already complex, was useless to attain the end pursued. He 
believed that peace could be maintained by solving interna- 
tional litigations by juridical means. This he considered neces- 
sary and at the same time sufficient. 43 

To secure peace M. Merignhac thought it essential to estab- 
lish some judicial institution which would assure the triumph of 
law over violence. This new organization should unite two in- 
dispensable conditions acceptability and durability. It would 
be acceptable, if it were not complicated and did not frighten 
the people by innovations too radical and too costly for their 
budgets; if it did not lead to convulsions in the actual status 
quo, such as would bring on war while having peace for their 
objectives; if it did not constitute a powerful organization 
frightening the states on the subject of their actual and future 
independence. On the other hand, it would be durable if flexible 
enough to meet all the ulterior changes which might result from 
circumstances, and especially from the evolution of national- 
ities, without becoming the motive or the pretext, and providing 
its decisions applied to all the litigants and were sanctioned in 
a sure and efficacious manner. 44 

The jurist did not explain what a "sure and efficacious" 
manner would be. He was opposed to the creation of an in- 
ternational executive and police force capable of enforcing 
international decisions on a recalcitrant state, But moral com- 
pulsion alone was not in 1895, any more than it is In 1942, suf- 
ficiently strong to guarantee the enforcement of international 
arrangements. Moreover, he appears to have overlooked the 
fact that certain types of cases are unsuitable for settlement 

. f pp. 409-10, Paragraph 443. 
V pp. 426-27, Paragraph 4S9- 


along juridical lines and that sovereign states refuse to submit 
all their differences to arbitration. 

M. Merignhac thought it prudent to change as little as pos- 
sible, to realize only the absolutely indispensable reforms; con- 
sequently, he advocated only the establishment of an inter- 
national judiciary and not a legislature and executive. But on 
this point he was opposed to a permanent tribunal composed of 
judges, unimpeachable, having a fixed term, and exercising a 
function comparable to that filled by the national magistrates. 
Permanent judges, he feared, might become too powerful; that 
which he considered should be rendered lasting was the prin- 
ciple and not its functions, the jurisdiction but not those who 
were to exercise it. 45 In place of permanent jurists, unimpeach- 
able, he preferred judges named for each case juries in a 
word. The jurisdiction would thus be permanent, but the 
people exercising it would be chosen as arbitrators. 46 

The conclusion drawn by Professor Merignhac in his study 
was that when the questions of the Orient and Alsace-Lorraine 
should be liquidated and disarmament acted upon, the moment 
would have come to consider the establishment of an inter- 
national jurisdiction, which subsequently would prevent war 
between the nations. Up to then, this jurisdiction appeared to 
him absolutely impossible of realization, because the great 
powers would reject it from fear of seeing it intervene in the 
great questions dividing them. Moreover, supposing it were 
established, its decisions could be violated with impunity by 
those states to which they appear prejudicial. The jurisdiction 
destined to secure the reign of justice was, he thought, scarcely 
conceivable in the bellicose atmosphere of Europe, for law 
dwells in regions more serene and less tormented. If the sub- 
stitution of law for force in the solution of international dis- 
putes were possible and if there existed certain obstacles which 
rendered it unrealizable in the eyes of those who did not live in 
abstractions but sanely envisaged the actual condition of in- 

45 Ibid., p. 428, Paragraph 460. * 6 Ibid., p. 429, Paragraph 461. 


ternational society, then the first step was to remove the 
obstacles. 47 

During the period 1875-98 individual jurists condemned the 
ever-mounting armaments and hoped to see the governments 
restrict their military budgets within certain proportions, but 
the international jurists as a body refrained from enunciating 
theories on a subject for which they saw no practical solution 
of the difficulties involved. Disarmament is indeed a question 
of policy for governments and not one of international law; 
jurisconsults were therefore under no obligation to consider it. 
In spite of their realizing the constant danger to peace in the 
increasing armaments, they nevertheless remained officially 
silent on the question. At the annual conference of the Institute 
of International Law not a single resolution on the subject was 
proposed; 48 nor did the International Law Association pass a 
disarmament resolution after 1875 or discuss the problem be- 
tween its 1879 and 1907 conferences. 49 From 1888 until Tsar 
Nicholas II issued his famous Rescript, only two articles on 
armaments and disarmament appeared in the Revue de droit 
international et de legislation compar&e one in the Revue 
ginirale de droit international public*' 1 not one in the Revue 
de droit public et de la science politique en Prance et <! 
Vitranger^ not one in the Juridicial Review or the Harvard 

47 Ibid., pp. 514-15, Paragraph 550. 

48 Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit International and Resolutions of the Insti- 
tute of International Law Dealing with the Law of Nations (New York, 1916), 

40 Transactions of the International Law Association, i^/j-ipa^, compiled by 
W, A. Bewes, p, 39, p, 234, p. 251. 

00 Revue de droit international et de legislation compart, XXI (1889), 
77-103 and XXVI (1894), 573-85. There were, however, three articles In 
XIX (1887), 398-407; 472-78; 479-86. 

81 Revue g<$n$rah de droit international public t 1 (1894), $13-23. 

w ln Vol. Ill (1894), p. 183, there was a one-paragraph notice concerning 
M. Souchon's proposal and a short unsympathetic reference (p, 390) by M. 
Moureau, of the Law Faculty at Aix, to M. Jules Simon's recommendation for 
the reduction of military service to a year. 


Law Reviews The great majority of the jurists saw no means 
of solving the technical difficulties involved in the limitation of 
armaments and then supervising and enforcing any arrange- 
ment that might be made. Seeing no method of removing 
the nightmare which weighed upon the world, they remained 

If the governments had been willing to limit their armaments 
and had turned to the jurists for a draft treaty on the subject, 
the jurisconsults would have had difficulty in agreeing on its 
actual form. Some would have recommended the reduction of 
the term of military service as the most practicable step, but 
that is only one form of reduction of armaments which does not 
take into consideration naval armaments, fortifications, weapons 
of war and war potential. Raoul de la Grasserie, for example, 
hoped to bring about disarmament through the creation of a 
vast international society; M. Merignhac believed that general 
disarmament could come only after the liquidation of the causes 
of conflict; while M. Souchon was of opinion that international 
jurists should not await a far distant peace before approaching 
the subject, but that they should recommend the conclusion of 
treaties limiting the permanent forces of each state. He con- 
sidered the most efficacious approach to the problem to be the 
limitation of military service in general to one year. But this, 
he understood, was not in reality disarmament, for the great 
powers had already augmented their effectives by the same laws 
which diminished their military term, for example, France in 
1889 and Germany in 1893. M. Merignhac, on the other hand, 
considered one year of service inadequate. 

Still the few international jurists who did approach the prob- 
lem of limiting armaments went far more deeply into It than 
did most members of the Universal Peace Congresses, who 
thought that disarmament could be solved through the use of 
arbitration. The jurisconsults realized that peace and dis- 
armament would only come with the formation of an interna- 
tional government. Although they differed as to the form this 


organization should take, they agreed on one point that a 
strong public opinion in favor of disarmament would have to 
express itself before governments would feel compelled to act 
upon the problem. 




BY 1888 the excessive armament expenditure of the Great 
Powers was considered one of the major problems facing 
Europe. A survey of the statements both auspicious and in- 
auspicious made about armaments during the decade 1888-98 
offers sufficient proof that in the various countries the question 
of a limitation was making headway among the official class. 
The two British Prime Ministers of the period, the Marquis 
of Salisbury and Lord Rosebery, turned their attention to the 
problem. The German Emperor, the Tsar of Russia, the Kings 
of Italy and Denmark, by their behavior caused vague rumors 
of their interest in disarmament to be circulated in the press. 
Yet so cautious and so shrouded in secrecy was the official 
approach to the problem that it is almost impossible today to 
determine its exact nature; one thing, however, is certain: never 
before was the question of heavy armaments considerd by gov- 
ernments with such gravity and foreboding. 

The Marquis of Salisbury, who in his Lord Mayor's Day 
Speech of 1887 had referred to the ever-increasing European 
armaments, again drew attention to the problem at the Guild- 
hall on November 9, 1888. Speaking on the "Peace of Europe/' 
he said: 

And there is another danger, or, if not a danger, a cause of dis- 
quietude a cause which if it does not disquiet us, must at least 
attract our earnest attention, and that is that, year after year, we 
see that new necessities of fresh armaments are recognized. Fresh 
forces are brought into the ranks, larger and larger armaments are 
constructed, vaster and vaster sums are devoted to the purposes of 



defence. And as the process goes on we ask Where is it to end? 
Will the time come when the nations will think that they have pre- 
pared enough and will begin to decrease their accumulations of arma- 
ments and men? I see it stated on good authority that there are no 
less than 12 millions of men, of armed men maintained by the five 
Powers of Continental Europe, 1 

The Prime Minister did not conclude on a note of hope of 
seeing the burden diminished but rather by appealing to his 
country to prepare even more to face the impending danger. 
"I do not say," Lord Salisbury continued, "that this should 
diminish our confidence in peace, but I feel that there is a 
general impression pervading the community one of those 
wide public impressions affecting every mind and every class 
which carries by its very universality the warrant of its truth 
which tells us that in the midst of so much preparation we must 
not remain unprepared." 

This was typical of Lord Salisbury's attitude towards the 
armament problem. He saw no chance of permanent peace in 
Europe so long as the powers continued to increase and perfect 
the instruments of destruction which they might use against 
each other; still, having regard to the dangers surrounding 
Great Britain, he felt compelled to provide the necessary pre- 

Several writers interested in peace and disarmament among 
whom were W. T. Stead, an English journalist; "Diplomaticus" 
(the poet Mr. Austin); A. Geouffre de Lapradelle, a French 
Professor of Law; Robert Coulet and Dr. Hans Wehberg, 
both authors of books on the limitation of armaments stated 
that about 1890 Lord Salisbury had a report on the financial 
aspects of armaments drawn up for the private information of 
the Foreign Office* The memorandum is said to have been "very 
confidentially" communicated to Emperor William II, who was 
astonished by it and made known his intention of calling a 
European Congress to concert practical means for assuring uni- 

1 The TimeSf November 10, 1888, p, 10, col. 4. 


versal peace. His project, vaguely announced in the press, was 
badly received, especially in France; in consequence, it was 
dropped. W. T. Stead, in the Review of Reviews Annual for 
1899, entitled the "United States of Europe," traced the germ 
of the Tsar's Rescript to this document. 2 Stead, 3 Coulet, 4 Du- 
bois, 5 and de Lapradelle 6 claim that the Kaiser intended to call 
a conference. Mr. Austin, 7 a whole-hearted supporter of Lord 
Salisbury's policy and a frequent visitor at Hatfield, 8 stated his 
belief that it gave rise to an exchange of views among the 
Powers. 9 

These men may be partly correct, but the writer has been 
informed that the report in question was not drawn up on Lord 
Salisbury's instructions; it was produced from Italian records, 
on his own initiative, by Mr. Henry Nevill Bering of the British 
Embassy at Rome, and communicated by him to the Marquis 
of Dufferin, who forwarded it to Lord Salisbury. 10 The docu- 
ment was not published. 11 

The Marquis of Salisbury may have communicated this sta- 
tistical report to the German Emperor, who may have wished 
and even intended to call a Peace Conference. In fact, numer- 
ous rumors to that effect circulated in the press in the early 
'nineties. It is possible that there may have been an exchange 
of views among the powers: although it is conceivable that 

2 F. Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead, II, 122-23. 

3 Loc. cit.y also Stead, La Chronique de la Conference de la Haye i8gg, p. 3. 

4 Robert Coulet, La Limitation des armements, pp. 75-76. 

5 Georges Dubois, Des Charges de la paix armie et de la limitation des 
armements, pp. 85-86. 

6 Revue ginirale de droit international public, VI (1899), 622-23. 

7 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, The Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (Hodder 
and Stoughton, London, 1932), IV (1887-92), 56, 

8 Hatfield House, Lord Salisbury's Hertfordshire Home. 

"Diplomaticus," "The Vanishing of Universal Peace," The Fortnightly 
Review, LXXI (New series) (May, 1899), 875. 

10 Letter from the Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office to the writer. 
L 73 3/449/405, February 22, 1935. The writer has examined this unpublished 
document in the Foreign Office. 

"Foreign Office Archives, Enclosure 2 in Despatch No. 72 sent by the 
Marquis of Dufferin to the Marquis of Salisbury, April 29, 1890. 


W. T. Stead, de Lapradelle, Coulet, Dubols and Wehberg may 
have been mistaken, as not one gives a primary source for his 
statement and no doubt the latter four copied Stead or "Diplo- 
maticus"; one would hardly expect Mr. Austin to have made so 
important a statement involving Lord Salisbury without any 
foundation. There is the possibility that the Prime Minister 
had a special report on the financial aspects of armament 
other than the one sent to him by the Marquis of Dufferin 
drawn up for the private information of the Foreign Office and 
that he submitted it to William II. On this point, however, the 
Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office has informed the 
writer that "the only memorandum which can be traced in that 
Department having any resemblance to the one described is a 
report on the revenue and expenditure of the Seven Great 
European Powers for the period 1882-88, including the figures 
for naval and military expenditure." 12 The Marquis of Salis- 
bury, when accepting the Tsar's invitation to a Peace Confer- 
ence, inferred that some attempts to limit armaments had pre- 
viously been considered. He wrote to Sir C. Scott, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that "serious and successful 
efforts have on more than one recent occasion been made with 
that object by the Great Powers." 13 If anything was done by 
Lord Salisbury and the Kaiser it must have been "strictly con- 
fidential" and it remains so, for Lady Gwendolen Cecil states 
that she has not come across any document at Hatfield House 
referring to the subject. 14 Moreover, the Foreign Office Li- 
brarian, on the instruction of Sir John Simon, informed the 
writer that "there is nothing in the Foreign Office archives to 
suggest that the contents of the despatch No. 72 of 2gth April, 
1890, from His [sic] Majesty's Ambassador at Rome regarding 
the cost of armaments in Europe, were ever communicated to 

12 Letter from the Assistant Librarian at the Foreign Office to the writer, 
L 733/449/45> February 22, 1935. 

13 B. D., I, 221, The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, London, October 
25, 1898. 

14 Letter from Lady Gwendolen Cecil to the writer, December 31, 1934. 


the German Emperor." 15 There is, of course, the remote possi- 
bility that some other document was submitted to the Kaiser, 
but this does not appear probable in view of the fact that the 
Editors of Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 
1871-1914 write that the statement made by W. T. Stead and 
others to the effect that William II planned a peace conference 
in the early 'nineties is unsupported by any documents they 
have found in Berlin. 16 

Although the Marquis of Salisbury appears to have made no 
official proposal for a limitation of armaments. Lord Rosebery 
in 1894 approached the Russian Ambassador, Baron de Staal, 
on the problem. For years Rosebery had been in close touch 
with the Liberal and Dissenting movement for a limitation of 
armaments. This agitation reached its highest point in the 
summer of 1894; in May and June, articles urging a reduction 
of the term of military service and a halt in armament expendi- 
ture written by M. Jules Simon and W. T. Stead appeared in 
the Contemporary Review. In May Stead also suggested in his 
Review of Reviews that the Powers should agree not to allow 
their military and naval budgets to pass beyond the 1894 limit 
until the end of the century. Ever since April, the Churches 
and the Arbitration Alliance had been busy collecting signa- 
tures to a Memorial to the Government on the limitation of 
armaments, 17 In May Stead initiated a National Memorial ad- 
dressed to the British Government, urging the opening of nego- 
tiations with all the European Powers as a first step towards an 
agreement on armament limitation. 18 Consequently, Lord Rose- 
bery believed that public opinion was in favor of a limitation 
and that the time was opportune* When, in August, the Prime 
Minister received from the Associated Churches their Memorial 
asking Her .Majesty's Government to propose some practical 

15 Letter from S. Gaselee to the writer, 12079/449/405, April 9, 1935. 
l& Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, XV (Berlin, 
1924), p. 141 footnote. Hereafter, Die Grosse Politik. 

17 Supra,, pp. 103-04. 

18 Supra, pp. 104-08. 


step to promote the international reduction of armaments, he 
gave the assurance that the subject was "constantly engaging 
the attention" of the Government. His statement was quite 
true, for in May he confidentially approached Baron de Staal on 
the question of an international agreement to arrest the growth 
of armaments. Lord Rosebery's latest biography, written by 
the Marquess of Crewe, 19 contains no reference to the conver- 
sation and correspondence to which Rosebery did not wish to 
give a strictly official appearance. Although in 1894 it was 
known that he had sounded the Russian Government on the 
idea of a limitation of armaments, the official revelation did 
not occur until the publication in 1929 of the Correspondence 
diplomatique de Baron de Staal, 1884-1900. 

On May 2 de Staal informed Giers, Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, that Lord Rosebery had invited him to his 
home to discuss the problem of limiting armaments. Inasmuch 
as the British Minister wished their conversations to be strictly 
confidential he had chosen this method of approach rather than 
the more official Foreign Office. Rosebery considered the Em- 
peror Alexander as the strongest guarantee of general tran- 
quillity and his will as the cornerstone of the pacific edifice of 
Europe. The Prime Minister would take no step without the 
moral support of the Tsar. Therefore, he wanted to know if 
de Staal would sound the ground on the subject. 20 

M. Giers replied that he could not give a precise answer to 
this question, "as important as delicate," without first sub- 
mitting the details to his august Master. This "vaste projet," 
with many difficulties to surmount, would require prolonged 
study and, in consequence, a sympathetic but non-committal 
reply was all that could be given at the time. 21 

At the Prince of Wales's Levee, Lord Rosebery and Baron de 

19 The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London, 1931). 

20 Correspondence Diplomatique de Baron de Staal, 1884-1^00 (Paris, Le 
Baron A. Meyendorff, 1929), I, 241-42, Staal & Giers, London, April ao/May 
2, 1894. 

21 Ibid., p. 242, Giers a Staal, Saint Petersbourg, April 27/May 5, 1894. 


Staal had another conversation on the question of disarmament. 
The end of the official reception having interrupted their in- 
formal talk, the Prime Minister promised to resume the consid- 
eration of the subject in a private letter, which he begged Staal 
to make known to M. Giers. On June 6 Lord Rosebery com- 
municated with the Russian Ambassador and asked that his 
letter should "preserve the most strictly confidential character." 
He believed that the time was propitious for a general consider- 
ation of the question and that, if a conference were assembled 
for the relief of Europe from its terrible war burdens, it would 
not separate without practical and beneficial results. 22 The 
problem was: how could such a conference be convoked? In 
writing to Baron de Staal, Rosebery stated that the "Emperor 
of Russia by his high, pure character, and his single-minded 
desire for peace is the Sovereign who appears to me to be 
marked out as the originator of such a meeting." He went on 
to say that the Tsar was above suspicion, while at the same time 
the splendor of his position and his spirit of conciliation would 
attract powers who would not care to be represented at a con- 
ference elsewhere. The Prime Minister pointed out that the 
armies of Great Britain were, in comparison to those of the 
Continent, numerically so small that an invitation from her 
would not carry the weight which should properly attach to a 
measure of this nature. "In the second place/ 7 he wrote, "the 
policy of colonial expansion on which some nations have em- 
barked, has caused a certain amount of friction which would 
make it desirable that the presiding Power at such a Confer- 
ence should not be one engaged in colonial enterprise." Various 
reasons would make it difficult for other nations to move, and in 
fine he could conceive no Prince or Personage comparable to 
His Imperial Majesty for the purpose of summoning the con- 
ference. 28 

On August 3, Baron de Staal again reported to M. Giers 

aa /foU, II, 246, Staal a Giers, London, May ai/June 12, 1894. 
23 Ibid., II, 243-44, Rosebery & Staal, London, June 6, 1894. 


that he had made use of a conversation with Lord Rosebery to 
speak to him on the question of disarmament. This time the 
Ambassador directed his language along the lines which the 
Russian Foreign Minister had indicated in a letter dated June 
I2/24, 24 Lord Rosebery was still of opinion that, if a common 
action was destined to solve the question which responded to 
the most elevated interests of civilization, it could be effected 
only under the powerful initiative of the Russian Sovereign, 
Alexander III, considered by Europe as the arbiter of peace. 
Staal wrote that he took care not to discourage the British 
Minister. 25 

Lord Rosebery, no doubt, was actuated by the most sincere 
intentions in approaching Baron de Staal. Although he ear- 
nestly hoped for peace and freedom throughout the world, he 
could scarcely be considered a pacifist since by peace he did not 
mean "peace at any price." 26 He considered it a melancholy 
and humiliating confession that the peace of Europe mainly de- 
pended, not on the divine precepts of the Christian religion, 
but on the awe inspired in every nation by the existence of vast 
armaments. 27 MM. Staal and Giers do not appear to have been 
very enthusiastic over the idea of the Russian Government's 
summoning a peace conference, but they were careful not to 
reject it definitely. The outbreak of the Sino- Japanese War 
made the moment inopportune, and the sudden death of the 
Tsar completely stopped the further discussion of the proposal. 
But one of the last official acts of the Emperor was to express 
his sympathy and admiration for the attempt initiated in Eng- 
land for promoting the reduction of armaments, for the main- 
tenance of peace was one of the main objects of his policy and 
he was glad to know that a movement was on foot in Great 
Britain directed towards so desirable an end. When his strong 
hand was removed, it was not expected that the young Tsar 

24 Ibid., p. 249 footnote. This has not been found. 
23 Ibid ., p. 249. 

20 T. F, G. Coates, Lord Rosebery His Life and Speeches, I, 346. Speech at 
the annual banquet of Glasgow University Gladstone Club, March 29, 1880. 
27 The Marquess of Crewe, op. cit. t II, 556. 


Nicholas would attempt to take action in the matter. It was 
thought that even if his sympathies were entirely in accord 
with those of his father, he would not want to incur the ill-will 
of the General Staff of the Russian army. Thus the chance for 
a mutual agreement on the limitation of armaments seemed to 
have passed. 

Besides Lord Rosebery's unsuccessful attempt to bring about 
a conference to consider the problem of armaments, there are 
various unofficial reports that the German Emperor entertained 
similar ideas. From time to time in the early 'nineties it was 
rumored that William II intended to call a European Congress 
to discuss practical measures of arriving at Universal Peace and 
general disarmament. In March, 1890, some London journals 
reported that "the Emperor has planned sensations which will 
startle the world, among which is the convoking of an Inter- 
national Congress for abolishing Standing Armies, with the ex- 
ception of a small force, in proportion to each country's popu- 
lation." 28 

In April the "Continental Gossip" of the Glasgow Herald 
wrote: "What will the German Emperor do next? is now the 
general cry. He has done so many startling things already, and 
takes such an evident delight in making men's tongues wag, 
that nobody would be much surprised if he were to propose a 
Congress for universal disarmament. Men have already become 
convinced that he is sincerely religious, and that he has no 
ambition for bloodshed." 29 Whatever may have been the source 
of these hearsays, they certainly were not related to any com- 
munication which Lord Salisbury might have made to the Em- 
peror concerning the expenditure memorandum forwarded by 
the Marquis of Dufferin to the British Prime Minister on 
April 29 and received May 5, 1890. Any action on the part of 
the Kaiser in March and April, that is, before the document 
arrived at Downing Street, must obviously have been quite 
independent of this report. 

28 The Herald of Peace, April, 1890, p. 45. 
, May, 1890, p, 63. 


It would appear that throughout 1890 and 1891 the Kaiser 
at least entertained the Idea of convoking a conference and 
probably discussed it with his cousin, the Emperor Francis 
Joseph of Austria, for, on January n, the Berlin correspondent 
of the New York Sun stated that the Emperor was engaged 
upon negotiations for a proposition concerning European dis- 
armament and that he had entirely won over Francis Joseph to 
the idea. 30 Rumors of this nature circulated in the press during 
January, and though unreliable, they were not altogether with- 
out significance. The Berlin correspondent of one journal 
wrote: "Unless I am much mistaken he (William II) is at the 
present time, and has been in fact this very week, engaged upon 
negotiations for a momentous proposition for European Dis- 
armament. What I actually know, on the subject, is that His 
Majesty has an ally whom he personally influences 3 and whom 
he has entirely gained over to the idea of disarmament of the 
military forces of the Continent. That ally is his Imperial 
cousin, the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria." 31 

In February, 1891, the Empress Frederick visited Paris 
ostensibly for the purpose of trying to induce French artists 
to send their pictures to the Berlin Exhibition. But it was 
rumored that in reality the journey was intended to prepare 
the way for a visit of the Emperor whose aim was more far- 
reaching than an act of courtesy to the French nation. His 
visit was to be the forerunner of a scheme for partial disarma- 
ment. But the Kaiser's plans failed to materialize, for his 
mother's visit did not prove so successful as it had been hoped. 
The Emperor's project, vaguely announced in the press, was 
badly received, especially in France, where he was accused of 
acting in his personal interest, of wishing to make other powers 
acknowledge his supremacy and to compel France to abandon 
her pretensions to Alsace-Lorraine. 32 

30 The Times, January 12, 1891, p. 6, col. i. 
81 The Herald of Peace, February, 1891, p. 193. 

33 Robert Coulet, op. cit., pp. 75-76; Georges Dubois, op. tit., pp. 85-86; 
Dr. Hans Wehberg, op. cit., p. 13; F. Whyte, op. di. t II, 122-23. 


In July, 1891, William II paid an official visit to England, 
and the British and Foreign Arbitration Association, acting 
upon the strength of these various undenied rumors in the 
press, used the occasion for presenting to His Imperial Majesty 
a Memorial on the subject of European Disarmament. Among 
the statements in this petition were these; 

We believe that the solution of the great problem of the severe 
struggle for existence among the masses of the people in Europe is to 
be chiefly found by the diminution of the vast Armed Forces, that 
result in a ruinous competition in preparation for war, and of the 
oppressive system of Military Service and Taxation. 

It would be a great relief to the people of Europe, if, by mutual 
arrangement, the Military and Naval Forces could be reduced, for it 
would set men free for the development of peaceful industries and 
enterprises, whose energies are now absorbed in Military Service, and 
thus greatly add to National prosperity and contentment. 

We therefore humbly pray your Majesty graciously to receive this 
Memorial, and to consider seriously the important subjects herein 
referred to, and we have reason to hope and believe that if your 
Imperial Majesty will graciously take the lead, the Rulers of the 
other Great Powers of Europe will cordially co-operate with your 
Imperial Majesty, and thus great and lasting good will result there- 
from. . . . 3a 

The Memorial was received at the German Embassy by 
Count Hatzfeldt for presentation to William II, and by com- 
mand of the Emperor, the German Ambassador conveyed his 
thanks to the Association. The following day, July 10, at a 
banquet given to His Majesty at the Guildhall, the Emperor 

"My aim is above all, the maintenance of Peace. For peace alone 
can give the confidence which is necessary to the healthy development 
of science, of art, and of trade. Only so long as Peace reigns are we 
at liberty to bestow our earnest thoughts upon the great problems, 
the solution of which, in fairness and equity, I consider the most 
prominent duty of our time. You may therefore rest assured that I 
shall continue to do my best to maintain, and constantly to increase 


the good relations between Germany and the other nations, and that 
I shall always be found to unite with you and them in a common 
labour for peaceful progress, friendly intercourse and advancement 
of civilization." 34 

This statement, beautifully indefinite on the subject of disarma- 
ment, was interpreted by the pacifists as evidence of the Em- 
peror's pacific sentiments and his willingness to co-operate with 
others in limiting armaments. 

While in England, William II visited Lord Salisbury at Hat- 
field, and the Paris Figaro published some notes on their con- 
versation. It reported that the question of European disarma- 
ment was touched upon and the Emperor is reputed to have 
said, "Germany cannot go on arming, arming, arming." Lord 
Salisbury replied, "It is only a great monarch like your Majesty 
who could dare to set an example on this subject." The Em- 
peror comprehended Lord Salisbury's meaning and renounced 
his original intention of suggesting that England should initiate 
a proposition of disarmament. 35 

Similar rumors to those in which the Kaiser figured in 1891 
were fepeated in the early months of 1894. In April of that 
year it was positively asserted in diplomatic circles in Paris 
that the German Emperor had submitted an initial scheme of 
disarmament, not only to the King of Italy and the Emperor 
Francis Joseph, but to the Tsar. 86 After sounding the King of 
Denmark, who is said to have shrunk from the responsibility, 
the Emperor William, it is reported, asked the German Am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg to submit the plan of a conference to 
Alexander III. The convoking of the pacific gathering was to 
be left to the Tsar himself and the Russian capital was to serve 
as the meeting place. 

Whether the Emperor really approached the Tsar and 
whether Alexander III answered William II as he is reported to 

?., P. 5. 

35 The Herald of Pence, August, 1891, p. 277. 
* 6 The Spectator, LXXII (April 21, 1894), 529. 


have done, we cannot know as certain. The French newspapers, 
however, published something very like what he may have said, 
or what he might have said, had he been approached in the way 
in which the Emperor is claimed to have approached him. What 
the Tsar is reputed to have stated when Count Schuvaloff "re- 
turned a polite refusal" to the German monarch's message is 
briefly this: 

"Gigantic armies are not a cause, but an effect. They are due to 
the wars of the last quarter of a century, and to the Treaties in which 
these wars ended. The Triple Alliance was entered into to defend the 
state of things arising from these Treaties. Therefore it is hostile to 
France and Russia, for these Powers suffered from these Treaties. 
Neither of these Powers wish for war, but they have to place them- 
selves on the defensive, and to be ready to put a stop to a state of 
things which threatens both, should the offensive be taken against 
them. Russia, besides, could take no step in the matter of disarma- 
ment unless Germany first came to an understanding with France, 
and Austria expressed herself ready to leave the whole Balkan 
Peninsula to its legitimate owners, the Slavs and the Turks. Were this 
done, every State in Europe would spontaneously disarm, because 
there would be no more need for great standing armies. 37 

These references in the press to William's desire to see a dis- 
armament conference convened, led Mr. Byles, on April 20, to 
ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if any 
communications of that nature had reached the Foreign Office. 
Sir Edmund Grey answered that none had been received. 38 
Whether, therefore, the Emperor actually made the advances 
attributed to him we cannot know. But if he did they were 
certainly quite unofficial, for we have the statement of the Edi- 
tors of Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette that 
they have found no documents In Berlin relating to the Kaiser's 
intentions of calling a peace conference. 89 

After Alexander's death rumors of the German Emperor's 

37 The Spectator, LXXII (April ax, 1894), 5 2 9- 

38 Parliamentary Debates, Fourth series, XXIII, col. 980. 
3Q Die Grosse Politik, XV (Berlin, 1924), 141, footnote. 


pacific intentions again circulated in the press. La Conference 
Inter farlementaire, the organ of the Union Interparlementaire, 
referred to these in April, 1895. In an article entitled, "A 
propos de desarmement," it stated: "The German Emperor is 
evidently considering in his mind the great and grave question 
of disarmament. It should not be doubted in the presence of 
noises so often repeated, that he intends to convoke a diplo- 
matic conference." 40 

It would appear that, although European monarchs might not 
agree to call a conference to consider disarmament, they were, 
at least, unofficially discussing the problem in 1894. On March 
26, M. de Blowitz, the Times Correspondent, forwarded from 
Paris a telegram which embodied what King Christian IX of 
Denmark was reported to have said a few days previously to a 
Spanish statesman whom he had received: 

I hope to live long enough to see Europe enter upon the pathway 
of military retrenchment and to behold the Sovereigns of Europe 
taking measures to protect their several peoples against the con- 
stantly-increasing burdens of military armaments. My dear son-in- 
law, the Tsar of Russia, whose mission consists in maintaining Peace, 
is quite ready to enter upon this pathway (they had evidently dis- 
cussed it together), and my great and good friend the Emperor of 
Austria is equally disposed to do his utmost to this end. I have never 
ventured to speak to the German Emperor because a young Sovereign 
is always dreaming of winning new laurels, but I am sure the King of 
Italy would have no objection to discuss the question of military 
burdens, while as for you, the great Princess who watches over the 
throne of Spain has proved, by so ostensibly drawing closer to France, 
that she has in view only that prolonged peace which is so necessary 
to her people. I am sure, therefore, that Russia, Austria, Spain, and 
even Italy are equally eager for an unbroken period of peace, and to 
see all people relieved of a portion of the burdens which weigh them 
down. 41 

Too much importance must not be assigned to this royal 
utterance, for its authenticity was subsequently questioned, and 

40 La Conference Interparlementaire, April r, 1895, p. 302. 

41 The Times, March 26, 1894, P- 3- 


a sort of semi-official denial of its delivery published. Never- 
theless, it is to be noted that the embryonic idea of a lasting 
peace was beginning to take shape in the minds of sovereigns. 

In the same issue of the Times, the Berlin correspondent 
quoted an interpretation by the Germania of a statement made 
by Count von Caprivi at Danzig. According to this the German 
Emperor was at the time occupied with the problem of reducing 
the burdens of military expenditure. This article completed, 
so to speak, the words of King Christian, for it permitted the 
addition of the Emperor William's name to the list of sovereigns 
cited as desirous of reaping the benefits of peace. 

Throughout the decade 1888-98 there was among the official 
class in most countries a growing feeling that the competition 
in armaments was becoming ruinous and that some concerted 
steps should be taken to arrest it. French public opinion, how- 
ever, appeared to oppose any suggestion of a limitation of 
armaments or any congress which might stabilize the status quo. 
When, on December 19, 1896, a group of Socialists in the 
Chamber of Deputies led by M. Dejeante solicited a vote of 
urgency in favor of a proposition to the effect that the French 
Government should "summon a conference of all nations in 
order to proceed to a general, progressive, organized disarma- 
ment," 42 their declaration was rejected by 490 votes to 35* 43 
M. Gauthier pointed out that on the French frontier there were 
three powerful, armed nations which were a menace to the in- 
dependence of the country. It was a dangerous Utopia to 
believe that they were disarming. Moreover, for twenty-six 
years two provinces, torn from the mother country, had looked 
forward to better days and had awaited the hour of inevitable 
reparations. Finally, it was argued, the integrity of the French 
territory and the power of the Republic were indispensable for 
assuring to the world the realization of democracy and social 

42 Annales de la Chambre ties Diputts, 6^* Legislature, debats parlementaires, 
session extraordinaire, ip decevnbre 1896, p. 1299. 

43 Ibid., p. 1301. 


reforms. 44 No doubt, it was the French hostile attitude which 
deterred William II from making an official proposal for a peace 
conference; for the latent enmity between Germany and France 
was the center of the strained European relations. Germany 
could afford to be pacific because, so far as the Continent was 
concerned, she was satisfied and would have been glad to have 
the European Powers express their official approval of the map 
of Europe. She might even have been willing to agree to an 
international understanding on standing armies, so long as 
populations were used as the basis of proportionality, for then 
her army would be able to maintain its supremacy over that of 
France. Such an agreement would have left her free to con- 
centrate on the development of a strong navy, as demanded by 
her expanding trade and her colonial aspirations. But an ambi- 
tious naval program in the 'nineties would, as is proved by 
later events, have opened a new phase of competition in an 
Anglo-German naval armament race. Austria, too, was pacific, 
for she could hardly afford to relish the thought of war which 
would be almost certain to disrupt the Habsburg Empire. Great 
Britain, the government and especially the people, desired to 
check armament expenditure. The three doubtful countries 
were Russia, France and Italy. The first two were determined 
not to limit their armaments until the injustices of past wars 
were rectified they were nations dissatisfied with the status 
quo. Had France and Russia agreed to disarm, they would have 
relinquished for a long time all hope of re-acquiring the lost 
provinces and opening Constantinople to the Slavs. Further- 
more, Russian autocracy demanded large armaments. The Tsar 
Alexander's personal love of peace, which was so often paraded 
in the press, was considered by. many as "cobweb and moon- 
shine." An autocratic system like the Russian, it was argued, 
must always be prepared for waging aggressive wars on friv- 
olous pretexts, because war might at any moment be an indis- 
pensable help in its internal policy. 
A *Loc. at. 


Italy Increased and wanted to increase her armaments, not 
so much for protection, as the Triple Alliance was sufficient de- 
fense of Italian rights, but because she wished to rival the mili- 
tary establishments of the greater powers in order to play a 
more prominent part in international affairs. Still King Hum- 
bert made repeated declarations of his love of peace. On April 
5, 1894, when he received M. Gaston Calmette, the Figaro 9 s 
special representative in Rome, he is reported as having de- 

There exists absolutely nothing that would allow us to go to war, 
neither our budget which unfortunately shows a deficit, nor our 
inclination, nor our desire, nor reason. . . . We are, then, not a 
danger of war, but, on the contrary, a guarantee of peace; rest 
assured of that. And I know that the pacific sentiments I express to 
you are shared by the Emperor of Austria and the German Emperor, 
as well as by the Tsar. Moreover, which is the Sovereign in Europe 
who would, at the present moment, with the existing armaments, 
with the incessant improvements in modern artillery, engage his 
people in a war? Whichever side may be victorious, victory will be 
so terrible, accompanied by such hecatombs of men, followed by such 
rivers of blood, that no King, no Emperor can think of it without 
shuddering for his armies. . . , 45 

This pacific declaration was scoffed at in France, where the 
blackest designs were atributed to the Italian sovereign. It was 
said that King Humbert should demonstrate his peaceful inten- 
tions by disarming. 

Thus statesmen, kings and emperors professed to the utmost 
their love of peace but continued ceaselessly to prepare for 
war. All, more or less, considered a limitation or an arrest of 
armaments desirable, yet each attributed ulterior designs to 
any suggestion of a proposition from another. No one per- 
sonage of the decade appeared willing to initiate a definite, 
official proposal for a limitation of armaments, or a conference 
to study the problem. Armaments increased at an even faster 
rate. Lord Salisbury, in his Guildhall Speech of November 9, 

45 Le Figaro, April 10, p. i, col. i. 


1897, declared that the competition, unless curtailed, would 
end in a terrible effort of destruction, fatal to Christian civiliza- 
tion. His one hope was that the powers might some day be 
welded together into some international constitution which 
would give to the world "a long spell of unfettered commerce, 
prosperous trade, and continued peace." 46 

Less than a year after Lord Salisbury's Mayor's Day Speech 
the world was greatly surprised by an invitation from the young 
Tsar Nicholas II to meet in conference to discuss "a possible 
reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all 
nations." The last Tsar of all the Russias gave a lead to the 
rest of Europe by making an official proposal for the all-round 
limitation of armaments. Whatever his motives may have been 
he crystallized in a definite form the thoughts of many who 
were alarmed at the ever-increasing armament expenditure of 
the period. 

* # * 

46 The Times, November 10, 1897. 



PUBLIC opinion is a new compelling political force which has 
come into the world since the Middle Ages. In fact, it is a 
development of the last century; before the French Revolution 
nothing of the kind was known or dreamed of in Europe. This 
new force in political life may be divided into two types. One 
is the popular belief in the fitness or Tightness of something, 
a belief that certain lines of conduct should be followed or a 
certain opinion held by good citizens or right-thinking persons. 
This is what Mr. Balfour calls "climate." Such a belief does 
not impose any duty on anybody beyond outward conformity 
to the accepted standard. But public opinion in the true sense 
is a consensus among large bodies of persons which acts as a 
political force, imposing on those in authority certain enact- 
ments or certain lines of policy. 1 This study is concerned with 
public opinion in the second meaning, and its influence, if any, 
upon the movement for a limitation of armaments. 

Although it cannot be measured with a tape, public opinion 
in a modern constitutional state, we are all agreed, should pre- 
vail. But creating and formulating public opinion is the great 
problem. In the nineteenth century there were two accepted 
methods of expressing public opinion: by elections and by the 
use of the press. But the elections were held only at intervals, 
and they served only as a medium through which this force 

1 E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," The Atlantic 
Monthly, LXXXI (January, 1898), 2. 


manifested itself in action. We must, therefore, turn to the 
press, which as an organ of public opinion not only expresses 
views and tendencies already in existence but is a factor in 
further developing and moulding the judgment of the people. 
According to Lord Bryce, newspapers are influential in three 
ways: "as narrators, as advocates, and as weather cocks. They 
report events, they advance agreements, they indicate by their 
attitude what those who conduct them and are interested in 
their circulation take to be the prevailing opinion of their 
readers." 2 He continues: 

It is chiefly in its third capacity, as an index and mirror of public 
opinion, that the press is looked to. This is the function it chiefly 
aims at discharging; and public men feel that in showing deference to 
it they are propitiating, and inviting the commands of public opinion 
itself. 3 

Although newspapers reflect and mould a general state of 
mind, the public mind must be ripe for moulding and directing. 
The moulding process may have been due to newspaper agita- 
tion over a period of time, but even then the public mind must 
have been receptive. 4 In order to build a strong structure of 
public opinion there must be unanimity of thought in the 
newspapers, and there is no such unanimity except in the state 
controlled and censored press. In the last half of the nineteenth 
century the press did not play an important part in the forma- 
tion of a strong current of public opinion favoring disarmament. 
If all the newspapers and magazines, or a great majority of 
them, had said the same thing about the heavy armaments of 
the period or if they had all come out in favor of a limitation of 
armaments they would have wielded a powerful influence; but 
this they did not do. 

On the subject of armaments, both the liberal and conserva- 

2 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, II (Macmillan, New York, 
1911 edition), 275 and 277. 

3 Loc. cit. 

4 R. D. Blumenfeld, The Press in My Times, pp. 44-45. 


tive journals of Great Britain showed a tendency to extreme 
caution. An occasional paper like the Daily News might call 
attention to the need for reducing standing armies. Another 
might offer advice. The Manchester Times, for example, 
called attention in 1848 to the fact that the London daily press 
was, on the whole, unfavorable to peace proceedings. It advised 
the friends of peace to concentrate on enlightening opinion at 
home, and to undertake the conversion of the Times and its 
satellites. 5 

English papers and periodicals of the mid-century Christina 
Phelps divides according to their attitude to the peace move- 
ment into three classes: the eulogistic, the neutral, the hostile. 
In a case apart were the London Times and Punch, the former 
antagonistic, the latter friendly to the cause. The Times, most 
influential of the daily papers, was actively opposed to the early 
peace movement and its editorials alternately ridiculed and 
denounced the whole movement. 6 The Year-Book regularly 
mentioned the Peace Congresses; the Annual Register noticed 
briefly the London Convention of 1843 an d made flippant 
comments on the Frankfort Convention of 1850. The Daily 
News supported the peace movement in 1848, then gradually 
lost interest in it, ceasing in 1851 even to report the peace 
congresses. Twenty-two papers gave unqualified, though spas- 
modic support to the movement. Ten of these were provincial 
papers including the Leeds 9 Mercury and the Manchester Exam- 
iner. The sympathetic London papers were either liberal, free 
trade or religious, and they included the Morning Advertiser 
which had the second largest circulation in the kingdom. 7 Of 
the opponents of the peace movement, Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine was the most consistently denunciatory, and the 
Morning Chronicle was the most intelligently hostile. They 

5 Christina Phelps, The Anglo-American Movement in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century, (No. 330, Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 
New York, 1930) p. 184. 

7 /&*<*., p. 180. 


argued that the friends of peace were impracticable and unpa- 
triotic, that arbitration was no guarantee against the use of 
force, and that disarmament would never be practicable so 
long as human nature remained unchanged. 8 

A survey of the articles on disarmament published in the 
newspapers and periodicals of the decade 1888-98 shows that 
the press was not moulding public opinion on the subject; nor 
was it, on the other hand, being noticeably influenced. True, 
more was published on the topic than at any other previous 
time in history; but the number of articles compared with those 
on wars, battles, armies, navies and soldiers was very small. 
Disarmament items in the Times, the Daily News, the Daily 
Telegraph, Le Temps, Le Figaro, the New York Times, and 
the New York Herald were tucked away in inconspicuous 
columns and probably read by only a few. 

Many British magazines which might have exerted a great 
influence upon public opinion completely ignored the existence 
of the problem. The Athenaeum, the Edinburgh Review, the 
Fortnightly Review, the Quarterly Review and the Humani- 
tarian remained silent on the question of disarmament. In the 
August number of the Nineteenth Century, Henry Geffcken 
referred to the question briefly by stating that all attempts to 
limit armaments were futile; disarmament comes only when it 
imposes itself by exhaustion. The Contemporary Review for 
May and June, 1894, published articles on the limitation of 
armaments as did the Spectator and the Standard for March 
and April of the same year. But only the Review of Reviews* 
edited by W. T. Stead, took a definite stand on questions of 
peace and disarmament. 

The American periodicals played no better part. The Inter- 
national Journal of Ethics, devoted to the advancement of 
ethical knowledge and practice, did not treat the problem until 
after the Tsar's Rescript appeared. The Atlantic Monthly f 
Harper's Monthly, Scribnefs Magazine, the Century Maga- 

8 Ibid.,p.xSi. 


zine, the American Review of Reviews, LittelVs Living Age 
and the Living Age devoted ample space to the treatment 
of "The Benefits of War," "The Study of War/' "Warlike 
Europe/' "The Evolution of the Naval Officer/' "The French 
Navy/' "The Standing Army of Great Britain/' "The Russian 
Army/' "Austro-Hungarian Army/' "The French Army/ 7 "The 
Italian Army/' "The German Army/' "Side Lights on the Ger- 
man Soldier/' "The Problem of the Philippines" and "The 
Economic Basis of Imperialism/ 3 yet never once during the 
decade did these magazines touch the question of disarmament. 9 
M. de Blowitz contributed an article entitled "The Peace of 
Europe" to McClure's Magazine for June, 1894, but that same 
periodical completely ignored the Tsar's Rescript. At the 
time it was engrossed in the Spanish American War and devoted 
its space to "The Cost of War/ 3 "The Fighting Leaders/' 
"Theodore Roosevelt/' "Dewey at Manila/' etc. 

If we agree with Mr. Walter Lippmann that public opinions, 
if they are to be sound, must be organized for the press not by 
the press; and if this organization is the "task of a political 
science that has won its proper place as a f ormulator in advance 
of a real decision, instead of apologist, critic, or reporter after 
the real decision has been made," 10 then again, there was no 
organized opinion favoring disarmament in the decade before 
1898. The Revue de droit public et de la science politiqne en 
France et a V&trang&r; u the Juridical Review, a quarterly 
review of juridical and political science published in Edinburgh; 
the Political Science Quarterly, edited by the Faculty of 
Political Science at Columbia University; the Yale Review, 
a quarterly journal for the scientific discussion of political, 
economic and social questions; the Journal of Political Econ- 

9 The Atlantic Monthly, Harper's Monthly 3 the American Review of Reviews, 
the Century and Scribner's Magazine on several occasions published articles on 

10 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (Macmillan, New York, 1921), p. 32. 

11 In Vol. Ill (1894), pp. 183, 390-91, there were two short notes concerning 
M. Souchon's and Jules Simon's proposals. 


omy, issued by the Department of Political Science in the 
University of Chicago; the Journal of Political Science, pub- 
lished for the American Social Science Association and con- 
taining papers of the Department of Jurisprudence; and the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, published for Harvard Uni- 
versity, paid no attention to the economic burdens of huge 
armaments and their limitation. 

The Revue des deux mondes published three articles by 
M. G. Valbert on International Arbitration and Peace but 
none dealing directly with disarmament until after Nicholas 
had issued his Eirenicon. 12 Likewise the Revue de Paris did 
not touch the problem of armament limitation until May, 
i899, 13 and remained silent on the Tsar's manifesto in its 
1898 and 1899 issues. Its only reference to armaments was in 
an article contributed by Maurice Loir in May, 1894, entitled 
"L'Armement de la reserve navale" in which the author 
criticized the French Navy for having so long neglected a pro- 
gram of armament. Finally, the volumes of Public Opinion, a 
comprehensive summary of the press throughout the world on 
all important current topics, contained only three short refer- 
ences to disarmament before the appearance of the Rescript; 14 
and one of these, "Disarmament A Lesson from Armenia," 
advocated an armed Europe. "Until the East is christianized 
and free,", it reads, "the disarmament of Europe would be a 
measureless calamity to the world." 15 Thus, if we look upon 
the press as a medium through which public opinion is formed 

12 Arthur Desjardins, "Le D6sarmement, tude de droit international," Revue 
des deux mondes, XXVI (October, 1898, 573-83. 

13 Albert Pingaud, "Napole"on III et le de"sarmement," Revue de Paris, 
Mai, 1899 (Vol. Ill), pp. 296-308. 

14 "Disarmament of Nations" Address of Rev. Dr. Dana Boardman, Presi- 
dent of the Christian Arbitration and Peace Society, at the annual meeting, 
Washington, March 4, 1890, Public Opinion, VIII (March 15, 1890), 535; "A 
Plea and a Plan for Disarmament," M. Jules Simon, in the Contemporary 
Review, London and the London Standard, Public Opinion, XVII (May 17, 
1894), 155; "Disarmament A Lesson from Armenia," (The Commonwealth 
[Bapt] Philadelphia), Public Opinion, XX (May 21, 1896), 652. 

15 Public Opinion, XX, 652. 


or through which it is expressed, we must conclude that in the 
decade 1888-98 there was not a dominant current of opinion 
in favor of disarmament. 

If we look elsewhere than in the press for disarmament agita- 
tion, we are forced to draw practically the same inference. 
A. Lawrence Lowell maintains that the political community as 
a whole is capable of public opinion only when the great bulk 
of the citizens is united and agreed upon the ends and aims of 
government in regard to a particular problem. 16 In the nine- 
teenth century there was not a body of men agreed upon the 
means whereby the action of governments on the limitation of 
armaments should be determined. "Public opinion/' writes 
Charles W. Smith, "is composed of individual opinions that 
have been subjected 'to a process of consolidation and clarifica- 
tion' until they have attained unity of direction. If individual 
opinions are not similar enough to flow together, there cannot 
be a public opinion." 17 Individual opinions on disarmament 
had not arrived at unity. In the national parliaments there were 
isolated complaints by liberals, pacifists and radicals against 
armaments, and resolutions were proposed requesting the gov- 
ernments to consider the convoking of an international con- 
gress to deal with the problem; but these were neither supported 
by the chambers in which they originated nor considered seri- 
ously by the governments. There was no concerted, simultane- 
ous approach to the problem in the various parliaments. The 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, a practical organization which 
might have organized a unified international effort to bring 
about a limitation of armaments, carefully avoided taking a 
definite position on the problem at its conferences. Interna- 
tional jurists in their official bodies the Institute of Inter- 
national Law and the International Law Association refrained 
from touching the question of disarmament. 

10 A, Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Longmans 
Green, New York, 1914), p. 9. 

17 Charles W. iSmith, Public Opinion in a Democracy (Prentice Hall, New 
York, 1939)) P- *9- 


If it is true that "only when a conflict imposes heavy sacri- 
fices on us that an opinion makes itself felt in favor of pre- 
serving or cutting loose"; if "we develop opinions when called 
upon to act, to fight, or to pay"; 1S then the laboring class and 
women should have been the leading agitators for a limitation 
of armaments. Although the burden of war and armed peace 
weighs heaviest upon the working classes, who have to support 
the largest part of the taxes and suffer the most from obligatory 
military service, labor, as a class did not, in the nineteenth 
century, take a firm and determined stand on the question of 
disarmament. 19 Neither did women. It is only natural that 
women should hate war which breaks up their homes, robs 
them of their sons, husbands and support but this hatred had 
done little by 1898 to assist in the struggle for a limitation of 
armaments. In the decade 1888-98 women took a greater 
interest in peace and Peace Societies than at any time before 
in history, and they occasionally uttered Isolated complaints 
and warnings against war and heavy armaments; but a great 
international organization of women, supporting disarmament 
and opposing war because the members comprehended that it is 
an evil for the whole human race, did not exist. As early as 
1868, Marie Georgg, the Treasurer of the Geneva League of 
Peace and Liberty, had urged the formation of an interna- 
tional league in "Les tats-Unis de PEurope"; but not until 
1895 was an International Peace League of Women founded. 
In November, 1896, La Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour 
les DSsarmement Giniral called a Congress of international 
journalists to meet in Paris to examine the question of dis- 
armament. The members hoped to find a practical method of 
approach to the problem. But no truly international Peace 
Congress of Women met in the nineteenth century. It took the 
cataclysm of a World War to awaken women from their leth- 

18 L. B. Namier, "Public Opinion and Representative Government," in 
Skyscrapers find Other Essays (London, 1931), p. 37. 

10 Only the Socialist wing of the laboring class directed attention to the prob- 
lem of armaments. 


argy. At the few women's international meetings of the 'nine- 
ties disarmament was not touched. For example, the chief aim 
of the International Council which convened the London Con- 
gress of 1899 was "t promote greater unity of thought, sym- 
pathy and purpose amongst women workers of different 
nations"; therefore, the Conference was not permitted to iden- 
tify itself with any "movement of a controversial nature." 20 
But the Council pledged itself to support the cause of peace 
through furthering the principle of arbitration. 21 

Statesmen, kings and emperors "secretly" and "confiden- 
tially" considered and discussed the armament enigma but not 
one ventured to take an open official step to alleviate the heavy 
burden of the "armed peace." Only the national Peace Soci- 
eties, the Universal Peace Congresses, and the Churches of 
Great Britain took a definite stand in favor of a limitation of 
armaments. But the churches, slow to participate in the peace 
movement, gave only a temporary and half-hearted support to 
the cause. Their agitation reached its zenith in the years 1894- 
97 and then declined so that by 1898 they were not actively 
engaged in promoting a disarmament policy. Consequently, we 
must conclude that a public opinion favoring a limitation of 
armaments, being "something always there always being in- 
fluenced and influencing an invisible public meeting of the 
whole country in perpetual session, with the press a new and 
indispensable organ of government," 22 was non-existent in the 
decade 1888-98. 

If we go deeper into the question of public opinion and try 
to discover what moves large bodies or groups of people or 
parties to demand that their government take action along a 
certain line on any matter, we learn that by the latter part of 
the nineteenth century utilitarianism had become the primary 

20 The Countess of Aberdeen, "The Woman's International Parliament," 
The North American Review, CLXIX (1899), 146. 

21 Ibid., p. 147. 

22 A. D. Lindsay, The Essentials of Democracy (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, 1929), p. 27. 


motive. 23 Utilitarianism had fully taken possession of political 
discussion. A writer or speaker on a political subject had to 
show that his proposition would make people richer or more 
comfortable. Historical experience no longer influenced polit- 
ical affairs. Religious and moral authority which, from the 
Middle Ages down to the eighteenth century had been so 
powerful, had ceased to exert much influence on the affairs of 
the world. Any attempt to mould public opinion by its instru- 
mentality was almost certain to prove ineffectual. Therefore, 
the disarmament resolutions of the Universal Peace Congresses 
and the National Memorial sponsored by the Churches and 
Arbitration Alliance were not destined to compel the govern- 
ments to take action. For, as Dicey writes, "it is difficult to 
make emotion, however respectable, the basis of sound legisla- 
tion." 24 This does not imply that Peace Societies and the 
Church can play no part in a movement for disarmament. Their 
field lies, however, not in petitioning governments but in 
educating the public to a sense of its responsibilities. Mr. Elihu 
Root once said: "The open public declaration of a principle in 
such a way as to carry evidence that it has the support of a 
great body of men entitled to respect has a wonderfully com- 
pelling effect upon mankind." 25 When the educative process 
has been worked out and the multitude of men have reached 
the point of genuine and not perfunctory acceptance of a new 
standard, they can, through their chosen representatives, bring 
pressure to bear on the governments which eventually must 
conform themselves to it. 

Mr. Walter Lippmann is convinced that the public is not a 

23 A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in 
England during the Nineteenth Century (Macmillan, London, 1914), p. 450; 
and E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," The 
Atlantic Monthly, January, 1898, p. 2. 

24 A.V.Dicey,/oc. cit. 

25 Addresses on, International Subjects by Elihu Root (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1916). Collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James 
Brown Scott, Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, 
in the City of New York, April 15, 1907, p. 134. 


fixed body of individuals; it is merely those persons who are 
interested in an affair and can effect it only by supporting or 
opposing the actors. 26 The group most actively interested in the 
problem of limiting armaments always has been the interna- 
tional armament ring, which in the nineteenth century as well 
as in the twentieth naturally used its influence and great re- 
sources to prevent a limitation. If we agree with Professor 
E. H. Carr that propaganda is ineffective until it becomes 
linked with military and economic power "that power over 
opinion cannot be dissociated from military and economic 
power" 27 then we must recognize the fallacy of a belief in an 
international opinion on a limitation of armaments; for the 
military and naval experts, the high governmental officials and 
those who controlled the factors of production were all opposed 
to disarmament. In the nineteenth century movement for a 
limitation of armaments, numbers did not make public opinion; 
numbers did not give the directive for the particular decisions 
made; numbers were not consulted on the matter; numbers did 
not consider what road should be taken until the Tsar's deci- 
sion was made. For the late nineteenth century disarmament 
movement at least, it appears that we must accept Lippmann's 
and Namier's conclusions that the public was a mere phantom, 
an abstraction, 28 that there was no public opinion with regard 
to a thing so delicate as the limitation policy to be pursued. 29 

Although Europe enjoyed a period of peace after 1878, it 
was an "armed peace." Governments grew more and more 
nervous at the ever increasing expenditure, and they realized 
that the competition must cease or end in a war of annihilation. 
The public, for the most part, ignorant of the actual figures, 
apprehended in a general way what was happening, for they 

2b Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (Macmillan, New York, 1925), 

P. 77- 

27 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1010-1039 (Macmillan, 

London, 1939)* P- *7 

28 Walter Lippmann, op. cit,, p. 77. 

29 L. B. Namier, op. cit* t p. 37, 


were finding the burden of military charges heavier to bear. 
The majority of the people were uninformed and apathetic on 
the question of disarmament. Peace Societies and some journal- 
ists attempted to point out the economic and humanitarian 
advantages of a limitation of armaments, but their efforts were 
outnumbered by the numerous arguments of the necessity for 
national defense, of the impossibility of limiting armaments 
while neighboring states were continually increasing theirs. 
The belief that a limitation of armaments would bring the 
greatest happiness and good to the greatest number had not 
penetrated the public mind. The mass of the people looked 
upon disarmament as a Utopian dream. They did not trouble 
to weigh seriously the idea of the possibility of its realization; 
they stood by indifferently and often obstinately opposed to it. 
The people were perfectly convinced of the hideousness of war, 
they found armaments a heavy burden, and they had hope of 
being eventually freed from them by some future evolution; 
but the idea that they themselves, by a powerful effort, could 
and must bring about this evolution did not occur to them. 

In short, in 1898 there existed in England, the United States, 
and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate 
opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion 
did not exert a great influence upon governments. At the close 
of the century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what 
they said, not in what they did. 30 When diplomats, kings and 
emperors approached the problem of limiting armaments they 
did so not on account of the pressure of public opinion but 
because they were finding their budgets increasingly more diffi- 

30 Public opinion on the question of disarmament asserted itself more strongly 
after 1900, so that by 1907 statesmen were consciously regarding it. Public 
opinion was not responsible for the Rescript of 1898; but later it exerted suffi- 
cient influence upon British statesmen, especially upon, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman and Sir Edward Grey, to induce them to include the subject of a 
limitation of armaments on the agenda of the Second Hague Conference against 
the wishes of the power that had proposed the same idea in 1898. Public opinion 
succceeded in placing the subject on the program, but it was not strong enough 
to force governments to discuss and consider the problem seriously in con- 


cult to balance, and, in some instances, were piling up huge 
deficits in time of peace; they dreaded the terrible hazards of 
modern war; they feared internal revolution and economic and 
political convulsions in the social order all of which might 
prove fatal to their position. When finally the initiative of 
proposing a conference to deal with the problem of armaments 
was taken it came from a country where even pacifist opinion 
on the subject was only in a nascent form and still inarticulate, 
where all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where 
no Peace Society existed. The proposal came from above and 
was not forced by pressure of opinion from below; it emanated 
from a monarch who least of all considered public opinion, but, 
who, perhaps more than any other, feared the consequences of 
the "armed peace" and could gain most politically, economi- 
cally and strategically, from a respite in the armament race. 

Part II 



EUROPE was indeed amazed when, on August 27, 1898, the 
famous Rescript of Tsar Nicholas II was announced, amazed 
and bewildered. Could the proposal be the outcome of some 
crafty political design, or was it meant sincerely? The political 
situation at the time was certainly most unpropitious. Though 
the threat of war between France and England over Fashoda 
seemed dispelled, military preparations continued on both sides, 
unabated; at the very moment the United States and Spain 
were engaged in war; all nations were rapidly increasing their 
means of defense and offense. Talk of peace measures at such 
a moment appeared quixotic and impractical in the extreme. 
Nevertheless, this famous official document was addressed to 
the leading governments of the world in the name of one of the 
highest war lords, urging them to meet in conference to deal 
with the "grave problem" of armaments. 


August 12/24, 1898 

The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of 
the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations represent, in 
the present conditions of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards 
which the efforts of all Governments should be directed. 

This view fully corresponds with the humane and magnanimous 
intentions of His Majesty the Emperor, my august Master. 

Being convinced that this high aim agrees with the most essen- 
tial interests and legitimate aspirations of all the Powers, the 
Imperial Government considers the present moment a very favour- 



able one for seeking through international discussion, the most effec- 
tive means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting 
peace, and above all of limiting the progressive development of 
existing armaments. 

During the last twenty years aspirations towards general pacifica- 
tion have particularly asserted themselves in the consciences of 
civilized nations. The preservation of peace has been made the aim 
of international policy; for the sake of peace the Great Powers have 
formed powerful alliances, and for the purpose of establishing a 
better guarantee of peace they have developed their military forces 
in an unprecedented degree, and continue to develop them without 
hesitating at any sacrifice. 

All these efforts, however, have not yet led to the beneficient 
results of the desired pacification. 

The ever increasing financial burdens strike at the root of public 
prosperity. The physical and intellectual forces of the people, 
labour and capital, are diverted for the greater part from their nat- 
ural application and wasted unproductively. Hundreds of millions 
are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction which are 
regarded to-day as the latest inventions of science, but are destined 
to-morrow to be rendered obsolete by some new discovery. National 
cultural, economical progress, and the production of wealth are 
either paralysed or developed in a wrong direction. 

Therefore, the more the armaments of each Power increase, the 
less they answer to the objects aimed at by the Governments. Eco- 
nomic disturbances are caused in great measure by this system of 
excessive armaments, and the constant danger involved in this 
accumulation of war material renders the armed peace of to-day a 
crushing burden more and more difficult for the nations to bear. It 
consequently seems evident that if this situation be prolonged, it 
will inevitably lead to that very disaster which it is desired to 
avoid, and the horrors of which make every humane mind shudder 
by anticipation. 

It is the supreme duty, therefore, at the present moment of all 
States to put some limit to these unceasing armaments, and to find 
means of averting the calamities which threaten the whole world. 

Deeply impressed by this feeling, His Majesty the Emperor has 
been pleased to command me to propose to all Governments who 
have Representatives at the Imperial Court the meeting of a Con- 
ference to discuss this grave problem. 

Such a Conference, with God's help, would be a happy augury 


for the opening century. It would concentrate in one powerful effort 
the strivings of all States which sincerely wish to bring about the 
triumph of the grand idea of universal peace over the elements of 
trouble and discord. It would, at the same time, cement their agree- 
ment by a united affirmation of the principles of law and equity on 
which rest the security of States and the welfare of peoples. 



St. Petersburg, 12, 1898. 

This document, which as Count Muraviev declared origi- 
nated entirely with his Imperial Majesty, was distributed to 
members of the foreign diplomatic body on Wednesday, Au- 
gust 24, during the usual weekly reception at the Foreign 
Office. As each Ambassador entered the room, the Foreign 
Minister took a paper from a pile ready on his table and 
handed it to the visitor, who ran his eyes over it with some 

Were men to gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles? 
If the invitation had come from the Queen of England, or the 
President of the French Republic, or the President of the 
United States, no one would have been much, astonished. But 
the Tsar of Russia seemed the very incarnation of militarism. 
He was the sovereign of the largest military power, with re- 
sources for increasing its military strength unrestricted by 
constitutional and parliamentary limitations. He was the man 
who was supposed to be the absolute master of unnumbered 
legions of armed men, the man who was regarded as a menace 
to peace and progress wherever Russia had a frontier in 
China, Persia, Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula; even in 
free Scandinavia men did not reckon themselves safe from the 
colossal power which had absorbed Poland and Finland. The 

1 The Rescript was officially dated August 12/24, 1898 (12, "Old Style Russian 
Calendar") . It was made known to the public through a Reuter Telegram dated 
St. Petersburg, August 27, 1898. 

Source: Parliamentary Papers, i8pp, CX, Russia, No. i, pp. 1-3; official 
French text and English translations. Also Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1898, p. 541. 


Finns bitterly complained that simultaneously with the issue of 
the Rescript the Russian Government was occupied with a 
study of the ways and means for considerably increasing the 
military forces of the Grand Duchy and for piling up financial 
burdens upon a loyal people schemes which a sincere peace 
policy should render unnecessary. The Hungarians professed 
surprise at Russia's attempting to inaugurate the peace^era at 
a time when she was making presents of enormous quantities of 
arms and ammunition to a restless and warlike Balkan Prince. 
In Tsarist Russia of 1898 there were certain backward eddies 
which ran counter to the St. Petersburg peace current. Up to 
1898 nothing had been done by Russia in matters of foreign 
policy to show that a new and more conciliatory line of action 
had been resolved upon. 

Indeed, it did seem strange that the head of the greatest 
force of armed men in the world should call a cry of peace 
throughout the world at the moment when there were wars and 
rumors of wars and agitations in every portion of the globe. 
Still, writes Dr. E. J. Dillon, opinion in Russia was almost 
unanimous in claiming the absolute sincerity of the Tsar's 
proposal. 2 The project emanated directly from the Emperor 
himself, it was thought, not from any of his advisers. The idea 
had been suggested in many ways from without; four years 
earlier by Lord Rosebery, later on by the Tsar's own father, 
Alexander III, and lastly by Bloch's War oj the Future in Its 
Technical, Economic, and Political Relations. It was alleged 
that Nicholas II had pondered over it for nearly three years; 
he had statistics on the subject specially prepared; he had 
reports on the advantages and disadvantages of certain methods 
of realizing the scheme laid before him; and he had consulted 
the Kaiser and the King of Denmark on the more general 
aspects of the measure. Lastly, he took counsel with his 
Foreign Secretary as to the advisability and ways and means 

S E. J. Dillon, "The Tsar's Eirenicon," The Contemporary Review, LXXIV 
(November, 1898), 612. 


of embodying the idea in a workable shape; and only after it 
had successfully passed through all these preliminary stages 
did it finally appear before the world as the celebrated circular 
letter signed by Count Muraviev. 3 

To the young Russian sovereign universal peace was an 
hereditary question, for it represented the highest aspirations 
of a father whose principles and whose passion were peace. 
Certainly the Tsar's forefathers furnished numerous examples 
of a sincere, though somewhat spasmodic and eccentric, interest 
in humanitarian projects. In 1815 Alexander I ? inspired by 
Christian and mystical motives, conceived the Holy Alliance, 
whose members were to be guided by the precepts of "Justice, 
Christian Charity, and Peace." Alexander II freed the serfs 
in 1860, procured the condemnation of explosive bullets by 
international convention in 1868, and in 1874 made a strenuous 
but unsuccessful attempt to induce all the states of Europe to 
agree upon a code for regulating military operations on land. 
Alexander III was aptly called the "Peace Keeper of Europe." 
With this strain of idealism and enthusiasm in his blood, the 
young Tsar may well have resolved to signalize his reign by a 
great effort to lighten the war burdens of the nations. This is 
rendered all the more probable through what we know of the 
strength of his domestic affections. His mother was the widow 
of the peace-loving Alexander; his wife was celebrated for her 
humanity and gentleness no less than for her beauty. He could 
expect from the Tsarina sympathy and support in his humani- 
tarian projects. 

There were, however, influences other than heredity which 
acted as undercurrents at the Court of St. Petersburg. One of 
the many channels through which the humane suggestion came 
to the Tsar was J. von Bloch, a banker of Polish Semitic origin 
and a member of the Russian Council of State, who forsook 
finance at Warsaw to devote himself to the study of political 
economy and to examine particularly the question of the future 

3 Loc. dt. 


of war in its politico-economical aspects. Eight years he ap- 
plied himself to the special study of which his work, The War 
of the Future in Its Technical, Economic and Political Rela- 
tions, is the monument. It is composed of six volumes; the 
first three deal with the then existing machinery of war on land 
and on sea, the fourth and fifth with the influence of modern 
armaments on the social and economic conditions of the world. 
The last volume embodies the author's conclusions: that the 
conditions of warfare had so changed in late years that the 
future of war would be "not fighting, but famine, not the 
slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up 
of the whole social organization/' and, further, this Titanic 
trial of strength would not furnish or define any final solution 
of the problems which it was intended to settle; it would merely 
give rise to a revised gospel of revenge and inaugurate a new 
period of ruinous rivalry in military preparations. When the 
impossibility of war is apparent to all, Bloch maintained, other 
means of a less impractical character must be devised for the 
settlement of international disputes. 

"The object of this exhaustive investigation," writes Dr. E. 
J. Dillon, "is to create a powerful current of opinion against 
militarism and wars, and in favor of peace and arbitration 
among those social classes from which spring the men who can 
transmute subjective views into objective facts." 4 With pains- 
taking thoroughness von Bloch examined each question dis- 
cussed, displayed exact knowledge of matters technically ob- 
scure, and arrived at conclusions many of which have since 
been proved correct. Some of the chapters were first brought 
out as articles in a Moscow Liberal journal. The book itself 
was published in the early part of 1898; owing to difficulties 
with the Censure Office, its existence was brought to the notice 
of the Tsar. Many of the facts relied upon by von Bloch were 
said to have struck the Emperor as new, startling and instruc- 
tive. All the promised fruits of universal peace were of a 

4 E. J. Dillon, op. ctt. f pp. 614-15. 


character that appealed to Nicholas, and the ways and means 
suggested by the author of establishing a permanent European 
Court of Arbitration appeared to him admirable. 

Baroness Bertha von Suttner wrote in her Memoirs that 
she learned that Bloch's book had made a deep impression on 
the Tsar. She was also delighted to learn, from a very trust- 
worthy source, that Nicholas II had read her Die Waff en Nieder 
before the appearance of his manifesto; 5 yet the Baroness was 
firmly convinced that a long chain of many influences, among 
which that of reading a novel could have been of only small 
effect, must have preceded such an action. While at The 
Hague during the Peace Conference (May 9, 1899), she in- 
quired of Bloch regarding the reception of his book by the 
Tsar. The famous author tells the following story: 

Yes, the Tsar has studied the work thoroughly. When he received 
me in audience, the maps and tables from the book lay spread out 
on the tables, and he had me carefully explain all the figures and 
diagram. I explained until I was tired out, but Nicholas II did not 
grow weary. He kept asking new questions or throwing in observa- 
tions which testified to Ms deep appreciation and interest. "So this 
is the way the next war would develop," he said: "those would be 
the results, would they?" 

The Ministry of War, to which a copy had to be submitted, fur- 
nished the Emperor with a report and voted to authorize its pub- 
lication. In justifying its report it said: "Such a comprehensive and 
technical book will not be much read; it is therefore far less danger- 
ous than the Suttner novel, Die Waffen nieder. Inasmuch as the 
censor passed the latter, Bloch's "War of the Future" may a fortiori 
be admitted." 6 , \ 

The proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Congress at 
Budapest in September, 1896, were also considered as one of 
the influences under which it was believed that the Tsar de- 
cided to approach the governments of the world to consider the 

5 Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1910), II, 
193, Letter from Prince Peter Dolgorukof. 

6 Ibid., p. 252. 


possibilities of arresting the ruinous progress of military arma- 
ments. 7 The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Times, on 
December 16, 1898, published the following statement from an 

You will remember that about a couple of years ago an inter- 
Parliamentary peace conference on disarmament was held at Buda- 
pest, and was attended by Members of the different Parliaments of 
Europe. At that time the Russian Consul-General in the Hungarian 
capital was M. Basili, who has since been appointed under Count 
Muravieff, Chief of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign 
Office. The promoters of the Conference, and especially Count 
Apponyi, wished to have a Russian delegate, but, unfortunately 
or perhaps fortunately, as some persons prefer to think Russia 
was the only country not blessed with Parliamentary institutions. 
The Imperial autocratic Government naturally found it quite im- 
possible, and contrary to its professed principles, to send an official 
delegate to sit together with the chosen representatives of self- 
governing peoples. Therefore Russia was not officially represented. 
When, however, the conference came to an end, M. Basili sent a 
copy of its resolutions to the Ministry in St. Petersburg, where they 
were duly relegated to the archives, and, for the time, forgotten. 

Meanwhile Count Muravieff came into power, and M. Basili was 
recalled and placed at the head of the Asiatic section of the Ministry 
in the place of Count Kapnist. His report of the peace conference 
at Budapest would probably never have been heard of again had 
it not been for the discussion in very high places over the heavy call 
to be made upon the Russian exchequer for military improvements 
and the increase of the navy. . . . 

In consequence of the discussion that took place in these circum- 
stances as to the expense of armaments, it is said that the Report 
of the Conference at Budapest, which was calculated to suggest a 
remedy, was taken out of the pigeonholes and sent to the Emperor. 8 

In his The United States of Europe, as well as in a private 
letter to Randal Cremer, 9 W. T. Stead has confirmed the above 

7 Supra, p. 95 et seq* 

8 The Times, December 16, 1898, p. 5, col. 6; Howard Evans, Sir Randal 
Cremer, p, 179. 

g Founder of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and Workmen's Peace Commit- 
tee, later known as Workmen's Peace Association and still later as the Arbitra- 
tion Association. 


statement. He also wrote that M. Basili, after attending the 
Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1896, reported to his gov- 
ernment strongly in favor of action in the stay of armaments. 
His suggestion was not received with approval by his official 
superiors, and it remained for a long time in abeyance; then 
came the notable utterance of Lord Salisbury on November 9, 
1897, deprecating the increasing competition of the nations in 
armaments. After this M. Basili renewed his representations 
in favor of an attempt to arrive at an international agreement 
on the subject. The idea commended itself to Count Lams- 
dorff, who submitted the proposal to the Emperor. After a 
short time the Rescript was issued. 10 

Subsequently a semi-official denial of the statement made by 
the Times appeared in the Journal de St. Petersbourg, but the 
Special Commissioner of the Daily News declared that the 
story was quite true. He stated: "M. Basili is so much In 
earnest about securing a successful issue for the conference 
that he is willing even to deny he ever existed, if he could 
thereby gain a point for peace. But facts are not affected by 
such excess of zeal, and Mr. Cremer will be glad to know that 
the only result of the official correction has been to establish 
more firmly the truth of the original statement." n 

In a letter of May 26, 1933, addressed to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Nicholas Notovitch, a Russian author and jour- 
nalist and an acquaintance of Count Muraviev, claims credit for 
having drawn the Foreign Minister's attention to the minutes 
for the Budapest meeting. Muraviev presented them to the 
Emperor. 12 

So far as the writer has been able to discover, these asser- 
tions that the proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Confer- 

10 Ho ward Evans, op. tit., pp. 179-80; Georges Dubois, Des Charges de la 
Paix Arm&e, et de la Limitation des Armements, p. 88. 

11 Howard Evans, op. cit., p. 180. 

12 Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to the Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
May 26, 1933, enclosure in a letter from the Department of State, Washington, 
D. C., to the writer, RP. n6.3/444$> November 18, 1939. 


ence of 1896 influenced the Tsar in issuing Ms Eirenicon, are 
unsupported by Inter-Parliamentary Union documents. 13 It 
may be that M. Basili attended the sessions of the Universal 
Peace Congress meeting simultaneously in Budapest and re- 
ported its proceedings on the limitation of armament expendi- 
ture, which report, as stated above 14 may have been presented 
to Tsar Nicholas. If so, the Russian ministers simply used 
this memorandum to reinforce their economic arguments. 

Still other theories have been formulated regarding the influ- 
ences which moved the Tsar. In the Review of Reviews Annual 
for 1899 William T. Stead traced the germ of the Rescript to 
Lord Salisbury's confidential state paper on the armaments of 
Europe. 15 The Westminster Gazette remarks that the genesis 
of the Tsar's message was to be found in the suggestion which 
Lord Rosebery made to Baron de Staal in i894. 16 Others 
argued that Nicholas II was afraid of the inner enemy, namely 
Nihilism, which would be let loose by war. They contended 
that the young Tsar feared social revolution in every country 
and first of all in Russia. They characterized him as saying, 
"do not let us fight one another for the present; keep down 
expenditure and set about reducing the political freedom of the 
nations; keep your armies to fight your own people with, 
and I will lead off with the suppression of Home Rule in Fin- 
land." 17 

It was inevitable that many attempts should be made to 
trace the origin of the memorandum, and as inevitable that 
they should be unsuccessful. What the Tsar's motives may 
have been will probably always be questioned. No doubt he 
was moved by a genuine sense of the evils of the armed peace 
and by a desire to alleviate it for moral and economic reasons. 

13 Howard Evans, Radical Fights of Forty Years (London, 1913), p. 118. 

14 Supra, Chapter IV, p. 96. 

15 F. Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead, II, 122-23; also Review of Reviews, 
XVIII, 296. Supra, Chapter VII, p. 135 et seq. 
. 16 Review of Reviews, XVIII, 297. Supra, Chapter VII, pp. 137-40. 
17 Anonymous, The Tsar and Tolstoi Played Out, p. 28, 


But, since nineteenth century Russia was the Tsar in a much 
more literal sense than that in which the French Monarchy had 
been Louis XIV, the personality of the young ruler ought to 
be understood in any attempt to trace the origin of the Rescript. 
Dr. E. J. Dillon who lived and worked for years in close 
contact with the liberal movement under three Tsars, and in 
various capacities as a student, as a graduate of two Russian 
faculties and universities, as Professor of Comparative Philol- 
ogy at the University of Kharkov, as the author of several 
literary and scientific works, as leader writer of two Russian 
newspapers and editor of one, as representative of the Daily 
Telegraph and as adviser to Count Witte enjoyed the advan- 
tage of meeting many of the Emperor's foreign friends, some 
of his teachers and his Finance Minister. Having discussed 
with them the Tsar's character in general and those traits in 
particular which throw most light upon his aptitudes as a ruler, 
Dillon writes that he is not hesitant to affirm that, according 
to all those sources, Nicholas II was a "true idealist of a some- 
what mystic but cautious type, 33 freely speculative in theory 
and giving loose reins in his humane feelings, but careful in 
practice when the weal of his subjects was at stake "never 
to cut himself loose from his earthly moorings and drift before 
the winds towards castles in the air." 18 Despite a quickness of 
apprehension which was almost intuitive and a delicacy of 
sensitiveness which seemed well-night preternatural, the Tsar, 
maintains the English journalist, never indulged in the luxury 
of acting on the spur of the moment or playing the effective but 
dangerous part of a deus ex machina. He sent all his gleanings 
to the administrative mill to be ground in the ordinary humdrum 

way. 10 

This extreme caution seemed to Dillon to be one of the most 
noteworthy traits of the Tsar's character. He writes of the 

18 E. J. Billion, op. cit., pp. 612-13. 


To Mm lofty idealism comes natural, but education or intuition 
has wedded it to a rigorous sense of what is practicable and worth 
striving for. He takes an eminently human view of all things 
human, and is a firm believer in adjusting means to ends. Hence his 
sensibility of intellect, his susceptibility to new impressions and 
generous impulses, is rendered beneficial or harmless by his tena- 
cious adherence to traditional forms. He is keenly sensible that no 
one can grasp all the elements of such a complicated machine as 
the administration of a mighty empire, and his relations towards 
his Ministers are based upon a frank recognition of the fact. Having 
selected the men whom he believes to be well qualified for their 
respective posts, he makes them the channels through which his own 
ideas must pass before assuming visible shape in the statute book. 20 

Perhaps, as Notovitch maintains, Nicholas II did suggest to 
Count Muraviev the calling of a conference to make a common 
study of grievances and by an entente to put an end "to the 
pillaging of the people through the too costly maintenance of 
armies looking forward to absurd war." 21 While the Emperor 
was sojourning in the Crimea Admiral Grigorovitch, his Minis- 
ter of the Marine, came to him with his customary report and 
requested that the Emperor authorize a national loan for 300 
million rubles for the reconstruction of the war fleet; for the 
Admiral bore in mind that Germany was surpassing them in 
naval strength. The Tsar refused, indicating that he did not 
see the necessity of such an expenditure which would under- 
mine the well-being of the people, all because of the fear 
inspired in the Minister by the construction of some new ships 
by a neighboring country. Later, however, 190 thousand rubles 
of an unclaimed fund in the public treasury was placed at the 
disposal of the Minister of the Marine. 22 

Apparently inspired by the success of Admiral Grigorovitch, 
the Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, appeared eight days 
later with the request that the Emperor authorize a program 

30 Ibid., p. 614. 

21 Letter of Nicholas Notovitch to Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
May 26, 1933, p. $. 
32 /&*<*., p. 2. 


calling upon the Minister of Finance to raise a national loan 
for the purchase of new method firearms and for the re-equip- 
ment of the entire army according to the latest methods in use 
in France. 23 The Tsar did not favor the proposal; furthermore, 
he did not foresee the danger of imminent war. Kuropatkin in- 
formed His Majesty that the military intelligence of both 
France and Russia were well informed of a program of great 
surprise which the Kaiser was preparing and Russia must 
therefore be ready in any event. Moreover, the Minister added 
that the military convention with France obligated Russia to 
have a common system of armament with her ally. Nicholas 
replied that he would consult with Count Muraviev to see what 
could be done to avoid this kind of expenditure. 

The next day the Emperor received his Foreign Minister, 
who was coming with his periodic report, and during the con- 
versation the former demanded that he be told frankly just 
"what is taking place in Europe. Particularly what is it that 
my very agitated cousin is stirring up?" Muraviev is reported 
by Notovitch to have replied: "Europe is quite tranquil and is 
maintaining a position of watchfully awaiting developments in 
what concerns our neighbor who is a little too active and is 
taking every precaution, anticipating an unexpected 'coup de 
theatre/ We too, are however watching carefully, for this 
agitation seems to us dangerous and not of the customary kind." 

Nicholas asked if it would not be useful to invite all the 
powers large and small to make a study of their common 
grievances. The Minister could foresee no success in such a 
project for pacification through the simple means of a con- 
ference of the powers among whom were some who wanted a 
war to break out. "Well then, make a study of the question. 
I am very much for it and I am quite confident that such a 
proposal on my part will be accepted" were the final words of 
the Emperor. 24 

Nicholas Notovitch reports that on the very day of this con- 

*., p. 5- 


versation he met Muraviev along the quai of the Black Sea. 
The Count said: "Well, I am glad to see you, you who are 
always attacking us as the fomenters of war, and chiding us 
for doing nothing to pacify the hostile agitations among the 
various peoples. How now? What would you do if you were 
now in my place?" Notovitch referred him to the minutes of 
the Budapest meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a copy 
of which was sent for and its presentation to the Tsar produced 
a great impression. In deciding to call a conference the mon- 
arch expressed the "hope that the world of parliamentary 
governments will support my taking the initiative though we 
are not a constitutional form of government." 25 

Dr. Dillon, who, after the Tsar's own family and Ministers, 
perhaps knew more about the source of the Rescript than any 
other person, infers in his article published in November, 1898 
and therefore written soon after the appearance of the famous 
document that Nicholas II did not act independently but 
with the full cognizance and approval of his Foreign Minister. 
Dillon probably knew much more than he was able to write in 
1898. It would have been ungracious as well as dangerous for 
a foreigner making his livelihood and home in Russia and 
enjoying the confidence of Count Witte to divulge state secrets; 
but after the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, in 1918, Dillon 
wrote his Eclipse of Russia in which he gives what was prob- 
ably the true source of the Rescript. 26 If we accept his story 
together with that of Witte, we must conclude that the Rescript 
did not originate with the idealistic Tsar but was suggested to 
him by his Ministers and promulgated in his name as a means 
for furthering Russian policy. Or it may be that the sagacious 
Muraviev, acquainted with the humanitarian tendencies of the 
Tsar, only hinted at the idea, letting it be known that he him- 
self approved, and the young monarch then acted. 

25 2m, pp. 6-7. 

26 E. J. Billon, The Eclipse of Russia (Curtis Brown, London, 1918), pp. 
269-87. Cf. the following chapter. 


Whatever its origin may have been the Tsar and his Ministers 
brought the proposition into the realm of actual facts. They 
showed that the idea of a general limitation or arrest of arma- 
ments is a serious project which merits the attention and study 
of statesmen. 



IT MAY be that the young Tsar whose "enlightened human- 
ity and heroic courage" are deserving of the utmost praise 
earnestly proposed putting an end to a state of things abhorred 
by all thoughtful people; certainly there is little doubt that the 
Russian Ministers seriously approved the project, which they 
adopted. But when the same thing is done by two persons it 
ceases to be the same, and it would be fallacious to contend that 
the object and the motives of the Russian statesmen were 
identical with the aims and aspirations of their monarch. The 
Foreign and Finance Ministers could safely approve or even 
promote the scheme since their policies were bound to profit 
by its success. Russia needed peace for consolidating her new 
acquisitions, for improving her economic and financial system, 
for the completion of her strategical railways and canals and 
for carrying out her new naval program. Accordingly, to sus- 
pect Count Muraviev and Count Witte of insincerity is tanta- 
mount to suspecting them of complete lack of astuteness. 

A respite in the armament competition would have been 
advantageous to Russia for political, strategical, economic and 
financial reasons. Russia by 1898 had acquired more territory 
than she could assimilate in twenty-five years. Her advances 
in the Orient could continue without a great army and navy. 
But good finances and pacific activity wisely directed were the 
most certain means for her to prepare against the rival powers 
which would oppose her ambitions in the East. 

Count Sergius Witte, Russian Minister of Finance and the 
greatest statesman who had arisen in the country since the 



days of Peter, was immutably bent upon peace. In Ms confi- 
dential talks with Dr. E. J. Dillon, Ms adviser, he often empha- 
sized the fact that Russia occupied a place in the hierarchy of 
nations to which she was nowise entitled; if ever the discovery 
were made by the Kaiser, he feared the consequences might be 
calamitous. The Russian Empire was weak, disunited, about 
to explode into tiny fragments, and a campaign against a great 
power like Germany would very soon reveal tMs condition. All 
wars had therefore to be avoided because of the fatal revelation 
to which they would lead. 1 

Count Witte wanted peace also in order to place the coun- 
try's finances on a sound basis and to foster its industries by 
opening, through railways and "peaceful penetration," vast new 
markets in the East for Russian produce. That was the key to 
his grandiose scheme of railway building. After the Russo- 
Turkish War railroad construction was practically suspended; 
it fell to Witte's lot, as Minister of Ways and Communications, 
and later as Minister of Finance, to resume the work. In this 
respect he succeeded in achieving a good deal, for during his 
administration the railway mileage of the country was doubled. 
In the seven years alone from 1891 to 1898 Russian railroad 
mileage was extended from 18,441 to 28,442 English miles; 
the gross receipts mounted from 296,087,000 to 457,549,541 
paper rubles; and the number of passengers carried increased 
from 47,942,765 to 70,877,406^ 

The vast enterprise of constructing the Trans-Siberian Rail- 
way, covering a distance of 4,950 miles and involving an expen- 
diture of approximately 150,000,000 rubles, was carried out 
owing to Witte's efforts, assisted first by Emperor Alexander III 
and then by Nicholas II. It would seem that this great railroad 
in its conception and its early years was an enterprise of a 
purely economic nature. Witte states that its great originator 
had no political or military designs in connection with the road. 

1 E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, p. 40. 

2 The Statesman's Yearbook, 1900, p. 979. 


Alexander III wished to establish communication by the short- 
est possible route between the distant Maritime Province and 
Central Asia. Both Alexander and his successor attributed a 
strategic importance to the road of a strictly defensive nature. 
The Trans-Siberian was not intended to serve as a means for 
territorial expansion. 3 

Although military and strategical considerations may thus 
not have influenced the early construction of the famous rail- 
road, they certainly played an important part in its history after 
the Sino- Japanese War altered the political situation in the Far 
East. By the Peace of Shimonoseki, 1895, Japan acquired the 
peninsula of Liaotung, including the harbors of Ing-Kow and 
Port Arthur. The Russian Government regarded this arrange- 
ment with alarm, for it gave Japan a footing on the continent 
in the neighborhood of the Russian sphere of interest. Witte 
realized that it was to Russia's best interests to have as her 
neighbor a strong but passive China, which would assure 
Russia's safety in the East. He accordingly insisted on the 
necessity of thwarting the execution of the peace treaty. The 
Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Lobanov-Rostovski, won over 
Germany and France to the Russian point of view, and Japan 
was forced to accept a war indemnity in lieu of the Liaotung 

Simultaneously, Count Witte entered into negotiations with 
China and offered her Russia's services for the conclusion of 
the large loan which she needed in order to pay the indemnity. 
Russian resources were pledged as security for the Chinese loan. 
The Finance Minister took practically complete charge of and 
arranged for the transaction on the French money market by 
founding the Russo-Chinese Bank in which French financiers 
were the chief share-holders. In April, 1896, the Chinese Gov- 
ernment sent Li Hung-chang to St. Petersburg as Ambassador 
Extraordinary to carry through the negotiations. 4 In confer- 

3 The Memoirs of Count Witte. Translated and edited by Abraham Yarmo- 
linsky (London, 1924)* PP- 86-87. 
4 /bid., p. 8*. 


ence with him, Count Witte dwelt on the services which Russia 
had rendered to China. He assured the Ambassador that, hav- 
ing proclaimed the principle of China's territorial integrity, 
Russia intended to adhere to it in the future; but to be able to 
upholding this principle, she must be in position in case of 
emergency to give China armed assistance. Witte argued that 
to give the Chinese Empire military aid it was necessary to have 
a railroad running along the shortest possible route to Vladi- 
vostok, across the northern part of Mongolia and Manchuria. 
By 1896 the Trans-Siberian Line had reached Transbaikalia, 
and if it were continued straight across Chinese territory instead 
of deflected to the north along the Amur, some 514 versts 5 
would be saved. Technically the Amur section presented great 
difficulties. Besides running along the river it would compete 
with the Amur steamship companies. Moreover, the Mongo- 
lian route possessed the advantage of a more productive soil 
and a more favorable climate. Witte pointed out to Li Hung- 
chang that the projected route would raise the productivity of 
both the Russian possessions and the Chinese territory it 
would cross. 6 

As a result of these negotiations a secret Russo-Chinese pact 
was concluded. The Chinese Government granted to Russia 
permission to build a railroad within Chinese territory along 
a line between Chita and Vladivostok, but Li Hung-chang 
stipulated that the road must be in the hands of a private 
corporation. For that reason Russia formed the Eastern 
Chinese Railway Corporation. This organization, nominally 
private, lay completely in the hands of the government. China 
agreed to cede to Russia a strip of land sufficient for the con- 
struction, and operation of the railroad, within which territory 
the corporation was permitted "to have its own police and to 
exercise full and untrammelled authority." Finally, the two 
countries obligated themselves to defend each other in case 

5 A Russian measure of length equal to 3,500 feet or approximately two -thirds 
of an English mile. 

6 The Memoirs of Count Witte, pp. 86, 89. 


Japan attacked the territory of China or Russia's Far Eastern 
maritime provinces. 7 The terms of the railway concession 
granted by China were favorable to Russia. The agreement 
provided for China's right to redeem the road at the expiration 
of thirty-six years, but the conditions were so burdensome that 
it was highly improbable that the Chinese Government would 
ever attempt to effect the redemption. It was calculated that 
should China wish to redeem the road at the beginning of the 
thirty-seventh year she should have to pay at least 700 million 
rubles. 8 Thus the history of the Russo-Chinese negotiations for 
the construction of the Chita-Vladivostok section of the Trans- 
Siberian Railway shows clearly the military and strategical 
importance of this great route. 

Count Witte was not definitely bent upon the building of 
railroads in general for strategical purposes. His aim, above all, 
was peace; he looked on railways as commercial and industrial 
adventures and as means of increasing the productivity of labor 
by enabling it to move from place to place with the seasons, a 
very important consideration in Russia where the climate in 
the north and central regions imposed upon labor a long period 
of idleness. While the Minister of Finance strained every effort 
to develop a network pf railroads, the Minister of War only 
supported him when he proposed to build railroads of a strate- 
gical importance. Often lines were built counter to Witte's 
recommendation, and sometimes the direction of non-strategic 
routes was distorted to suit the purposes of the War Minister. 
Count Witte complained of the great harm done to his work by 
General Kuropatkin and especially the Chief of Staff, Obruchev, 
whose monomania was strategic railways. 9 Nicholas II often 
sided with the military authorities and prevented the Minister 
of Finance from building the lines most productive economi- 
cally. After dealing with communications for forty years, Count 
Witte was convinced that a country will be best off if, in build- 
ing railways, it is guided by purely economic considerations. 

7 Ibid., p. 90. 8 Ibid,, p. 95. Q Ibid., p. 75. 


On the whole such lines would also meet strategic needs. It was 
his opinion that these factors should become the basic principle 
of railroad construction. 10 

In connection with Russian railway construction and expan- 
sion eastward it should be borne in mind that in December, 
1897, a squadron of Russian warships occcupied Port Arthur 
and Talienwan. The German occupation of Kiao-chow offered 
a favorable occasion for the Russian action, which the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs attempted to justify by reporting that if 
Russia failed to occupy these seaports England would. 11 In 
January, 1898, the Russian Government drew up a set of 
demands which included not only the cession of Port Arthur 
and Talienwan but also that part of the Liaotung peninsula 
which is known as the Kwantung Provinces. These were to be 
leased for thirty-six years without any compensation to China, 
and permission was demanded for the construction of a branch 
line linking them with the Trans-Siberian. 12 Largely under the 
influence of the fact that a number of Russian warships, 
cleared for action, lay off Port Arthur, the agreement was 
signed by the Chinese Government on March 15, 1898. 

Thus it is evident that at the time of the appearance of the 
Rescript the Russian Government was pursuing a consistent 
policy of railway construction and expansion eastward. The 
young Tsar ; was personally interested in railway development, 
and, though he had no definite program of conquest, he was 
possessed, Witte states, of an unreasoned desire to seize Far 
Eastern lands. 13 The military authorities continually insisted 
on still more railway lines to meet their needs. And it was they 
who, because of the enormous strategical importance of the 
ports, urged the seizure of Port Arthur and Talienwan. There- 
fore, it is quite possible and highly probable that Nicholas II 
and his Ministers saw in the Rescript a possibility of diminish- 
ing armament expenditure, thus ensuring that there would be 
money for further railroad development. Certainly this was a 

10 Loc. dt. " Ibid., p. ioi. 13 Ibid., p. 102. 13 Ibid., p. 83. 


strong accusation brought against them in other countries, 
especially in England, 

Critics of the Rescript argued that the great public works 
which Russia had undertaken with a view to military exigencies 
required an enormous amount of money and general tranquillity, 
and that when the works were finished, with the economic 
development which would come within a number of years, 
Russia would be able to cope, on land if not on the sea, with 
any force which could be brought against her. Russian states- 
men were accused of attempting to reduce the weight of the 
military debt which at that time was absorbing 21.37 P er cent 
of the total expenses in order to reorganize the means of 
communication, then taking only 2.95 per cent. 14 A reduction 
of armaments would not require Russia to drain her treasury 
in defense of her western frontier but would leave her free to 
aggrandize, cover and exploit her Asiatic and European terri- 
tories by means of new railways. In the Russian budget pub- 
lished on January i, 1899 (O.S.), the department of commu- 
nications received more than 397,000,000 rubles, which was 
37,000,000 rubles more than the credit allotted to the Minister 
of War. 15 In this respect the Russian budget on the eve of the 
Peace Conference was a peaceful one. On the surface, the 
railways look pacific and civilizing; but, as has been pointed 
out, a Russian railway in Asia is not exclusively, or even pri- 
marily, intended for purposes of trade and passenger convey- 
ance; it is often a strategical work of the first importance. 

A British "Soldier," writing on "The Tsar's Appeal for 
Peace, 7 ' states that certain shrewd statesmen were set upon the 
cautious and steady expansion of Russian territory. They 
aimed to carry Russian influence and railways through Persia 
so as to place Western Afghanistan, Herat, the Heri-Rus, and 
the most convenient approach to India completely at the mercy 
of Russia; to complete the Siberian and Manchurian railways, 

14 Revue ginirale de droit international public, VI, 101. 

15 The TimeSj January 13, 1899, p. 3, col. 6. 


to drill and organize Manchurian levies and to accumulate 
stores in view of further aggression against China; and to work 
by Norwegian disaffection towards securing from Norway the 
ice-free Varanger fiord. 16 The most effective increase of Rus- 
sian power in all these directions could best be realized by at 
least ten years of peace. 

In 1898, the "Soldier" points out, Russia was busily engaged 
on a network of strategical canals and railways; she was 
planning the construction of the Riga-Kherson canal to join 
the Baltic with the Black Sea, which would double the value 
of her fleet, 17 while the canal from the Caspian towards Herat 
was then within a short distance from the capital of Afghani- 
stan. A railway through Samarkand was due to reach Tash- 
kent in 1899 and the next year a branch-line was to be con- 
structed which, for military purposes, would turn the Pamir 
Highlands from the east. Russia was at the same time working 
on the Trans-Siberian, the Manchurian, and the Liaotung 
railways whose completion would give her effective possession 
of Manchuria, Talienwan and Port Arthur. The "Soldier" 
claimed that Russia was pushing investigations along the whole 
line of the eastern frontier of Persia where it borders upon 
Afghanistan and Beluchistan with a view to the construction 
of a railway southwards towards the Persian Gulf. When Persia 
was traversed by a railway guarded by Russian troops it was 
feared that the country would become for all practical purposes 
a Russian province and a secure base for further advance 
towards India. 18 Once these railway projects were completed,, 
her enemies argued, Russia would enjoy the advantage of 
occupying the inner line from which she could strike at her 
foe with force and directness. But all those plans required 
money and peace. Consequently, the idea of the Rescript was 
an admirable stroke of Russian diplomacy. 

16 "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," The Contemporary Review, 
LXXIV (October, 1898), 500-501. 

17 The Statesman's Yearbook, 1900, p. 957. 

18 "A Soldier," op. cit., p. 501. 


Moreover, Poland in 1898 was a thorn In the Russian side 
and contributed to bring about a state of things under which 
peace at any price was practically a condition of existence to 
the Russian Empire. A secret report of Prince Imeretinsky, 
Governor General of Poland, a report dealing with the feelings 
of the Polish people especially the attitude of the peasantry 
and the Roman Catholic clergy showed after a hundred years 
of Russian domination of Poland that authorities in St. Peters- 
burg only faintly entertained the hope of bringing Russia 
and Poland together. Peace had been maintained in Poland 
since 1863, yet the Poles were still striving for their independ- 
ence, and this they were endeavoring to obtain by educating 
the lower classes in patriotism. Prince Imeretinsky was of the 
opinion that a Polish insurrection in 1898 would be more 
widely supported by the Polish people than on the occasion of 
the last rising. The Minister of War and the Minister of the 
Interior were agreed that the state of feeling in Poland was 
still as menacing to Russia as it had been in i863- 19 

Economic and financial considerations too were certainly 
among the causes underlying the Rescript. Shortly before its 
appearance the Russian Minister of Finance had reported that 
a suspension of armaments must come if bankruptcy and the 
horrors of a wide-spread famine were to be avoided. At the 
time Russia's indebtedness amounted to 3,062,147,280 gold and 
3,046,644,837 paper rubles, making a total of 6,108,792,117 
rubles. 20 The War Minister's expenditure was 303,277,000 
rubles and that for the marine 67,289,000. On the other hand, 
public instruction received only 26,921,000 rubles, or less than 
one-thirteenth of the amount spent on war preparations. 21 Since 
1891, over ten million of the moujiks had been enduring con- 
tinuous famine, the old nobility were insolvent and the Excheq- 

19 "Secret Official Report of the Condition of Poland," The Times, August 13, 
1898, p. n, cols. 1-3. A Polish revolutionist stole a copy of this report, smug- 
gled it out of Russia, and sent it to London to be used among the Poles. 

2(> The Statesman's Year Book, 1900, p. 947. 

21 Ibid., p. 942. 


uer had every year to contribute approximately 1,500,000 
in subsidies to appease actual hunger. The money markets of 
Berlin and London were practically closed to Russia and an 
attempt to secure a loan of $125,000,000 from the United 
States failed because the Americans distrusted the security. 

Mr. Charles Conant, writing in the North American Review 
for February, 1899, states that in making his proposal the Tsar 
was actuated by the far-sighted motives of public policy which 
had governed the economic measures of the Russian Govern- 
ment for many years. Russia was trying to organize the 
machinery of her economic system in such a manner as to 
make her the early and dangerous rival of the great industrial 
nations; all she needed to complete this work was relief from 
the heavy burden of taxes necessary for maintaining her great 
armies. Count Witte furnished the key to the policy of the 
Russian Government by this declaration contained in his report 
of 1898 to the Tsar: 

The principal support of the economic and financial prosperity 
of Russia consists in the traditional policy, pacific and just, of her 
sovereign. The principles bequeathed by the late Emperor Alexander 
III, and the sincere spirit of peace which animates your Majesty 
are guarantees that, in the future, as in the past, the foreign policy 
of Russia will be exempt from every aggressive position towards 
other States, with the view to the promotion of the well-being of 
our country, and that from this source our economic and financial 
system shall be menaced with no danger. 22 

As Minister of Finance, Witte was also in charge of com- 
merce and industry. He saw in industrial development the 
creation of a new source for the application of labor. He con- 
sidered it imperative to develop Russian industries not only in 
the interest of the people, but also of the State, for a modern 
body politic cannot be great without a well-developed national 
industry. Count Witte tried to facilitate the formation of 

22 Charles A. Conant, "Russia As A World Power," The North American 
Review, CLXVIII (February, 1899), 178. 


joint-stock companies, and he arranged industrial loans from 
the Imperial Bank. He claims to have increased Russian indus- 
try threefold during the time that he was in power. 23 His 
attempts to improve the financial and economic condition of 
the land were known and watched outside the country. In fact, 
Ms introduction of the gold standard of currency (1896) at- 
tracted world-wide attention, for it definitely established Rus- 
sia's credit and put her financially on an equal footing with the 
European powers. M. Arthur Raffalovich, Russian financial 
agent in Paris, declared in the Government's annual volume on 
the financial development of the world, Le Marche financier 
(1898), that the economic life of Russia had become the center 
round which converged all the care of the Government, the 
interest of the public and the attention of foreign observers. 24 
In Mr. Conant's opinion the whole energy of the State was 
being applied to making the nation capable of competing in the 
fields of manufacture, industry, commerce and credit with the 
great western European nations and the United States. This 
was easy in a state where the absence of parliamentary institu- 
tions gave force, directness and promptness to every measure 
decided upon for the development of the country. In Russia, it 
was necessary to convince only the Tsar and the Council of 
Ministers, composed of men well trained for statecraft and 
undeterred by the exigencies of party politics from following 
their economic convictions. After discussing the economic 
development of Russia as illustrated by her incorporated stock 
companies, her deposit, check and railway systems, Mr. Conant 
concluded that it was not surprising that Russian statesmen 
decided that Russia would gain enormously in the race with 
other industrial nations by devoting her whole energy to eco- 
nomic development. Hence the Tsar's proposition that the 
world lay aside its arms and give its people an opportunity to 
devote themselves to industrial pursuits looked directly to the 

S3 The Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 76. 
24 Charles A. Conant, op. cit.j p. 179. 


future dominance of Russia in the commerce and finance of 
the world. 25 

Count Witte played, perhaps, a greater part in bringing 
about the Rescript than is generally attributed to him. As 
Russia's Finance Minister he was laboring under great diffi- 
culties, and certainly desired to see military expenditure limited. 
Dr. E. J. Dillon, his close friend, states that Witte grudged 
every ruble he had to spend on armaments; he loathed the 
very name of war and was never weary of denouncing it. "It 
is my conviction," he wrote in Mrs. Dillon's album, "that the 
burden of armaments without limitations may become more 
irksome than war itself." 26 As early as the autumn of 1894, 
during an interview in Vienna, Count Witte is reported to have 
expressed himself strongly in favor of the reduction of arma- 
ments. He regretted that preparations for war were increasing 
despite the continued peace pronouncements by the three most 
powerful sovereigns. The result of the competition between the 
states was that the relation of the forces of the respective 
powers remained the same, while their general strength was 
fruitlessly exhausted. 27 

The financial situation of Russia regarding armaments ap- 
pears to have reached a climax in the summer of 1898. In that 
year the total expenditure on the Navy, which had been 
59,902,166 rubles in 1897, was increased to 68,055,417 rubles. 28 
On January 13 the Russian budget and estimates of expenditure 
for the following year showed an increase of 66,226,351 rubles 
for 1899. On the same day War Minister Vannovski 29 retired 
and was succeeded by General Alexy Nikolaievich Kuropatkin, 
who had been Governor of Transcaspia. In June the War 
Minister informed Muraviev that Austria was about to increase 
and rearm her artillery, which would compel Russia to do like- 

25 Ibid,, p, 189. 

26 E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, p. 275. 

27 Review of Reviews, October, 1894, p. 322. 

28 Statesman's Year Book, 1900, p. 957. 
20 Also written Wamowsky. 


wise. In a memorandum to the Emperor, Kuropatkin stated 
that since France and Germany had stolen a march on the 
other powers by providing their armies with improved guns 
(field and heavy guns), Austria and Russia could not and 
would not lag behind. But the cost of rearming the artillery 
was a deterrent, for Russia was at that time engaged in rearm- 
ing her entire infantry. Neither Russia nor Austria was wealthy. 
Could they not agree to a simple compromise that would com- 
mend itself to both governments all the more readily that the 
two empires belonged to opposite camps? Why should they not 
agree to keep the money in their respective treasuries? 30 Witte, 
in his Memoirs, tells us that the War Minister suggested that 
his country should open negotiations for the purpose of induc- 
ing Austria to give up her plan, on the understanding that 
Russia would refrain from increasing or perfecting her artillery. 
The Finance Minister did not favor this step, for he was con- 
vinced that it would produce no practical results and would 
merely reveal Russia's financial weakness to the whole world. 
He explained to Dr. Dillon that what was wanted was some 
ruse by means of which Russia could induce Austria to stay her 
hand and discuss disarmament instead of investing large sums 
in the improved gun. His thoughts centered round an idea of 
a league of pacific nations vying with each other in trade, in- 
dustry, science, arts and inventions; and he believed that even 
though the opportunity had not yet come to draw nearer to 
this, there would be no harm in setting the powers to thinking 
about it. si In speaking to the Foreign Minister, Witte stated 
that he would apply the principle underlying General Kuro- 
patkin's plan not only to Austria and Russia but to all the 
nations of the world. In this way the Russian Government 
would avoid invidious distinction and leave no ground for mis- 
givings. He "expatiated on the incalculable harm which the 
growing militarism was doing to the peoples of the world and 
the boon which would be conferred on humanity by limiting 
80 E. J. Dillon, op. cto^ pp. 272-73. 31 Ibid., p. 274. 


armaments." Apparently Ms ideas produced a profound im- 

Several days later a special council was called to consider the 
War Minister's project. As soon as Kuropatkin had read and 
explained his proposal, Witte criticized it sharply. A lively 
debate ensued in the course of which Count Muraviev and 
Count Lamsdorffj the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
endorsed Witte's idea unreservedly, whereupon the proposed 
scheme was dropped. Then to the amazement of those present, 
Muraviev calmly took out a sheet of paper and read the rough 
draft of a circular to the powers on the subject of the limitation 
of armaments, the contents of which he said His Majesty 
favored. It was Count Witte's idea expressed in diplomatic 
phraseology. The Minister of Finance recognized the fruit of 
his suggestion, and smiled at the humanitarian wrapping, for he 
knew that the whole scheme was a piece of hypocrisy and 
guile. 32 General Kuropatkin, however, opposed the project; 
Witte approved it, for it appeared to him less impracticable 
and odd than the proposal for an agreement with Austria, pre- 
viously suggested by the War Minister. 33 This rough draft, 
which was placed in a finished form by Count Lamsdorff, was 
ratified by the Tsar and subsequently handed to all the foreign 
diplomats accredited to the Court of St. Petersburg. 34 

If we accept the explanation of Count Witte and Dr. Dillon, 
we are bound to conclude that the Rescript was not in its 
genesis directly due to idealistic motives but that it originated 
with Witte and Muraviev as an attempt to extricate the Russian 
Government from financial difficulties. Certainly Russia's eco- 

33 For Count Witte's part in the Rescript see Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia 
pp. 270-78; The Memoirs of Count Witte, pp. 96-97; Ward and Gooch, The 
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy i/tfj-rpip, III, 258-59. NOTE: 
The last two references differ slightly; the latter states that it was Kuropatkin, 
the Minister of War, who saw in a partial arrangement with Austria confession 
of weakness (p. 259). The writer's statements are based on Count Witte's 

34 E. J. Dillon, op. cit., p. 277. 


nomlc and political policies at the time point to that conclusion. 
What the Emperor's motives may have been will probably 
always be disputed. No doubt they were a politico-humanitarian 
composite, but those of his Ministers do not appear to fall in 
quite the same category. 
Dr.E. J.Dillon writes: 

There would in all probability have been no Hague Conference 
if General Kuropatkin had asked in the ordinary way for the neces- 
sary credit to enable him to follow the example of his German col- 
league and supply the Russian army with the new gun. It is 
equally probable that if Witte had simply accepted or rejected the 
War Minister's suggestion of a "deal" with Austria, the peace con- 
ference would not have been convoked or thought of. With a touch 
of that irony which generally accompanied his frank talks about 
the Tsar with an intimate friend like myself, Witte, who was senti- 
mental rather than cynical, remarks that the Tsar's peace proposal 
was one of the greatest mystifications known to history, and at the 
same time a beneficent stimulus. However high we may rate the 
contributory causes of the peace movement inaugurated by Nicholas 
II, history will retain the decisive fact that the motive of its prime 
author was to hoodwink the Austrian Government and to enable 
the Tsar's War Minister to steal a march on his country's future 
enemies. 35 

35 E. J. Dillon, op. tit., p. 278. 


THE Tsar's manifesto was hailed with enthusiasm by the 
apostles of peace, for it was the most significant event which, 
up to 1898, the peace movement had to show. It filled all the 
pacifists with jubilation, because that which is colossal and 
at the same time unexpected overpowers. "On the whole/ 7 
wrote Baroness von Suttner, "from our standpoint, the event 
cannot be estimated highly enough. One of the most powerful 
of rulers acknowledges the peace ideal, comes out as an op- 
ponent of militarism; from this time on the movement is incal- 
culably nearer its goal; new ways are opening before it, and 
it is to be carried on to a new basis of operations." * 

To the pacifists the time seemed eminently favorable for 
making a disarmament proposal because on the one hand the 
governments were proclaiming through their statesmen in the 
strongest language possible their fervent desires for the main- 
tenance of the general peace and further that no efforts should 
be spared on their part to secure it; on the other hand, the 
peoples of every country were complaining beneath the heavy 
burden of taxation and appealing for deliverance from military 
conscription. Throughout the world the peace movement seized 
its great opportunity. The various types of peace organizations, 
national and international, bombarded the Tsar with congratu- 
lations and petitioned and memorialized their governments. 

Tsar Nicholas IFs invitation to the powers to hold a Peace 
Conference, while quite unexpected, came as a fulfillment of the 
hopes of the Peace Societies, At last someone had been found 

1 Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs, II, 190, citing her periodical, Die Waffen 
Nieder, VII (September, 1898), 344. 



to make a beginning. Here was a significant admission that 
the so-called Utopian dreams of the "amiable enthusiasts" who 
were working for peace and the prosperity of nations were 
practical and within the realm of government. Regardless of 
what motives or political reasons had actuated the Tsar and his 
ministers, a proposal had at last been made to carry into effect 
what the Peace Societies had urged for over eighty years. 

One of the first acts of the Secretary of the British Peace 
Society, Dr. Darby, was to telegraph the Society's gratification 
to the Tsar. 2 On September 2 the Executive Committee held a 
meeting at which it adopted a resolution hailing with satisfac- 
tion the Russian Emperor's proposal and expressing the Soci- 
ety's deep gratitude to "Almighty God that, at length, after such 
long advocacy of the beneficent object proposed . . . its ideals 
should be recognized as practicable, and such a proposal be 
made to carry them into effect by one of the greatest poten- 
tates in the world"; and trusting that all civilized governments, 
notwithstanding the difficulties that would have to be faced, 
would persevere until the noble object of the Tsar of Russia 
should be attained, "and a new era of Peace and Prosperity be 
inaugurated." 3 

The Committee also embodied in a letter addressed to the 
Friends and Members of the Society various practical sugges- 
tions which seemed desirable. 4 There was no need, they said, 
to bring the pressure of the electorate to bear upon a reluctant 
government, for they had heard on good authority that the 
Foreign Office was not only in agreement with, but had prac- 
tically given its cordial adhesion to, the action of the Tsar. 
Nevertheless, there was much to be done in the way of com- 
bating the influence of those parties interested in the mainte- 
nance of the present military system, as well as the influence of 
all those who distrusted the Tsar and his proposal. The 
Government would need popular support, and it would be of 

2 The Herald of Peace, October i, 1898, p. 125. 

3 Loc. cto. 4 Lac. dt. 


great assistance to the cause If the strong sentiment of the 
British people were expressed so as to give encouragement to 
the Tsar. The Committee recommended that the Rescript 
should be accepted in good faith and cordially supported by 
everybody in authority and especially by the leaders of opinion 
and those who had the ear of the Government. They suggested 
the holding of public meetings to stimulate and give expression 
to popular sympathy. These, they thought, should be in the 
character of public demonstrations, with the best speakers 
and strongest supporters; and care should be exercised to pre- 
vent the meetings being captured or utilized by opponents of 
peace. 5 

The auxiliary branches of the Peace Society took the matter 
up, and large meetings were held throughout the British Isles 
at which resolutions were passed hailing with thankfulness the 
Tsar's invitation to the powers and expressing the earnest hope 
that the British Government would not only heartily accept 
this invitation but also exert its utmost influence to secure the 
success of the deliberations. 

The Society of Friends, too, took immediate steps and on 
September 8, the members resident in Essex and Suffolk as- 
sembled at a Quarterly Meeting at Saffron Walden, drafted a 
Memorial to the Marquis of Salisbury, a Memorial earnestly 
desiring that the statesmen of Europe and Her Majesty's 
Government in particular would see to it that the Conference, 
notwithstanding the complexity of the situation, might "not 
separate without inaugurating some real steps towards a true 
and lasting Peace." 6 

Later, the General Body the Meetings for Sufferings rep- 
resenting the Religious Society of Friends in Great Britain, 
adopted a minute expressing its deep thankfulness for the pro- 
posal made by the Tsar of Russia and respectfully urging the 
Queen's Government to respond cordially to the invitation. "We 
believe," the minute concluded, "that our Heavenly Father is 

5 LOG. tit. * Ibid,, p. 126. 


preparing the hearts of the nations for this proposal, and it is 
our prayer that He will guide their action upon it and direct 
their counsels into issues of Peace." T Moreover, the Yearly 
Meeting of 1899 sent a deputation to The Hague with a 
message of congratulation and prayerful good wishes to the 
various Ambassadors there. 8 

The Christian Churches of the world, especially the Dissent- 
ing Churches of Great Britain and the Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the United States, gave expression to their great 
satisfaction both in particular congregations and in their gen- 
eral gatherings. The Bishop of Carlisle trusted that God might 
"dispose the deliberations of the proposed Conference to the 
attainment of a general and abiding peace." The Bishop of 
Bath and Wells spoke of the Tsar's Rescript as "a noble 
proposal, the highest watermark yet reached by the tide of 
Christianity." The Reverend Hugh Price Hughes, speaking for 
the Wesleyans, declared that the Circular was "the wisest and 
most Christian proposal ever made by a European Sovereign." 
The London Congregational Board of Ministers, which met on 
September 14, at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, adopted 
a resolution expressing its profound gratitude and satisfaction 
with the Tsar's Eirenicon and trusting that the British Govern- 
ment would "exercise its utmost power to bring to a successful 
issue the deliberations upon a subject so fraught with conse- 
quences in connection with the happiness of the whole human 
family." Copies of their resolution were sent to the Tsar and 
to Lord Salisbury. At a large gathering of the National Coun- 
cil of the Free Evangelical Churches of England and Wales at 
Liverpool in April, 1899, a resolution was passed expressing 
thankfulness for the Rescript. The Reverend Dr. Clifford, 
President of the Free Church Federation, reports that local 
and district councils throughout the land, embracing nearly 

7 Loc. dt. 

8 M. E. Hirst, The Quakers in Peace and War (Swarthmore Press, London, 
1923), PP. 271-72. 


2,000,000 Free Church Members, passed with unbroken una- 
nimity resolutions expressing the desire of these Churches that 
Her Majesty's Government should use this unique opportunity 
for furthering as far as possible the cause of universal peace. 9 

Mr. Maddison, M. P. ? spokesman for the labor groups of 
Great Britain, claims that whenever they had the opportunity 
of collective expression of opinion, labor uanimously favored 
the proposed Conference. 10 The Trades Union Congress, rep- 
resenting the industrial classes of Great Britain and Ireland, 
distinguished itself by being the first representative body of 
Englishmen to express approval of the Rescript. On August 31 
this Congress of organized workers passed unanimously a reso- 
lution in which it hailed with satisfaction the message of the 
Tsar in favor of international disarmament and called upon the 
Government to use all its legitimate means to give effect to it. 11 
Throughout the autumn, local labor bodies and Liberal and 
Radical Associations adopted similar resolutions. In the United 
States the Labor Convention meeting in Kansas City in 1898 
placed itself on record as approving any movement which 
would tend to bring peace to the world. 12 

On the announcement in the public press of the Tsar's Re- 
script the Committee of the British and Foreign Arbitration 
Association 13 took immediate action 14 by the adoption of a 
lengthy Memorial on the subject of armaments which it pre- 
sented to the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Russia, 
Austria, France and Italy. This Memorial appealed to the 
Governments of Europe to give serious consideration to the 
question of a proportional and gradual disarmament. The 
Association was convinced that "the enormous and ever-increas- 
ing armaments of Europe imperil equally the prosperity of the 

, p. 271. 

10 Review of Reviews, XIX (1899), 330. 
^Ibid., XVIII (September, 1898), 331. 

12 Ibid., p. 296. 

13 Founded by Hodgson Pratt. 

14 The Advocate of Peace, LXI (May, 1899), in. 


competing nations and the happiness of the people individually, 
while at the same time, they greatly increase the imminence of 
war." Europe had practically 18,000,000 armed men, most of 
whom were withdrawn from peaceful pursuits and spending the 
flower of their strength in fanning the flame of military antag- 
onism and cultivating a spirit of revenge, vainglory and blood- 
shed. The annual expenditure of Europe on means of defense 
and aggression, including the interest on public debts, mainly 
incurred for these purposes in past years, had risen in the 
preceding thirty years from 2 10,000,000 to 416,000,000; and 
yet none of it was destined to promote either national pros- 
perity or the reproduction of wealth. In the same period of 
time the national debts of Europe had nearly doubled, having 
risen from 2,626,000,000 to 5,223,000,000, thus imposing 
upon the different countries a burden almost insupportable. Tax- 
ation had reached a height never before endured in the world's 
history. Throughout Europe the ruinous military rivalry was 
spreading a dangerous discontent so wide and deep that Anarch- 
ists and Nihilists easily found a fertile soil upon which to carry 
out their revolutionary practices. The Memorial pointed out 
the madness of the naval rivalry between Great Britain on the 
one hand and Russia and France on the other. The Arbitration 
Association implored the Governments of Europe in the highest 
interests of humanity and real prosperity to begin to disarm 
and disband the greater part of their vast forces in order that 
the soldiers might return to peaceful pursuits, "and be no more 
a burden to their fellow country-men, or a menace to the peace 
of nations." 15 

In presenting this Memorial the British and Foreign Arbitra- 
tion Association used economic and not religious arguments to 
appeal to the governments. It tried to emphasize that competi- 
tion in armaments only piles up enormous national debts and 
adds to the burdens of taxation which the people must bear, 

15 Lewis Appleton, Fifty Years Historic Record of the Progress of Disarma- 
ment, pp. 6-7. 


thus creating discontent without increasing the security of 
nations. The Memorial was typical of Hodgson Pratt's ap- 
proach to the problem of peace eminently practical and 
entirely secular. 

On the Continent the friends of peace carried out a similar 
though not quite so intensive program as that in England. A 
universal campaign was promoted by the Peace Bureau at 
Berne and by an extensive tour begun by Baroness von Suttner 
early in 1899, well supported in the Neue Freie Presse and the 
Neue Wiener Tageblatt. In Germany the pacifist movement for 
supporting the Tsar's initiative was led by the German Peace 
Society in Berlin and by the Burgomaster of Munich. Mme. 
Selenka too worked indefatigably in organizing meetings with 
the result that peace demonstrations were held in Munich, 
Mainz, Frankfort, Nuremberg and Breslau. In France M. 
Emile Arnaud, President of the Societe Internationale de la 
Paix et de la Liberte, and Frederic Passy organized meetings 
and conferences. The Women's International Disarmament 
League, with headquarters at Paris, had over two hundred 
thousand adherents by December, iSgS. 16 The French Peace 
Crusaders organized and were received at the Sorbonne, the 
Paris City Hall and the Grand Hotel. In Belgium the Peace 
Societies, under the presidency of Comte Goblet d'Alviella, 
drafted a Memorial, to which 50,000 names were affixed, 
thanking the Tsar for his initiative in calling the Conference. 17 
In the Netherlands Mme. Waszklewicsz van Schilfgaarde, 
founder and President of the Netherlands Women's League for 
International Disarmament, obtained a great number of signa- 
tures to an international address expressing the hope of a suc- 
cessful outcome, to be presented to the Peace Conference. 18 The 
Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association and the Swedish 
Women's Peace Society circulated more than fifty thousand 

16 The Advocate of Peace, LX (December, 1898), 254. 

17 Review of Reviews, XIX (1899), 332. 

18 Jonkheer B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, History of the Peace Movement 
in the Netherlands (The Hague, 1915), p. 13- 


copies of an appeal to the Swedish nation asking for support 
of the Tsar's manifesto. Similar appeals were made in Norway, 
Denmark and Holland. 19 

Finally, an attempt was made to rally the women of the 
world In support of the Tsar's peace proposal Frau Selenka of 
Munich, Bertha von Suttner of Vienna, Dr. Leopold Katscher 
of Budapest; Princess Wiszniewsky of Paris, and Mme. Wasz- 
klewicsz van Schilfgaarde of The Hague, all organized women's 
demonstrations. They proposed that in the week prior to the 
meeting of the Conference all the women's associations through- 
out the world should hold simultaneous demonstrations in 
favor of peace, pass identical resolutions and telegraph their 
names and numerical strength to a central committee which 
would compile and present to the Conference on its assembling 
a statement of the prayers of the womanhood of the world. 20 

In response to a request from the Women's Association for 
Peace and Disarmament in France and Germany, Countess 
Aberdeen, President of the International Council of Women, 
appealed to the women of Great Britain and Ireland to take steps 
in each community for the purpose of securing as numerous and 
as influential a meeting of women as possible. On May 15, 
1899, an Address of British Women, signed by the Countess of 
Aberdeen, Lady H,enry Somerset, Mrs. Wynford Phillips and 
many others, was submitted to meetings throughout the world. 
It pointed out that for the first time in history women were 
making "their advent as a distinct force and factor in interna- 
tional politics." It appealed to sisters, daughters, wives and 

19 The Advocate of Peace, LXI (February, 1899), 37. 

20 Review of Reviews, XIX, 332. The following National Secretaries were 
named to organize these demonstrations: Mrs. Wright-Sewell for America, 
Signora Emilia Mariani for Italy, Mme. Waszklewicsz van Schilfgaarde for 
Holland, Frau Niewstadt for Denmark, Mile. Saint-Croix for France, Mme. 
Selenka for Germany, Miss Mary I. .Stead for England, Frau Anna von 
Schabanoff for Russia, Dr. Bella S. de Ferrero for Spain, Frau Bramee for 
Sweden, Baroness Bertha von Suttner and Fraulein Aug. Fickert for Austria, 
Frau Dr. Mejoen for Norway, Frau Professor Heller for Hungary, Herr von 
B allow for Egypt, Sir Jeejeebhoi Merwanjeed Adabhoi for India, and Mrs. 
Fashima for Japan. 


mothers in every land to unite in resolving to wage unceas- 
ing war against war and the spirit which makes for war, in 
order that they might "no longer have to bring forth sons to 
be corrupted in the barrack and slaughtered on the battle- 
field." 21 

The Universal Peace Congress, which was planned to meet in 
Lisbon in 1898, was given up because of the decision of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union not to hold its annual conference, 
but a general meeting of the Bureau was convened at Turin on 
September 26. The Assembly immediately sent a telegram to 
the Tsar expressing its respectful gratitude for his peace propo- 
sition. Then a sub-commission was charged with elaborating 
some propositions for the most proper steps to render fruitful 
the initiative of the Russian Emperor. 22 After expressing the 
hope that all the governments would give a sincere adhesion 
to the proposal of the Tsar 23 and that the projected Conference 
should meet without delay, the Assembly suggested that the 
Conference "propose to the nations the conclusion of a general 
Treaty of permanent arbitration." It also expressed the hope 
that the work of the International Conference would "serve as 
the point of departure for the gradual adoption of international 
laws safeguarding the autonomy of each nation and assuring 
justice between peoples," and that "the reign of Peace" would 
be "substituted for the barbarous regime of war and the ruin- 
ous regime of armed peace." 24 

British delegates raised objections to these propositions. 
They pointed out that a General Treaty of Arbitration and a 
formal code of International Law might be attained in the 
distant future but would not be reached at the Conference. 
They warned their colleagues against coupling Utopian projects 
with the one definite proposal of the Tsar, the abatement of 

21 Review of Reviews, XIX, 449. 

22 Proch-Verbal de VassembUe ginirt&e des dlUgu&s des sodltiis de la 
(Turin, 1899), p. 2. 


the armament competition. But their advice was not heeded; 
the propositions of the sub-commission were adopted by 21 
votes against 4. 25 

The Peace Society Assembly at Turin has been criticized for 
not having acted with more sagacity at a most opportune 
moment. The commonest prudence would have dictated a great 
and united effort to concentrate opinion upon the primary 
object of the Rescript the arrest of armaments; but this did 
not happen. The enthusiasm of the pacifists who for so long 
had looked forward to the reign of peace and law carried them 
too far afield. A mighty autocrat had suddenly and unexpect- 
edly adopted as his own the best of the arguments which they 
had for generations addressed to deaf ears. At last governments 
were going to listen and to consider. Is it to be wondered that 
the jubilation of the lovers of peace swept them beyond the 

In the meantime the Peace and Arbitration organizations in 
Great Britain joined forces. Dr. Darby, Randal Cremer, Hodg- 
son Pratt and Felix Moscheles divided the British Isles into 
districts and, during the twelve months following the Rescript, 
distributed about 300,000 pamphlets. The man who did most 
to foster what favorable public opinion there was for the Con- 
ference was Mr. W. T. Stead. Although the most vociferous 
and theatrical representative of British pacifism, Stead was 
not a pacifist in the usual sense of the term, for in his 1894 
articles on the "Truth About the Navy" and later in his advocacy 
of the formula, "two keels to one, 35 he showed himself a pro- 
tagonist of a strong British Navy. From 1883, when he took 
over the editorship of the Pall Mall Gazette, he had devoted 
his energies to an attempt to keep the public correctly and 
sanely informed on questions of foreign policy, and to fostering 
by his "new journalism" an international outlook conditioned 
by "sober defence, no jingo, and more arbitration." 26 Stead 
felt that the psychological moment had come to relieve the 

25 Loc. cit. 26 A. C. F. Beales, The History of Peace, p. 203. 


strained tension among the various states. He originated a 
grand scheme of a peace crusade through the countries of 
Europe, in which ten influential representatives from every 
state were to take part, to visit the governments and address 
public meetings. This scheme failed; whereupon, its originator 
made the journey all over Europe alone. 

Mr. Stead was anxious to ascertain how the Emperor's mani- 
festo was received in various countries, especially in official 
circles; above all, he wished to learn what direction the Tsar 
and his ministers intended to give to the coming Conference. 
Acting on his own initiative, after interviewing Mr. Balfour, 27 
who refused to assume any responsibility for the trip, Stead 
started out in September on a tour of Europe which was even- 
tually to take him to the Russian Court. In Belgium, King 
Leopold refused to see him, but in answer to a second note 
beseeching an interview, the King sent this frank statement: 
"You wish to speak to me of disarmament. I desire with all 
my heart that it may take place, but I could not in any case 
usefully say anything to you on the noble aspiration which it is 
better to leave in the interest of its success to the care of the 
generous and powerful Emperor who has conceived it." 2S 

In Paris, Stead found M. Clemenceau, M. Blowitz, and 
Monson, the British Ambassador, all sceptical over the Re- 
script. There was only one opinion in the French capital, 
namely, that the Conference could do absolutely nothing and 
that it might precipitate war. 29 In Berlin the British Ambassa- 
dor refused to secure him an interview with the Kaiser. Mr. 
Stead's letters to the Daily News from Paris and Berlin re- 
flected candidly the unfavorable attitude of most of the people 
with whom he had talked. Of the French and Germans this is 
what he reported: 

27 In the absence of Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour was in charge of the Foreign 

28 Frederick Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead, II, 131, King Leopold to W. T. 

29 Ibid., p. 132. 


Men. of the world, men of experience, men of affairs, above all, 
men who are deeply versed in the tortuous wiles of diplomacy, agree 
in expecting nothing from the Conference of Disarmament and in 
fearing much. If the hard-pressed toilers of the world are to obtain 
any appreciable relief from the crushing load of Militarism, they 
will have to extend to the generous initiative of the Tsar a much 
more hearty reception. ... The Democracy may help the Autocracy 
to achieve this boon for the English race. It will certainly not reach 
them at the hands of Bureaucracy. 30 

Stead's St. Petersburg visit compensated to some extent for 
his preceding disheartening experiences. Mr. Whyte, his biog- 
rapher, thinks it safe to say that no foreign journalist ever 
interviewed so many notabilities in the Russian capital in so 
short a space of time (a fortnight). His most important talk 
was with Count Witte, Minister of Finance, who was apparently 
jubiliant over the Eirenicon. "Henceforth," he said, "if my 
colleagues should clamour for more millions for the army and 
the navy I shall have no more trouble in rebutting their 
demands. I shall simply hold up the Emperor's Rescript and 
they will not be able to say a word." 31 

At Livadia, in late October, Mr. Stead was received several 
times by the Tsar. It was perhaps inevitable that the ambi- 
tious journalist, after so many disappointments, should on this 
occasion form too exalted an opinion of the ill-fated Nicholas. 
The Tsar was typically Russian in his responsiveness and 
anxiety to please, and Stead's enthusiasm over the Rescript 
must naturally have been gratifying to him. The Englishman 
was well pleased with the autocrat in whom he found four 
excellent qualities "alertness, exactness, lucidity, and definite- 
ness.^ 32 Stead's appreciation of the Emperor was, no doubt, 
real and not merely worked up in the interest of the peace 
movement. He actually liked Nicholas II and saw great possi- 
bilities in him. After his first interview he wrote to a friend in 

30 ibid., PP. 134-35. 

31 ibid., PP. 136-37. 

32 For a full and rather effusive description of Tsar Nicholas II which is 
interesting in the light of his tragic end, see Whyte, II, 138-40. 


England: "He is mucli better than I expected. If only we back 
Mm up, we get the best chance we ever had of saving millions. 
It is a perfect godsend to have such a man in such a place with 
such ideas." 33 

On his journey home W. T. Stead stopped in Rome, where, 
after twice appealing to "the Pope of the Middle Ages and of 
the Truce of God" to "come to the help of a weary and war- 
worn world," he was favored with a letter from the Cardinal 
Secretary of State. 

Back in London the English journalist started his Interna- 
tional Crusade of Peace which was definitely launched at a 
great public meeting at St. James's Hall on December 10. Mr. 
Balfour was present, and in a letter Mr. John Morley showed 
that he sympathized with the demonstration. On December 23 
the General Committee of this International Crusade appealed 
to their fellow citizens, especially those in positions of influ- 
ence and authority, to support the objects of the Rescript and to 
cooperate in an effort "to secure such a vigorous and compre- 
hensive expression of the will of the people" as would assure to 
Her Majesty's Government the support of the nation in realiz- 
ing the earnest desire of the Tsar that something practical 
should be done. This Appeal to the People by the International 
Crusade of Peace was signed by the Bishop of London on 
behalf of the Committee. 34 

In January W. T. Stead founded a new weekly journal, War 
Against War, expressly to canvass the coming Conference. He 
reported to Cardinal Rampolla what had been done and trans- 
mitted to the Holy See an account of the St. James's Hall 
Conference and the prospectus of War Against War, soliciting 
the approval of the Pope. In response to his appeal he received 
from the Cardinal Secretary an autograph letter with an 
expression of appreciation for his peace work. 

The first stage of the International Crusade of Peace cul- 
minated in the presentation to Mr. Balfour of a Memorial 

33 Ibid., p. 140. S4 Review of Reviews, XIX, 132. 


which summed up and embodied the resolutions passed at more 
than 200 town meetings in all parts of the United Kingdom. 
This was decided upon at the National Convention held in 
St. Martin's Hall, Charing Cross, on March 21, 1899- Lord 
Salisbury was asked to receive the Deputation bearing the 
Memorial, but because of Ms absence the function had to be 
performed by Mr. Balfour, who, as First Lord of the Treasury, 
Leader of the House of Commons and Acting Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, was the natural recipient of the Memorial. The 
Earl of Aberdeen introduced the Deputation, which included 
the Bishop of London; Mr. Leonard Courtney, a Liberal M. P. 
and Editor of the Contemporary Review, Mr. Shaw Lefevre, 
a Radical Liberal M. P.; the Reverend Dr. Clifford, repre- 
senting the Free Churches; Mr. Maddison, a Radical M. P., 
representing Labor; and Mr. John O'Connor, a Liberal M. P., 
representing Ireland. 

Mr. Balfour said, in receiving the Memorial, what he was 
sure Lord Salisbury desired him to say, that the sentiments 
"collected from this long list of important gatherings through- 
out the length and breadth of the land, have the heartiest sym- 
pathy of Her Majesty's Government." He was certain that 
Lord Salisbury would receive the account of the Conference 
with the greatest interest and would reciprocate in the heartiest 
manner the wishes of the Deputation that the Emperor's 
scheme might, in the immediate future, bear all the fruit which 
was anticipated. 35 

Finally, on April 26, another Liberal Deputation, including 
Lord Monkswell; the Hon. Philip Stanhope, M. P.; Dr. Mac- 
Ewan, M. P.; Thomas Bart, M.P.; George Jacob Holyoake, 
M. P.; Mrs. Jacob Wright; Hodgson Pratt; and W. T. Stead, 
presented to Baron de Staal, the Russian Ambassador at the 
Court of St. James, a Memorial to His Majesty, the Emperor of 
Russia, thanking him for the initiative which he had taken in 
summoning the Peace Conference. 86 

35 Ibid., pp. 331-32. 3e Ibid., pp. 445-47- 


Among the first American organizations to take action upon 
the Tsar's Rescript was the legislative body of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church, known as the General Convention, which at 
its meeting in Washington, D. C., on October 5, 1898, passed 
two strong resolutions on the subject, one addressed to the Tsar, 
commending his action, the other calling upon the United 
States to do what it could for the establishment of a permanent 
court to settle controversies among nations. The General Con- 
vention consisted of bishops of the Episcopal Church and sev- 
eral hundred representative clergymen and laymen. Among 
the names signed to the resolution was that of Mr. Robert 
Treat Paine of Boston, President of the American Peace 
Society. 37 The Tsar's initiative was also warmly applauded by 
the United Society of Christian Endeavor. Likewise the Boston 
Association of Ministers placed itself on record as approving 
the Rescript. 

The Boston Peace Society undertook the task of organizing 
meetings and conferences throughout the land. The Directors 
of the American Peace Society appointed Dr. Charles G. Ames 
to co-operate with other organizations and citizens of Boston 
in promoting public interest throughout the country in the 
Tsar's proposal. A Peace Crusade was formed, with Dr. Ed- 
ward Everett Hale as Chairman, which published The Peace 
Crusade, the temporary organ of the movement for promotion 
of public interest in the Conference. Although the American 
Peace Societies appear to have been a little less active than 
those in Europe, in general they gave a hearty response. In so 
far as other organizations considered the project they pro- 
nounced in its favor. 

On February 21, 1899, a meeting was held in Dr. Bale's 
church preparatory to a series of public meetings for Inarch 
and April in Tremont Temple. These Monday noon meetings 
were conducted under the auspices of the Massachusetts Good 

37 J. L, L., "The Czar's Truce of God," Boston Evening Transcript, February 
18, 1899, p. 5, col, 4; The Advocate of Peace, LX (November, 1898), 225. 


Citizenship Society to promote public interest in the proposed 
Hague Conference. Among those who participated on the 
program were Edwin D. Mead, Robert Treat Paine, Edward 
Everett Hale, long an advocate of peace, Dr. Lyman Abbott of 
Brooklyn, Dr. William Cunningham of Trinity College, Cam- 
bridge, England, Dr. George C.'Lorimer, pastor of the Tremont 
Temple, Dr. Francis E. Clark of the United Society of Christian 
Endeavor, and Mr. Samuel Gompers of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor. 

Professor W. Rauschenbusch of the Rochester Theological 
Seminary, Dr. Richard Henry Thomas of Baltimore, and 
Mr. W. J. Mann and Mr, F. L. Hutchins of Worcester led the 
movement in support of the Conference in their home cities. 38 

After the appearance of the Rescript, Dr. George Dana 
Boardman of Philadelphia, President of the Christian Arbi- 
tration and Peace Society, published a revised and enlarged 
edition of his brochure on the Disarmament of Nations, or 
Mankind One Body. Practically all the April, 1899, issue of the 
Advocate of Peace, the organ of the American Peace Society, 
was devoted to the Hague Conference. 

American women, like their European sisters, organized to 
promote the purposes of the Conference. At least 2,500 persons 
attended the Women's Peace Crusade meeting in Tremont 
Temple on April 3, 1899. Addresses were made by Julia Ward 
Howe, Alice Freeman Palmer, Lucia Ames Mead, Mary A. 
Livermore and Miss O. M. E. Rowe, President of the Massa- 
chusetts State Federation of Women's Clubs. 39 

The Peace Department of the National W.C.T.U. considered 
the Conference at The Hague as "the beginning of the end of 
war." The State Superintendent of peace and arbitration and 
the general officers of the W.C.T.U. held meetings in their 
several communities to promote public interest in the Con- 

38 The Advocate of Peace, LXI (March, 1899), 77. 

39 Ibid. (May, 1899), pp. 112-14. 


ference. For these the National Superintendent provided a 
suggestive program. 40 

Finally, Benjamin F. Trueblood was named by the Board 
of Directors of the American Peace Society to represent them 
at The Hague during the sitting of the Conference and to co- 
operate with other experienced peace workers to promote the 
purpose of the Conference. 

N. W. J. Hayden of Lowell, Massachusetts, in a letter to the 
Editor of the Boston Evening Transcript, stated that it was a 
matter for regret that so little had been done in the United 
States to answer the Tsar's proposal for a conference for a 
limitation of armaments. He referred to the fact that the 
largest part of the detail work had been done in Boston. It 
seemed to Mr. Hayden that the Americans at large were acting 
to the cold-blooded sentiment of "let them look out for them- 
selves," which Dr. Albert Shaw had expressed in his editorial 
in the American Monthly Review of Reviews* 1 "It is not 
often that the people can act effectively as a unit"; Hayden 
wrote, "but there is an opportunity for Vox Populi to be Vox 
Dei indeed." He wanted the American people to speak to their 
President with no uncertain voice, that he might see to it that 
when the Conference met the United States should be repre- 
sented by men instructed not only to express America's great 
desire that the European people should find it possible to rid 
themselves of so oppressive a burden, but also able to show 
how such a long-wishedfor end might be attained. 42 

This is the brief story of what the peace organizations and 
enthusiastic individuals did to create a public interest in the 
Rescript and to urge the governments to give their best con- 
sideration to the Tsar's proposal. They have been criticized 
on the one hand for having done too much and on the other 

40 Ibid. (June, 1899), p. 127. 

41 American Monthly Review of Reviews, XIX (January, 1899), 19, 

42 N. W. J. Hayden, "The Czar's 'Truce of God/ " Boston Evening Transcript, 
February 17, 1899, p. 6, col. 5. 


hand for not having done enough. The enthusiasm of the 
pacifists led them to read more into the Rescript than it con- 
tained and to ask for more than could possibly be attained from 
the then existing state of European Society, without definite 
international machinery for settling disputes and enforcing 
agreements. The peace groups have been ridiculed for passing 
numerous resolutions and for petitioning and memorializing the 
governments and the delegates at the Conference. When the 
Peace Conference assembled, Count Miinster reported to 
Berlin that it had attracted the roughs and the rabble of the 
entire world; journalists of the worst type, like Stead; Baptist 
Jews, like von Block; and women of peace, like Baroness von 
Suttner. In his Autobiography, Andrew D. White, the Amer- 
ican delegate, refers to shoals of telegrams, reports of proceed- 
ings and societies, hortatory letters, crankish proposals and 
peace pamphlets sent to The Hague. 43 

It is argued that the pacifists should have bent all of their 
energies towards educating and arousing the electorate to 
demand that their representatives in the parliaments should 
support the peace proposal and bring pressure to bear upon 
the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. They should have 
created and developed an enlightened public opinion through- 
out the various nations, which would have led them to under- 
stand that their true interests were involved. Statesmen must 
feel a force behind them impelling them to act; if they are to 
be moved to translate their ability and experience into deeds, 
they must be convinced that the people they represent desire 
them to act. The statesmen of 1898, if they were to have 
striven with all their might for the realization of the Tsar's 
proposition, would have had to understand that the bulk of 
their fellow-citizens would hold them responsible for any failure 
their efforts might have prevented. Unless the public opinion 
of the civilized world had, in 1898, declared unmistakably in 

43 Andrew D. White, Autobiography (D. Appleton-Century, London, 1905), 
II, 285. 


favor of some stop to the expansion of armaments, they were 
bound to increase. But there was no strong current of public 
opinion on the question of armaments. It is unjust, however, 
to blame Peace Societies and Peace advocates for not creating 
one. Public opinion on a question cannot be created overnight; 
its development is a slow process. The pacifists attempted, 
through public meetings, conferences, pamphlets and memo- 
rials, to arouse the inert public. They thought they were doing 
their best. They certainly did practically all that was done to 
create the little opinion there was in favor of the Rescript and 
the Conference. And it should be remembered that they had 
always to face and to attempt to dissipate the strong opposition 
of the greater part of the public press. They were toiling in 
an age when the public was more influenced by the daily news- 
paper and periodicals than by religious enthusiasts and pacifists. 

Perhaps some individual Peace Societies might have done 
more. For example, the Netherlands Society has been cen- 
sured for having done so little to bring the Peace Conference 
to the public notice. The Netherlands Women's League for 
International Disarmament obtained signatures to an interna- 
tional address presented to the Conference, and this was about 
all that was done. The Secretary of The Hague branch wrote 
in his annual report for 1899 that for the branch in question 
1899 was a y ear of repose; in spite of the Conference not one 
public meeting was held during the whole year. It was pro- 
posed that the Netherlands Peace League should convoke rep- 
resentatives from all the Peace Societies to a great public 
Peace demonstration during the time of the Conference. This 
proposition, however, did not materialize for several reasons: 
lack of financial resources; too short a time for the preparation 
(from the end of March to the middle of May) ; and the fact 
that the Netherlands Society was unqualified to take the initia- 
tive for such a peace congress, this being the task of the 
International Bureau of Berne. 44 

44 Jonkheer B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, op. cit., p. 13. 


Regardless of the criticism that for one reason or another 
may be directed against peace enthusiasts, the ethical value of 
the Tsar's Rescript, when looked at from the Christian point of 
view, must be ranked very high. We must admit that the 
overgrown armaments of Europe in 1898 and of the world 
today were and are a negation of Christian principles, and any 
proposal to limit their further increase should receive the whole- 
hearted support of the Christian universe. Professor Lawrence, 
in an article in the International Journal of Ethics, pointed out 
the ethical value of the Tsar's proposal. If we believe in the 
teachings of Christ, he writes, "we must range ourselves with 
those who see in the Rescript of the Tsar an attempt to bring 
the practice of civilized states into some approximation to 
agreement with the principles of the religion which most of 
them profess." 45 But, unfortunately, such considerations do 
not meet with universal acceptance, and they certainly do not 
greatly influence statesmen whose personal acquaintance with 
the wiles of diplomacy is bound to make them sceptical. Reli- 
gious arguments must be reinforced by others of a more 
utilitarian nature if they are to have any noticeable effect. 

45 J. W. Lawrence, "The Tsar's Rescript," The International Journal of 
Ethics, IX (January, 1899), 142-43. 


THE Tsar did not suggest anything in the nature of general 
disarmament. His project was much more modest, for all he 
asked was that the governments should concert measures for 
stopping the increase of armaments, and, if possible, reduce 
proportionally those that already existed. The European press 
at first echoed a grand sentiment of sympathy for the ideas 
proposed by the Russian sovereign; but at the same time, espe- 
cially in the journals connected with the diplomatic circle, it 
expressed uncertainty upon the ways and means of arriving at 
the desired end. 1 Soon, however, the humanitarian side of the 
circular lost the importance that was first attached to it, and 
more than that, it became in many cases a weapon in the hands 
of opponents of the undertaking. Its secret enemies delighted 
in talking and writing about it, in the hope that the realization 
of the proposed measure would thus be lost in words. Its open 
enemies put forward the axiom that fighting is an element of 
human nature, that war cannot be abolished, and that to try 
to accomplish its abolition is beyond the sphere of practical 
politics. They ridiculed the Rescript and held it up to the 
world as visionary and Utopian. 

The English newspapers and magazines, after recovering 
from the first amazement of the Rescript, settled down to a 
sceptical examination of the document. The periodicals, which 
had either ignored or only slightly concerned themselves with 
the problem of armaments before August, 1898, now published 

1<( Le D&sarmement g6n6ral et la presse europgenne," Le Temps, August 31, 



scathing articles casting out and out derision on the "invita- 
tion by the Russian Emperor to a general rubbing of noses and 
exchange of fine sentiments on the subject of peace and good 
will among men." 2 Almost all contributors expressed their 
confidence in the integrity of the Tsar and agreed that he had 
acted nobly and with the finest intentions, but they were con- 
vinced that the best motives in politics avail little as against 
the prosaic opposition of stern facts. The Emperor's views 
and wishes, it was claimed, were not those of his ministers. 
Most writers saw ulterior motives in the proposal. The bad 
financial condition of the country, together with continuous 
famine, rendered it impossible for the Finance Minister to 
provide the necessary funds for the ever-increasing armaments. 3 
The Russian Government wished relief from military burdens 
in order to carry out a program of public works undertaken 
with an eye to military exigencies. 4 Strategical railways on the 
confines of Afghanistan, destitute of commercial value, were 
being built with the simple object of harassing British rule in 
India. 5 Russia desired peace because a war, she feared, would 
mean the loss of Poland. 6 The Foreign Office, alarmed at the 
scarcity of cash and warships, and disturbed by the world's 
sudden discovery of Russia's impotence in the Far East, was 
also glad of a respite. 7 Further, a real and durable peace would 
enable the heads of departments in the War Office to conceal 
defective transport, a jobbed and plundered commissariat, im- 

2 Henry H. Howorth, "Some Plain Words About the Tsar's New Gospel ot 
Peace," The Nineteenth Century, XLV .(February, 1899), 203; cf. Sidney Low, 
"The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference," The Nineteenth Century, XLV 
(May, 1899). 

3 "A Note on the Peace Conference," The Quarterly Review, CXC (October, 
1898), 540. 

4 Arnold White, "The Tsar's Manifesto," The National Review, XXXII 
(October, 1898), 210. 

5 "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," The Contemporary Review, 
LXXIV (October, 1898) , 500. 

6 Arnold White, op. cit., p. 203. 

7 Ibid,, p. 202. 


perfect medical arrangements and the notorious Incapacity of 
the Russian Staff to stand the strain of a war with a first class 
naval power at a distance from a Russian base. 8 

Some English people found it difficult to reconcile the Tsar's 
love of peace with a proposition for increasing the Russian 
Army by two army corps and the reorganization of the navy 
involving an expenditure of nine million pounds. Moreover, 
the Russian treatment of Finland at the moment of the Eireni- 
con was severely criticized in Great Britain and Scandinavia 
as being contrary to the spirit of the peace proposal. In May, 
1899, the Nineteenth Century published an article, "Russia in 
Finland/ 7 by J. N. Reuter, in which he pointed out that in 
October, only two months after the Rescript, the Imperial 
Government sent to the Senate of Finland a proposition for a 
new Army Bill which would, among other things, raise the 
military force in the Grand Duchy from 5,600 to about 35,000 
men. On February 15, 1899, an edict was passed which prac- 
tically swept away the Finnish constitution. 

About the middle of April the Diet was informed of the 
Emperor's approval of General Kuropatkin's proposition that 
the army proposal, then under discussion by the Finnish Diet, 
should be regarded as an affair "concerning the interests of 
the Empire and, consequently, the Finnish Assembly would 
have no right of rejecting or modifying it." Thus the increase 
of the Russian Army could be arranged before the close of the 
conference which was intended by the Tsar to put a stop to 
further armaments. It was claimed that if the Manifesto of 
February 15 had not been applied to this particular Bill, the 
question would not have been decided in time, because for a 
law of this kind the constitution of Finland distinctly required 
the consent of the Diet, and the Russian Government had 
every reason to believe that the Diet would not give its consent, 
Sidney Low, writing on "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Confer- 

8 Loc. cit. 


ence," concluded that: The destruction of the Finns 7 national 
liberties, and the sacrifice of their local institutions had to be 
consummated in hot haste, in order that these poor peasants 
might be caught in the military net "just too soon to be pro- 
tected by any international agreement against increasing ex- 
isting military establishments. Such is the wedding-garment 
in which holy Russia arrays herself to prepare for the bridal 
feast of Peace to which she is good enough to invite her rivals 
among the nations." 9 

Two very different poets were among the many serious- 
minded men who conscientiously held aloof. Mr. Kipling, for 
one, placed his faith in the discovery of some new engine of 
death so devastating that war must end and "peace arrive by 
herself." 10 Mr. William Watson (later Sir) could not sympa- 
thize with a war against war, for he held "that the Turk 
should be erased out of existence as a Power, having dominion 
over peoples foreign to himself"; and if this erasure could only 
be effected by act of war, then he was for war. The Tsar 
"seems sincere in his so-called Disarmament proposal, yet my 
confidence in him is shaken by the recollection that he saw 
all those atrocities n perpetrated at his door, and never lifted 
a finger (which was all he needed to have done) to stay the 
horror." 12 

Those who did not directly criticize the policy of the Rus- 
sian Government questioned the idea of disarmament. Mr, 
W. J. Stillman, the Times correspondent at Rome, observed 
that a suspension of the increase of armaments would only lead 
to a closer study directed to the efficiency, and therefore the 
aggressive power, of the present armaments. He was of opinion 
that a halt in the competition would have the result of enabling 
the less efficient armies to overtake the more efficient, and put 
all on the terms of equality, which would render war more 

9 Sidney Low, op. dt. f p. 697. 

10 F. Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead, II, 149. 

11 Armenian massacres of 1896. 

12 F. Whyte, op. tit., p. 149. 


rather than less probable. The suspension of the Increase of 
armaments would appear to operate to the disadvantage of 
England chiefly, and to the advantage of Russia. 13 

Sidney Low, in an article entitled "Should Europe Dis- 
arm?" 14 set out to glorify war and its "priceless blessings." 
He argued that the "Aryan race" should not disarm in the face 
of the yellow and black menace, "It would be a crime against 
humanity to hold all the precious gifts, that Latin, Celtic, 
Teutonic, and Saxon civilization has given to the world, at 
the mercy or the forbearance of Slavonic and Asiatic hordes." 15 
Neither did he believe that the world would be any better or 
any richer for disarming, as some countries had combined to 
make themselves uncommonly prosperous in spite of the "blood 
tax." Sidney Low was convinced that great armaments did not 
tend to promote war, but the contrary. The conscript army, he 
argued, is too cumbrous a weapon to be used lightly, and the 
tremendous risks attendant on failure in a modern war act as 
a deterrent from fighting. He noted that the only country that 
had been almost continually at war was that one which had 
a comparatively small mercenary army and did not depend 
upon conscription. England from 1870 to 1898 had done more 
fighting than the rest of the world put together. 16 

The Spectator, in considering the Russian Eirenicon, was 
convinced that the Tsar's scheme was not only bound to fail, 
but its promulgation had actually done a grave injury to the 
cause of peace. It had unsettled men's minds and drawn their 
attention to the instability of the status quo. Peace means the 
continuation of the existing status quo, but were all the powers 
agreed in its continuance? France most assuredly was not, 
and she was politically as well as geographically the pivot state 
of Europe. All France regarded the status quo as infamy. Her 

13 W. J. Stillman, "The Peace of Europe," The Contemporary Review, LXXV 
(March, 1899), 312. 

14 Sidney Low, "Should Europe Disarm?" The Nineteenth Century, XLIV 
(October, 1898), 521-3' 

16 Ibid., p. 524- l6 !*&> P 529. 


provinces were still in the hands of the robber ; and until they 
were redeemed there could be no thought of acquiescence. Even 
in England; which had gained so much and held so wide an 
empire, there were half a dozen active and eager bodies of men 
wanting to expand more rapidly and thoroughly in several 
parts of the globe. As for Russia, she might respect the Euro- 
pean status quo and might wish other people to respect it, but 
she did not wish for the status quo in China, in Persia or in 
Asia Minor. Even the United States, once the most contented 
of the powers, did not intend to be kept a prisoner to the North 
American Continent. The status quo was not what the powers 
desired. How, then, could they be expected to agree to a pro- 
posal which, if it meant anything, meant the permanency of the 
status quo? To the Spectator the notion of a conference at 
which pledges to disarm or not to arm any further seemed 
illusory or positively dangerous. "It would either settle noth- 
ing, or else end in 'fighting like devils for conciliation,' and 
arming to enforce disarmament." 17 

The London Times, however, made this favorable comment 
on the Circular: 

The note breathes a spirit of generous, perhaps, indeed, almost 
quixotic humanity a spirit familiar in the effusions of visionaries, 
but too seldom found in the utterances of great sovereigns and 
responsible statesmen. Never, perhaps, in modern history have 
aspirations, which good men in all ages have regarded as at once 
ideal and unattainable, found so responsive an echo in the counsels 
of one of the greatest and most powerful of the world's rulers. In 
principle the proposals of the czar, put forth on a solemn occasion 
with every mark of disinterested sincerity, will command the sym- 
pathy and respect of all men of good-will. So far as Great Britain 
is concerned, we long ago abandoned continental ambitions, and 
there is no power in the world which has less to gain or more to lose 
by any disturbance of the existing territorial status quo. ... If 
Russia, which has also a great, but still undeveloped industrial 
future before her, is becoming fully convinced, as we in England 

17 The Spectator, LXXXI (September 3, 1898), 296. . 


long have been, that resources are better devoted to the beneficent 
arts of peace than to the destructive uneconomic energies of war, 
Englishmen, as essentially peace loving people, can only hail the 
czar's pronouncement with the utmost cordiality as glad tidings of 
great joy, which, whatever may be the practical issue, casts honor 
upon that sovereign's generous and lofty spirit and humanity. The 
difficulties are great, but nothing can henceforth deprive the czar 
of having brought peace and disarmament into the sphere of prac- 
tical politics. 18 

Finally, an anonymous writer using the pseudonym, "A 
Soldier," saw in the Rescript a Russian attempt "to revivify 
in England the old Manchester peace party; to shake the con- 
fidence of Germany and other powers in any possibility of 
firm alliance with Britain; to demonstrate to the world that 
it is at any time easy to tickle the ears of Englishmen by well- 
selected phrases; and that in the long run not far-seeing states- 
men but phrase-mongers determine the policy of Britain." 19 

In spite of the rather hostile criticism of the Rescript in the 
leading British periodicals, public opinion in favor of the Peace 
Conference was more pronounced in England than in any other 
country. It spoke with no uncertain voice at public meetings, 
religious conferences and trades organizations. It would have 
been impossible to obtain anywhere from any open meeting a 
resolution requesting the Government to take no part in the 
proposed Conference. The Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Rose- 
bery, Lord George Hamilton, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Sir 
William Harcourt, Mr. John Morley and Mr. Balfour, when 
addressing public meetings, spoke of the Rescript and the Con- 
ference in sympathetic and hopeful terms. 20 Mr. Goschen gave 
proof of the sincerity of the Government's good wishes by an- 
nouncing that if the other great naval powers were ready to 

18 Public Opinion, XXV (September 8, 1898) (New York, 1899), 299. 

19 "A Soldier," "The Tsar's Appeal for Peace," The Contemporary Review, 
LXXIV (October, 1898), 504. 

20 W. T, Stead (Editor), "War Against War," Special Supplement to the 
Review of Reviews, January, 1899. 


reduce their program of naval construction, Great Britain 
would be prepared to modify hers. 21 There was not one lead- 
ing British statesman who would have openly and avowedly 
tried to wreck the Peace Conference. 

On the Continent opinion was less favorable. This was true 
even in Russia where the statesmen either approved of the 
Rescript or were forced by circumstances to appear to do so, 
and the few peasants who were aware of it dimly discerned 
that the grandson of the Tsar who had liberated them from 
serfdom was endeavoring to free them from the heavy burden 
of militarism. Naturally, government officials were unwilling 
to give full expression to any opinions they may have had. 
The American Charge d'Affaires in the Russian capital reported 
that the press had been forbidden to discuss the Rescript. 22 
Nevertheless, the St. Petersburg Novosti wrote: 

It stands to reason that the disarmament question cannot be solved 
without a previous removal of the causes for the armaments. The con- 
ference must accurately determine the respective pretensions of the 
nations and propose means for a peaceful arrangement. It may come 
to pass that at the close of the 19 century a liquidation may be 
effected of the international policies which are so prolific in troubles 
and dangers. 28 

According to the St. Petersburg Novoe Vremya: 

The true friends of peace are, naturally, on the side of Russia, but 
it is impossible to guarantee that some of the western cabinets will not 
raise objections, prompted by the fact that the armed peace which has 
existed since 1871 is the main source of their international strength. 24 

There was no strong current of Russian opinion in favor of 
peace and disarmament, for the ignorance and isolation of the 
peasants made all campaigns of pacifism among them ex- 

21 Parliamentary Debates, Fourth series, LXVIII, 323-24. 

22 Foreign Relations oj the United States, 1898, No. 179, p. 547, Mr. Pierce 
to Mr. Hay. 

23 Public Opinion, XXV (September 8, 1898); 298. 


tremely difficult. Moreover, all pacifist publications were care- 
fully censored and the Mennonite immigrants who endeavored 
to spread their evangelical doctrines were persecuted. Only a 
few attempts to create a public interest In disarmament and 
peace had been made. Vasili Vereshchagin, famous for his 
picture "Apotheosis of War/' through his paintings, and still 
more through his realistic books on the abominations of war, 
did much to dispel from the popular mind its romantic ideas 
of war. In 1897, he advocated an international congress to 
hasten the simultaneous disarmament of the European na- 
tions. 25 Prince Peter of Oldenburg, a grandson of Tsar Paul, 
had, as early as 1873, outlined to Bismarck a plan to abolish 
war by means of "international commissions of arbitration.' 7 26 
But pacifist ideas did not quickly strike root in Russia. In the 
middle 'nineties, Prince Peter Dolgorukof attempted to organ- 
ize a Russian Peace Society, but failed. 27 It was not until 1899, 
after the close of the Hague Conference, that he succeeded in 
founding such a society under the patronage of the Imperial 
Government. 28 

The masses of the Russian people did not hold a definite 
and clear cut opinion on the question of disarmament, and 
had they held one, it would not have counted. The public opinion 
of the military caste was omnipotent in pre-war Russia and 
really determined her fate and policy. The Russian Army 
offered almost the only career to five-sixths of the poor gentry 
of the country, and army officers do not like theories about 
reduction of armaments, and tendencies towards perpetual 
brotherhood and universal peace. Promotion, glory, all the 
inducements to men to enter the ranks are stifled by "the rust 
and corrosion induced by peace and theories of peace." So 
far as the writer has been able to determine, no army official in 

25 The Herald of Peace, XXV (October i, 1897), 304. 
20 A. C. F. Beales, The History of Peace, p. 215. 

27 Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs, II, 194, letter from Prince Peter Dolgorukof 
(also spelled Dolgoruki). 

28 A. C. F. Beales, Joe. d*. 


Russia of any great Importance supported the Emperor's Re- 
script. Prince Peter Dolgorukof, in a letter to Baroness von 
Suttner, states that when the Eirenicon was announced, he, in 
his capacity as reserve officer, was taking part in maneuvers. 
His fellow-officers regarded the matter without excitement, 
although the best among them could not help recognizing the 
correctness of the ideas embodied in the Rescript. The others 
were of opinion that all the peace projects concerned them very 
little, and that the military service to which they had been 
brought up would still for a long time fill their lives. 29 

Apathy among the population showed itself also in other 
European countries. In Germany a few peace enthusiasts 
raised their voices in jubilation over the Rescript and the 
Conference, but pacifist ideas were not widely disseminated; 
the masses of the people received the Tsar's proposal with 
coldness and suspicion. They thought of the difference in the 
defense of Russia and Germany; the former had only one 
frontier to defend, the latter two one on the East, the other 
in the West. Germany, situated as she was in the center of 
Europe with three great powers on her frontiers, was depend- 
ent upon armaments for her very existence. 

The Neue Hambitrger Zeitung sent a note to distinguished 
contemporaries, requesting opinions on the Russian manifesto. 
Very interesting replies were received. Many approved, some, 
like Leo Tolstoi, enthusiastically. But replies sent by opponents 
were in a majority, and they show that public opinion in Ger- 
many was not yet ripe for a limitation of armaments. Here are 
a few utterances of individuals: 

The history of many thousand years unfortunately argues against 
the possibility that war will ever cease. ... At all events the Russian 
proposal for disarmament is one of the cleverest diplomatic moves of 
modern times. 30 


29 Bertha von Suttner, op. dt. f II, 195. 
30 Suttner, II, 198. 


These are questions of high politics with which I have nothing to do. 
In my opinion, so far as our trade is concerned, all interests are sub- 
ordinated to one that is paramount, namely, that Germany be re- 
spected and feared, but so far as possible without being hated, in the 
world. Therefore, the mercantile class has a vital interest in seeing the 
safety of the empire assured in the ways understood by those who are 
responsible for it. 31 

Chairman of the Ham- 
burg Board of Trade. 

I cannot assent to the general notion that armies prepared for battle 
are unproductive. Armies are a protection to the nations against at- 
tacks. . . . The idea of disarmament is unfortunate. We should be 
glad that slouchy men can be trained in a manly education. 32 


I do not waste time thinking of Utopias. France lays down as a 
condition for every debate the return of the imperial lands; we lay 
down as our condition the exclusion of every discussion of this ques- 
tion. I think this is a sufficient answer. The talk of the private friends 
of peace is mere nonsense: the Tsar's advocacy of peace is perhaps a 
stimulus to war. 33 


The present proposal of Tsarist Russia for disarmament is a fraud. 34 


The stronger the armaments the greater the fear of assuming the 
responsibility of starting a war. Disarmament would make wars more 
frequent. Reduction of the present force would withdraw a part of 
the people from the school of military discipline and very generally 
diminish their efficiency. . . . The vital questions of the nations will 
always be settled by war. Germany must always lead the great powers 
in its armaments, because it is the only country that has three great 
powers as neighbours and may at any time be exposed to the danger 
of waging war on three frontiers. With the increasing solidarity of 
states, wars will naturally become more and more infrequent. It is a 

3l Loc,cit. 32 Loc.cit. ' 33 Loc.dt. 3 *Loc.cit. 


dream to expect anything more, and not even a beautiful dream; for 
with the guarantee of perpetual peace the degeneracy of mankind 

would be confirmed. 35 


Herr von Metzger, the Social Democratic delegate to the 
Reichstag from the third electoral district in Hamburg, wrote 
to the editor that "he did not feel the slightest inclination to 
waste even a quarter of an hour on that Russian diplomatic 
trick." 36 

The following quotations typify the tone of the newspapers 


The Tsar's proposal for disarmament goes against nature and 
against civilization. This alone condemns it. Baroness von Suttner 
who a few years ago gave the command Die Waffen nieder, and 
thereby won among all men a brilliant success, is now indeed ex- 
periencing the great triumph of having the Tsar join in her summons; 
but there will be only a short lived joy in this for Frau von Suttner 
and all good souls, for, as we have said, disarmament is contrary to 
nature and inimical to civilization. 37 

August 30, 1898. 

A stranger official document than the Tsar's peace manifesto, his 
summons to disarm and his proposal for a general conference, has 
never before thrown official and unofficial Europe into astonishment. 
The question rises to the lips, is this an honest Utopia, or is there 
hidden behind it a deep calculation of Russian politics, which, as 
is well known, is excelled in slyness by the diplomacy of no other 
state? It remains at all events a Utopia, in spite of all the European 
"Friends of Peace," and all the other chatter about international 
brotherhood. 38 

GRENZBOTEN, Number 37, 
September 15, 1898. 

The czar and his ministers have not deluded themselves with the 
idea that they can rid the world of the causes which for years have 
been responsible for the growing armaments. When a great power, 

35 Ibid., p. 199. 36 Loc. cit. 87 Ibid., pp. 199-200. m Ibid., p. 200. 


however, addresses such proposals to others, they will be recognized 
everywhere as deserving of the most serious consideration. 39 


Remembering Russia's political history, we do not believe in her 
sudden disinterestedness, and are satisfied that the emperor would 
not have conceived the idea of universal peace if Russia had been, 
like Germany, the greatest land power. It is absurd to believe that 
Russia will abandon her plans in connection with Persia, China, and 
Afghanistan. 40 


Germany will support the czar's peace proposition as far as pos- 
sible, but will have to keep her powder dry. For the immediate 
future she must prevent immature and therefore harmful influence 
upon her home and foreign politics. 41 


Many German newspapers, while eulogizing the Emperor's 
humanitarian benevolence, argued that the expenditure of 
money and the employment of men for military purposes were 
not impoverishing the state, since the money was expended 
and redistributed through the country, while the men found 
employment which they would not otherwise obtain. 42 

Professor Hans Delbriick, a distinguished German historian 
and editor of the Preussische Jahrbiicher, declared that the 
only power which, without difficulty could still increase its 
military forces was Germany, for she was the only great power 
to have men as well as money. Therefore, Germany desired 
no reduction of effectives, because she would lose the advantage 
of men, and no reduction of budgets because she would lose the 
advantage of money. 48 

Professor von Stengel of Munich, who believed that war is 

39 Public Opinion, XXV (September 8, 1898), 299. 

40 Loc. cit. 

41 Loc. cit, 

42 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1808, op. cit., p. 548. 

43 "Zukunftskrieg und Zukunftsfriede," Preussische Jahrbucher, XCVI (May, 
1899), 203 et seq. 


a God-given Institution and a part of most of the virtues and 
arts, went so far as to publish a pamphlet, Der Ewige Friede, 
which glorified and praised war and pointed out the mischievous 
absurdity of endeavoring to abolish armaments. In this all the 
arguments of the opponents, all the glorification of war and of 
armaments that had been brought against the notion of peace 
were summed up and there was added complete derision of the 
Conference, which the author characterized as a day-dream. 
This work became rapidly celebrated, especially when the 
German Government nominated Baron von Stengel as one of 
its representatives to The Hague. 44 This action, however, 
raised consternation in pacifist circles and the German Peace 
Societies protested publicly. 45 

Public opinion in Germany was with Professor Delbriick; 
the German Empire was the only power which, without diffi- 
culty, could still increase its military forces. Even the Social 
Democrats, supposedly advocates of peace, did not encourage 
the Conference. They were sympathetically inclined to the 
thought underlying the manifesto, for, as a political party, they 
had opposed the development of militarism and had consistently 
upheld the idea of national brotherhood for the purpose of pro- 
moting the common interests of mankind. The fact that the 
sovereign of an empire like Russia, whose policy had hitherto 
demanded militarism, should suddenly appear as its opponent 
was highly noteworthy, but could not prevent the Social Demo- 
crats from looking upon his action with some distrust. They 
were convinced that important internal political reasons had 
led the Russian Government to undertake the advocacy of the 
imperial plan, and they looked upon it as a purely diplomatic 
trick; consequently, the party could not participate heart and 

44 The Emperor's naming of Baron von Stengel as an official representative 
to the Hague Conference was, according to a famous German caricature, com- 
parable to introducing a bull into a bed of tulips: Revue gMfde de droll 
international public, VI (1899), 665. 

45 Suttner, op. dt>, II, 239. 


soul In an agitation in favor of the Rescript and the program 
of the Conference. 46 

Public opinion in France was from the first hostile to the 
Rescript, partly owing to offended amour propre, because 
France had not been taken into her ally's confidence, and partly 
because of the fear that an acceptance of the invitation would 
involve an acquiescence in the territorial status quo of Europe. 
The immediate reaction of the most important newspapers 
showed that the press would not furnish the necessary leader- 
ship for the mostly inarticulate elements which were gradually 
developing a saner point of view in regard to Franco-German 

The Paris correspondent of the London Times reported that 
M. Faure and the French ministers knew nothing beforehand 
and that the Tsar's proposal plunged the entire official world 
into terrible embarrassment and almost stupefaction. Every- 
body asked with dismay what it meant. It was a sad awakening 
for France, and her newspapers made an immense effort to 
restrain their feelings in the face of what was regarded as 
Russian perfidy. 47 The following comments were typical: 

It is to be hoped that Europe, like France, will consider the czar's 
proposal in a spirit similar to that with which it was inspired. 
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that if France owes it to 
herself to aid in such an attempt there is another portion of her 
moral patrimony which she cannot abandon without abdicating the 
very reason of her existence. . . . 48 


The powers, invited by France's ally to study the means of uni- 
versal peace, are divided into two classes. In the first must be 
included those whom the fortune of war has favored during the last 

46 Ibid., pp. 231-32, Letter from Herr A. Behel, Berlin, January 13, 1899; 
also p. 199, opinion of Herr von Metzger, Social Democrat delegate to the 
Reichstag from the third electoral district in Hamburg, 

47 Public Opinion, op. dt., p. 299. 

48 Ibid., p. 298. 


thirty years; in the second those who have suffered cruel territorial 
mutilations. Adhesion to the international conference is easy for 
the first, as it would mean solidifying forever the conquests of the 
past, but for the second it would create more delicate and compli- 

cated problems. 49 


Universal peace is a dream that has never been realized, and in 
which it would be well not to put too. much faith. 50 


The past, which we can not forget, is a stumbling-block in the way 
of the success of the conference. 51 


The general consensus of press opinion was that France 
as one of the powers dissatisfied with the status quo could not 
accept a limitation of armaments based upon the relative 
strength of existing armies. 52 It was admitted that she would 
have to participate in order to avoid the charge of being re- 
sponsible for the failure of the Conference, but this concession 
was made with the understanding that Alsace-Lorraine should 
not be mentioned. 53 After diplomatic assurance had been ob- 
tained that the Conference would be limited in its scope to 
the questions of armaments and arbitration, the French people 
became indifferent, taking no strong views on either side. The 
Conference might meet, but France had no intention of aban- 
doning the idea of revanche, which did not exclusively imply a 
private or national vengeance. France thought it incumbent 
upon her to vindicate her national honor not only in her own 
eyes, but also in the eyes of others. So long, however, as she 
imagined that she could retrieve the defeat of 1870, and pre- 
pared to do so, European armaments were bound to increase. 

50 Loc. tit. 

51 Loc. tit. 

82 E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870- 
1914; (D. Appleton-Century, New York, 1931), P- 184, citing "Aurore," August 
30, 1898, "Le Temps," August 31, 1898, "Autorite*," September i, 1898, 

53 Le Temps, August 31, September 3, 1898. 


Serbia, like France, demanded justice before permanent 
peace. The public opinion of that little country was opposed 
to the reduction of armaments before its justified claims were 
assured. The Serbs had worked and fought for more than 
four hundred years to free themselves from Turkish dominion; 
they were going to work and fight to deliver their people still 
divided among five different sovereignties. "As there is an in- 
dividual honor/' wrote Professor Milenko R. Vesnitch, "there 
is also a national honor, of which France has given the best 
example." "National honor" and "national dignity" he con- 
sidered the most certain factors in the preservation of general 
progress. Until Serbia's justified demands were met, until the 
grand principle of equality in international relations was ac- 
cepted, M. Vesnitch declared, "We shall arm ourselves down 
to the infants in their cradle; we shall all perish, one after the 
other, before the threshold of the supreme tribunal, demanding 
at the top of our voices, justice, and then peace! 9 5 * 

Le Temps states that the Italian press, while praising the 
initiative of the Tsar, expressed doubts upon the achievement 
of practical results. It asked, for example, if the plenipoten- 
tiaries would take for their point of departure the actual terri- 
torial status quo, or if, in order to place peace upon a sure 
foundation, they would occupy themselves with questions which 
at that moment divided Europe. Some newspapers expressed 
the fear that the discussion of these questions would precipitate 
war rather than lead to the result for which the Conference was 
called. The official Italian journals guarded a certain reserve, 
merely stating that the Italian Government, not having any 
grave international question pending, could only encourage the 
tentative of Nicholas II. 55 

But there was one issue on which both Italian public opinion 
and the Government united in opposing, and that was the 

M Revue gtnlmle de droit international public, V (1898), 742. 
cs "Le DSsarmement g6n6ral et la presse europ&nne," Le Temps, August 31, 


question of the representation of the Holy See at the Con- 
ference. Signor Zanichelli, in the Nuova Antologia, pointed 
out that the Pope was no longer a head of a state, that he nc 
longer had personal sovereignty. The writer concluded that the 
Pope could not be invited to the Conference and that if by 
chance he were, it would be the duty of the Italian Government 
to absent itself. This was a rigorous stand to take because the 
Tsar naturally saw in the Pope a great arbitrator who had 
settled so many differences and the minister of peace who 
constituted the highest moral authority of the world. 56 

At the same time Professor Pasquale Fiore, Professor of 
Law at the University of Naples, tried to show Italian public 
opinion that it was wrong to call the projected meeting a Dis- 
armament Conference while it had other objects. He considered 
the limitation of armaments impossible. 57 Moreover, disarma- 
ment would have scarcely any advantage for Italy, because 
lacking money and not men, she was interested only in the re- 
duction of budgets, not of effectives. As Crispi wrote in May, 
1899, Italy wished to keep her sword unsheathed in order to 
enter into possession of her territories still under foreign sub- 
jection. 58 

Public opinion in the United States generally approved the 
Tsar's Rescript without, however, attaching much importance 
to it. The following comments appeared in some of the leading 
daily newspapers: 

Whatever else the czar's proposal for disarmament brings about, 
it will be apt to put an end to the Russo-French alliance, and leave 
France isolated in Europe, and helpless to right what she thinks her 
great wrong. 59 


56 Revue g&nirale de droit international public, VI (1899), *Q3, citing 
Nuova Antologia, February 16, 1899, p. 682 et seq, 

57 Ibid., p. 336, citing Pasquale Fiore, "L'Imperatore di Russia e la Con- 
ference," in Nuova Antologia, CLXV (May, 1899) , 665. 

59 Public Opinion, op. cit., p. 300. 


We do hope that this Impressive episode of European affairs will 
not be lost upon Americans. When the czar prays for peace and 
disarmament, he prays that the world be allowed to "stand still" 
and devote itself to the quiet pursuit of peaceful production. The 
forward policy which our imperialists desire means great armaments 
and the constant threat of war, and it is of these that the war lord 
of Russia speaks impressive words. 60 


There is and always has been a "queer streak" in the mental make- 
up of the Russian Imperial house. The present czar seems to be 
in a dreamy mood in which men aspire to do good deeds for the 
execution of which they make no preparation. The Romanofs 
dream of empire when they are asleep, and of peace when they are 
awake. 61 


The czar's Quixotic suggestion that the nations drop their iron 
burdens and join hands in a universal peace does credit to his gen- 
erous heart, but we cannot hope it will have more material result 
than when offered by less powerful personages. It is not original, 
and it is hardly within the realm of the practical. 62 


If Russia could induce the European governments to reduce their 
military establishments, thus making it possible to correspondingly 
decrease her enormous standing army, Russia could devote her 
energies exclusively to the conquest of China, Tartary, Persia, and 
Turkey by the slow process of absorption; and the savings from 
her military budget would swell the corruption fund needed for the 
purchase of sultans, khans, and mandarins. 63 


Some journals feigned to believe that the Russian 'Circular 
was the consequence of the Spanish- American War. The tone of 
the Nation was sympathetic. In an article entitled "The Czar 
Disarmer," 64 the Rescript was considered "an event, an 
achievement of the first magnitude." It was a confession of the 
folly and futility of the military spirit, coming from the most 

60 Loc. cit. 61 Loc. cit. 6a Loc. dt. 63 Loc. dt. 

64 The Nation (New York), LXVII, No. 1731 (September i, 1898), 160. 


unexpected quarter. Its issuance alone was an achievement 
which would crown the young Nicholas with the brightest glory 
that the dying century had to bestow. Later the same peri- 
odical referred to the close connection between disarmament and 
arbitration and pointed out that when "two or more nations 
have provided a peaceful means of settling all quarrels, there 
must seem less and less reason for keeping themselves armed 
to the teeth in order to settle them by violence. . . . His- 
torically, arbitration and disarmament have gone hand in 
hand." 65 

In general, the American newspapers and periodicals were 
much more interested in depicting the exploits of the United 
States Navy and describing war heroes, like Theodore Roose- 
velt and Admiral Dewey, than in critically examining the 
Eirenicon. The Century, Scribner's Magazine, the Living Age, 
the American Monthly Review of Reviews, the North American 
Review, the Political Science Quarterly, the Yale Review, the 
Journal of Political Economy and the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics did not mention the Tsar's Eirenicon in their 1898 
issues. Their space was occupied with the "Problem of the 
Philippines/' "What Is To Be Done With Cuba?" "The Eco- 
nomic Basis of Imperialism/' and so forth. The few who 
troubled to write about the proposal considered the idea of 
disarmament impractical and the limitation of armaments a 
problem which did not concern the American Republic, 

In January, 1899, Albert Shaw, the editor of the American 
Monthly Review of Reviews, answered the statement of W. T. 
Stead that the people of the United States and England might 
exert a well-nigh decisive influence on the Conference by writ- 
ing that "the situation to which the Czar addressed his famous 
manifesto is purely and strictly a European situation. The 
United States is in no sense a military power," While this 
country held itself responsible in a general way for the peace 
and good order of the western hemisphere, it belonged to the 

65 Ibid., LXVIII (June i, 1899), No. 1770, 410. 


concert of Europe to deal with matters of common interest and 
concern in Europe and the adjacent parts of Asia and Africa. 
Since the invitation to the Conference was a general one, the 
United States ought to be well represented by men instructed 
to express America's great desire that the European people 
should find it feasible to rid themselves of so oppressive a sys- 
tem. This country would have to increase its army, but we 
should not enter upon any program of armament that would 
affect in any manner the questions of European policy pro- 
posed for discussion at the Conference. Mr. Shaw thought 
something might be done in the way of fixing arbitrary limits 
to the extension of European military preparation, but in the 
long run the cause of peace would be promoted most effectively, 
"first by the final adjustment of those unsettled questions which 
threaten the peace of nations Alsace-Lorraine, for example 
and, second, by an increased use of such means as arbitration 
for the settlement of disputes." 66 

Many in the United States, as in England, doubted the 
Tsar's sincerity. Henry Boynton, in an article published in the 
Boston Evening Transcript, February 16, 1899, compared 
Russia to an immense glacier from northern Asia, a Russia 
"steadily and silently sliding down from the Arctic frosts to- 
wards the rich plains of middle and southern Asia to the open 
sea beyond. The southern edge of this mighty avalanche can be 
outlined all the way from Turkey to the eastern shores of 
China. Obstacles , may temporarily check, but cannot change 
this movement. Its objectives are never lost sight of." Boynton 
stated that the other nations were not going to sit still while 
Russia thus climbs to greatness and grandeur. The most the 
powers could do would be to increase their naval armaments as 
fast as possible and thus present a threatening attitude towards 
this growing colossus of the North, and meantime compel her to 
maintain a naval force as nearly equal to theirs as she may be 

86 Albert Shaw, "The Progress of the World" (America and the Conference), 
American Monthly Review of Reviews, XIX (January, 1899), 19-20. 


able. The writer referred to Russia's railroad program and 
pointed out that to build and equip such railroads as were con- 
templated and building must bring a tremendous strain upon 
the best treasury. How plain it was that if all the great powers 
would build no more warships and largely reduce what they 
had, Russia would have the money thus saved from naval ex- 
penditures to put into railroads. Boynton suggested that the 
other great powers agree to stop building warships if Russia 
reduced her own war fleets and promised to send down no rail- 
road lines into China. He concluded that if the great Eastern 
question unfolded itself as he indicated, it would be desirable 
for "England's good that the United States should be on 'work- 
ing terms' with her and both governments have the Philippines 
as a working base for naval operations." 67 

Mr. Charles Conant, writing in the North American Review, 
without ridiculing the Rescript, traced its roots to an economic 
motive the desire of Russia to become the great competitor 
of the Anglo-Saxon race for the commercial and military su- 
premacy of the world. 68 The impression that prevailed in the 
press was that not much would be accomplished in the way of a 
limitation of armaments but that something might be done to 
extend the use of arbitration. 69 

67 Henry Boynton, "Is the Czar In Earnest?" Boston Evening Transcript^ 
February 16, 1899, p. 7, col. i. 

68 Charles A. Conant, "Russia as a World Power," The North American 
Review, CLXVIII (February, 1899), 178-90. 

69 A Diplomatist at The Hague, "The Peace Conference; Its Possible Prac- 
tical Results," The North American Review, CLXVIII (June, 1899), 771-78- 



JURISCONSULTS of international law, in examining the Tsar's 
peace proposals, were perhaps more detached in their judg- 
ments, more rational in their criticism than any other group. 
Less passionate than the national press in their differences, less 
enthusiastic than the absolute pacifists, less sceptical than 
statesmen and diplomats, they had some chance of being more 
just and more in harmony with the reality of facts. 

A majority of international jurists were agreed that dis- 
armament was desirable, but they could not devise an effica- 
cious scheme for its accomplishment. The greatest difficulties 
which they confronted in any plan for limiting armaments arose 
from the necessity of combining disarmament with the funda- 
mental principle of international law the sovereignty of the 
state from the problems of inspection and application of sanc- 
tions, from the attempt to define the exact nature of armaments, 
from an effort to arrive at a proportional equality, and finally 
from the opposition of some states to the permanent acceptance 
of the status quo. Here are obstacles as numerous as those ob- 
structing the abolition of war; here are difficulties surpassing 
all measure; in fact, the solution of even one of them will 
touch the Utopian. 

Assuming that the powers were, in principle, willing to dis- 
arm, the difficulty would arise when the delegates at the Hague 
Conference attempted to carry the idea into reality. First they 
would have to solve the perplexing problem of combining dis- 
armament with the independence of states. M. Rolin-Jae- 
quemyns, the renowned Belgian jurist, recognized this diffi- 


culty when, In September, 1887, he presented his proposition 
to the Institute of International Law at its session in Heidel- 
berg. He said: 

The essential principle is that of the independence, the autonomy 
of every sovereign State, and as a corollary thereof, the right and 
the duty which it has to defend its existence by all preventive or 
immediate means within its power. This principle, which will doubt- 
less be invoked in opposition to my proposition, I recognize and 
claim, not merely as a patriot, but as a jurist. I agree that the State 
which renounces the -right to defend itself commits suicide as much 
as the State which renounces the right to exist. I would not admit 
the legality of such a hypothesis for my little country any more than 
for the largest State. 1 

States will not disarm so long as they claim complete national 
sovereignty. For the idea of absolute sovereignty involves in 
the last resort the right to do anything which may be held to 
serve the interest of the nation regarded as a unit, irrespective 
of the consequences which this action may have for the rest of 
the world. Sovereignty necessarily includes the right to make 
war in the national interest, and as long as nations exist there 
will be causes of war between them, if only because there 
always will be territory to which more than one power considers 
it possesses a legitimate right. 

Moreover, each state exercises complete sovereignty within 
the limits of its territory and allows no other authority to inter- 
fere with the direction of its domestic affairs. But, to ensure the 
execution of any agreement, there must be inspection and 
control. No jurist was able to suggest how these could be accom- 
plished without intolerable interference. MM. Pillett and 
Fauchille, the editors of the Revue g&nirale de droit interna- 
tional public, were of opinion that the powers agreeing to limit 
their armaments would have to appoint a commission to which 
they would delegate the power of executing the decrees of the 
Conference. But the more the attributes of such a commission 

1 Revue de droit international et de legislation comparle, XIX (1887), 402. 


were considered; the more difficult It would be to constitute. 
These jurists and M. Des jar dins were agreed that a disarma- 
ment pact could not leave material sanctions unprovided, for 
necessity would demand the formation of an international army 
capable of enforcing the arrangements arrived at. It would 
have not only to check the insubordination of the little states, 
but in case of need, to reduce to obedience even great powers 
like Germany, Great Britain, the United States or Russia. This 
international army would have to be at least equal to the strong- 
est of the individual establishments, because, being formed of 
heterogeneous units from the national armies, it would be 
mobilized more slowly. 2 But what great powers would agree to 
this international force limiting their sovereignty in any way? 

MM. Fillet and Fauchille realized that official investigations 
would be necessary for discovering by what ruse a state might 
try to exceed the figures assigned to it. If, however, a commis- 
sion were given the right to investigate, objections would be 
raised to its entering the barracks and arsenals with a view to 
taking a census of the men and to verifying the material. Under 
this system the states, they feared, in place of arming without 
mystery, would arm secretly; thus the scheme would prove not 
only impracticable but dangerous to peace. To all the other 
causes of conflict would be added the irritating supervision of a 
third party and perhaps the accusation of secretly arming or 
manipulating figures; the nations would become more nervous 
and the political atmosphere charged with electricity. If it were 
discovered that a state had surpassed its budgetary figures, 
there would be no way to force it to obedience other than by 
declaring war on it, which would mean falling into the very 
peril that was to be avoided. 3 

It would prove almost impossible, Professor Felix Stoerk 
argued, to restrain the governments to a loyal observance of 

2 Revue ginirde, de droit international public, V (1898), 694; also, M. 
Desjardins, "Le DSsarmement, 6tude de droit international," Revue des Deux 
mondes, October, 1898, 677-78. 

3 Revue gtnirale de droit international public, VI (1899), 99. 


their engagements, for the international community was not 
sufficiently organized to admit institutions of control which 
could preserve the proportional reduction of its forces without 
impairing the sovereignty and the free movement of the Euro- 
pean states. In international society there was need for a system 
of legal means for determining the rights of each state and for 
settling, according to justice, controversies which arose among 
them. But in his opinion the establishment of a new adminis- 
trative community, an international union for the common 
reduction of armaments, was, in the then existing system of 
European society, with complications in Europe, Asia and 
Africa, a much greater source of danger to peace than would 
have been the temporary material advantages that the powers 
would have drawn from a reduction of their armies and navies. 4 
Stoerk pointed out that all tentatives of international control 
would augment the importance of information of an official 
character, and the difficulties of obtaining this would vary be- 
tween states governed absolutely and constitutionally. Ger- 
many, France, England and the United States, in 1898, could 
not build guns, equip soldiers or construct warships without 
parliamentary discussion. The same acts could be accomplished 
in Russia behind an impenetrable screen, where parliament and 
the press exerted no control; and while some countries would in 
good faith restrict their preparations, she could go on, un- 
molested by curiosity, doing pretty much what she liked. It 
appeared to Professor Stoerk that before official investigations 
could be carried out with any degree of success, the contracting 
powers would have to demand first some conditions of an iden- 
tical constitutional nature. 5 But to have insisted that Imperial 
Russia should have adopted a constitutional system, with all 
it implies, would have been tantamount to interfering with the 
sovereignty of that state. 

4 Ibid., V (1898), 705. Opinion of Felix Stoerk, Professor of International 
Law in the University of Greifswald and member of the Institute of Inter- 
national Law. 

. 703. 


Even if one were to accept the hypothesis that the states were 
disposed to consent to a temporary reduction of their arma- 
ments, the first great, practically insoluble problem would have 
been the task of defining and delimiting the term armaments. 
In regard to this problem Professors Brusa and Stoerk raised 
many questions without attempting to answer them. Under the 
name of armaments, they asked, would one understand only 
guns with their attendants and their munitions, fortresses and 
their ramparts, cruisers with their torpedoes, depots of powder 
and projectiles and soldiers of the first line or also commercial 
vessels, susceptible of transformation for war purposes, reserve 
armies, money or war treasures, borrowings, budgets, and the 
means and lines of transportation, such as canals and strategical 
railways? Under the name of armaments would one include 
only the materiel of war ready for use, or artificial and natural 
products? Is it a question of the sum of the means of attack 
and defense? Ought one to understand by the term the people 
capable of bearing arms, or those actually under arms? Would 
the reduction include also the means of defense or only the 
means of attack? Is it possible to draw a line of demarcation 
between the one and the other corresponding to their real 
meaning? Is it necessary also to take account of alliances, of 
population ready at a call, outside of legal prescription? 6 

Furthermore, MM. Brusa, Fillet and Fauchille drew atten- 
tion to the fact that war and industrial progress are so closely 
interwoven that it is impossible to reduce military expenditure 
without proportionally reducing pacific expenses. Not only the 
construction of battleships would have to be limited but also 
the building of commercial vessels because they can, if neces- 
sary, be transformed into warships, either as transports or 
squadrons of cruisers. The power to make war effectively de- 
pends not merely on direct warlike machinery, but on the 
development of the means of communication and applied science 

6 Revue gMrale de droit international public, V (1898), 704. Opinion of 
Felix Stoerk. fbid., VI (1899), 884. Opinion of M. TBrusa, Professor in the 
University of Turin and member of the Institute of International Law. 


among peoples. Thus railways, though apparently pacific works, 
are also instruments of strategic value of the first order because 
they increase the power of effectives and their means of action, 
On this point, those who were sceptical over the Tsar's Rescript 
claimed that after five years the completed Trans-Siberian and 
other railways in Asia would, at least for strategical purposes, 
treble the military forces of Russia without adding a single 
cossack to her standing army. Jurists asked: Was Russia to be 
required to cease these enterprises, and, if so, for how long? 

MM, Fillet and Fauchille pointed out the obstacles which 
would arise in attempting to establish a sure basis of propor- 
tional equality in armaments between the several states. The 
maximum could not be the same for Switzerland as for France, 
for Germany as for Russia, for a large and a small state, for a 
neutralized state and for one without such an international 
guarantee. A proportion would have to be fixed. 7 Who would 
say what reduction in the British Navy would be equivalent to 
the striking off of one hundred men from the muster-rolls of 
the German Army? Who would decide whether small and 
slightly armed states, like Holland, or a neutralized state, like 
Switzerland, were to be called upon to diminish their defensive 
forces when France or Austria disbanded an army corps? Who 
would tell the United States whether it might not increase its 
army until it approached in strength the establishments of 
European powers? In arriving at a proportionality would it not 
be necessary to take into consideration the vast natural re- 
sources of the British Empire and the United States as com- 
pared with the rather limited ones of a power like Italy? 

The maximum of the military budgets could not be absolute, 
but would have to be relative to the whole budget; that is to 
say, the military expenses would be proportioned to the others, 
one-fifth or one-eighth of the global expenses. All the states, 
moreover, would not have the same quantum. Some peculiar 
geographical circumstances of Spain, Italy, Great Britain and 

&, VI (1899), ioo. 


Germany would have to be considered. The neutrality of 
Switzerland and Belgium ought to lower their figures. Who 
would have the power to determine the quota? It would be too 
delicate and perilous a task for the Conference to tackle, 8 yet 
the failure to settle this particular point would reduce the whole 
attempt at disarmament to failure. 

Besides, certain states have colonial possessions. Would they 
be entitled to two budgets, one for a European war and the 
other for an overseas conflict or a punitive expedition? To 
refuse them a supplementary budget would be to place them 
in a state of inferiority to the others, while to accord it would 
be to place them in a state of superiority, since they could, in 
case of need, cast the resources of the two budgets into the same 
fund. In addition, the practice of private individuals opening 
a subscription in order voluntarily to supplement the military 
budgets would also require some international supervision and 
limitation. 9 

Finally, there was the problem of the acceptance of the status 
quo. Some states had rival and irreconcilable pretensions upon 
certain territories: France looked forward to the recovery of 
Alsace-Lorraine, the Slav States of the Balkans were deter- 
mined to liberate their brothers under foreign domination, Italy 
dreamed of "Italia Irredenta," England and Russia were open 
rivals in the Far East, and the future status of Egypt was still 
undetermined. Professor M6rignhac at the University of Tou- 
louse and Professor Vesnitch at Belgrade stated emphatically 
that France and Serbia could not think of reducing their armies 
before their justified aspirations were assured. Their "national 
honor" and their "national dignity" prevented their serious 
consideration of the Tsar's proposal; they demanded justice 
before peace. 10 

8 Loc. dt, 

Loc. dt. 

10 Revue giniml de droit international public, V (1898), 742, Opinion of 
M. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Professor in the University of Belgrade, member of 
the Institute of International Law. 


The problem of the permanent acceptance of the status quo 
has been and always will be the greatest stumbling-block in the 
path to a limitation of armaments. It was in the background 
when the war-weary powers in 1816 failed to come to an under- 
standing; it prevented Prussia from considering Lord Claren- 
don's proposal of 1870; after France lost Alsace-Lorraine in 
1871, it assumed a much greater significance. No plan for 
disarmament based upon the acceptance of the status quo was 
possible in 1898. In 1916, during the war which altered so 
radically the political and territorial status of Europe, a paper 
was written in which this point concerning the acquiescence in 
the status quo was critically examined. It reads : 

"Any general limitation of armaments implies that every State 
accepts for itself a definite standard of force not to be exceeded. 
This standard cannot be equal for all." On what principle is to be 
determined? None seems to be possible, except "the empirical method 
of accepting the present distribution of force as indicating the nor- 
mal to be varied, if necessary, in such a manner as to preserve the 
same proportion between the different States." How can we expect 
all countries to accept a rule by which this existing proportion should 
be stereotyped and made permanent? 

The existing proportionate distribution of force is the outcome of 
history, of past wars and territorial arrangements. It is the result 
of victories and defeats, of national achievements and of national 
disasters. At every given moment there are States who hope to 
retrieve past errors and misfortunes, and who strive to build upon 
stronger foundations the power of their nation. Such ambitions are 
natural and just. The nation that has them not is despised. To 
perpetuate indefinitely the conditions prevailing at a given time 
would mean not only that no States whose power has hitherto been 
weak relatively to others may hope to get stronger, but that a defi- 
nite order or hierarchy must be recognized, in which each State is 
fated to occupy a fixed place. Is this a condition which can be 
expected to meet with general acceptance? u 

General disarmament presupposes the solution or the regula- 
tion of all outstanding quarrels and burning questions among 
11 Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, p. 262. 


states which render armaments indispensable. But the govern- 
ments in accepting the Tsar's invitation laid down as the con- 
dition of the Conference the exclusion of all questions actually 
pending. They were justified in so doing; for the previous dis- 
cussion of these complex, delicate and threatening problems, 
touching the life of many countries and exciting their national 
sentiments, would certainly have constituted a grave danger. 12 
The mere raising of any of these contentious points would have 
frustrated the purpose for which the Conference was called. In 
the words of Professor Lawrence: "When there are so many 
lighted matches about, any attempt to sweep up all the loose 
gun-powder strewn over the face of the earth is far more likely 
to end in disaster than in the removal of inflammable mate- 
rial." 13 If, however, the settlement of all outstanding quarrels 
between states was a necessary preliminary to any agreement 
for arresting the growth of armaments and, if, at the same time, 
these smoldering questions were excluded from discussion, here 
was the great enigma, the sphinx of the Conference. 

Although the obstacles in the path to total disarmament or 
even to a partial and proportionate diminution of armaments 
were insuperable, Professor Lawrence considered that an 
agreement not to proceed any further in the competition, which 
was constantly endangering the security of the states without 
altering their relative position, was not an impossibility. There 
would be no need to solve a host of knotty problems before a 
solution were reached, and when it was reached, some machinery 
for seeing that it was honestly kept could be devised. There 
would be difficulties: a dishonest government, especially one 
uncontrolled by parliament and the press, might be able to 
conceal forbidden preparations. But Professor Lawrence be- 

12 Revue giniraU de droit international jublic, V (1898), 733- Opinion of 
M. Pasquale Fiore, Professor of Law, in the University of Naples, member of the 
Institute of International Law. 

13 J. W, Lawrence, Professor of International Law in Downing College, 
Cambridge, "The Tsar's Rescript," International Journal of Ethics, IX (Janu- 
ary, 1899), 149- 


iieved that if public opinion proved strong enough to force 
statesmen to devise a working plan for preventing the further 
increase of armaments, it would probably be strong enough to 
stop any attempt to persevere in a proved breach of the agree- 
ment. The success or failure of the Tsar's scheme depended, he 
thought, upon the amount of enlightened sentiment that could 
be rallied in its support. 14 

1 Ibid., p. 15- 



WHILE the Tsar's Eirenicon was welcomed by some, it was 
denounced by others; while some applauded it, many more 
scoffed; while the pacifists were jubilant, the diplomatists 
remained sceptical; while the daily press, with few exceptions, 
guarded a rather hostile attitude, the jurisconsults indicated the 
difficulties in the way of a limitation of armaments. 

Soon the powers accepted or made known their intention of 
accepting the invitation with what appeared on the surface to 
be general satisfaction. But official answers to official commu- 
nications often give little insight into the real minds of their 
authors. The first official reply to the Tsar's message was sent 
by William II of Germany. Prince von Billow states in his 
Memoirs that the Emperor was so surprised and excited by the 
imperial Rescript that, without consulting either him or Hohen- 
lohe, he sent on his own initiative a telegram to Nicholas II. 
The Empress told Billow that the Kaiser had not for a long 
time been so annoyed over anything as over the immature Tsar's 
sudden and stupid step. 1 Nevertheless, this is what he tele- 
graphed to the Russian Emperor on August 29: 

Prince Radolin has communicated to me, by Your commands, 
the Memoire about the proposal for an International Conference to 
bring about a general disarmament. This suggestion once more 
places in a vivid light the pure and lofty motives by which your 
counsels are ruled, and will earn You the applause of all peoples. 

1 Prince von Biilow, Memoirs, jp7-jpjrp, I, 275, of the Boston 1931 edition 
translated from the German by F, A. Voigt> and I, 232-33, of the London 1932 
edition translated from the German by Geoffrey Dunlop. 



The question itself theoretically as a principle seemingly simple- 
is in practice, I am afraid, eminently difficult, considering the great 
delicacy of the relations and dispositions of the different nations to 
each other, as well as with respect to the varied development of 
their respective histories. Could we for instance figure to ourselves 
a Monarch holding personal command of his Army, dissolving the 
regiments sacred with a hundred years of history and relegating 
their glorious colours to the walls of the armouries and museums (and 
handing over his towns to Anarchiste and Democracy). However, 
that is only en passant. The main point is the love of mankind which 
fills your warm heart and which prompts you to this proposal, the 
most interesting and surprising of this century! Honour will hence- 
forth be lavished upon you by the whole world; even should the 
practical part fail through the difficulties of the detail. My Gov- 
ernment shall give the matter its most serious attention. 2 

Von Billow states that he worked with Prince Hohenlohe tq 
ensure that the Russian Tsar would not be met with a rebuff, 
and especially so that there should not be aroused in the world 
the feeling that the continuance of the heavy burden of arma- 
ments and the undeniable tension of the international situation 
were due to the German people. 3 Nonetheless, he could not but 
be alive to the great difficulties which would have to be encoun- 
tered. In his opinion the only basis of discussion was the 
maintenance of the status quo, but this would probably not suit 
other powers, especially France. In the matter of Alsace- 
Lorraine, he stated that the German Government could not 
possibly consent to the reopening of questions which had been 
definitely settled. 4 

Although German statesmen were willing to accept the Tsar's 
invitation, they saw little hope of the Conference accomplishing 
much. As far as their country was concerned, a limitation of 

2 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4222, pp. 151-52. Kaiser William II to Tsar 
Nicholas II, Berlin, August 29, 1898. 

3 Prince von Billow, loc. cit. 

4 G. P. Gooch and .Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origin of the 
War, 1898-1^14. (Hereafter, British Documents.) Vol. I (London, 1927), No. 
263, p. 217, Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, September 2, 


either military or naval armaments was impossible. Germany, 
unlike Russia, had two frontiers to defend; if she limited her 
standing armies according to population or territory she would 
commit a great error and place herself at a disadvantage in rela- 
tion to her neighbors. Besides, the number of effectives was 
fixed by an agreement between the government and the 

As far as the German Navy was concerned the situation was 
little better. On April 10, 1898, after a struggle of ten years, 
William II, assisted by his new Admiral, von Tirpitz, had just 
succeeded in securing the approval of the Reichstag to a Navy 
Bill providing for a comprehensive program of naval construc- 
tion extending over a period of six years. But Admiral von 
Tirpitz considered his first Bill insufficient to create a fleet in its 
final form. Supplementary demands would have to be brought 
forward after the conclusion of the six years' period. The 
passage of the Naval Act was followed by widespread agitation 
carried on by the Press Bureau and the newly formed Navy 
League. It was evident that neither the German Emperor nor 
von Tirpitz would consider the limitation of naval armaments. 

Finally, German statesmen doubted the sincerity of the Tsar's 
proposal. Russia's financial predicament was believed to be 
the underlying motive for the Rescript. Von Billow was of 
opinion that Count Witte, who was anxious to obtain a further 
loan and who had been given to understand that no more money 
would be forthcoming from the French market, thought that 
his best chance of obtaining funds from England and Germany 
was to proclaim a pacific policy. 5 The Kaiser wrote in one of 
his characteristic notes : 

The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to the financial ex- 
haustion of Russia. Army increases, strategical railways, the rapid 
expansion towards China, the Siberian railway, all of this has drained 
the land, taxes can hardly be increased, and culture is at the lowest 
ebb. Witte had no further sources, since France has given out and 

5 Loc. dt. 


Germany and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is clearly 
proven that so far Europe has paid for the Russian armaments. 
All this must be counted in, along with the young Tsar's humanitarian 
nonsense which has led him to this incredible step. There's a bit of 
deviltry in it too, because any one who refuses the invitation will 
be said to want to break the peace and that at a moment when 
Russia cannot go further, while others especially Germany can 
now begin and make up for lost time. 6 

The German Emperor was inclined to consider more closely the 
intended expenditure of 90 million rubles on eight new first- 
class battleships and six first-class cruisers. The whole "lucu- 
bration" seemed to him to come from "Russia's grim necessity 
of escaping from her financial mess." T 

The Kaiser thought that the proposal had originated, no 
doubt, with Nicholas II who, after reading Bloch's book, had 
been impressed with the necessity to do something to mitigate 
the horrors of war and to prevent the wholesale destruction of 
human life. Count Muraviev and Witte warmly adopted the 
proposal. William said: 

The vanity of the former was tickled by the idea of presiding 
over a Conference, and thus having the opportunity of bringing 
himself into prominence and getting himself talked about, a con- 
sideration which influenced most of his actions, and the latter was 
in a serious want of money, and thought that the proclamation of 
a pacific policy would open for him the money markets of London 
and Berlin, which had now become a matter of vital necessity, 
since he had lost all hope of receiving further supplies from France. 8 

Furthermore, Russia had no inventors or manufacturers, and 
was obliged to purchase all her arms and powder abroad. This 
constituted a heavy drain on the resources of the country, and 
it was only natural that the Minister of Finance should wish 

6 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4219, pp. 149-50. Footnote 4. Prince von 
Billow to Kaiser William II, August 28, 1898. 

7 Ibid., p. 149. Footnote 4. 

8 British Documents, I, 222. Sir Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, 
December 22, 1898. 


that the vast sums which went to enrich the foreigner should 
be spent at home. 9 

In spite of the peaceful character of the Rescript it did not 
lead the European Powers not even Russia herself to reduce 
or keep their armaments stationary. At the opening of the 
German Reichstag on December 6, the Kaiser announced the 
bare outlines of a new Army Bill providing for an increase of 
26,576 10 men in the strength of the army on a peace footing. 
The preamble to the Bill states that the conditions which five 
years before had made an increase in the army necessary had 
not changed. Germany continued to be menaced in consequence 
of her geographical position. The war preparations of neighbor- 
ing states had meanwhile been carried on systematically and 
with a great expenditure of money; disarmament had nowhere 
taken place, and in the existing circumstances it could hardly 
be anticipated. Reference was made to the Spanish-American 
War which furnished proof of the disastrous consequences of 
neglecting in time of peace a careful and systematic preparation 
for war. No nation, the preamble continues, can afford to neg- 
lect this preparation if it means to maintain its prestige and 
preserve its possessions intact. In the future as in the past a 
strong and well-organized army will be the cornerstone of the 
state and at the same time the surest pledge of peace. Special 
attention was directed to the military preparations of France 
and "European Russia." These countries were, in spite of the 
Tsar's manifesto, perfecting their armies. In addition to a 
far higher strength on a peace footing than others, they had 
increased their annual draft of recruits to 250,000 and 300,000 
men respectively, while in Germany the number of recruits 
provided for in the estimates amounted only to approximately 

227,000. U 

When the debate on the Army Bill opened in the Reichstag 

9 Loc. cit. 

10 Including the necessary complement of non-commissioned officers, or 
23,277 men, excluding such officers. 

11 The Times, December 7, 1898, p. 5, cols. 4-5. 


on January 12, Minister of War von Gossler explained the 
motives which had actuated the Government in framing the 

The Eirenicon of the Tsar had given them the certainty that 
Germany would not within a measurable distance of time be attacked 
from that quarter. . . . Yet history taught them that the will of the 
mightiest Monarchs was not able to alter the interests of a great 
nation or the condition of its existence. If a nation meant to main- 
tain its independence, it must possess the strength requisite for pro- 
tecting its interests at any moment. If he looked around him in the 
world he found that nowhere had there been a cessation of prepara- 
tions for war. On the contrary, in view of the additions to the armies 
and navies of other nations the measure before them might well 
appear to be inadequate. 12 

Von Gossler pointed out that the wars of recent years had 
taught the great lesson that everything favored the side which 
had most carefully and longest prepared for war and had kept 
pace with the development of modern sciences in its armaments. 
He referred particularly to the Sino-Japanese and Spanish- 
American Wars and to the operations of the Anglo-Egyptian 
forces in the Sudan. 13 

The following day Herr Bebel, the leader of the Socialist 
party in the Reichstag, protested against the new Bill. He said 
that the peoples of Europe had an earnest desire for peace and 
that consequently its maintenance did not entirely depend upon 
the wisdom of the Government. He contended that it was 
mockery of the views expounded in the Tsar's manifesto to 
express to the Russian Government sympathy with the proposal 
and at the same time to introduce the Bill. But he was called 
to order amid the applause of the Right. Herr Bebel declared 
that Russia must avoid war because of her internal condition, 
while France was not in a position and did not believe herself 
to be in a position to go to war with Germany alone. This 

12 Ibid., January 13, 1899, p, 3? col- 5> 
18 Loc. tit. 


measure was therefore not justified by the political situa- 
tion. 14 

In the course of the Reichstag debate, Baron von Stumm, 
a Junker deputy, expressed Ms own theory as to the soundest 
attitude of Germany regarding the Tsar's Eirenicon. He did not 
think that the initiative of the Tsar would lead to any numerical 
reduction in the armed strength of Europe. But suppose that 
it were to do so, and that 10 per cent were to be struck off the 
armaments of all the powers, surely the best thing that Ger- 
many could do was to pass the Bill without delay. He trium- 
phantly pointed out, "it is clear that the country will fare best 
which has made most progress in its military preparations." 15 

The proposal for increase of the German Army led Austrian 
militarists to demand additions to their armaments. In January, 
1899, certain articles appeared in the Vienna military paper, 
the Reichswehr, pointing out how necessary it was that Austria 
should follow the example of Germany and increase instead of 
diminish her armed forces. This professional paper, which had 
great influence in the Dual Monarchy, stated: 

The German Army Bill, the first reading of which thoroughly dissi- 
pated whatever expectations may have been based on the coming 
disarmament conference, must be regarded in Austria as a reminder 
that the relative proportions of the armed forces of the Powers are 
about to undergo a further change to the disadvantage of the Dual 
Monarchy, and that the backward condition of our army compared 
with that of Germany will be further emphasized. The new German 
Army Bill, which is sure to be adopted, can have no other effect on 
this country than to force the Monarchy, in spite of peace conferences 
and the claims of economy, to set about the formation of a sixteenth 
corps d'arm&e at Briinn, and the rearmament and the reorganisation 
of our field artillery. For, as General von Gossler declared, and as 
history teaches, when a people fails to maintain an army proportionate 
to the extent of its territory, it renounces the position which it has 
been destined to occupy. 16 

14 Ibid., January 14, 1899, p. 7> col. 4. 

15 Henry H. Ho worth, "Some Plain Words about the Tsar's New Gospel of 
Peace," The Nineteenth Century, XLV (February, 1899), 207. 


The attitude of France towards the Rescript was one of 
polite frigidity. The fact that she was not consulted in advance 
was interpreted as a proof of Russia's slight consideration of 
French interests. France had a matter to settle with Germany, 
and she had counted upon Russian help when the hour should 
come. It appeared now that Russia was asking her to give up 
the idea of ever recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The Tsar had 
practically invited the powers to combine to compel France to 
abandon the hope which she had cherished for nearly thirty 
years and for which she had not hesitated to spend tremendous 

Nevertheless, since other great powers were accepting the 
invitation, France must not incur the responsibility of wrecking 
the Conference. Consequently, the French Cabinet expressed 
its approval of the Russian Circular and agreed to participate 
in the discussions on condition that Alsace-Lorraine should not 
be mentioned. M. Delcasse, speaking in the Chamber of 
Deputies on January 23, 1899, announced that France would 
not remain deaf to the call addressed to her by the head of a 
great nation, a friend, an ally with whom, he added, never had 
the accord been more complete and the relations more confident. 
But the same statesman in a private conversation with Count 
Minister, the German Ambassador in Paris, is reported to have 

In this conference we have entirely the same interest as you. You 
will not limit your forces at this moment nor agree to proposals of 
disarmament, we are in the same position. On both sides we wish to 
spare the Tsar and to find a formula to circumvent this question; but 
we will not let ourselves in for anything which might weaken our 
forces on either side. But to avoid a complete fiasco we may possibly 
be able to make a few concessions about arbitration. But these must 
not in any case limit the full independence of the great States. 17 

In England there was a stronger public opinion in favor of 
the proposed Conference than in any other country. This cur- 

17 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4253, p. 186, Count Mtinster to Prince von 
Hohenlohe, Paris, April 21, 1899. 


rent deterred statesmen and diplomatists from openly criticizing 
and opposing the Rescript, but it did not diminish their scepti- 
cism. At public meetings they offered tribute to the "noble 
Tsar" and then proceeded to make reserved and indefinite yet 
sympathetic speeches concerning the Conference. But behind 
the proposal British statesmen saw a Russian calculation. They 
were convinced that Russia desired a limitation of armament 
expenditure chiefly in order to concentrate her energies on a 
steady Asiatic expansion which in time might threaten the 
British position in India. Therefore, they had no intention of 
coming to an agreement that would seriously impair the effi- 
ciency of the British military and naval forces. 

Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, was just as con- 
scious as the young Tsar of the evils of the over-grown arma- 
ments of Europe. As early as 1887, eleven years before the 
appearance of the Rescript, he had drawn attention to the 
enormous and increased armies of Europe and had ventured to 
state that, so long as the competition of armaments continued, 
it was idle to hope that perfect tranquillity could prevail in the 
world. 18 These vast and always growing armaments created 
well-founded solicitude in the great statesman to whom the 
peace of Europe was a matter of deepest concern, and to him 
their mere existence constituted an unceasing and steady dan- 
ger. 19 With the tremendous forces that had been created, with 
the tremendous powers modern science had given to the weapons 
that could be brought into play, a European war had become a 
terrible hazard which must end in the national annihilation of 
those defeated. 20 But this state of things, in Ms opinion, had 
its compensation; the power of destruction which lay at the 
mercy of one word from a statesman or a monarch thereby 
imposed a responsibility so tremendous that he was not sure 

18 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, IV, 80, 
Guildhall Speech of November 9, 1887. 

10 The Herald of Peace, June i, 1888, p. 72. Speech on the "Continental 
Outlook" at Derby in December, 1887. 

20 The Times, November 10, 1888, p. 10, col. 4. Guildhall Speech of November 
9, 1888. 


that the securities of peace were not more sensibly increased 
than they would be in former times when the weapons of 
war were weak and war could be easily and cheaply under- 
taken. 21 

Although Lord Salisbury looked upon the ever increasing 
armaments as a source of danger and a cause of disquietude, 
he saw no practical means of lessening the burden. Perhaps the 
time would come when the nations, thinking they had prepared 
enough, would begin to decrease their accumulation of arms 
and men, but until then, in the midst of so much preparation, 
Great Britain must not remain unprepared. 22 

Less than a year before Tsar Nicholas astonished the 
world with his Eirenicon, Lord Salisbury declared that the com- 
petition in armaments, unless curtailed, would end in a terrible 
effort of mutual destruction, fatal to Christian civilization. His 
one hope for the world was that the powers might gradually be 
"welded together into some international constitution" which 
would result in a long period of peace. 23 Perhaps this notable 
utterance of the experienced and practical British Prime Minis- 
ter encouraged the young idealistic Tsar of Russia to proclaim 
his peace message. Nicholas II may have thought that it would 
have the hearty support of the greatest living European states- 
man; if so, he was doomed to disappointment. 

In accepting the invitation to the Conference Lord Salisbury 
wrote that 

the statements which constitute the grounds of the Emperor's pro- 
posal were but too well justified. It is unfortunately true that while 
the desire for the maintenance of peace is generally professed, and 
while, in fact, serious and successful efforts have on more than one 
recent occasion been made with that object by the Great Powers, 
there has been a constant tendency on the part of almost every nation 
to increase its armed force, and to add to an already vast expenditure 
on the appliances of war. . . . But the burdens imposed by this 

21 Cecil, op. cit., IV, 80; also British Documents, I, No. 269, p. 221. The 
Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, London, October 27, 1898. 

22 The Times t November 10, 1888, p. 10, col. 4. 

23 Review of Reviews, XIX, 7. Guildhall Speech of November 9, 1897. 


process on the populations affected must, if prolonged, produce a feel- 
ing of unrest and discontent menacing both to internal and external 
tranquillity. 24 

Lord Salisbury gave the assurance that Her Majesty's Gov- 
ernment would gladly co-operate in the proposed effort to 
provide a remedy for the evil, and if in any degree it succeeded 
they would feel that the Sovereign to whose suggestion it was 
due had fully earned the gratitude of the world at large. He 
hoped that the invitation might be accompanied by some indi- 
cation of the special points to which the attention of the 
Conference was to be directed. 25 

On the question of a limitation of armaments the English 
statesman was far from sure that a reduction was desirable 
even if the powers were to agree to a scheme. Although its 
immediately effect might be to decrease the burdens of taxation, 
it would, at the same time, rob war of some of its terrors, and 
thus add a new peril to those threatening the general peace. 
He was of opinion that no peace is possible in Europe without 
an armed force behind it. This force must be either concen- 
trated or distributed. In 1816 it was concentrated, in 1898 
distributed. In its latter form it was larger and more expensive, 
the reason being that the dangers to be provided against were 
more serious and numerous, and the powers attached a greater 
value to their individual sovereignty. He believed that the 
perfection of the instruments of warfare, their extreme costli- 
ness, and the horrible carnage and destruction which would 
accompany their employment on a large scale acted as a serious 
deterrent from war ; 26 armaments were so adjusted as to render 
a successful war not worth striving for. The moment, however, 
they were reduced, the prizes of war would outweigh its risks, 
and peace would be at an end. 

24 British Documents, I, No. 269, p. 221. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. 
Scott, London, October 24, 1898. 

25 Loc. cit. 

26 British Documents, I, No. 269. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, 
October 25, 1898. 


The conclusions which the Marquis of Salisbury might have 
drawn from a survey of the practical efforts that had been made 
to secure peace and disarmament in Europe were : 

1. That disarmament is impossible without the security of a 
durable peace. 

2. That a durable peace cannot be obtained without an equitable 
adjustment of all serious international grievances and the provision 
of a suitable machinery for the settlement of all future differences. 

3. That such an adjustment is impracticable and such a machinery 
would be ineffective unless a force were available to impose their 
decrees on possible dissentients. 

4. That the supply of such a force is, in the present condition 
of Europe, impossible. 27 

On the whole, the peace proposals advocated in the name of 
the Tsar, admirable as they might be in intention, did not 
inspire practical men, like Lord Salisbury, with much confidence 
or even hope. This was not so much due to their own inade- 
quacy as to the insuperable difficulties of the problems they 
attempted to solve. Militarism had never before had so strong 
a hold on the world. Its influence was everywhere, and every- 
where it was baleful. On the other hand, the desire for peace 
was stronger than ever before, and from this it had been as- 
sumed that the time was ripe for disarmament. But Lord Salis- 
bury realized that the moral sense of the world, whatever its 
strength, was not strong enough to exercise a decisive influence 
on the preservation of peace, that it had completely failed to 
overcome or even to diminish the political impediments which 
had hitherto stood in the way of a permanent pacification, and 
that the peace Europe was enjoying in 1899 was due less to 
moral rectitude than to material fears. 

The United States Government accepted the invitation con- 

27 "Diplomaticus," "The Vanishing of Universal Peace," The Fortnightly 
Review, LXV (1899), 877. "Diplomaticus" was Mr. Austin, the poet, a whole- 
hearted supporter of Lord Salisbury's policy both at home and abroad, and a 
frequent visitor at Hatfield. He forwarded the Prime Minister's policy by calling 
attention to aspects of it upon which Lord Salisbury could not himself dwell 
publicly. Cecil, IV, 56. 


tained in Count Muravlev's Circular at once, and the American 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to do so in the 
most cordial terms. But this did not mean that American states- 
men took the Rescript seriously. The President was of the 
opinion that the state of war with Spain rendered it imprac- 
tical at that moment to further reduce our armaments, which 
were far below the measure which the principal European 
powers would be willing to adopt in time of peace. 28 

President McKinley, in his Second Annual Message of 
December 5, 1898, referred sympathetically to the Tsar's pro- 
posal in these words : 

. . . The active military force of the United States, as measured 
by our population, territorial area, and taxable wealth, is, and under 
any conceivable prospective conditions must continue to be, in time 
of peace so conspicuously less than that of the armed powers to whom 
the Czar's appeal is especially addressed that the question can have 
for us no practical importance save as marking an auspicious step 
toward the betterment of the conditions of the modern peoples and 
the cultivation of peace and good will among them; but in this view 
it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the benefi- 
cent project. 29 

The United States, in virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, looked 
upon the limitation of armaments as a foreign problem. 30 At 

28 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, No. 139, p. 545. Mr. Day to 
Mr. Hitchcock, September 14, 1898. 

29 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Prepared 
under the Direction of the Joint Committee on Printing of the House and Senate 
(hereafter, Messages and Papers of the Presidents). XIII (New York), 6335-36. 

The Advocate of Peace, LVI (January, 1899), 8, made this reflection upon the 
President's statement: "President McKinley did not grasp the full import of 
what he was writing, or if he did he purposely meant to blind the country. 
England is spending this year on her army in round numbers $100,000,000, 
France $130,600,000, Germany, $120,000,000, Russia $190,000,000. The regular 
army of 100,000 which is now asked for by the President is to cost $167,000,000 
the coming year or about four times as much per soldier as the armies of Europe. 
Add to this $50,000,000 for the navy and $150,000,000 which we are paying for 
war pensions, and we shall have the colossal sum of $367,000,000 to be paid in 
a single year for war purposes." 

30 F. W. Holls, "The Results of the Peace Conference in Their Relation to the 
Monroe Doctrine," The American Monthly Review of Reviews, XX (November, 
1899), 562. 


the time the Government was occupied in the development of 
the fleet and the reorganization of the army. Consequently, it 
could not favor a diminution of military forces or any agree- 
ment that would restrain the "inventive genius" of the American 
people. R. M. Johnson asserted that the United States Govern- 
ment went into the Conference: "Firstly, out of courtesy to the 
Russian Government, secondly, being desirous of improving 
certain features of belligerency, and, perhaps, hoping to advance 
a step in the matter of neutral goods at sea; thirdly, attaching 
no importance to the disarmament proposal and but little to the 
arbitration question." 31 

The Tsar's Eirenicon pleased Italy no more than other coun- 
tries. Italy needed money but not men; she was only interested 
in the reduction of budgets, not of effectives. As the former 
Minister Crispi wrote in May, 1899, Italy wished to keep her 
sword unsheathed "in order to have the right to re-enter in the 
possession of those territories which are still under foreign 
rule." 32 Sir H. Rumbold, the British Ambassador at Vienna, 
reported to the Marquis of Salisbury that Count Nigra, the Ital- 
ian Ambassador, as well as Count Eulenburg, his German 
colleague, considered that a reasonable basis for a conference 
was afforded by the Russian proposal as resumed in these four 

1. That the question of immediate disarmament should remain 

2. That a simple exchange of ideas should take place, in no way 
binding the Powers. 

3. That all political questions, past, present, or future, should be 
excepted from discussion. 

4. That the object of the Conference should be an exchange of 
views on economic and military questions, 33 

With so carefully guarded a program as the above, the Am- 
bassadors thought there could scarcely be any objection to the 

31 R. M. Johnson, "In the Clutch of the Harpy Powers," The North American 
Review, CLXIX .(October, 1899), 449. 

32 Revue generak de droit international public, VI (1899), 665. 

33 British Documents, I, No. 267, p. 219. Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of 
Salisbury, September 14, 1898. 


Conference. Count Nigra, who regarded a reduction of arma- 
ments as quite out of the question, did not conceal his belief 
that there was but little probability of the deliberations leading 
to any practical results. 

The idea of disarmament or even a limitation of armaments 
did not appeal to Balkan statesmen, who demanded justice 
before peace. Such schemes were bound to be repugnant to 
those states with still a program of liberation to realize. The 
opinions of the Serbian Government were crystallized in M. 
Gjajas' very frank words to Mr. Macdonald, the British Minis- 
ter at Belgrade. "The idea of a disarmament/' he said, "does 
not please our people in any way. The Serbian race is split up 
under seven or eight different foreign Governments, and we 
cannot be satisfied so long as this state of things lasts. We live 
in hope of getting something for ourselves out of the general 
conflagration, whenever it takes place." 34 

The Turkish Government expressed the view to a German 
statesman that Prince Nicholas was arming and provoking un- 
rest in Bulgaria and Montenegro, and that disarmament was 
not practical for Turkey. 35 

Speaking from the other side of the world, Count Okuma of 
Japan stated his belief that the Rescript emanated from the 
Tsar's good heart and was the result of the peaceful policy of 
Alexander III. He spoke of the strain placed on the resources 
of Japan by her heavy army and navy expenditure which had 
led to the downfall of the previous Cabinet and might cause the 
fall of that of which he was himself a member. There was reason 
therefore to welcome the proposal. 

If Japan joined in working in the cause of peace, the aspirations 
of the Emperor of Russia would probably be realised, and the solution 
of the Chinese question rendered easy. 

But if the scheme miscarried, no harm would have been done. It 
would simply mean war. In that case what had Japan to fear? But 
personally he was for peace, and so was the Emperor of Japan. If, 

34 Ibid., No. 268, p. 220. Mr. Macdonald to the Marquess of Salisbury, Sep- 
tember 15, 1898. 

. t Note to No, 268. Report of Marschall, September i, 1898. 


therefore, east and west worked in unison, lie did not see why the 
desired result should not be obtained. 36 

Very similar to the scepticism of the leading statesmen in 
Germany, Great Britain, France, America, the Balkans and 
Japan was the attitude of the Tsar's own ministers. Count 
Witte, though conscious of the evils of huge armaments, wrote 
this about the Tsar and the Conference: 

I congratulated him upon having taken the initiative in the great 
and noble task of bringing about universal peace, but I pointed out 
that the Conference was not likely to have any practical results. The 
sacred truths of the Christian faith were enounced by the Son of 
God some two thousand years ago, and yet most of the people are 
still indifferent to these precepts. Likewise many centuries will pass 
before the idea of peaceful settlement of international conflict will be 
carried into practice. Five years later we ourselves showed that our 
talk about disarmament and peace was but empty verbiage. 37 

When Muraviev wrote to his cousin, Izvolski, then Minister in 
Munich, to ask him how the grandiose idea was received by the 
Bavarians, the frank answer he received was that the summons 
had been "warmly acclaimed only by hysterial women, Jews, 
and Socialists." 38 Herbert H. D. Pierce, the American Charg6 
d'Affaires ad interim, in St. Petersburg, reported that little value 
was expected to result from the Conference, that every diplo- 
matic officer with whom he had talked seemed to regard the 
proposition with that technical scepticism which great measures 
of reform usually encounter. The consensus among the mem- 
bers of the Russian Diplomatic Corps appeared to be that the 
whole proposal was "visionary and Utopian, if not partaking of 
Quixotism. 5 ' 39 

36 British Documents, I, No. 270, p. 222. Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of 
Salisbury, Tokyo, November i, 1898. 

37 Count Witte, Memoirs, p. 97. 

38 E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, p. 254. 

39 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, No. 179, p. 547. Mr. Pierce 
to Mr. Day, St. Petersburg, November 9, 1898, 

Part HI 



IT WILL be recalled that the Peace Societies, the British and 
Foreign Arbitration Association, the journalist, William T. 
Stead, and a few resolute members of the Russian Government 
used their influence in favor of the proposed Conference rather 
than a conference of ambassadors. One of the objectives of 
Stead's journey had been to ascertain the direction the Tsar 
and his ministers intended to give to the Conference. The 
British, in particular, emphasized the importance of a definite 
program. In referring to the Emperor's Rescript, Lord Rose- 
bery said that regarding its main issue, disarmament, it was 
necessary to dwell entirely on generalities because in such a 
proposal everything depended upon the plan and the practical 
means suggested to the Conference when it should meet, "for 
without a practical plan he feared the proposal might not lead 
to any tangible results." Lord Salisbury concluded his dispatch 
in answer to the Rescript by requesting some indication of the 
special points to which the attention of the Conference was to 
be directed. 

Count Muraviev on January n, 1899 (December 30, 1898, 
Old Style) replied, suggesting that it would be possible to pro- 
ceed forthwith to a preliminary exchange of ideas between the 
powers with the object: 

(a) Of seeking without delay means for putting a limit to the 
progressive increase of military and naval armaments, a question the 
solution of which becomes evidently more and more urgent in view 
of the fresh extension given to these armaments; and 

(b) Of preparing the way for a discussion of the questions relating 
to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific means 
at the disposal of international diplomacy. 



"In the event of the Powers considering the present moment 
favourable for the meeting of a Conference on these bases/' the 
Circular read, "it would certainly be useful for the Cabinets to 
come to an understanding on the subjects of the programme of 
their labours." 

The subjects to be submitted for international discussion at 
the Conference could, in general terms, be summarized as 

1. An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present 
effective of the armed military and naval forces and at the same time 
not to increase the Budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary 
examination of the means by which a reduction might even be effected 
in future in the forces and Budgets above mentioned. 

2. To prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kinds 
of firearms whatever and of new explosives, or any powder more 
powerful than those now in use either for rifles or cannon. 

3. To restrict the use in military warfare of the formidable 
explosives already existing, and to prohibit the throwing of pro- 
jectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by any similar 

4. To prohibit the use in naval warfare of submarine torpedo- 
boats or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction, to give an 
understanding not to construct vessels with rams in the future. 

5. To apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva Con- 
vention of 1864 on the basis of the Additional Articles of 1868. 

6. To neutralize ships and boats employed saving those overboard 
during or after an engagement. 

7. To revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs 
of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels which has 
remained unratified to the present time. 

8. To accept in principle the employment of the good offices, of 
mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves 
thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between 
nations; and to come to an understanding with respect to the mode 
of applying these good offices, and to establish a uniform practice 
in using them. 1 

1 Parliamentary Papers, CX, Miscellaneous, 1898, pp. 2-4 (101/102), French 
official text and translation; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, inclos- 
ure in No. 230, pp. 551-53, Mr. Hitchcock to Mr. Hay. 


Universal peace was no longer spoken of; the program was 
a new scheme, aiming rather at the regulation of armaments 
and war than at their abolition. But in this revised form the 
Russian proposal was hardly more acceptable. Lord Salisbury, 
in a confidential conversation with Count von Hatzfeldt, the 
German Ambassador in London, is reported to have "expressed 
himself very sceptically" with reference to Count Muraviev's 
program. He described the whole scheme as "pas serieux" It 
would be impossible, he thought, even if agreement could be 
reached on military and naval reductions, to secure the honor- 
able fulfillment by the individual powers of the arrangements 
arrived at. Salisbury was willing that his government should 
take part in the Conference; they would readily recognize the 
peaceable intentions of the Tsar but in the discussions would 
commit themselves to nothing which might limit the further 
development and the fighting efficiency of the British fleet or 
compel England to submit important English interests to the 
decision of third parties. 2 

It appeared to Lord Salisbury that the importance attached 
to the Russian proposal concerning the good offices of mediation 
and facultative arbitration had been much exaggerated. The 
acceptance in principal of mediation and facultative arbitration 
in cases lending themselves thereto would add nothing to the 
public law and established practice of nations. The principle 
of mediation in international quarrels had already been accepted 
by the great powers in the protocol of the April 14, 1856, at- 
tached to the Treaty of Paris. Not only was "facultative arbi- 
tration in cases lending themselves thereto" firmly established 
in the foreign relations of all civilized states, but some progress 
had been made with compulsory arbitration in cases of inter- 
national dispute. Since 1890 Great Britain had signed ten 
arbitration treaties for the settlement of various disputes with 
Germany, France, the United States, Colombia, the Nether- 

2 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4237, p. 170, Count von Hatzfeldt to Prince von 
Hohenlohe, London, January 26, 1899. 


lands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Venezuela, Russia and Belgium. 
She had also signed with the United States a Treaty of General 
Arbitration which had, however, failed to secure ratification by 
the Senate. General arbitration treaties already existed between 
Hungary and Portugal, the Congo and Switzerland, Italy and 
Argentina, and in the Pan-American Treaty of 1890, which 
established permanent arbitration between seventeen Repub- 
lics. The permanent treaty between Italy and Argentina, signed 
i n July, 1898, marked an advanced epoch in arbitration by 
making all disputes, including questions of "national honour," 
arbitral. It scarcely seemed necessary for the Conference to 
devote any portion of its valuable time to persuading the 
nations merely to accept the principle of "mediation and faculta- 
tive arbitration." 3 

As for "the mode of applying" arbitration and the "establish- 
ment of a uniform practice" in using its good offices, this seemed 
to the British Prime Minister to be rather an insignificant ques- 
tion of procedure. The Conference would be much better occu- 
pied in drawing up a permanent arbitration treaty based on a 
consolidation of cases already decided and on the principles 
embodied in the treaties submitting such cases to arbitration. 
Certain classes of disputes had already been admitted to be 
arbitrable by nearly all the great powers. In his opinion there 
were two such categories. In a memorandum on arbitration 
dated March 20, 1890, he writes: 

If the question to be decided is a disputed issue of fact, reference 
to arbitration is not very difficult to arrange, and it is often the most 
expedient mode of terminating a discussion. It is easy to state the 
question of fact on which the difference of opinion has arisen and not 
difficult to find an arbitrator of sufficient capacity and impartiality 
to give a decision in which both parties may with confidence acquiesce. 
Again, if there is an admitted code, rule or system of law, the terms 
of which are well ascertained and the validity of which is fully 
accepted by both parties, great advantage may result from seeking an 

3 "Diplomaticus," op. dt., 878-79. 


arbitrator to ascertain the bearing of such a law upon the facts of 
the disputed case. 4 

Lord Salisbury could see no reason why this admission should 
not be embodied in a permanent treaty and signed by all the 
powers who had already adopted it "facultatively." Were this 
done, a tribunal to try such cases might be immediately estab- 
lished, and the scope of the treaty could be enlarged as further 
bilateral treaties extended the principle of arbitration. In this 
progressive way something could be effected towards securing 
a large and established authority for arbitration in international 
politics. But even then the vital question of its decrees would 
remain unsolved. 5 

Lord Salisbury was aware that arbitration has its limitations, 
that it cannot be used for the settlement of all controversies. 6 
In cases where facts are not the main object in dispute and 
where there is no applicable law which both parties would be 
willing to accept, he thought it impossible to find any acceptable 
principle or doctrine of international jurisprudence that would 
guide an arbitrator in deciding the issue. "He would have no 
rule by which his decision could be framed except that of 
general political expediency as it might present itself to his 
mind. It is evident that for such a task as this an arbitrator of 
sufficient impartiality would be exceedingly difficult to find." 7 

The Marquis of Salisbury was just as sceptical in regard to 
the remaining clauses of the second Muraviev Circular, con- 
templating an arrest of armaments in men, weapons and cost, 
and a reconsideration of the non-ratified supplementary Con- 
vention of Geneva of 1868 and of the rules of war, also unrati- 
fied, known as the Declaration of Brussels. He did not see how 
such an arrest could be effected. Where was the line to be 
drawn? There was no uniformity in the strength and equip- 

4 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, op. tit., p, 267. 

5 "Diplomaticus," op. tit,, p. 879. 

6 Supra, Chapter III, pp. 79-84. 

7 Cecil, op, tit., 267-68. 


ment of the European armies and navies, and he was certain 
that the powers which had the advantage would not abandon 
it any more than the powers which had temporarily fallen into 
arrears would abide by their inferiority. An arrest of budgets 
was even more complicated and would meet with objections 
from Great Britain because, if Germany were to come to terms 
with France while the convention for the arrest of armament 
budgets were in force, the result would be to enable France 
to allocate a large portion of her military budget to her Navy 
and Russia to reduce her naval budget and increase her 
military expenditure on the Indian frontier while British hands 
would be completely tied. 8 

Nor did the English statesman think it likely that the at- 
tempt to revive the supplementary Convention of Geneva and 
the Declaration of Brussels would meet with more success. 
Both had been strongly opposed at the time for reasons which 
had lost none of their force. The Declaration had tended to 
give an advantage to the greater military states and to deprive 
an invaded country of the full use of its means of resistance. 
The smaller states had opposed it, and Great Britain was par- 
ticularly emphatic in her criticism. The objections raised by 
Great Britain against the supplementary Convention of Geneva 
were still as cogent as they had been thirty years before. 9 

Even the Russian officials did not regard the points enumer- 
ated as propositions to which they were definitely committed, 
"as they might possibly find themselves unable to support 
some of them in Conference." M. de Staal, the Russian Am- 
bassador, who was to serve as President of the august meeting, 
hoped that it would be possible to get round the armament 
question and to suggest a few alterations in international law 
and the Statutes of the Red Cross. 10 He told Von Billow that 
lie "knew well that most of the expectations which were bound 

8 "Diplomaticus," op. cit., p. 880. 
Loc. cit. 

10 Die Grosse Polttik, XV, No. 4250, p. 182. Count Miinster to the Foreign 
Office, April 4, 1899. 


up with the Conference could not be realized." But as the dean 
of Russian diplomacy (he was seventy-six years old) he had 
to see that the Conference did not result in "a fiasco for his 
sovereign and his sovereign's country and house. C I1 s'agit pour 
la Russie d'une question de prestige et d'honneur/ " n 

We therefore need not be surprised to find the British Prime 
Minister at the opening of Parliament in 1899 casting this rather 
gloomy reflection on the projected peace conference: 

. . . No one can doubt the purity and grandeur of the motives 
which must have animated the Emperor in giving this invitation, and 
every one must heartily wish that the anticipation will be realised; 
but further than that I do not think it safe to go. The constant in- 
crease in armaments which is taking place on all sides, at the very 
time when we are speaking of and prophesying peace, is not en- 
couraging to the ideal dreams in which, perhaps, the Tsar has in- 
dulged, and they warn us to prepare for a possible issue less gratifying 
than that on which he has most naturally and laudably allowed his 
mind to dwell. There are many difficulties to be surmounted before 
any such general benefits can be achieved as that which he has 
sketched out. I shall myself be satisfied if the results of this con- 
ference and of these negotiations are capable of fulfilling a somewhat 
humbler aim. If, by extending the use of the principle of arbitration, 
we are able to diminish the number of causes by which war can be 
induced, and if, by humane and beneficent legislation, we can diminish 
the horrors of that war, when it is waged, we shall, I think, have done 
for our generation a service of which the whole value cannot be 
appreciated at once, but to which the future inhabitants of the earth 
will look back with gratitude. And if, as I hope, in that more distant 
time it is developed to a greater and more perfect end, they will have 
cause to bless the name of the sovereign whose imagination and whose 
power and courage have resulted in such a measure. 12 

From this speech it appears that Lord Salisbury had little 
hope that the Conference would be able to restrict the increase 
in armaments. The fact is that, though the British were anx- 
ious to see the use of the principle of arbitration extended, they 

11 Ibid., No. 4257, pp. 193-94. Memorandum of the Foreign Secretary, 
Bernhard von Billow. 

of Reviews, XIX (1899), 209. 


had no intention of limiting their means of defense and offense; 
for, on May 16, 1899, before the Conference met on May 18, 
the Admiralty wrote a letter to the Foreign Office containing 
the following: 

As regards the proposals to limit the Naval forces their Lordships 
are of opinion that it will be found to be quite impracticable to come 
to any agreement as to the meaning of the term "effectifs actuels," 
or to ensure that the terms of any agreement arrived at would be 
carried out. ... 

With reference to the proposal to restrict improvements in weap- 
ons . . . any such restrictions would favor the interests of savage 
nations, and be against those of the highly civilized. It would be a 
retrograde step. . . . 

It is further observed that the proposal to limit the use of new 
explosives is believed to be impracticable unless the several Powers 
are prepared to make known to the Conference the nature and com- 
position of those which they now use and which are at present secret. 
Their Lordships believe that none of the Great Powers would be 
prepared to do this. 

As to the various proposals to regulate the conduct of war . . . 
their Lordships are averse to binding this country in this manner, as 
such an arrangement would be almost certain to lead to mutual 
recriminations. 13 

A copy of this communication was sent to Sir Julian Paunce- 
fote, the British delegate at The Hague on the opening day of 
the Conference. A similar despatch came from the War Office, 
summarizing the views of that body on the subject of the 
Russian Circular: 

Article i. It is not desirable that any undertaking should be given 
restricting the numbers and the cost of Her Majesty's military forces. 

Articles 2 and 3. It is not desirable to agree to any restrictions 
upon the employment of further developments in destructive agencies, 
whether in small arms, cannon, or explosives, or the methods of em- 
ploying them. 

13 British Documents, I, No. 274, pp. 224-25. Admiralty to the Foreign Office, 
May 1 6, 1899, 


Article 7. It is not desirable to assent to an international code 
on the laws and customs of war; but an undertaking may be given 
that Her Majesty's Government will consider the question of issuing 
instructions on these subjects for the general guidance of British 
forces. 14 

The instructions issued by the Marquis of Salisbury to 
Sir Julian Pauncefote did not, however, contain any stipula- 
tions as to the attitude the British delegates were to take to- 
wards the question of the limitation of armaments. The 
Marquis merely stated that Her Majesty's Government 
"agreed to the general definition of the objects of the Con- 
ference given in Count MouraviefPs note, namely, the diminu- 
tion of armaments by land and sea, and the prevention of armed 
conflicts by pacific diplomatic procedure." He went on to say 
that with regard to the eight points enumerated as proper 
subjects for discussion by the Conference, the British Govern- 
ment "thought it best to abstain from expressing any definite 
opinion beyond repeating their earnest desire to promote, by 
all possible means, the principle of recourse to mediation and 
arbitration for the prevention of war which formed the eighth 
and last point of Count MouraviefPs programme." 15 But, as 
stated above, Sir J. Pauncefote was informed of the opinions of 
the Admiralty and the War Office. 

Across the Atlantic, in a country whose armaments, compared 
with those of European countries, had been only meager, ex- 
plicit instructions were given to representatives which made 
very plain that the United States would not favor a diminution 
of military forces or any agreement that would restrain the 
"inventive genius" of her people. Secretary Hay, in his 
memorandum to the American delegates, was determined to 
leave the path opeh for any increase in armaments that his 
country might desire to make in future. Thus he wrote: 

14 Ibid., No. 276, p. 226. War Office to Foreign Office, May 17, 1899. 
13 Ibid., No. 275, p. 225. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir J. Pauncefote, 
Foreign Office, May 16, 1899. 


. . . The First article, relating to the non-augmentation and future 
reduction of effective land and sea forces, is, at present, so inapplicable 
to the United States that is deemed advisable for the delegates 
to leave the initiative upon this subject to the representatives of those 
Powers to whom it may properly belong. In comparison with the 
effective forces, both military and naval, of other nations, those of 
the United States are at present so far below the normal quota 
that the question of limitation could not be profitably discussed. 

The second, third, and fourth articles, relating to the non-employ- 
ment of firearms, explosives, and other destructive agents, the re- 
stricted use of existing instruments of destruction and the prohibition 
of certain contrivances employed in naval warfare, seem lacking in 
practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would prob- 
ably prove provocative of divergence rather than of unanimity of 
view. But it is doubtful if wars are to be diminished by rendering 
them less destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the 
periods of peace have been longer protracted as the cost and de- 
structiveness of war have increased. The expediency of restraining 
the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means 
of defence is by no means clear, and considering the temptations to 
which men and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is 
doubtful if an international agreement to this end would prove effec- 
tive. The dissent of a single powerful nation might render it alto- 
gether nugatory. The delegates are, therefore, enjoined not to give 
the weight of their influence to the promotion of projects the realiza- 
tion of which is so uncertain. 

The fifth, sixth, and seventh articles, aiming in the interest of 
humanity to succour those who by the chance of battle have been 
rendered helpless, thus losing the character of effective combatants 
or to alleviate their sufferings, or to ensure the safety of those whose 
mission is purely one of peace and beneficence, may well awake the 
cordial interest of the delegates, and practical propositions based 
upon them should receive their earnest support. 

The eighth article, which proposes the wider extension of good 
offices, mediation and arbitration, seems likely to open the most 
fruitful field for discussion and further action. . . . 16 

16 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, pp. 511-12, Mr. Hay to Hon. 
Andrew D. White, Hon. Seth Low, Hon. Stanford Nevel, Captain Alfred T. 
Mahan, U. S. Navy, 'Captain William Crozier, U. S. Navy, Delegates on the part 
of the United States; April 18, 1899; also James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace 
Conferences, American Instructions and Reports, pp. 6-9. 


From these instructions we can see that the Department of 
State of the United States was sceptical over the first four 
articles of the Muraviev Circular but was in sympathy with the 
proposal to extend the use of mediation and arbitration. 

The German delegates likewise were instructed "to be care- 
ful not to decide upon anything that would fetter the freedom 
of movement of German policy" but were to aim at "obtaining 
some harmless agreement which would prevent the Tsar's ef- 
forts being a complete failure. 53 "They were to keep on close 
terms with the Russian representatives, and support their meas- 
ures as far as possible, but when necessary, to add reservations 
and emendations of the text so as to rob it of any unfavorable 
tendencies. Otherwise they were to keep in the background and 
leave others to oppose impossible demands, so that Germany 
could not be reproached for having hindered by her conduct a 
great humanitarian work." 17 

The attitude of France, Russia's ally, towards the points 
in the Muraviev Circular did not differ greatly from that of 
other countries. She was not enthusiastic, for, as a power dis- 
satisfied with the status quo, she would not accept a limitation 
of armaments based upon the relative strength of existing 
armies. Even the moderate Temps declared that France could 
not endorse the Tsar's aims "until her existence had been safe- 
guarded and the reparation of the past and the redressment of 
the future had been assured." 18 

In order to avoid the charge of being responsible for the 
failure of the Conference, France agreed to participate, but 
she did so on the understanding that Alsace-Lorraine should 
not be mentioned. 19 Though she was represented by M. Leon 
Bourgeois, one of the founders of the Inter-Parliamentary 

17 Erich Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege (Berlin, 1925), pp. 

18 Le Temps, August 30, 1898. 

10 Ibid., August 31 and September 3, 1898; also M. E, Carroll, French Public 
Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914, p. 184. 


Union and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a champion of 
peace, we know from M. Delcasse's conversation with Count 
Minister 20 that his country would not agree to proposals of 
disarmament but might make a concession about arbitration. 21 
Count Nigra ? representing Italy, regarded the reduction of 
armaments as quite out of the question; and the very utmost 
that he hoped might be obtained would be the possible diminu- 
tion of the horrors of warfare through an agreement to pro- 
hibit some of the more destructive engines of war. 22 At The 
Hague the Italian Naval Delegate informed Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles A. Court, British Military Attache, that his instruc- 
tions were to agree to nothing in the shape or guise of a limita- 
tion of armaments. The Austrian delegate was instructed to 
assume a similar attitude, while Japan would only consider 
limiting her navy when it reached the standard of the Great 
Naval Powers. 23 Thus it is evident that no country intended 
to consider seriously the "grave problem' 7 of armaments. 

The Conference assembled at The Hague on May 18, 1899, 
and closed on July 29. Twenty-six of the fifty-nine sovereign 
governments of the world were represented by one hundred 
members. 24 Each power was permitted to send as many dele- 
gates as it wished, but was entitled to only one vote. Twenty 
of the states were European; four were Asiatic China, Japan, 
Persia and Siam; and two were American, the United States 

20 German Ambassador in Paris, Delegate to the First Hague Conference, 

21 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4253, p. 186, Count Minister to Prince von 
Hohenlohe, April 21, 1899. 

22 British Documents, I, No. 272, p. 223. Mr. Milbanke to the Marquess of 
Salisbury, Vienna, April 27, 1899. 

23 Ibid., I, No. 282, p, 230. Note on the Limitation of Armaments sent by 
Sir J, Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury, July 31, 1899. 

24 For a list of the delegates with their official positions and committee assign- 
ments arranged alphabetically according to the names of the countries in the 
French language, see F. W, Holls, The Peace Conference at The Hague and Its 
Bearings on International Law and Policy, Macmillan (New York, 1900), pp, 


and Mexico. Armed to the teeth with the most destructive ap- 
pliances that modern science up to the time had invented, the 
nations sent their representatives to The House in The Wood, 
which the Queen of Holland had placed at their disposal. The 
large Orange Hall, with its magnificent paintings by Rubens, 
seemed specially made for the purpose. "Ultimus ante omnes 
de parta pace triumphus" is the motto inscribed on the scroll 
in the Hall. Beneath the scroll the Angel of Peace confers her 
benediction upon the warrior Prince whose victories secured 
the Peace of Minister. Pallas Athene and Hercules personifying 
WISDOM and STRENGTH respectively are also depicted. 
Truly, STRENGTH was present on May 18, 1899, for all the 
cannon of the world, with a few negligible exceptions, could 
only speak by leave of the governments represented in The 
House in The Wood. But was the daughter of Zeus, WISDOM, 
equally in evidence? 

The Conference was presided over by M. de Staal, the Rus- 
sian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, and for many years 
a persona gratissima with English statesmen of both parties. 
He had as his assistant Professor de Martens of St. Petersburg, 
a learned man, a student of history and jurisprudence, and the 
author of several important books bearing on the evolution of 
international law. For several years he had been universally 
recognized as a "kind of unofficial Chief Justice of Christen- 
dom." It was his high character and ability in conjunction with 
those of one or two of his associates that saved the prestige of 
the Russian Foreign Office at The Hague. 

The work of the Conference was laid out with reference 
to the points stated in the Muraviev Circular of December 30, 
1898, and divided among three great committees. The first 
dealt with the limitation of armaments and war budgets. The 
second was concerned with the extension of the Geneva Red 
Cross rules of 1864 and 1868 to maritime warfare and the re- 
vision of the Brussels Declaration of 1874. The third consid- 
ered mediation, arbitration and other methods of preventing 


armed conflicts. It is, however, the attempt to secure an inter- 
national accord for the limitation of armaments, both in num- 
bers and in equipment, that is of primary interest in this study. 

Discussion of the subject was opened in the First Com- 
mittee on June 23 by M. Beernaert of Belgium, the President 
of the Committee. M. de Staal took the occasion to express 
the hope that on the question under consideration the desires 
of anxious populations should not be balked. Disarmament was 
not to be considered. "What we are hoping for," he declared 
"is to attain a limitation a halt in the ascending course of 
armaments and expenses. We propose this with the conviction 
that if such an agreement is established, progress in other direc- 
tions will be made, slowly perhaps, but surely. . . . For the 
moment we aspire to the attainment of stability for a fixed 
limitation of the number of effectives and military budgets." 25 

After an eloquent address by General Den Beer Poortugael 
of Holland, Colonel Gilinsky of Russia presented the text of the 
two proposals submitted by the Imperial Government, which 
was as follows: 

I. As to Armies: 

1. An international agreement for the term of five years, stipu- 
lating for the nonaugmentation of the present number of 
troops kept in time of peace. 

2. The determination, in case of such an agreement, if it is 
possible, of the number of troops to be kept in time of peace 
by all of the Powers, not including Colonial troops. 

3. The maintenance, for the term of five years, of the amount 
of the miiltary budgets in force at the present time. 

II. As regards Navies: 

i. The acceptance in principle of fixing for a term of three years 
the amount of the naval budget, and an agreement not to 
increase the total amount for this triennial period, and the 
obligation to publish during the period, in advance: 

(a) The total tonnage of men-of-war which it is proposed 
to construct, without giving in detail the types of ships. 

(b) The number of officers and crews in the navy, 
25 Frederick W. Holls, op. dt., pp. 71-72. 


(c) The expenses of coast fortifications, including fortresses, 
docks, arsenals, etc. 26 

Colonel Gilinsky explained that the Russian proposals were 
not in themselves novel, since they simply extended over the 
entire world principles which had been accepted in many 
countries. He pointed out that in Germany the strength of the 
army was fixed every seven years; in Russia the military budget 
was settled for a term of five years. The period might be short- 
ened if the Conference so decided. As for disarmament, he re- 
peated that it was neither practical nor desirable to discuss that 
question until an agreement had been reached regarding a 
limitation of existing armaments. 27 

At the meeting of the First Committee, on June 25, general 
discussion was opened. M. de Staal reminded the delegates 
that armed peace at the time was causing more considerable 
expense than the most burdensome wars of modern times. 

A member of the German delegation, Colonel von Schwarz- 
hoff, struck the opposite note. In a speech of great force and 
ability he pronounced the following: 

I do not believe that among my honoured colleagues there is a single 
one ready to admit that his sovereign, his Government, is engaged 
in working for the inevitable ruin, the slow but sure annihilation of 
his country. I have no mandate to speak for my honoured colleagues, 
but so far as Germany is concerned, I can reassure her friends com- 
pletely and dissipate all benevolent anxiety regarding her. The 
German people are not crushed beneath the weight of expenditures 
and taxes; they are not hanging on the edge of the precipice; they 
are not hastening towards exhaustion and ruin. Quite the contrary; 
public and private wealth is increasing, the general welfare, and 
standard of life, are rising from year to year. 

As for compulsory military service, which is intimately associated 
with these questions, the German does not regard it as a heavy 
burden, but as a sacred and patriotic duty, to the performance of 
which he owes his existence, Ms prosperity, his future. 28 

ae Ibid,, pp. 72-73. 
27 Ibid., pp. 73-74- 

38 J. JB. Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, Conference 
of iSpp (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920), pp. 308-10. 


In continuing. Colonel Schwarzhoff explained that the question 
of effectives could not be regarded by itself alone, disconnected 
from a number of other questions to which it is quite sub- 
ordinate. He believed that it would be very difficult to sub- 
stitute an international convention for so eminently national 
a task. There would also be technical obstacles. For instance: 

In Germany the number of effectives is fixed by an agreement be- 
tween the Government and the Reichstag, and in order not to repeat 
every year the same debates, the number was fixed for seven and 
later for five years. ... It is precisely our "quinquennium" which 
prevents us from making the proposed agreement. 

There are two reasons against it: First, the international period 
of five years would not synchronise with the national period of five 
years, and this would be a serious inconvenience. 

Furthermore, the military law which is to-day in force does not 
fix a special number of effectives, but on the contrary it provides for 
a continuous increase up to 1902 or 1903, in which year the re- 
organization begun this year will be finished. Until then, it would be 
impossible for us to maintain even for two consecutive years the same 
number of effectives. 29 

Colonel Schwarzhoff 7 s speech was conclusive evidence that 
Germany was going to vote against the limitation motion. Colo- 
nel Gilinsky, however, replied to the Colonel's arguments, stat- 
ing that he considered it possible to meet the objections based 
upon the present laws of Germany. 

A representative of Holland, Jonkheer van Karnebeek, 
called particular attention to the fact that the forces of an- 
archy and unrest would be the only ones to profit directly by 
the failure of the Conference to agree on some limitation of the 
increase of armaments. Doctor Stancioff of Bulgaria, voicing 
the sentiment of the lesser states, declared that armed peace 
was ruinous, especially for small countries whose needs were 
enormous and who had everything to* gain by using their re- 
sources for the development of industry, of agriculture and the 
requisites of general progress. 80 The delegates of the great 

c. at. 


powers remained silent, and Colonel Schwarzhoff appeared 
desirous to press the question to an immediate vote. The Presi- 
dent, however, at the suggestion of Sir J. Pauncefote, proposed 
that the naval as well as the military projects of Russia should 
be referred to two small Committees of naval and military 
experts. Schwarzhoff was named chairman of the military 
committee. 31 

At the next meeting of the First Committee, June 30, the 
military sub-committee made its report a very laconic report 
indeed to the effect that: 

The members of the committee, to whom was referred the proposi- 
tion of Colonel Gilinsky, regarding the first point in the Circular 
of Count Mouravieff, after two meetings, report, that with the excep- 
tion of Colonel Gilinsky they are unanimously of the opinion, first, 
that it would be very difficult to fix, even for a period of five years, 
the number of effectives, without regulating at the same time other 
elements of national defence; second, that it would be no less difficult 
to regulate by international agreement the elements of this defence, 
organized in every country upon a different principle. In consequence, 
the committee regrets not being able to approve the proposition made 
in the name of the Russian Government. A majority of its members 
believe that a more profound study of the question by the Govern- 
ments themselves would be desirable. 32 

Following the presentation of this report, General Zuccari 
of Italy declared that the number of peace effectives of the 
Italian army was fixed by organic laws which Ms government 
had no intentions of changing and that it must therefore reserve 
to itself complete liberty of action with regard to any inter- 
national agreement on the subject. 

Baron de Bildt, first delegate of Norway and Sweden, ex- 
plained that the great number of units of the Swedish Army 
rested on a system two centuries old; thus his country could 

31 In Baroness Bertha von Suttner's words, it was as if cobblers had been 
chosen to "deliberate on how men could give up wearing footgear." 

32 Frederick W. Holls, op. cit., p. 83; also J. B. Scott, op. tit., p. 135. A sim- 
ilar report was made by the naval sub-committee. 


not engage to maintain such an organization, even for five 
years. He regretted that he was not able to support the proposal 
made by Colonel Gilinsky. M. Bille of Denmark stated that 
the views of Baron Bildt were in complete harmony with those 
of the Danish Government. 33 

Then M. Leon Bourgeois, representing France, came for- 
ward with a speech which, though it did not save or aim to 
save the Russian proposal from burial, at least assured a resur- 
rection. He pointed the way to a more elevated method of 
handling the question "presented to the civilised world by the 
generous initiative of the Emperor of Russia. 5 ' 

The French statesman, too, belonged to a country which 
supported readily all personal and financial obligations im- 
posed by national defense upon its citizens, but he recognized 
that if the considerable resources devoted to military organiza- 
tion were in part put to the service of pacific and productive 
activities, the total prosperity of each nation could not but 
increase at a much more rapid pace. M. Bourgeois reminded 
his colleagues that they had no right to consider only how their 
own particular country bore the burden of armed peace. "Our 
task is a higher one: We are called upon to examine the situa- 
tion of the nations as a whole." 

Although it was a painful necessity to be obliged to give 
up a positive and immediate understanding on this matter, he 
thought the Conference should try to prove to public opinion 
that it had at least sincerely examined the problem placed be- 
fore it. "We shall have not labored in vain if, by formulating 
general terms, we indicate the purpose toward which we 
unanimously desire, as I hope, to see the civilised peoples as a 
whole march." 34 

After this speech, which was hailed with rounds of applause, 
the President requested M. Bourgeois to frame in writing the 
wish which he had so eloquently expressed. Whereupon the 
French delegate proposed the following wording: 

33 J. B. Scott, op. cit., p. 317. 34 Ibid., pp. 317-18. 


The Commission is of opinion that the restriction of military 
charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is ex- 
tremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare 
of mankind. 35 

As no delegate asked the floor in regard to the proposition of 
M. Bourgeois, the President declared it to be adopted. 

The second sub-committee, to which the naval propositions 
had been referred, made a report similar to that of the first 
sub-committee, so far as the limitation of naval budgets was 
concerned; and the full Committee resolved that the resolution 
presented by M. Bourgeois applied equally to both Russian 

Subsequently, the entire Conference unanimously adopted the 
resolution proposed by the First Committee on the above mo- 
tion and formulated the following: 

The Conference expresses the wish that the Governments, taking 
into consideration the proposals made at the Conference may examine 
the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces 
by land and sea, and of war budgets. 36 

Thus the entire subject was relegated to the further study 
of the various governments; but before the question was com- 
pletely disposed of, Captain Mahan, on behalf of the United 
States delegation, made it obvious that little encouragement 
for the reduction or limitation of armaments should be expected 
from his country. His declaration was not meant to indicate 
mere indifference to a difficult problem, because it did not 
affect the United States immediately, but it expressed a "de- 
termination to refrain from enunciating opinions upon matters 
into which, as concerning Europe alone, the United States 
has no claim to enter. . . ." He declared that: 

The military and naval armaments of the United States are at present 

35 Ibid., p. 319 ; Holls, op, cit,, p. 90. 

36 J. B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, American Instructions and 
Reports (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1916), 
P. 75. 


so small, relatively to the extent of territory and to the number of 
the population, as well as in comparison with those of other nations, 
that their size can entail no additional burden of expense upon the 
latter, nor can even form a subject for profitable mutual discussion. 37 

Moreover, the proposition that the "Contracting Powers agree 
to abstain from the use of projectiles, the object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases/' fared little 
better. For two powerful countries withheld their assent: the 
United States, not wishing to restrain the inventive genius 
of her people, refused to accept it; and Great Britain wisely 
conditioned her vote upon unanimity. 

The Conference in another direction produced a positive 
result; namely, the creation of a "panel 53 of judges called the 
Hague Court. Yet here, "not a single Power was willing to 
bind itself to a hard and fast rule to submit all questions to 
arbitration/' not even Great Britain and the United States, the 
nations who had used it most successfully in the past and who 
appeared to be anxious to see its use extended. Lord Salisbury 
explained to Count Hatzfeldt 38 that the permanent court should 
only be "entrusted with disputes of minor importance, par- 
ticularly in cases dealing with claims for money compensation, 
and not with decisions on more important and political ques- 
tions." For example, he considered it absolutely out of the 
question that the Court of Arbitration should ever have to 
intervene in the question of Egypt or Alsace. Furthermore, an 
appeal to it was not to be obligatory but optional. 89 

Germany disapproved, perhaps more strongly than any 
other nation, of Sir J. Pauncefote's proposal for the formation 
of a permanent international tribunal and for making the ap- 
peal to it in certain cases compulsory. At Holstein's instigation 
her delegates were instructed to hold aloof from this attempt, 

37 J. ,B. Scott, The Proceedings of the Hagtte Peace Conference^ The Confer* 
ence of iSop, p. 327. 

38 German Ambassador in London. 

39 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No, 4306, pp. 279-80. Count Hatzfeldt to the 
Foreign Office, London, June 14, 1899* 


even though the other states decided in its favor. But the head 
of the German delegation, Count Minister, reports Andrew D. 
White, the American delegate, did not say that he would oppose 
a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, "but he insisted 
that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany 
is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she 
can mobilize her army in ten days; and that neither France, 
Russia, nor any other power can do this. Arbitration, he said, 
would simply give rival powers time to put themselves in readi- 
ness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Ger- 
many." 40 

The German delegate was not the only representative who 
raised objections to arbitration on military grounds. Sir John 
Fisher, English Naval Delegate and Admiral in the British 
Navy, used the same argument about the sea that Count 
Minister had used regarding the land. "He said that the navy 
of Great Britain was and would remain in a state of complete 
preparation for war; that a vast deal depended on prompt 
action by the navy; and that the truce afforded by arbitration 
proceedings would give other powers time, which they would 
otherwise not have, to put themselves into complete readiness. 
He seemed uncertaiu whether it was best for Great Britain, 
under these circumstances, to support a thoroughgoing plan of 
arbitration; but on the whole seemed inclined to try it to some 
extent." Mr. White added, "Clearly what Great Britain wants 
is a permanent system of arbitration with the United States; 
but she does not care much, I think, for such a provision as re- 
gards other powers." 41 

Finally, rather than break up the Conference and leave 
the blame for the collapse entirely upon Germany, the German 
representative consented to the establishment of a permanent 
court of arbitration on the stipulation that it lay with the 

40 Andrew D. White, Autobiography (D. Appkton-Century, London, 1905) , 
II, 265. 

41 A. D. White, of. cto,> II, a68. 


individual states whether or not they would have recourse to i 
in any case of dispute. Most of the other states wished to g< 
a little further but yielded in order to make the resolutior 
unanimous. "A net full of large holes, but one in which om 
can get entangled nevertheless" was how Count Miinster de- 
scribed the organization of the tribunal. 42 The Kaiser, who ai 
heart considered the whole Conference a farce, when he con- 
sented to the establishment of the Court, announced his inten- 
tions in the following statement: "To prevent the disgrace oJ 
the Tsar in the face of Europe I vote for this nonsense. But ir 
my actions, now and hereafter, I shall trust and invoke onlj 
God and my sharp sword. 3 ' 43 

In spite of the adoption of plans for mediation and arbitra- 
tion, the extension of the Geneva rules, and the more careful 
definition of the laws of war, the First Hague Conference die 
very little towards solving the problem for which it had beer 
convened the grave problem of armaments. This inability tc 
cope with the primary question caused Baron de Bildt to de- 
clare in his address of June 30: 

. . . We are about to terminate our labors recognising that we have 
been confronted with one of the most important problems of the cen- 
tury, and that we have accomplished very little towards its solution, 

Let us not indulge in illusions. 

When the results of our deliberations shall become known, there 
will arise, notwithstanding all that has been done for arbitration, the 
Red Cross, etc., a great cry: It is not enough! 

And this cry: "It is not enough," most of us in our consciences 
will acknowledge to be just. Our consciences, it is true, may also 
tell us in consolation, that we have done our duty, since we have 
faithfully followed our instructions. 44 

But he ventured to say that this duty was not fulfilled and that 

42 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4349, p. 345. Count Miinster to Prince Hohen< 
lohe, Scheveninger, July 30, 1899. 

43 Ibid., No. 4320, p. 306 Footnote n, pp. 5-6, Prince von Bttlow to Kaisei 
William II, June 21, 1899. Also Erich Brandenburg, op, cit., p, 116. 

44 J. B. Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Confer- 
ence of 1899, pp. 316-17. 


there still remained something for them to do to encourage 
their governments to study, each in their own way, the idea 
initiated by the Tsar. An idea which "responds to a desire felt 
by thousands upon thousands of men, that means too that it 
cannot die." 45 

If, in retrospect, we consider calmly and without prejudice 
the attitudes of the different nations before and at the Hague 
Conference of 1899, can we hold any one nation responsible for 
the failure to limit armaments or military budgets, the problem 
that was put to the fore-front in the Muraviev Circular? All 
the great powers found the Tsar's proposals extremely trouble- 
some, but the majority of them had to take into consideration 
pacific public opinion and were therefore rather cautious in 
expressing their attitude. German statesmen were in a slightly 
different position because in their country pacifist ideas were not 
widespread, and the opinion of the outside world was considered 
a secondary matter. The opposition of the German delegates 
relieved other representatives of the unpleasant task of reject- 
ing the Russian proposals. But it is plain that only German 
methods, not policy, differentiated Germany from the other 
powers. If her delegates had exercised a little more self- 
restraint, as they had been instructed to do, other states might 
have taken the initiative and Germany would have been spared 
the criticism that she was responsible for the failure of the 
Conference, 40 

It is true that some representatives expressed themselves 
more frankly than others. The technical delegates were, on the 
whole, more vehement in their objections than the statesmen. 
Strong opposition to the Russian proposal was offered by the 
German Military Delegates, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, 
while, on the other hand, the British Naval Expert, Admiral 
Sir John Fisher, criticized them from the standpoint of the 
naval powers. Lord Salisbury, in choosing Mm, remarked that 
Fisher had fought so well over the transfer of naval ordnance 

48 Loc. tto. 40 Cf. Erich Brandenburg, op. <&>, pp. 131-32- 


from the army to the navy, "that he had little doubt that he 
would fight well at the Peace Conference." Before going to The 
Hague, Sir John forewarned the Admiralty that he knew only 
one principle, "Might is Right.' 347 

We get a glimpse of Sir John Fisher and his actions at the 
august assemblage from this description written by W. T. 
Stead, who knew him intimately: 

At The Hague in 1899 Fisher had a position the like of which no 
Admiral held at the second Conference in 1907. The naval ascendency 
of Great Britain was then accepted by all. Germany was but a 
fourth-rate naval power. Japan had not proved her prowess. The 
Americans worked hand in glove with us; and among the naval dele- 
gates Fisher was like a little god. As he was personally most 
gracious, put on no airs, and danced like a middy till all hours in the 
morning, no man at The Hague was more popular than he. 

Fisher's ideas as to war, and especially as to naval war, were all 
based upon those current in Nelson's time. He was a bit of a bar- 
barian who talked like a savage at times, to the no small scandal 
of his colleagues at The Hague. 

"The humanising of War! 77 he declared, "You might as well talk 
of humanising Hell! When a silly ass at The Hague got up and 
talked about the amenities of civilized warfare and putting your 
prisoners 7 feet in hot water and giving them gruel, my reply, I regret 
to say, was considered totally unfit for publication. As if war could 
be civilised 1 If Fm in command when war breaks out I shall issue 
my orders: 

" 'The essence of war is violence. 7 

" 'Moderation in war is imbecility. 7 

" 'Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere. 7 77 48 

Admiral Fisher's opinion of the Conference in general was 
not very high, as can be gathered from a conversation with 
Count Minister in which he is alleged to have referred to it and 
M. de Staal as follows: "As President of that nonsense? Does 
that count?" 49 

47 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No, 4274, p. 226, Report of Captain Siegel, German 
Naval Delegate to First Hague Conference, June 28, 1899. 

48 Admiral R. H. Bacon, Lord Fisher (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1929), 
I, 12021. 

40 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4351, p. 357. Count Miinster to Prince von 
Hohenlohe, Sdheveningen, July 17, 1899. 


Captain A. T. Mahan, the American Naval Delegate, worked 
"hand in glove" with Fisher at The Hague. He, too, was 
wedded to the views generally entertained by older men of the 
naval and military services. An authority on sea power through 
his numerous publications on the subject, including The Impor- 
tance of Sea Power on History and The Interest of America in 
Sea Power Present and Future, he had written: "That the or- 
ganization of military strength involves provocation to war is 
a fallacy, which the experience of each succeeding year now 
refutes. The immense armaments of Europe are onerous; but 
nevertheless, by the mutual respect and caution they enforce, 
they present a cheap alternative, certainly in misery, probably 
in money, to the frequent devastating wars which preceded 
the era of general military preparation." 50 Mahan had "very 
little, if any, sympathy with the main purposes of the confer- 
ence," and did not hesitate to declare his disbelief in some of 
the measures which the American delegates were especially 
instructed to press. "Still," writes Mr. White, "his views have 
been an excellent tonic; they have effectively prevented any 
lapse into sentimentality. When he speaks the millennium fades 
and this stern, severe, actual world appears." 51 

The appearance of two naval powers at the close of the 
nineteenth century added to the difficulties of the Conference. 
Suspicion of the naval armaments of Great Britain and inci- 
dentally of the United States and Japan, was expressed by 
Count Witte w and by Captain Siegel, the German Naval Dele- 
gate. 53 Captain Mahan was described by the Kaiser as "our 
greatest and most dangerous foe." w Certainly the new policy 
of the United States and the rapid growth of her fleet 
brought to the fore new considerations which were bound to 

50 Captain A, T. Mahan, The Merest of America in Sea Power Present and 
Future (Harper's, New York, 1897), P 104. 

51 A, D. White, op. dt. t II, 347, 

sa Die Grom Politik f XV, 165, No. 4232. Prince von Radolin to Prince von 
Hohenlohe, December 28, 1898. 

3 Ibid, f No. 4274, Report of Captain Siegel, German Naval Delegate to the 
First Hague Conference, June 28, 1898, 

84 Ibid., p, 183, Footnote. , , , 


influence other nations. On this point, Sir J. Paunceforte 

Captain Mahan has not only stated that his Government will on 
no account even discuss the question of any limitation of naval arma- 
ments; he has also informed me that he considers that the vital 
interests of America now lie East and West, and no longer North 
and South; that the great question of the immediate future is 
China, and that the United States will be compelled, by fact if not 
by settled policy, to take a leading part in the struggle for Chinese 
markets, and this will entail a very considerable increase in her naval 
forces in the Pacific, which again must influence the naval arrange- 
ments of at least five Powers. 55 

Germany, distrustful of the navies of Great Britain and 
the United States, announced through Captain Siegel that she 
could not consider the limitation of her naval armaments. On 
the other hand, Russia could not come to a separate understand- 
ing with Great Britain so long as there was no check upon the 
navies of Germany and Japan, with whose maritime strength 
she was mainly concerned. 

Though the First Hague Conference failed in its primary 
mission and, no doubt, brought to light truths that might better 
have been kept in the background, the concourse of so impor- 
tant a body demonstrated for the first time in history the epoch- 
making fact that a Congress of world powers convened to deal 
not with some concrete question demanding immediate solution 
but to consider and discuss the application of the general 
and fundamental principles of justice and humanity to inter- 
national questions, can be made a practical and effective agency 
in the government of the world. The greatest benefit of the 
Peace Conference was in the fact of the Conference itself; in 
the spectacle of all the great powers meeting in the name of 
peace, and exalting "national self-control and considerate judg- 

55 British Documents, I, No. 282, p. 231. Note on the Limitation of Arma- 
ments sent by Sir J. Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury in his despatch of 
July 31, 1899. 


ment and willingness to do justice." 56 The fact that the ques- 
tion of peace was no longer discussed merely by philosophers, 
jurists and Utopians, but by responsible governments also, was 
proof of the enormous strides forward that had been made 
in the sphere of international politics. 

56 Addresses on International Subjects by Elihu Root (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1916). Collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James 
Brown Scott ; Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, 
in the City of New York, April 15, 1907, p. 144. 



THOSE who had been optimistic over the results of the First 
Hague Conference had every reason to be discouraged by the 
events that followed it. In the autumn of 1899 the relations 
between England and the Boer Republic, long tense, reached 
a breaking point. The Boers proposed arbitration. The Brit- 
ish, who had championed arbitration at The Hague, refused; 
war followed. 

The twentieth century opened with conflicts fought in the 
Far East and South Africa. Russia struggled in distant Man- 
churia; a combined European and American Army avenged the 
outrages of the Boxers by sacking Peking; England fought 
in the Transvaal, five thousand miles from her base of sup- 
plies; the United States had just conquered and now held 
under military rule possessions an even greater distance from 
home waters. All these wars demonstrated the new significance 
of sea power in history and intensified the naval armament 

The First Hague Conference had referred the question of 
the limitation of armaments to the respective governments for 
further study. The result was one spark of light in the period, 
the conclusion, on May 28, 1902, of a treaty between Chile 
and Argentina which, in some respects, was an advance on 
anything achieved previously. It provided the adjustment by 
arbitration of all disputes between the two countries unless the 
Constitution of either was involved. In addition the contract- 
ing powers signed a disarmament convention which provided: 



Article I. With the view of removing all motive for uneasiness or 
suspicion in either country, the Governments of Chili and of the 
Argentine Republic desist from acquiring the vessels of war now 
building for them, and from henceforth from making new acquisi- 

Both Governments agree, moreover, to reduce their respective 
fleets, with which object they will continue to exert themselves until 
they arrive at an understanding which shall establish a just balance 
between the said fleets. 

This reduction will take place within one year, counting from the 
date of the exchange of ratifications of the present convention. 

Article II. The two Governments bind themselves not to increase 
their naval armaments during a period of five years, without previous 
notice; the one intending to increase them shall give the other 
eighteen months notice. 

It is understood that all armament for the fortification of the 
coasts and ports is excluded from this agreement, and any floating 
machine, such as submarine vessels, etc., destined exclusively for the 
defence of these, can be acquired. 

What was more remarkable than the actual agreement to 
limit naval armaments was that the two contracting parties 
agreed in Article III that they should "not be at liberty to part 
with any vessel, in consequence of this convention, in favor 
of countries having questions pending with one or the other." l 

The continuous increase in military and naval expenditure 
attracted the attention of the national and International peace 
bodies. Resolutions were passed calling for a limitation of 
armaments at the French Peace Congresses at Nimes in 1904, 
Lille in 1905 and Lyon in 1906; 2 at the First National Peace 
Congress in Manchester in 1904, at the second in Bristol in 
1905 and at the third in Birmingham in 1906; 8 at the Italian 

1 Enrique J. Tagle, Los Tratados de Paz Entre jLa Reptiblica Argentina y 
Chile (Buenos Aires, 1902), Convenci6n Sobre Linutaci6n de Armamentos 
Na vales, p. 24; Armand Billard, L* Arbitrage et la limitation de$ armements, 
Les Tra!t6s passes le 28 mai, 1902, entre le Chile et la Republic Argentine; 
Georges Dublis, Des Charges de la Pah Armle, et de la limitation des arme- 
ments (Caen, 1909), pp. xio~i$. 

fl Hans Wehberg, Die Internationale Beschrankung der RUstungen (Stuttgart 
and Berlin, 1919), p, 418-19. 

3 Ibid*, pp. 4 a 1-2 a. 


Peace Congresses at Turin in 1904 and Perugia in 1907; 4 and 
at the Austrian and German Peace Societies' Meeting in igoj. 5 
Discussions of the limitation of armaments were initiated and 
resolutions were proposed at the Universal Peace Congresses 
convened in Glasgow in igoi, 6 at Monaco in 1902 / at Rouen 
and Le Havre in 1903,* at Boston in 1904, at Lucerne in 1905 10 
and at Milan in I9o6. n At Rouen the Congress invited the 
friends of peace in all countries to insist upon their govern- 
ments' studying the question and taking some measures to 
arrive at a truce in armaments and their final reduction. 

At the seventh annual meeting of the Lake Mohonk Con- 
ference on International Arbitration, convened in 1901, a re- 
duction of armaments was advocated by Mr. Edwin Ginn. 12 Ob- 
jections, however, were raised by , Commander Albion V. 
Wadhams of the United States Navy, who stated he would 
favor disarmament when it was no longer necessary to have 
armed policemen in our cities and militia in each state. Captain 
Wadhams maintained that it was our mighty navy that had 
made it possible for the United States Government to exercise 
such powerful influence in Eastern affairs. 13 No resolution 
was adopted. At the 1904 Lake Mohonk Conference a lengthy 

5 Ibid., pp. 415-16. 

6 Proceedings of the Tenth Universal Peace Congress Held in St. Andrews Halt, 
Glasgow, from 10-13 September ipoi (London, 1902), p. 112; Hans Wehberg, 
op. cit., p. 397. 

7 Bulletin Officiel du XI* Congr&s Universel de la Paix, tenu a Monaco du 
2 au 6 avril igoz (Berne, 1902), pp. 47-48. 

8 Bulletin Officiel du XII* Congres Universel de la Pah, tenu a Rouen et au 
Havre du 22 au 27 sept. 1003 (Berne, 1903), pp. 104-15. 

9 Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, Held at Boston, 
Mass., U. S. A. October third to eighth, 1904 (Boston, 1904), p. 296, 

10 Bulletin Officiel du XIV<* Congres Universel de la Paix, tenu a Lucerne du 
ip au 23 septembre 1005 (Berne, 1905), pp. 188-93. 

11 Bulletin Officiel du XV Congr&s Universel de la Pah, tenu a Milan du 
15 au 22 septembre 1006 (Berne, 1906), p. 151. 

12 Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference 
on 'International Arbitration, igoi (Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1901), 
p. 20. 

13 Ibid,, pp. 67-77- 


discussion of the problem of heavy armaments 14 was finally 
closed by Mr. Richard Bartholdt, member of Congress from 
Missouri, .who asked the Conference to endorse a resolution 
pending in Congress. Unanimous approval was given to this 
concurrent resolution which requested the President to invite 
the governments to send representatives to a conference whose 
purpose should be "to devise plans looking to the negotiation 
of arbitration treaties between the United States and the differ- 
ent nations, and also to discuss the advisability of, and, if pos- 
sible, agree upon, a gradual reduction of armaments. 15 

In 1903 at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Vienna 
Sir John B runner moved a resolution recalling the fact that the 
First Hague Conference was convened to consider, among other 
things, the burden of armaments and whereas the burden had 
continually increased, the Union was of opinion that the time 
had "arrived when the project submitted by Russia in 1898 
should be again submitted to and considered by another con- 
ference." lc Some of the German representatives, though ex- 
pressing a desire for reduction, intimated that they could not 
vote for the resolution in the form in which it was presented; 
nonetheless, it was carried by a good majority. 

The next year the Inter-Parliamentary Union, on the invita- 
tion of Mr. Bartholdt, founder and president of the American 
group, held its first American Conference at St. Louis, Missouri. 
One result of this 1904 convention was to excite greater interest 
on the part of the United States Congressmen. Up to that date 
the majority of the American people had taken but a philan- 
thropic interest in questions of arbitration and disarmament; 
but the rapid increase of the United States Navy and the rise 

14 Report of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on 
International Arbitration (Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1904), pp, 

1S /Mi, p. 122. 

ie Christian L. Lange, Union Interparlementa$re f resolutions des conferences 
et decisions principles du conseU (Bruxelles, 1911), skieme resolution G, R. 
pp, 80-81, pp. 67-74, 


of the Japanese power in the Pacific were bringing about a 
change. At St. Louis the Union adopted a resolution requesting 
the several governments of the world to send delegates to an 
international conference for the purpose of discussing the 
questions which the Conference at The Hague had expressed 
a wish that a future Conference be called to consider. The 
members "respectfully and cordially requested" the President 
of the United States to invite all the nations to send represent- 
atives to such a conference. 17 President Roosevelt, who the 
same year also promised the Universal Peace Congress to take 
the initiative in calling a new Conference to continue the work 
of that of 1899, accepted the charge offered him. 

At the reception of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Septem- 
ber 24, 1904, the President stated that the body had shown 
sound judgment in concluding that a second Conference should 
now be called to carry further toward completion the work of 
the first. He pointed out that it would be visionary to expect 
too immediate success for the great cause which the Union 
was championing, but very considerable progress could be made 
if we strove with "resolution and good sense toward the goal 
of securing among the nations of the earth ... a just sense of 
responsibility in each toward others, and a just recognition in 
each of the rights of others." 18 The President promised at 
an early date to issue the call for the requested conference and, 
on October 21, 1904, a Circular was communicated by the State 
Department to the various powers. 19 

Though the project met with a general expression of assent 
and sympathy, the Russian and Japanese Governments consid- 

17 Compte Rendu de la XII* Conference tenu a Saint Louis, Missouri, du 
12 an 14 septembre, 1904, p. 60; Foreign Relations of the United States, 

pp, 10-11. 

18 Compte Rendu de la XII* Conference tenu $ Saint Louis, Missouri, 

p. 61. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XIV, 6891, "Remarks at the 
White House on the Occasion of the Reception of the Interparliamentary Union." 

19 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, pp. 10-13; British Docu- 
ments, VIII (London, 1932), Ch, LXV, pp. 185-87, "Preliminaries of the Second 
Hague Conference." 


ered the moment of war very inopportune for a discussion of the 
subject proposed by the United States. A second Circular of 
December 27, 1904, stated that the replies indicated that the 
proposition had been received with general favor "and the pros- 
pect of an early Conference was regarded as assured as soon 
as the interested powers were in a position to agree to a date 
and place of meeting and to join in the formulation of a gen- 
eral plan for discussion. 55 20 

While international bodies were considering the problem 
of overgrown armaments, the urgency of limiting expenditures 
because of their danger both to peace and financial stability 
was recognized by frequent debates in several of the national 
legislatures, especially in the British Parliament. In July, 1903, 
Mr. Chamberlain supported Mr. Goschen's pronouncement of 
1899 to the effect that Great Britain was ready to modify her 
program of naval construction if the other naval powers should 
be prepared to diminish theirs, and declared that for the Eng- 
lish Cabinet it had maintained its full value. 

The next year, on February 29, Messrs. Roberts, Buchanan 
and Robertson declared in the House of Commons that since 
Great Britain held a predominant position among the naval 
powers of the world, she should propose a reduction of naval 
armaments to the other powers. The object of the motion, Mr. 
Roberts stated, was, in the first place, to call attention to the 
constant increase that was going on in the Naval Estimates; 
in the second place, to point out what was patent to all, that 
those large increases must, if they were persisted in, have a re- 
tarding effect on the industrial system of the country; and, 
in the third place, to suggest that the time had arrived when 
the Government should be urged "to make every effort possible 
in order to come to some arrangement with other great naval 
powers, which would lead to a diminution in the future ship- 
building programmes of the various countries concerned." 21 

20 Foreign Relations of the United States, op, dt., pp. 13-14. 

&l Parliamentary Debates, Fourth series, CXXX, col 1274, February 29, 1904* 


He was answered by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who 
stated that the Board of the Admiralty had avoided and would 
avoid giving any stimulus to the expansion of armaments by 
the formulation of large programs of construction, but when 
such programs had been adopted by other powers, they had no 
choice but to take them into account In framing their own 
policy. 22 

Meanwhile in his Fourth Annual Message of December 6, 
1904, President Roosevelt drew attention to the difficulties in 
the way of a limitation of armaments in these words : 

There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in interna- 
tional law. . . . Until some method is devised by which there shall 
be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would 
be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, -for those with 
most sense of international obligation and with keenest and most 
generous appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, 
to' disarm, the result would mean an immediate recrudescence of 
barbarism in one form or another. Under any circumstances a suffi- 
cient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of 
international police; and until international cohesion and the sense 
of international duties and rights are far more advanced than at 
present, a nation desirous of securing respect for itself and of doing 
good to others must have a force adequate for the work which it 
feels is allotted to it as its part of the general world duty. 23 

In September, 1905, Carl Schurz wrote President Roosevelt 
congratulating him for his interposition between Japan and Rus- 
sia and urging him to render another service to mankind, by 
promoting the "gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens 
imposed upon the nations by the armed peace." M IB his reply 
Mr. Roosevelt stated that he was not clear either what could 
or ought to be done. He wrote among other things: 

*., col. 1275, 

33 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XIV (New York, no date), 6922; 
Fourth Annual Message, White House, December 6, 1904, to the Senate and 
House of Representatives. 

24 Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and ffenry 
Cabot Lodge, x884~~ipi8, II (New York and London, 1925), 


Until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable 
chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be con- 
sidered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can 
do only a limited amount to advance its coming on earth. There is of 
course no analogy at present between international law and private 
municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the former 
while there is for the latter. ... At present there is no similar inter- 
national force to call on, and I do not as yet see how it could at 
present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some 
strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat 
of armed force, put a stop to disorder. . . . Unjust war is dreadful; 
a just war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free 
and civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarians 
with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the 
calamities caused by all the wars of the nineteenth century would be 
trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by international agree- 
ment state exactly which power ceases to be free and civilized and 
which comes near to the line of barbarism or despotism. 25 

President Roosevelt did not mean that it was hopeless to 
make the effort. Perhaps some scheme would be developed. 
America, fortunately, could assist in such an effort, for no one 
would suggest her disarmament, and although she should con- 
tinue to perfect her small navy and minute army the President 
thought it unnecessary to increase the number of ships. But 
before he would advocate international action, save in the way 
of commending it to the attention of the Hague Tribunal, he 
would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action pre- 
sented. In a postscript Mr, Roosevelt stated his opinion that 
"a general stop in the increase of the war navies of the world 
might be a good thing"; but he would not like to speak too 
positively off hand* "At any rate," he concluded, "nothing 
useful could be done unless with the clear recognition that we 
put peace second to righteousness." m 

On September 13, 1905, Baron Rosen, Russian Ambassador 

25 Ibid,, pp. 197-99, Letter from President Roosevelt to Mr. Schun*, Septem- 
ber 8, 1903 ; Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (Scrlbtier's, New York, 

19*3) >PP 539-9*' 
a@ Loc, cit. 


in Washington, presented to President Roosevelt at Oyster Bay 
a memorandum from St. Petersburg stating that in view of the 
termination of war and the conclusion of peace between Russia 
and Japan, His Majesty the Emperor, as initiator of the Inter- 
national Peace Conference of 1899, held that a favorable mo- 
ment had come for the further development and for the sys- 
tematizing of the labors of that conference. 27 Roosevelt reports 

After he had read the letter Rosen began to hem and haw as to 
the steps already taken by me a year ago, and about the fact that 
the Hague Conference was the peculiar pet project of the Czar. I 
finally interrupted him and said that I thought I understood what he 
wished, and that he could tell the Czar at once that I was delighted 
to have him and not me undertake the movement; that I should treat 
the movement as being made on his initiative, and should heartily 
support it. This evidently relieved Rosen immensely. I rather think 
that the Czar had felt from past experience with the Kaiser that there 
was a fair chance that I might endeavor to appear as the great 
originator myself. 28 

Thus the President of the United States yielded the initiative 
to the Tsar of Russia and received wide acclaim for his generos- 
ity, his unselfishness and "graciousness well-nigh unprecedented 
in world politics." 29 The decision was announced on September 
19 when a communique appeared in the Journal de Saint-P6ters- 
bourg, stating that invitations to the Conference would be issued 
by the Russian Government with the cordial support of the 
President of the United States. 30 The members of the Inter- 
Parliamentary Union regretted that President Roosevelt al- 
lowed Russia to take the lead in calling the Conference. 
M. Albert Gobat, of Switzerland, the Secretary of the Union, 

27 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, p. 828, Memorandum handed 
to the President, September 13, 1905. 

28 Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry 
Cabot Lodge, 1884-1018. II, 201. 

20 David J. Hill, "The Second Peace Conference at The Hague,*' American 
Journal of International Law, I (July, 1907), 435* 
80 British Documents, op. at,, p 188. 


who was among those present at the White House when the 
President promised to call the Second Hague Conference, felt 
that he had only partly kept his promise to the Union. Gobat 
complained that Mr. Roosevelt "sounded the powers as to their 
willingness to send delegates, but retired when Russia, after 
the powers had consented, manifested a desire to convoke the 
meeting herself. This we deeply regret, for we are convinced 
that President Roosevelt would have invested the Conference 
with an entirely different importance. Russia does not march 
in the van of civilization." 31 

As a matter of fact, Roosevelt was "glad to be relieved from 
making the move" on his own initiative. He wrote to his Sec- 
retary of State, Mr. Elihu Root: "I should have done it if no one 
else had done it because I think it ought to be done; but I par- 
ticularly do not want to appear as a professional peace advocate 
a kind of sublimated being of the Godkin or Schurz variety 
and it gives us a freer hand in every way to have the Czar make 
the movement." 32 Actually, Theodore Roosevelt considered 
Schurz's pacific approach and the Baron Rosen episode not as 
serious, but rather as events only for the amusement of women; 
for in sending copies of the relevant letters to his friend Henry 
Cabot Lodge for his perusal, the President wrote: "Nannie 33 
and Lady Harcourt might be amused at the enclosed corre- 
spondence with Schurz, and of a letter to Root." M 

In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress on December 5, 
1905, President Roosevelt again referred to the absence of the 
sanction of force for international law and the great calamity 
for the free peoples, the enlightened independent, and peace 
loving to disarm while leaving it open to barbarism or despotism 
to remain armed. The practical thing to do, in his opinion, was 

81 Edwin D. Mead, The Limitation of Armaments, The Position of the 'United 
States at The Hague Conference (Boston, 1907), p. 20. 

32 Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry 
Cabot Lodge t II, 201. 

3a Mrs. Henry Cabot Lodge. 
* p. 195. 


to try to minimize the number of cases in which war must be 
the arbiter and to offer, at least to civilized powers, some sub- 
stitute which would be available in at least a considerable num.- 
.ber of instances. He expressed the hope that the Second 
Hague Conference might be able to devise some way to make 
arbitration between nations the customary way of settling inter- 
national disputes in all save a few classes of cases, which should 
themselves be sharply defined and rigidly limited. 35 

Theodore Roosevelt was never sanguine over the prospects 
of limiting armaments. After the Second Hague Conference had 
failed to propose an acceptable plan and that of limiting the 
size of battleships met with no favor at all, the President stated 
in his Seventh Annual Message that it would be folly for this 
nation to base any hope of securing peace on an international 
agreement as to the limitation of armaments. Such being the 
case it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding of 
our navy* 86 

Moreover, Roosevelt had no patience with "amiable, but 
fatuous persons," who pass resolutions demanding universal 
arbitration for everything and disarmament, or with those who 
"write well-meaning, solemn little books, or pamphlets, or edi- 
torials, and articles in magazines or newspapers, to show that 
it is 'an illusion' to believe that war ever pays, because it is 
expensive." 37 If the principles held by pacifists were right, 
Roosevelt argued, then it would have been better that Amer- 
icans should have never achieved independence, and better that, 
in 1 86 1, they should have peacefully submitted to seeing their 
country split into half a dozen jangling confederates and slav- 
ery made perpetual" 3S Finally, it would be folly to try to 
abolish our navy and at the same time to insist that we have the 

35 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XIV, 6993, Fifth Annual Message, 
White House, December 5, 1905. 

3Q Ibid., Seventh Annual Message, White House, December 3, 1907, pp 

37 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 534. 

38 Ibid. 


right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, that we have a right 
to control the Panama Canal which we ourselves had dug, that 
we have the right to retain Hawaii and prevent foreign nations 
from taking Cuba, and a right to determine what immigrants, 
Asiatic or European, shall come to our shores and the terms on 
which they shall be naturalized and shall hold land and exercise 
other privileges. 39 Roosevelt was convinced that "only that 
nation is equipped for peace that knows how to fight, and that 
will not shrink from fighting if ever the conditions become such 
that war is demanded in the name of the highest morality." 40 

Fortunately, however, the principle of arbitration gained 
ground in the early part of the century, especially in Scandina- 
via. Denmark, profiting from her comparative security, con- 
tracted two "all-in" arbitration treaties: one with the Nether- 
lands (February, 1904), and one with Italy (December, 1906), 
for the peaceful settlement of all disputes without reservation. 
Four other similar treaties soon followed, including one with 
Great Britain. 41 By the Treaty of Karlstad in 1905, Norway 
peacefully severed political connections with Sweden and, on 
October 26, 1905, the two nations signed a convention in which 
they agreed to submit to the Hague Court whatever future dif- 
ferences they would be unable to settle by diplomatic negotia- 
tions, except "questions of independence, integrity, and vital 
interest." 42 

On the same day Norway and Sweden signed another con- 
vention which demilitarized their frontier by setting aside a 
zone between the two countries which was to be completely neu- 
tralized, Both states agreed to refrain from using this zone 
as a base for war operations or for concentrating armed military 
forces, except such as might be necesary for maintaining public 


40 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XIV, 7"3^4* Seventh Annual 
Message, White House, December 3, 1907. 

41 L. S, Woolf, International Government (London., 1916), p, 48, note, 
4SS Sven$k Fdrfattnings-Sanalmg 1905 N:4 81, Convention meltan Svetige ocfc 

Norge mg&ende tvUters HUnskjutande M $k&}edon, Artikel i, pp JM. 


order. Fortifications; war ports and "depots de provision" for 
serving the army or navy were not to be built in future and the 
fortifications already existing in the neutral zone were to be dis- 
mantled. The convention took effect immediately and could 
only be denounced by common accord. 43 

On December 22, 1905, no doubt with these agreements 
in mind, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman delivered a speech 
at the Albert Hall, London, in which he said: 

I rejoice that the principle of arbitration has made great strides, 
and that to-day it is no longer counted weakness for any of the 
Great Powers of the world to submit those issues which, would once 
have been referred to the arbitrament of self-assertion and of passion 
to a higher tribunal I hold that the growth of armaments is a 
great danger to the peace of the world. A policy of huge armaments 
keeps alive, and stimulates, and feeds the idea that force is the best, 
if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy 
that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores, and I submit 
to you that as the principle of pacific arbitration gains ground, it 
becomes one of the highest tasks of a statesman to adjust these 
armaments to a newer and happier condition of things. 44 

Throughout the year preceding the Second Hague Confer- 
ence there was a lively agitation in Great Britain for the ques- 
tion of the limitation of armaments to be included in the pro- 
gram of the Conference. There was a good reason for this : the 
military and naval expenditures in Britain in the ten years 
1896-97 to 1906-7 had increased by 63 per cent for the army 
and 43 per cent for the navy. On May 9, 1906, Mr. Vivian, 
a Labor Member of Parliament for Birkenhead, called atten- 
tion to public expenditure and moved, 

That this House is of opinion that the growth of expenditure on 
armaments is excessive and ought to be reduced; such expenditure 
lessens national and commercial credit, intensifies the unemploy- 

43 Ibid., "Konvention mellan Serige och Norge ang&ende neutral zora befast- 
ningars nedlaggande m.m.," Artikel i and Artikel 9, pp. 8-9, 13. 

44 Howard Evans, Sir Randal Cremer, p. 293. 


nent problem, reduces the resources available for social reform; and 
cresses with exceptional severity on the industrial classes; and it 
Jaerefore calls upon the Government to take drastic steps to reduce 
,he drain on national income, and to this end to press for the inclusion 
)f the question of the reduction of armaments by international agree- 
nent in the agenda of the forthcoming Hague Conference. 45 

The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in answering Mr. 
Vivian, stated that a great deal depended on the policy of other 
;ountrieSj and by that he meant the feeling among the people 
n Europe. He held nevertheless that a declaration of this 
and from a British House of Commons was something that was 
TOrth having, if only for the effect it might produce on other 
governments. He expressed his belief that there never had 
)een a time when the relative and comparative supremacy of 
;he British Navy was greater than in 1906 and that at the mo- 
nent at least it was as secure as ever before in history. Sir 
Edward Grey pointed out that he could not extend the promises 
?vhich had been made by the Prime Minister and others as to 
;he specific reductions, for what Great Britain could do with 
egard to the Hague Conference must depend on the response 
:rom other governments. But he welcomed the resolution as a 
wholesome and beneficial expression of opinion. And just as in 
;he time of the late Government, Lord Goschen, the First Lord 
)f the Admiralty, issued a public invitation on behalf of British 
Government to other countries for a reduction of naval arma- 
nents, so he trusted that this resolution might be taken as being 
in invitation from the British House of Commons to respond 
;o their feeling in favor of encouraging a reduction of arma- 
nent 46 The adoption of Vivian's resolution without division 
hedged the British Government to urge the consideration of 
;he subject at the Hague Conference. 

In the same month (May 25) Lord Averbury brought the 
irmament question forward in the House of Lords when he 

45 Parliamentary Debates^ Fourth series, CLVI, May 9, 1906, col 1383, 
v cols. 1413 and 


asked His Majesty's Government whether they had taken any 
steps to carry out the suggestion made by the Prime Minister 
in a speech on December 22, 1905, that as "the policy of huge 
armaments feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the 
only solution of international difference ... it becomes one 
of the highest tasks of the statesman to adjust armaments to 
the newer and happier condition"; and, if so, whether there 
were any Papers that could be laid on the Table of the House. 47 
Averbury was aware that the force which each nation requires 
depends greatly on that of other countries and that formerly 
Great Britain could not effectively suggest a reduction because 
it was impossible for her to dimmish her armaments. Of late 
years, however, the increase in British armaments had been 
far greater than in other European countries. In the preceding 
ten years Italy had increased her naval and military expenditure 
by 1,500,000; France by 6,000,000; Germany by 8,700,000. 
The British increase during the same period has been over 
30,000,000 something like double that of France and Ger- 
many put together. 48 

Lord Averbury pointed out that the position of Europe 
was a disgrace not only to men of common sense but to pro- 
fessing Christians. If the suggestions thrown out by the Prime 
Minister were accepted, it would be an enormous boon to the 
people of Europe; it would, he believed, save the Continent 
from drifting into revolution and misery. Of course it was pos- 
sible that their overtures might be rejected. But even if they 
were, they could feel that they had done their best* They had 
held out the olive branch; it would be a failure but an honor- 
able, even glorious failure. He did not, however, entertain 
such a fear; he had too much confidence in the common sense 
and conscience of Europe. And if they succeeded, it would 
be one of those cases in which peace has its victories as well 

^Parliamentary Debates, Home of Lords, Fourth series, CLVII, col 1517, 
May "25, 1906. 
48 Ibid., col. 1519. 


as war, and they would confer an incalculable boon, not only 
on their own people, but on the whole world. 49 

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Fitz- 
maurice, in replying, reminded the members of the House of 
Lords that the Government had already turned to this ques- 
tion. They hoped, indeed confidently believed, that the next 
year, unless events took quite an unlocked for and unfavorable 
turn in Europe, they would be able to propose some reduction 
in expenditure, by means of changes in war establishments, 
which might tend somewhat in the direction of the wishes of 
Lord Averbury. 50 The Under-Secretary, nevertheless, ex- 
patiated on the difficulties in limiting armaments the problem 
of finding a "unit of disarmament 7 ' and the great difficulty of 
finding the tribunal, of fixing upon an arbitrator "who should 
decide as to whether or not the unit of disarmament, if one had 
been found, was really honest and efficiently applied by all the 
contracting powers." 51 Nonetheless, Lord Fitzmaurice en- 
dorsed the words of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons 
on May 9, and in concluding announced that "we decline to be 
precluded from making a proposal ourselves at The Hague 
Conference if the times and seasons are favourable, as we trust, 
under Divine providence, they may be." 52 Considerable im- 
portance was attached to this double English declaration in 
the month of May, for it seemed to signify a demand for a con- 
sideration of the question by the powers or, at least, for enter- 
ing it upon the agenda of the Conference. 

After these declarations in Parliament a Committee of 
members of both Houses, composed of Lord Courtney, Lord 
Eversley, Lord Weardale, Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, Lord 
Reay, Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, Sir John Macdonell, 
Professor Westlake, Mr. J. M. Robertson and others assembled 
in London to prepare for the Second Hague Conference; they 
adopted the following resolutions: 

40 Ibid,, col. 1523. w Ibid., cols. 1532-34. 

180 Ibid,, col. 1531. fia iTMdL, coi 1536. 


1. That the chief question to be brought before the Second Hague 
Conference should be that of an agreement for a general limitation 
of armaments; and that the British Government should make pro- 
posals to this end; 

2. In any limitation of armaments, the armies and navies of the 
various nations should be treated separately; 

3. That the simplest, though not the only standard of naval 
strength, is that of naval expenditure; 

4a. That Great Britain seek to persuade the Powers to agree to 
a Proportional Reduction of Naval Expenditure for five years; or, 
failing such agreement, that Great Britain propose an arrest of ex- 
penditure for three years with a view to reduction at a later date; 

4b. That the principle of reduction or the principle of arrest 
shall be applied not only to the total naval expenditure from all 
sources, but also to the annual provision for the construction of new 

5. All naval expenditure of colonies and dependencies should be 
included in the above-mentioned totals insofar as it is under the 
control of the contracting Powers; 

6. Great Britain should be prepared to support any proposal 
for the limitation of land forces which may be laid before the 
Hague Conference; 

7. That the terms of Resolution 4 be applied mutatis mutandis, 
to army as well as navy expenditure; 

8. It is advisable to establish, in connection with the Permanent 
Council of the Hague Court, Committees of Reference for the super- 
vision of the carrying out of the aforesaid agreements, for the col- 
lection of all necessary information, including statistics of expendi- 
ture on armaments, and for reporting on any technical questions 
which may be referred to them; 

9. That the Agreement should contain a provision for its being 
denounced by any of the Parties to it on two years' notice being 
given, and a provision for the reference to arbitration of any difference 
arising. 58 

Pending the convocation of the Second Hague Conference 
the Interparliamentary-Union stressed the expenditure aspects 
of the armament problem. At its 1905 meeting in Brussels, it 
resolved that the Conference should "consider the limitation of 

83 Hans Webberg, The Limitation of Armaments, pp. 29-30. 


land and sea forces and military budgets." 54 The following 
year the Union was invited to London by the new Liberal 
Government with the express intention of rousing public opin- 
ion in favor of disarmament. 55 Sir Henry Campbell-Banner- 
man, as Prime Minister of Great Britain and Leader of the 
House of Commons, welcomed the delegates and in his address 
reminded the body of the words of the Tsar in convening the 
First Hague Conference: "Hundreds of millions are devoted 
to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, although to- 
day they are regarded as the last word of science are destined 
tomorrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh dis- 
covery in the same field." The speaker asked: 

Is it not evident that a process of simultaneous and progressive 
arming defeats its own purpose? Scare answers to scare, and force 
begets force, until at length it comes to be seen that we are racing 
one against another after a phantom security which continually 
vanishes as we approach. If we hold with the late Mr. Hay that 
war is the most futile and ferocious of human follies, what are we to 
say to the surpassing futility of expending the strength and substance 
of nations on preparations for war, possessing no finality, amenable 
to no alliances that statesmanship can devise, and forever con- 
suming the reserves on which a State must ultimately rely when the 
time of trial comes, if come it must I mean the well-being and 
vitality of its people? 50 

The Prime Minister requested the delegates to "insist, in the 
name of humanity," upon going to the Conference at The 
Hague, as the British hope to attend, "for the purpose of de- 
creasing the burdens of the war and naval budgets." 57 

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, President of the French 
group, who was present In an official capacity at the First 
Hague Conference and had rendered distinguished service to 

54 Christian L. Lange, op. cit., p. 94; G.R., pp. 99-116. 

w Christian L. Lange, "The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Reduction of 
Armaments," The Inter-Parliamentary Union from i^p-ipjp, p. 65* 

66 The Times, July 24, 1906* 

m Official Report of the Conference held in the Royal Gallery of the Home 
of Lords, London, x&oti (London, 1907), p. 221. 


the cause of peace and arbitration in his own country, pre- 
sented a comprehensive and cogent report on the limitation of 
armaments. He considered the question as one of the most 
pressing of those which parliaments and governments were 
called upon to face. All the other items on the Hague program 
were insignificant compared with the limitation of armaments, 
"for which the whole world is waiting.' 5 If the Conference 
failed to act bravely on this subject, it would be condemned 
to avow its impotence and declare its own bankruptcy. 
D'Estournelles was convinced that the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union ought to demand and obtain the inclusion of the question 
of limitation in the program. "Our role," he said, "is to create 
public opinion, or rather to reveal to all peoples that they have 
but one and the same opinion, and that governments ought to 
concert and obey that opinion." M. Messimy, the reporter of 
the Naval and Military Budget in the French Chamber of 
Deputies, followed with a detailed statistical account of the war 
expenditure of the various powers. He concluded by expressing 
the wish for a meeting of a small number of delegates from 
each Parliament whose sole object would be to discuss the 
means to be employed in civilized countries "for putting an end 
to the increase of military budgets, and to maintain them within 
the limits of the figures which they have at present reached." r>8 
The discussion of the problem of the limitation of naval and 
military expenditure was brought to a close by the unanimous 
acceptance of the following resolution: 

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, considering that the increase 
of naval and military expenditure which weighs upon the world is uni- 
versally recognized as Intolerable, expresses the wish that the question 
of limitation be inscribed on the programme of the next Hague 

The Conference decides that each group of the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union shall, without delay, place this resolution before the Govern- 
ment of its country and exercise its most pressing action on the 

58 Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs, II, 287. 


Parliament to which it belongs, in order that the question of limita- 
tion be the object of a national study necessary to the ultimate success 
of the international discussion. 59 

Likewise the Universal Peace Congress at Milan in 1906 
suggested to the governments which were to be represented at 
the Second Hague Conference that proposals for an arrest of 
armaments should be limited to a plan of agreement simply 
stipulating that for a certain period of five years at least, and 
until a conference of the signatory powers had again discussed 
the question, the signatory powers should not increase their 
average total military and naval expenditure. 60 

The twelfth annual Mohonk Conference meeting in the 
summer of 1906 emphasized the urgent necessity of the gen- 
eral restriction of armaments and of the special duty of the 
United States to co-operate with England to this end. Mr. 
John W. Foster, the President of the Conference, expressed in 
his opening address the earnest hope that our government would 
follow up the indication made in the message of the President, 
and that its delegates to The Hague would take the lead in 
bringing about an agreement for a limitation and, if possible, 
a reduction in armaments. 61 He believed that the measure next 
to, if not equal in importance with, compulsory arbitration to 
secure the world's peace, was the limitation and diminution of 
the armaments of the great powers. 62 Chief Justice Stiness, of 
Rhode Island, who spoke after Mr. Foster, urged that an effort 
should be made for some limitation of naval and military 
budgets. 08 Mr. Samuel B. Capen of Boston believed there 
"was never such an hour, never such an occasion to present 
this great question. The omission of it by the Czar from the 

59 C. L. Lange, op, cit., G. R., pp. I27~S7 243-75* 

60 Bulletin Official du XV Congrfa Universal de la Paix t tenu a Milan du 
xs au 22 septembre xgo6 (Berne, 1906), p. 151. 

01 Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on 
International Arbitration, xpoti (1906), pp. 12-16. 
p. 22-26. 


Rescript is most significant, and therefore there is all the more 
need for the United States to press the point, that this question 
shall be in the program." 64 Charles Hamlin of Boston, Presi- 
dent Faunce of Brown University and Mr. Justice Brewer 
of the United States Supreme Court, all reiterated the demand 
for a restriction of armaments. The Conference adopted a 
resolution to the effect that "as the general restriction of arma- 
ments can only be secured by concurrent international action, 
unanimously recommended by the British House of Commons, 
we earnestly hope that this subject will receive careful and 
favorable consideration." This was supplemented by another 
respectfully petitioning President Roosevelt to instruct the 
delegates for the United States to the next Hague Conference 
to urge that body to give favorable consideration to three meas- 
ures, one of which was "a plan for the restriction of armaments 
and if possible for their reduction by concurrent international 
action." 65 

Naturally, after the encouraging addresses and resolutions 
of 1906, there was much surprise at and much publicity given 
to the action of the Lake Mohonk Conference the following year 
when it voted against a resolution "expressing its great satis- 
faction in the support of the President and Secretary of State 
of the United States of the position of the British Government, 
and earnestly hopes that this subject will be freely and fully 
discussed at the coming Hague Conference." ca Although the 
resolution failed, the President of the Conference, President 
Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, while passing 
disarmament by, had urged the wisdom of formal international 
consideration of the possibility of restricting the future growth 
of the great armies and navies of the world, without impairing 
the efficiency of those that existed. 67 He was in entire accord 

M Ibid., p. 27. 

es Ibid., p. 139 ; also Resolutions of the Lake Mohonk Conference on Internet 
tional Arbitration, 1907 (1907), p. 141. 

00 Report of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference 
on International Arbitration, xpo? (1907), p. 141. 

67 Ibid.,p. 16. 


with the position of the British Government. Edwin D. Mead 
maintains that fifteen minutes more discussion, with such men 
as Professor John Bassett Moore and Dean Kirchwey of the 
Columbia University Law School, asking to be heard when 
the debate closed, would have decisively changed the vote. The 
final decision, he claims, should not be regarded as an expression 
of American international sentiment or of the serious judgment 
of the Mohonk Conference itself. Rather that judgment was 
reflected in the strong speeches and united action of 1906; and 
the real voice of the American peace party was heard at the 
National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York in 
April, ipoy. 08 

Secretary of State Elihu Root in an address opening this 
Peace Congress on April 15 stated that the United States 
Government was of the opinion that the subject matter of the 
resolutions of the First Hague Conference ought to be further 
considered and discussed in the Second Conference; that there 
ought to be at least an earnest effort to reach or to make prog- 
ress toward reaching some agreement under which the enor- 
mous expenditure of money and the enormous withdrawal of 
men from productive industry for warlike purposes might be 
reduced, arrested or retarded. The government had not been 
unmindful of the fact that the question was one which pri- 
marily concerned Europe rather than America; that the condi- 
tions which had led to the great armaments of the time were 
mainly European conditions, and that it would ill become us to 
be forward or dogmatic over a matter which was so much more 
vital to the nations of Europe than to ourselves. Secretary 
Root continued: "It sometimes happens, however, that a state 
having little or no special material interest in a proposal can, 
for that very reason, advance the proposal with the more ad- 
vantage and the less prejudice. The American Government 
accordingly, at an early stage of the discussion regarding the 

8 Edwin D, Mead, The Limitation of Armaments, The Position of the 
United States at the Hague Conference, p. 9, 


program, reserved the right to present this subject for the 
consideration of the Conference." It might be that the dis- 
cussion would not bring the Second Conference to any definite 
and practical conclusion; certainly no such conclusion could be 
effective unless it met with practically universal assent, for 
there could be no effective agreement which bound some of the 
great powers and left others free. There would be serious 
difficulties in formulating any definite proposal which would 
not be objectionable to some of the powers. Nevertheless, the 
effort could be made; it might fail in this conference, as it failed 
in the first, but even if it failed one more step would have been 
taken toward ultimate success. Mr. Root warned his audience 
that "long-continued and persistent effort is always necessary 
to bring mankind into conformity with great ideals; every 
great advance that civilization has made on its road from 
savagery has been upon stepping-stones of failure, and a good 
fight bravely lost for a sound principle is always a victory." 69 

Secretary Root was unwilling that the Conference should 
be postponed simply because its meeting might result in failure. 
He did not share Baron d'Estournelles's view that the Con- 
ference should not take place in 1907 because public opinion 
was not yet ready for it. Mr. Root considered that some of the 
subjects to be brought before the Hague Conference could only 
be advanced at all at the risk of failure, and before some of 
them were settled there would perhaps have to be many fail- 
ures, 70 

In making his statement of the position of the United States 
Government before the Arbitration and Peace Congress, the 
Secretary of State emphasized the duty and the power of the 
peace party to create by agitation a public opinion in which 
the government would find its strongest reinforcement. Stu- 

69 Addresses on International Subjects by EHhu Root, pjx 138-39* Address in 
Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, in the City of New York, 
April 15, 1907. 

70 British Documents, VIII, 197, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. Durand, Novem- 
ber 6, 1906. 


dents, teachers and philosophers, men able "to look upon the 
world as It ought to be/' should "press their views upon the 
world and insist upon conformity," until a righteous public 
opinion effects the natural purpose which governments repre- 
sent. Mr. Root said: 

The adoption of a new standard of human action is never the result 
of force or the threat of force; it is always the result of a moral 
process, and to the initiation and continuance of that process public 
assertion and advocacy of the principle are essential. When that 
process has been worked out and the multitude of men whom 
governments represent have reached the point of genuine and not 
perfunctory acceptance of the new standard, governments conform 
themselves to it. 71 

The National Arbitration and Peace Congress unanimously 
endorsed the position of Secretary Root and resolved that the 
time had arrived for decided action towards the limitation of 
the burden of armaments, which had enormously increased 
since 1899, an d requested and urged the Government of the 
United States to instruct its delegates to the Hague Conference 
to support, with the full weight of our national influence, the 
proposition of the British Government as announced by the 
Prime Minister, to have, if possible, the subject of armaments 
considered by the Conference. 72 

American pacifist opinion was anxious for the consideration 
of a definite proposition at the Conference. There might be 
examined the plan proposed by an English committee, of which 
Sir John Macdonell and other eminent jurists were members, 
for the limitation only of budgets each country agreeing that 
its annual naval and military appropriations for the following 
five years should not exceed its average annual expenditure 
during the preceding five. Or the Conference might deal with 
President Roosevelt's proposition, commended in his letter 
to the New York Arbitration and Peace Congress in April, 

71 Elihu Root, op, cit., p. 134. 

72 Edwin D. Mead, op. tit., pp. 2-3. 


1907, that the governments should all agree to build battle- 
ships no larger than those now building. 73 Then there was 
President Eliot's suggestion that a commission of ten or twelve 
men of high standing from the leading nations study together 
ways and means for the restriction and gradual proportionate 
reduction of armaments and report definite recommendations 
to the next subsequent conference; this proposal differed slightly 
from that of M. Albert Gobat who preferred that the Commis- 
sion report later to the Second Conference. 74 These, at least, 
were perfectly definite propositions, and, from the pacifist point 
of view, furnished a clear practical basis for discussion. 

Thus between the First and Second Hague Conferences 
demands came from several distinguished individuals and 
from national and international bodies for a further study of 
the "grave problem" for which Nicholas II had called the First 
Peace Conference, Outside the British Parliament and the vari- 
ous international groups, M. Jean Jaures, Baron d'Estournelles 
de Constant, M. Leon Bourgeois and Gaston Moch were prob- 
ably the most courageous advocates of a reconsideration of the 
problem. But French public opinion as in 1896 was unsympa- 
thetic. France needed the direction of leaders who could or- 
ganize an effective movement of opinion in behalf of peace 
and a limitation of armaments. E. M. Carroll points out that 
men like Baron d'Estournelles and Fr6d<ric Passy could not 
supply this need for they were not closely identified with a large 
political group which they could enlist in support of their 
cause. 75 Not only were leaders with an important following 
needed but also those with a practical program. 

The leadership for international conciliation through the 
acceptance of the status quo as the basis of permanent peace 
came from the Socialists. The most active members of that 

73 Hans Wehberg, The Limitation of Armaments, p. 70, citing Protocole, p, 33, 
Cf. Die Grosse Polilik, XXIII, Part I, No. 7817, pp. 88-89 and British 
ments, VIII, No. 165, p. 195. 

74 Edwin D. Mead, op. cit., pp. 17-18, 20. 

7S E. M. Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs p, 193. 


party in the first decade of the twentieth century were Jean 
Jaures and Francis de Pressense. The former, defeated for re- 
election to the Chamber in 1898, was returned in 1902 and 
immediately attempted to force France to renounce the policies 
and values which for thirty years had been considered funda- 
mental. 76 M. Jaures' motion of 1900 inviting the government 
to initiate negotiations for a simultaneous disarmament failed 
because of the deflection of the "Radical" or right wing of 
the Republican bloc. 77 Disarmament had been included on the 
platform of this group; but Jaures' and Pressense's pronounce- 
ments on the revanche had aroused the indignation and opposi- 
tion of this right wing group. Both Socialist leaders were op- 
posed to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by war; they wanted 
France to acquiesce in the loss of these provinces if they could 
not be recovered peacefully. But the proposition advocated by 
Jaures in 1902 was condemned and even misrepresented. Le 
Temps insisted that the reason for armament bore no relation 
to the Alsace-Lorraine question; its solution "would not hasten 
disarmament by a single hour, nor would it remove a single 
motive for suspicion. . , ." The Petit Journal went so far as 
to say that Jaur&s had proposed "submission to Germany and 
that France should immediately scrap her armaments.' 7 T8 
Clemenceau wrote that the Socialist orator "was mistaken 
in thinking that the people of France did not desire the 
revanche?' 70 Finally, Le Temps asserted that the Socialists 
"do not think, do not feel, nor do they desire what the rest of 
France thinks, feels, or desires . . . nothing can be done with 
them." ao 

In Great Britain the demand for an understanding concern- 
ing armaments was more pronounced; and it received more 

, P. 197- 

78 Ibid>> p. 196, citing Le Temps, September 25, 1902, and the Petit Journal, 
October i, 1902. 

80 Ibid*, pp. 196-97. 


attention than in any other country; first, because the burden 
there was heavier, and, second, because England could agree 
in 1907 to limit her armaments without fear in any direction. 
Her naval supremacy was unchallenged; her insular position 
protected her from the assault of the large conscript armies 
of the Continent; in ten years she had augmented her naval 
and military expenditure from 40,440,000 to 6i,635,ooo. 81 
She alone was prepared to advocate at The Hague an armament 
agreement based on a simultaneous, proportional diminution 
of expenditure or a maintenance of the status quo. 

81 Bulletin de statistique et de legislation compar&e, 1906, p. 593. Expenditure 
on the army had risen from 18,270,000 in 1897-98 to 29,796,000 in 1906-7 
and that on the navy from 22,170,000 to 31,839,000. 



RUSSIA finally took the initiative in summoning the Second 
Hague Conference in a communication of April 3, 1906, ad- 
dressed to the powers signatory to the Hague Convention. But 
this document was not of the type of either the Rescript of 
August, 1898, or the Muraviev Circular of January, 1899. The 
Russian attitude was now different from what it had been at the 
time when the main object of the Tsar, if not of his ministers, 
was the limitation of armaments. Now, after her defeat, Russia 
desired to increase her armaments. Disarmament, therefore, 
was not included in the program. 

In convoking a second Peace Conference [the Circular read] the 
Imperial Government have had in view the necessity of giving a 
fresh development to the humanitarian principles which formed the 
basis of the work of the great international meeting of 1899. 

They are at the same time of opinion that it is desirable to increase 
as far as possible the number of States taking part in the labours of 
the proposed Conference, and the enthusiasm which this appeal 
has met with, proves how deep and widespread is the wish today to 
give effect to ideas having as their object the welfare of humanity. 

The First Conference broke up with the conviction that its work 
would be completed subsequently by the regular progress of the 
enlightenment among the nations and as the result of experience 
gradually acquired. Its most important creation, the International 
Court of Arbitration, is an institution which has already been tested, 
and which has collected for the common weal, as it were in the 
areopagus Court, jurists enjoying universal respect. It has also been 
proved how useful the International Commissions of Inquiry have 
been for settling differences which] have arisen between one State 
and another, 



There are, however, improvements to be made In the Convention 
relative to the pacific settlement of international disputes. . . . 

A Convention respecting these matters would have to be elab- 
orated, and would form one of the most important duties of the next 

Consequently, as it is at present desirable to 1 examine only such 
questions as are of pressing importance, in the light of the experience 
of recent years, leaving untouched those questions which might affect 
the limitation of military and naval forces, the Imperial Government 
put forward as the programme of the proposed meeting the following 
principal points: . , .* 

On the day this Circular was issued, Benckendorff informed 
Sir Edward Grey that in convoking the Second Hague Confer- 
ence for July, Russia desired to secure improvements in the 
Working of the Court and additions to the Rules of War by land 
and sea, but did not propose to discuss the limitation of arma- 
ments. In 1906, the request for a discussion of armament 
budgets came from Great Britain, not Russia; for the newly 
installed Liberal Government wished to limit expenditure on the 
navy in order to have money for the social reform to which 
they were pledged. Moreover, the dStente following the Al- 
gegiras Conference made the time opportune for the British 
Cabinet to strive for a reduction of armaments. 

Therefore, after careful consideration of the program out- 
lined in the note, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secre- 
tary, replied on July 25 that, as he gathered, Russia did not 
desire to exclude discussion of the subject, it was the wish of 
the British Government to see it included, 2 On the same day 
he told the American Ambassador that "we ourselves would be 
able to announce, next year, some reductions on both the Army 

* Parliamentary Papers, "International," 1908, CXXIV (Cd,38S7); "Corre- 
spondence Respecting the Second Peace Conferences Held at The Hague in 1907," 
No. i, pp, 2-3 (translations). 

Four points which concerned improvements in the working of the Court and 
additions to the "Rules of War by land and sea." 

2 Ibid., No. 6, p. 8. Sir Edward Grey to Count BenckendorJf, July 25, 1906. 


and the Navy. At the Conference, we should be prepared to 
propose still further reductions on the Navy in future years, 
provided the other Powers would do something of the same 
kind. 7 ' The British Government were not specially anxious to 
initiate the discussion themselves but they wished the American 
Government to know that "when it was brought forward at the 
Hague Conference they would be ready to support it, both by 
precept and by example. 3 ' 3 

As the Russian Foreign Office felt itself unable to fix a date 
for the meeting of the Second Peace Conference before the great 
powers signified their agreement to the program, communica- 
tions went on actively for nearly a year concerning the attitudes 
of the different governments towards the subjects to be dis- 
cussed at the coming meeting. As a result of this direct corre- 
spondence, at least four of the European powers announced their 
unwillingness to discuss a limitation of armaments. 

On May 17, 1906, Sir F. Bertie, the British Ambassador in 
Paris, transmitted to Sir Edward Grey an extract from a speech 
delivered the day before in Algeria by M. Thomson, the Minister 
of Marine, in which he declared that it would be highly impru- 
dent for France to check her naval armaments. a She was 
bound to maintain her rank as second naval Power in the 
world, and not to expose herself to the risk of losing it even for 
a few hours." Sir F. Bertie added that the Minister's observa- 
tions were in the nature of a reply to the open letter addressed 
to him by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant advocating a reduc- 
tion of armaments. 4 

The attitude of the Minister of Marine did not differ greatly 
from that of M, Cambon who was apprehensive that a discussion 
in full Conference on the subject of limitation of armaments 
might not only result in nothing, but might seern ridiculous. He 
saw, however, a diplomatic yet harmless method of disposing 

3 British Documents, VIII, No, 162, p, 191, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. 
Durand, July 25, 1906, 

4 Ibid. f No* i#9, 189. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, May 17, 1906, 


of the question. He suggested that the subject had much better 
be referred to a committee of jurisconsults or of delegates 
belonging to the great powers, and that its consideration by the 
full Conference might meanwhile be adjourned. M. Cambon 
also thought that the uneasiness which had arisen in the United 
States with regard to Japan had started a movement in America 
in favor of building ships, and this might make the United 
States reluctant to take the initiative at the Hague Conference. 
When Sir Edward Grey asked the French Ambassador whether, 
in case Great Britain and Germany were able to attain some 
mutual agreement to suspend naval construction, he thought 
other countries might do the same, Cambon replied that "France 
was in arrears, and he did not think she could diminish Naval 
expenditure unless an agreement was also made in favour of 
the limitation of Military as well as Naval expenditure." 5 In 
fact, the French Government saw no need for the British to 
include the question of the limitation of armaments in the 
program of the Second Peace Conference, since this was a 
subject that had been particularly excluded by the Russian 
Government and one on which the views of the German Gov- 
ernment were so well known. But should the initiative be taken 
by some other Government, by that of the United States, for 
instance, the French would be compelled to support it in order 
to satisfy public opinion. 6 

Just before the Conference met in June, 1907, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a reply to M. Pressens6's inter- 
pellation, declared that in case the disarmament question should 
become acute at The Hague, diplomatists would be supplied 
with the procedure to enable them to find a formula for the 
proposal. 7 

In the early months of 1907, Professor de Martens of St. 
Petersburg visited Berlin, Paris and London to sound the powers 
with regard to the discussion of the reduction or limitation of 

s Ibid., No. 177, pp. 206-7, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie, February 14, 

6 Ibid., No, 170, p. 199. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, December S 1906, 

7 Echo de Paris, No. 8394, June 8, 1907. 


armaments at the Hague Conference. On February 15, he 
talked with Sir Edward Grey who informed him that he pre- 
ferred the subject to be labelled "Expenditure on Armaments" 
rather than "Disarmament." Sir Edward thought it most desir- 
able that a discussion in this form should take place. In view 
of the attention already given to the subject by public opinion 
and by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the British statesman 
thought there would be great disappointment if it were not dis- 
cussed; indeed he felt that the Conference would lose in pres- 
tige if it separated without venturing to touch this question. 

Professor de Martens asked the Foreign Secretary whether 
he considered that the discussion must be "a serious one, and 
not that the matter should simply be raised and buried in half- 
an-hour." When Sir Edward Grey replied that he certainly 
thought that the discussion "must be a serious one/' Professor 
de Martens dwelt upon the danger of friction arising and sug- 
gested previous discussion between the great powers. 8 

While the Russian envoy was in London, Sir Edward Grey 
wrote to President Roosevelt to ascertain if the Americans were 
going to raise the question. He knew that if the Hague Con- 
ference separated without discussing expenditure on armaments, 
Parliament would have to be given a definite answer as to why 
nothing could be done, and that if need be, he "must get a *y es ' 
or 'no 7 from Germany by putting a direct question." 

"Meanwhile," Grey wrote, "if your Delegates bring the sub- 
ject forward, ours will be instructed to support; but if you 
decide not to take the initiative (which I should very much 
regret) I should like to know in good time, that I may con- 
sider what course it is best to take. It will be a poor lame 
Conference if the Powers all meet there and shirk the ques- 
tion. . . . 9 

Thus the position of the British Government in the early 

8 British Documents, VIII, No. 179, pp. 209-10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. 
Nicholson, February 15, 1906; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, 
p. 1 102. Ambassador Reid to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1907, 

British Documents, VIII, No. 175, p. 203. Sir Edward Grey to President 
Roosevelt, February 12, 1907. 


months of 1907 was: They had told the Russian Government 
that they desired to see the question of expenditure on arma- 
ments discussed, but if this was mentioned in the invitation 
they wished the American Government also to state their 
opinion. Sir Edward Grey hoped, for the sake of public senti- 
ment, that the limitation of armaments would be considered at 
the Conference but realized that some mention of the subject 
should be made in the invitation as otherwise a discussion of it 
at The Hague could be ruled out. He did not, however, wish 
Great Britain to be isolated in any proposal. 

Finally, in March, Professor de Martens, the learned scholar 
and jurist who was in close touch with the Russian Foreign 
Office, suggested a plan which would save the face of the British 
while placing their proposal on the program, yet would not 
injure the sensibilities of the German delegates. He thought, 
as Sir A. Nicholson 10 informed the Foreign Secretary, that it 
would be advisable before the Russian Government issued 
invitations, if the British Government were confidentially to 
explain at Berlin a harmless procedure which might be followed 
at the Conference in regard to the question of limitation of 
armaments, namely, "that the question should be submitted to 
Conference and then referred to a Special Committee of naval 
and military experts, who, before the termination of Confer- 
ence, would present a report concluding with a Resolution/' 

In view of the feeling which on his second visit Professor 
de Martens found existing at Berlin, he was strongly in favor of 
this course. He further suggested that his proposed step should 
be taken at the German capital before the formal request of the 
British Government to have the question discussed was com- 
municated to St. Petersburg, so that the Russian Government 
would, "in issuing final invitation, simply accompany it with a 
communication of the desire of His Majesty's Government" n 

10 British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. 

11 British Documents, VIII, No, 185, p. 215. Sir A. Nicholson to Sir E. Grey, 
March 14, 1907. 


Sir Edward Grey, although he did not object to referring the 
question of the limitation of armaments to a committee, was 
skeptical about the above method of procedure, for it was bound 
to shift to some extent the initiative onto the British Govern- 
ment. He wished to ascertain whether the United States would 
advocate this plan at Berlin concurrently with Great Britain. 
Accordingly he telegraphed to Mr. Bryce, the British Ambassa- 
dor in Washington, as follows: 

I should be ready to agree to the question when raised at the Con- 
ference being referred to a Committee representing the Great Powers, 
who should report to the Conference. I do not think this Committee 
should be restricted to Naval and Military experts. Our desire is to 
act with the United States and I cannot therefore commit myself 
to any procedure without knowing whether they agree. Please there- 
fore ascertain the views of the American Government upon this 
telegram, especially on the two points of what should be said as 
regards expenditure on armaments in the invitation issued by the 
Russian Government and whether the procedure should be accepted. 
I do not propose that any scheme for restricting expenditure on arma- 
ments should be formulated before the Conference, but if no mention 
of the subject is made in the invitation any discussion whatever 
may be ruled out when the Conference meets. 12 

Already, even before the final invitation had been issued, the 
proposal for a limitation of armaments was moribund. It may 
be true that the British and American Governments wished that 
there should be some consideration of the subject at the Confer- 
ence, but the other great powers were certainly not so inclined. 
Discussion of the problem in Conference had been forestalled 
by a process of direct communication between the governments 
having the greater immediate interest in the subject. Prince von 
Billow, the German Chancellor, stated that he was not opposed 
to a discussion, but Germany could not assent to a solution that 
might be antagonistic to her interests. The Emperor, however, 

, VIII, No. 186, p, 217. Telegram of Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce, 
March 15, 1907, 


was opposed to any discussion 13 and Russia did not want to 
offend Germany in the matter. Professor de Martens declared 
that the Russian Government was' not opposed to a disarma- 
ment discussion and did not wish to be so considered; but 
wanted the Conference to proceed without friction. 14 Count 
Karl von Wedel, a German diplomat, considered it incompatible 
with the dignity of a great power to allow any state to interfere 
in so vital an affair. 15 "It is an encroachment on the rights of 
a sovereign," said the Tsar who had proposed the same idea in 
1898. Count Muraviev dismissed the intentions of the "Friends 
of Peace' 3 as "Utopias." 16 In a public pronouncement, the 
Italian Foreign Secretary, Signer Tittoni, stated that the Italian 
delegates would support the British, and he informed the United 
States Government that if the English proposals encountered 
difficulties the Italian delegates would bring forth substitute 
propositions. 17 But in an informal conversation with Mr. Gris- 
com, the American Ambassador in Rome, Signor Tittoni said 
that the "Italian delegates to the conference would neither take 
part in the discussion nor vote on the question of limitation of 
armaments." 18 Baron d ? Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign 
Minister, regretted the desire of the British to enlarge the scope 
of the discussion by raising this question. He, like the German 
Foreign Office, found material enough in the Russian program 
as announced, and did not think it necessary to add new sub- 
jects. D'Aehrenthal was certain that no practical results would 
be obtained and that therefore to raise the question "would be 
simply to waste the time of the Conference; moreover, it would, 

13 Erich Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege (Berlin, 1925) , p, 244, 
based on the observations of the Kaiser published in a newspaper, August 6, 

14 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, p. 1103, Ambassador White 
to Secretary of State, Rome, March i, 1907, 

15 Die Grosse Politik, XXIII, Part I, No. 7860, pp, 135-36, Count Karl von 
Wedel to Prince Billow, February 27, 1907. 

10 Ibid., p. 105, Count Monts to Prince von Bblow, January 22, 1907. 

17 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, No, 863, p, xio$. Italian Am- 
bassador to the Secretary of State, April 5, 1907, 

18 f bid., p. 1106. Ambassador Griscom to the Secretary of State, April 6 


not improbably, lead to friction and would be apt to disturb 
rather than improve the general relations between the Powers." 
To this Sir E. Goschen, then British Ambassador at Vienna, 
replied that he could not see why the mere fact of bringing the 
subject of expenses on armaments before the Conference should 
have any disagreeable consequences. For, he explained, "if 
after the question had been raised, it was held that the discus- 
sion was useless or premature, that would," he presumed, "be 
for the time being the end of the matter." 19 

The attitude of the United States as to the consideration of 
the subject of limiting armaments was stated in a letter from 
the Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador dated June 7, 
1906. Mr. Root wrote that the Government was not unmindful 
of the fact that the people of the United States dwell in com- 
parative security, partly by reason of their isolation and partly 
because they have never become involved in the numerous 
questions to which many centuries of close neighborhood had 
given rise in Europe. They were, therefore, free from the appre- 
hensions of attack which are to so great an extent the cause of 
large armaments; and it would ill become them to be insistent 
in a matter so much more vital to the nations of Europe than 
to them. Nevertheless, sometimes the very absence of a special 
interest in a subject enables a nation to make suggestions which 
a more deeply interested nation might hesitate to present. The 
Government of the United States, therefore, felt it to be its duty 
to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace 
Conference as one of the subjects of consideration the reduction 
or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further 
could be accomplished, some slight advance might be made 
toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the 
Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference. 20 

10 British Documents, VIII, No. 190, p. 219, Sir E. Goschen to Sir E, Grey, 
March 23, 1907. 

30 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, No. 27, pp. 1635-37. The 
Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador, June 7, 1906; J. B. Scott, The 
Hague Peace Conferences American Instructions and Reports (Washington, 
1916), p. 75. 


President Roosevelt at first hoped that the Conference would 
consider limiting the size of battleships to 15,000 tons. 21 He 
quite agreed with Captain Mahan that it was absurd for the 
different nations to try to outvie each other in building big 
ships. He thought that the Dreadnought was "quite as big as 
any ship need be/ 7 and his idea was that a proposal should be 
brought forward at the Hague Conference "that no ship should 
in future be built bigger than the Dreadnought." The President 
asked Count Gleichen to put the proposition before the British 
Government and to ask them what they thought about it. 23 
While promising to support Great Britain at The Hague, Mr. 
Roosevelt warned Sir Edward Grey and Haldane not to let 
themselves be led away by emotional ideas. "Wars are not 
conducted on sentimental principles/' he said, "and I am afraid 
of the present Government giving way to the noisy sentimental- 
ity of their followers, in opposition to their own good sense." 23 

President Roosevelt had very little faith in the Conference 
accomplishing much, as can be gathered from the following 
passage in a letter he wrote to Mr. Andrew Carnegie on 
August 5, 1906: 

I hope to see real progress made at the next Hague Conference. 
If it is possible in some way to bring about a stop, complete or partial, 
to the race in adding to armaments, I shall be glad; but I do not yet 
see my way clear as regards the details of such a plan. We must 
always remember that it would be a fatal thing for the great free 
people to reduce themselves to impotence and leave the despotisms 
and barbarians armed. It would be safe to do so if there were some 
system of international police; but there is now no such system. 24 

In short, Roosevelt's opinion was that sufficient naval and 
military force should be kept up to make the higher civilizations 
masters of the world. 

21 Die >Gros$e Politik, XXIII, I, No. 7817, pp. 88-89. Correspondence between 
Tschirschky and Tirpitz, September 7 and October xo, 1906; and Speck von 
Sternburg to the Foreign Office, October 9, 1906 (No. 7818, p 89). 

22 British Documents, VIII, No. 165, p, 195. Count Gleichen to Sit M* 
Durand, September 2, 1906. 

24 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (Scribner's, London, 

I92O), I. 21-22. 


Thus, during the year between the proposal for the Second 
Hague Conference and the issue of the final invitation, the 
governments of the world discussed with one another their 
attitude toward the question of limiting armament expenditure. 
Nevertheless, during this period, one power, Great Britain, 
showed evidence of good faith by announcing in July, 1906, 
that one of the four battleships of the Cawdor program would 
be omitted, with corresponding reduction in destroyers and 
submarines. This step did not evoke a favorable response from 
Berlin, for the next month the Kaiser, in a conversation with 
Sir Frank Lascelles, informed the British Ambassador that "in 
case the disarmament question came up in any form whatever 
(at the Conference), German participation was to cease, for I 
as well as my people would never tolerate any prescription by 
foreigners regarding the condition of our Navy and Army. 7 ' 
To this Sir Frank replied: "I perfectly understand, and quite 
agree with you, that that is quite out of the question, and 
impossible. It is exactly the same with us." 25 

About the same time, August 15, 1906, King Edward visited 
his nephew at Cronberg. No strictly political conversation took 
place between His Majesty and the Kaiser, but the German 
Emperor reported to President Roosevelt in. January, 1907, that 
"the King himself took the initiative in telling me that he 
entirely disapproved of the New Conference and that he con- 
sidered it as a ^humbug. 7 The King told me that he not only 
thought the Conference useless, as nobody would, in case of 
need, feel bound by its decisions, but even as dangerous. It was 
to be feared that instead of harmony more friction would be the 
result. 77 * M 

The Kaiser admitted that he did not conceal from His 
Majesty that he himself was not enthusiastic about the Con- 
ference, and especially told the King and Sir Charles Hardinge 

Grosse Politik, XXIII, I, No, 7815, pp, 85-86. William II in con- 
versation with Sir F. Lascelles, August 15, 1906, 

m lbid. f p, 93, Telegram from German Emperor to President Roosevelt, 
January 5> 1907; also, Scrtfonefs Magazine, April, 1920, p. 397; Sir Sidney Lee, 
King Edward VII (Macmillan, London, 1924), II, 529-30. 


that Germany could not recede from her naval program laid 
down six years before, but that Germany did not build up a 
fleet with aggressive tendencies against any other power; she 
did so only in order to protect her own territory and commercial 
interests. 27 

On the other hand, William II, in a conversation with 
Hardinge, is said to have ridiculed the approaching Hague 
Conference by calling it "great nonsense," and to have urged 
that direct negotiations between the great powers would be 
more successful in regulating naval warfare. When the ques- 
tion of a limitation of armaments was raised he declared that 
"Germany since the peace of Tilsit, had depended on the 
strength of her own right arm, and her safety lay in her present 
overwhelming army. She could put into the field three million 
more men than France and crush France by sheer weight of 
numbers." Despite his boastfulness, the Kaiser showed a desire 
for good relations with England and hinted that he was fully 
prepared to discuss conditions of naval warfare with her before 
the Conference. 28 

Undeterred by the hostility of the Kaiser to a discussion of 
armaments, the British Prime Minister made an impressive 
appeal to Europe in an article entitled "The Hague Confer- 
ence and the Limitation of Armaments/' published in The 
Nation, a liberal weekly, March 2, 1907. He wrote: 

The disposition shown by certain Powers of whom Great Britain 
is one, to raise the question of the limitation of armaments at the 
approaching Hague Conference, has evoked some objections both at 
home and abroad, on the ground that such action would be ill-timed, 
inconvenient, and mischievous. I wish to indicate, as briefly as may 
be, my reasons for holding these objections to be baseless. 

It should be borne in mind that the original Conference at The 
Hague was convened for the purpose of raising this very question, and 
in the hope that the Powers might arrive at an understanding calcu- 


28 Sir Sidney Lee, op, dt. f II, 530, 


iated to afford some measure of relief from an excessive and ever- 
increasing burden* The hope was not fulfilled, nor was it expected 
that agreement on so delicate and complex a matter would be reached 
at the first attempt; but, on the other hand, I have never heard it 
suggested that the discussion left behind it any injurious conse- 
quences. I submit that it is the business of those who are opposed 
to the renewal of the attempt, to show that some special and essential 
change of circumstances has arisen, such as to render unnecessary, 
inopportune, or positively mischievous a course adopted with general 
approbation in 1898. 

Nothing of the kind has, so far as I know, been attempted, and I 
doubt if it could be undertaken with any hope of success. It was 
desirable in 1898, to lighten the burden of armaments; but that 
consummation is not less desirable to-day, when the weight of the 
burden has been enormously increased. . . . 

I am aware of no special circumstances which would make the 
submission of this question to the Conference a matter of Interna- 
tional misgiving. . . . Since the first Hague Conference was held, the 
points of disagreement between the Powers have become not more but 
less acute; they are confined to a far smaller field; the sentiment in 
favour of peace, so far as can be judged, has become incomparably 
stronger and more constant; and the idea of arbitration and the 
peaceful adjustment of International disputes has attained a practical 
potency, and a moral authority undreamt of in 1898. . . . 

Let me in conclusion say a word as to the part of Great Britain. 
We have already given earnest of our sincerity by the considerable 
reductions that have been effected in our naval and military expendi- 
ture, as well as by the undertaking that we are prepared to go 
further, if we find a similar disposition in other quarters. Our dele- 
gates, therefore, will not go into the Conference empty-handed. It 
has, however, been suggested that our example will count for nothing, 
because our preponderant naval position will still remain unimpaired. 
I do not believe it. The sea power of this country implies no challenge 
to any single State or group of States. . . . Our known adhesion to 
those two dominant principles the independence of nationalities 
and the freedom of trade entitles us of itself to claim that if our 
fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the 
waters of the world, but a message of the most cordial goodwill, 
based on a belief in the community of interests between nations. 29 

30 The Nation (London) (March 2, 1907), 1, 4; also, J. A. Spender, Sir Henry 
Campbelt~Bannerman f II (Houghton, London, 1923), 328-30. 


This article had been submitted to Sir Edward Grey and 
most carefully discussed with the Foreign Secretary before it 
was issued. The writer was certain that words could not have 
been more carefully chosen to avoid offense or misunderstand- 
ing, but the result was extremely discouraging. Le Temps, in 
referring to it, stated that "this article, which has made England 
ridiculous in the eyes of the world, has caused no pleasure in 
France and has awakened evident irritation in Germany." 30 
King Edward, who was at Biarritz at the time, wrote, among 
other things, on a report of a Cabinet meeting sent him: "I am 
disgusted at his article in The Nation and his backing up the 
Women's Franchise Bill. Both are unnecessary and the matter 
very undigested. I suppose he will support the Channel Tunnel 
Bill next week!" 31 From the first His Majesty had desired 
that his Government should not initiate the discussion of limi- 
tation of armaments at The Hague and was willing that Great 
Britain should support such a proposal only if coming from the 
American delegates. It is a matter of conjecture to what extent 
his opinions on the subject were influenced by President Roose- 
velt. King Edward was supported in his view by the Ad- 
miralty, 32 who, as at the time of the Conference of 1899, were 
opposed to any reduction of naval force. 

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's sincerity was, however, 
confirmed by a Navy program of three capital ships and a 
promise to drop one of them if other powers would do the same. 
The offer was communicated officially to seven nations, but, on 
April 30, von Billow, to whom the invitation was virtually 
addressed, announced in the Reichstag that the German Gov- 
ernment could not participate in a discussion which they be- 
lieved to be unpractical, if not actually dangerous. At the same 
time the British Government were informed that if anything 
was to be done in this direction it must be through the ordinary 

30 Le Temps, March 7, 1907. 

31 Sidney Lee, op. tit., II, 467. 
02 Ibid, pp. 438-39. 


diplomatic channels. In the meanwhile Russia and Austria 
expressed a desire to postpone the question. 

Despite the conciliatory attitude of the British Prime Minis- 
ter, a warm believer in the principle of conditional programs in 
naval construction, the German General Staff regarded his offer 
as part of a plan concerted with France to put pressure on 
Germany. To a large number of Germans the publication of 
the Nation article seemed paradoxical. Only one year before 
Great Britain had launched the Dreadnought, a new type of 
fighting vessel whose superiority over all other battleships then 
afloat had been repeatedly emphasized by Sir John Fisher. The 
Home Fleet was being concentrated in the North Sea, and Mr. 
Haldane was busily organizing an expeditionary force to oper- 
ate on the Continent, but certainly not against France or Russia. 
That the supreme Naval Power at the moment of its own great 
preponderance desired a halt in naval competition seemed the 
antithesis of conciliation. In Berlin many believed that Great 
Britain together with France and Russia wished to force the 
issue with Germany before she became too formidable at sea. 33 

Though the sincerity and enthusiasm of Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman may not have been doubted in his own country, the 
wisdom of his policy was certainly questioned. On March 5, 
on presentation of the naval budget for 1907-8, Mr. Arthur 
Lee, Conservative M. P. and naval specialist, stated that Eng- 
land had already sacrificed enough on the altar of peace in 
reducing her naval program and peace effective. He felt it 
would be more honest for Great Britain to go before the Hague 
Conference with the two-power Standard as the basis of her 
minimum and if the Government liked, as her maximum 
strength; but he did not want Britain to make herself "ridicu- 
lous in the eyes of the world by going before the Conference 
with the bait of one 'Dreadnought' which might be dropped if 
other Powers cut out something else, as if we were putting out 

33 On this point see: J. A. Spender, Sir Henry Campbett-Bannerman, II, 
330-31; and J. A* Spender, Fifty Yews of Europe (London, 1933), p. 267. 


a piece of toasted cheese to catch unwary mice. The other 
powers were not unwary, and they would not be fooled in that 
way." He hoped that the Prime Minister, when at the Confer- 
ence he held out that bait to the other Powers, would be able to 
obtain some result in suspending shipbuilding, but he did not 
believe that any such thing was possible. 34 

Finally, by April 3, 1907, all the powers to which the Imperial 
Government had, in April, 1906, communicated their draft 
proposals as to the work to be undertaken by the new Confer- 
ence, had expressed their adhesion. But before summoning the 
meeting the Imperial Government thought it their duty to fur- 
nish the powers which had accepted their invitation with a 
statement of their position. 

Accordingly, Count Benckendorff reported that Great Britain, 
Spain and the United States desired a discussion on disarma- 
ment, while the last country had introduced an additional ques- 
tion, namely, the passing of an agreement for restricting the 
employment of force for the recovery of ordinary public debts 
resulting from contracts. 

But the Imperial Government considered it their duty to 
state that, on their side, "they adhere to their proposals of 
April, 1906, as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference, 
and that, in the event of the Conference initiating a discussion 
which did not appear to them likely to lead to a practical issue 
they reserve in their turn the right of abstaining from such 
discussion/ 7 At the same time the Russian Foreign Minister 
announced that similar observations had been made by the 
German and Austro-Hungarian Governments. 

Soon the nations appointed their delegates and issued to 
them detailed instructions. Those of Great Britain and the 
United States are particularly interesting, for they concern the 
initiation of the proposal for a limitation of armaments. On 
June 12, the British Foreign Secretary signed elaborate instruo- 

34 Parliamentary Debates, Fourth series, CLXX, col. 668. 


tlons to Sir Edward Fry, who was accompanied by Sir E. Satow, 
Lord Reay, Sir H. Howard, British Minister at The Hague, 
with General Ellis and Captain Ottley, Director of Naval Intel- 
ligence, as experts. The Government had now acceded to the 
views of the King and Admiralty and merely decided to support 
a proposal from the American delegates. From the following 
it is obvious that caution was the keynote of these instruc- 
tions : 

The Government, in accepting the invitation, reserves the right of 
suggesting the discussion of other questions. Foremost among them 
is that of expenditure upon armaments. . . . They felt it was better 
to have a discussion, even if it did not lead to a satisfactory con- 
clusion. Discussion without results would, at any rate, have kept the 
door open for continuing negotiations on the subject. Whereas to put 
the question aside would seem like an admission that it was hopeless, 
and had receded since the First Conference, of which it was the 
prime object. . . . 

The position of Germany both as a military and as a naval Power 
is such that it is difficult to regard as serious any discussion in which 
she does not take part. His Majesty's Government would be most 
reluctant that anything should take place at The Hague Conference, 
summoned, as it is, in the interest of peace, that would be of a 
nature, to cause friction or ill-feeling. You will therefore consult 
closely with your United States colleagues, and ascertain what in- 
structions they have, and consider with them what line it is best 
to take. 

Should it be decided that the subject shall be discussed and a 
practical proposal invited, you are authorised to say that His Maj- 
esty's Government would agree to a proposal that the Great Powers 
should communicate to each other in advance their programmes of 
new naval construction. . . . His Majesty's Government are aware 
that this would not necessarily lead to any reduction in expenditure; 
but they are hopeful that the mere fact of communication between 
the Powers would provide opportunities for negotiations that do not 
now exist, and would tend to alleviate the burden of expenditure or 
retard its increase. 80 

At the same time the British delegates were instructed that 
Great Britain could not agree to abandon the right of capture 

38 Parliamentary Paper s t op, at., pp. 12-13. 


at sea, except in return for concessions of equal value. On this 
point the Foreign Secretary informed Sir Edward Fry that: 

It is probable that a proposal will be brought before The Hague 
Conference to sanction the principle of the immunity of enemies' 
merchant ships and private property from capture at sea in time of 
war. ... It must be remembered that the principle, if carried to its 
logical conclusion, must entail the abolition of the right of com- 
mercial blockade. During recent years the proportion between the 
British army and the great Continental armies has come to be such 
that the British army, if operating alone, can not be regarded as a 
means of offence against the mainland of a great Continental Power. 
For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war, 
Great Britain has, therefore, to rely on the navy alone. His Majesty's 
Government cannot, therefore, authorise you to agree to any Resolu- 
tion which would diminish the effective means which the navy has 
of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy. 

You should, however, raise no objection to the discussion of this 
question of immunity from capture at the Conference, nor should you 
refuse to participate in it, nor need you necessarily take the initiative 
in opposing a Resolution. ... If at some future date the great con- 
tinental armies were to be diminished . . . and if it became apparent 
that such a change could be brought about by an agreement to secure 
this immunity from capture at sea under all circumstances, and was 
dependent upon it, the British Government might feel that the risks 
they would run by adhering to such an agreement . . . would be 
outweighed by the general gain and relief. 36 

We shall see how the refusal of the Admiralty to dispense with 
this powerful weapon placed Great Britain in an awkward posi- 
tion at The Hague. 

On the question of the limitation of armaments the Instruc- 
tions to the American delegates were as cautious as those to the 
British. The delegates were reminded that upon every question 
it is important to remember that the object of the Conference 
was agreement, and not compulsion. After reasonable discus- 
sion, if no agreement were reached, it would be better to lay 

3& British Documents, VIII, No. 206, pp. 246-47, Instructions to British 
Plenipotentiaries, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Fry, June xa, 1907* 


the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference. 37 The 
policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances and to 
refrain from any interference or participation in the political 
affairs of Europe, the delegates were instructed, must be kept in 
mind, and might impose upon them some degree of reserve in 
respect of some of the questions discussed by the Conference. 38 
After quoting the contents of Secretary Root's letter of June 7, 
1906, to the Russian Ambassador, 39 the instructions stated that 
there should be a sincere effort to learn whether, by conference 
and discussion, some practicable formula might not be worked 
out which would have the effect of limiting or retarding the 
increase of armaments. The United States Government was 
still of opinion that this subject should be regarded as unfinished 
business, and that the Second Hague Conference should ascer- 
tain and give full consideration to the results of such exami- 
nation as the governments might have given to the possibility 
of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First 
Conference. Regret was expressed that discussion should have 
taken place before rather than at the Conference, for discussion 
at the Conference would have afforded a greater probability of 
progress toward the desired result. The fact, however, could 
not be ignored. 40 The final instructions to the delegates were as 
follows : 

If any European Power proposes consideration of the subject, 
you will vote in favor of consideration and do everything you prop- 
erly can to promote it. If, on the other hand, no European Power 
proposes consideration of the subject, and no new and affirmative 
evidence is presented to satisfy you that a useful purpose would be 
subserved by your making such a proposal, you may assume that the 

37 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, Part 2, pp, 1129-30. "Instruc- 
tions to the American Delegates to The Hague Conference, 1907," Messrs. 
Joseph H, Choate, Horace Porter, Uriah M, Rose, David Jayne Hill, George B. 
Davis, Charles S. Sperry and William I, Buchanan, pp. 1128-37; also James 
Brown Scott, op. tit., pp. 71-76. 

08 Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit,, p. 1131. 

g Ibid*, pp. 1131-32. 


limitations above stated by way of guidance to your action preclude 
you from asking the Conference to consider the subject. 41 

The Second Hague Conference sat from June 15 to October 
18, with M. Nelidov, who represented Russia, presiding. At 
the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Latin American re- 
publics had been invited; consequently, forty-four sovereign 
states sent delegates to this Conference which thus was more 
truly international than the first. 

It was known beforehand that any proposal in regard to the 
limitation of armaments would have no immediate results; 
nevertheless, a discussion was initiated by Sir Edward Fry on 
August 17 at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference. 
He began by quoting the Muraviev Circular of 1898, and then 
pronounced its true and eloquent words to be more opportune 
than ever. Since then the armament expenditures of Europe, 
the United States and Japan, had risen from 251 to 320 millions 
of pounds sterling. He was quite sure that the Conference 
agreed with him that the fulfillment of the desire expressed by 
the Emperor of Russia and by the First Conference would be 
a great blessing for the whole of humanity. Sir Edward as- 
sured the body that his Government was a convinced supporter 
of these high aspirations, and that it charged him to invite the 
Conference to co-operate for the realization of this noble desire, 
He proceeded to say: 


The Government of Great Britain will be prepared to com- 
municate annually to Powers which would pursue the same course 
the program for the construction of new ships of war and the expendi- 
ture which this program would entail. This exchange of information 
would facilitate an exchange of views between Governments on the 
subject of the reductions which it might be possible to effect by mutual 

The British Government believes that in this way it might be 
possible to arrive at an understanding with regard to the expenditure 

41 LOG. dt. 


which the States which should undertake to adopt this course would 
be justified in incorporating in their estimates. 

In conclusion, therefore, Mr. President, I have the honour to 
propose to you the adoption of the following resolution: 

The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Con- 
ference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; 
and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased 
in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares 
that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume 
the serious examination of this question. 42 

The British proposition was supported by the United States, 
France and Spain. The delegates of the Argentine Republic 
and Chile presented to the Conference their treaty of May 28, 
1902, and the supplementary agreement of January 9, 1903, in 
the belief that these protocols might be of some use in the study 
of Great Britain's proposals. The discussion was concluded by 
a brief address from the President. In 1899, M. Nelidov de- 
clared, the discussions had been so lively that they had threat- 
ened to wreck the Conference. Therefore, the Russian Govern- 
ment this time had refrained from placing the limitation of 
armaments upon the program. He continued, "If the question 
was not ripe in 1899, It is not any more so in 1907. It has not 
been possible to do anything on these lines, and the Conference 
to-day finds itself as little prepared to enter upon them as in 
i899- 48 He could only applaud the English initiative and recom- 
mend the Conference to unite in accepting the resolution as it 
had been proposed by Sir Edward Fry. 

In the absence of the German delegates the resolution was 
accepted with unanimous applause, whereupon the President 
announced that the unanimity of the acclamation made it un- 
necessary to proceed to a vote. 

Thus the question of limitation of armaments was quietly, 
quickly, peacefully and respectfully laid to rest. The discussion 

42 J. B. Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference 
of xgo? (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920), I, 89-90. 


had lasted only twenty-five minutes, a period shorter by five 
minutes than Professor de Martens had originally suggested 
for consideration of the subject. 44 It had not even been neces- 
sary to refer the matter to a Committee of Experts. 

The friends of peace had hope for something more substantial 
than this academic resolution; but under the circumstances it 
would not have been "diplomatic" for the British Government 
to have proceeded further. Germany, Russia and Austria, it was 
definitely known, stood in the way. France was not anxious 
for a limitation of armaments, though, for the sake of appear- 
ances, she was ready to take part in a harmless discussion. The 
Admiralties and War Offices of most countries were opposed to 
the idea. It is not likely that any result would have been 
reached at the Conference, even if Germany had consented to 
a discussion. It was Germany's frankness rather than her 
policy that distinguished her from other great powers. Never- 
theless, she acted unwisely, for she has had to shoulder the 
blame for the failure of the world to disarm in 1899 and again 
in 1907. 

The brief twenty-five minute discussion provided the British 
delegates with a clear conscience. They did "all in their power," 
as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, "and if greater results 
were not obtained, it must be borne in mind that all progress in 
these matters depends on general consent, and that any attempt 
to force the pace beyond the general goodwill of nations is 
bound to have a negative result, and may even lead to friction, 
which is a good deal worse than the negative result.' 7 

Apart from disarmament the only other subjects on the 
agenda which interested the general public were arbitration 
and the immunity of private property at sea, the second of 
which was brought forward by the United States and firmly 
resisted by the British Admiralty. Germany, Austria and Italy 
supported the Americans, while the British were placed in a 
position in which they seemed to be holding out for the largest 

44t Supm f p. 325. 


belligerent rights against the human opinion of the rest of the 
world. The civilian representatives of the British Liberal Gov- 
ernment could do nothing against the obduracy of the experts, 

The beau role, as Lord Reay complained, had certainly 
passed to Germany. One of the grounds on which large navies, 
and above all a large German Navy, were demanded, was the 
necessity of defending commerce in time of war. It seemed only 
logical that, if this danger were removed, one of the excuses 
for naval armaments would disappear and disarmament could 
then be seriously considered. But so long as the British Ad- 
miralty insisted on the right to capture merchant ships Germany 
must build a fleet capable of protecting her rapidly expanding 
commerce and one that would be respected on the high seas. 

The German naval experts were well aware of the effect that 
an agreement on the immunity of private property at sea would 
have on their fleet in being, and at heart would not have wanted 
such a proposal to be carried; for, at the time of the First 
Hague Conference, Captain Siegel had expressed his opposition 
to the idea. He well knew that if private property at sea were 
declared inviolable, demands would at once be raised in Ger- 
many for a diminution of naval war material, particularly of 
cruisers, since their chief purpose, to protect trade, would no 
longer be included in the tasks of the navy; then it would be 
asserted that in future only battleships were necessary. The 
naval experts wanted above all to combat such agitation, for 
they considered a reduction of the cruiser fleet the greatest 
mistake. Was it not this type of fleet that made Great Britain 
"able to maintain her character as the strongest Power all over 
the world'? 45 

The unyielding opposition of the British technical delegates 
to the immunity of private property at sea and their argument 
that a hundred-ton marine collier must be treated as an auxiliary 
man-of-war, were difficult to reconcile with the British desire 

40 Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4273, p. 227. Report of Captain Siegel, Ger- 
man Naval Delegate to the First Hague Peace Conference, June 28, 1899. 


for a limitation of armaments and had the effect of making Great 
Britain appear hypocritical. Marschall von Bieberstein, the 
leader of the German Delegation, was jubilant that the British 
had turned the situation to German account. The way was now 
clear for new German Navy Laws and the great competition in 
dreadnoughts that was to characterize the period from the Sec- 
ond Hague Conference to 1914. This discussion of maritime 
law led, in February, 1909, to the Declaration of London which, 
because of the opposition of the House of Lords, was rejected 
by the British Government. Thus, when the World War started, 
German submarines were at liberty to send as much of British 
shipping to the bottom as they were capable of doing, and 
England was morally free to starve out Germany if she could. 
Nor did the principle of compulsory arbitration make much 
headway at the Second Conference. On this issue the Germans 
have been criticized for their opposition to the principle of 
compulsion; but again, as in 1899, the other powers were 
hardly more favorable to the idea. Austria was not willing to 
accept compulsory arbitration so long as the Balkan question 
was unsettled. The French Minister at Rome said that his 
country would never consent to obligatory arbitration. Great 
Britain was at first opposed to it but later threw in her weight 
on the side of compulsion. In spite of her apparent enthusiasm 
and the fact that she had signed a special arbitration treaty with 
Germany in 1904, England refused to submit to arbitration 
the German claims to compensation for two ships stopped dur- 
ing the South African War. Great Britain made the basis of 
her refusal that this was a political, not a legal, question and 
therefore affected the "vital interests" of the nation. On the 
other hand, an arbitration treaty that Germany had signed with 
the United States came to naught because the American Senate 
insisted on the right to accept or reject the compromts proposed 
in each particular case. Still, some of the delegates to the Con- 
ference, in particular M. Bourgeois, Herr Lammasch and Mr. 
Choate, were honest in their support of arbitration. In the 


voting Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Switzerland and 
the four Balkan States stood against the proposed obligatory 
arbitration, while Italy, Japan and Luxemburg abstained from 
voting, so that, lacking unanimity, the motion was defeated. 
In these circumstances it was impossible to do more than pass 
a resolution "admitting the principle of obligatory arbitration, 33 
and declaring that certain disputes are suitable for settlement in 
that way. 46 

Although the Conference failed on three important problems 
on its agenda, it extended to naval warfare the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention; obtained some limitation on floating mines, 
live torpedoes, the bombardment of undefended places, the 
dropping of explosives from the air; and declared against poison 
gas all of which was forgotten in the years 1914-18. And 
finally, the body resolved that another Conference should be 
held within seven years, 47 a period which expired when the most 
highly civilized nations of the world possessed of the most 
powerful and deadly means of destruction devised to that time 
were engaged in one of the most ghastly annihilations in history. 

40 J. B. Scott, op, tit. Vol. I, Plenary Sessions, p. 332. 
47 /&*U, p. 169, 



THE limitation of armaments is not a matter of mathematics 
nor of morals but of politics; states seek to give effect to their 
national policies through armaments as well as through mone- 
tary and immigration policies, tariffs and embargoes. Arma- 
ment competition is inextricably interwoven with political ten- 
sion, and international agreement on armaments is possible only 
when the national policies of states are not in conflict; for 
international disarmament standardizes the relative diplomatic 
power of the countries involved and prevents the use of arma- 
ment competition to upset the political equilibrium. Fleets and 
armies, since they are the means by which a nation can coerce 
other nations by direct physical violence, are inevitably impor- 
tant elements of diplomacy. As the instruments 'of war and 
therefore of national policies, their limitation involves questions 
affecting national honor and vital interests. How can an effica- 
cious plan for disarmament be combined with the fundamental 
principle of international law, the sovereignty of the state? 
How can a proportion be found that will be just to all states, 
large and small, rich and poor, those with several frontiers to 
defend and those with only one, those with far-flung colonial 
possessions and those with none, those on the periphery or far 
distant from the armed camp and those in its midst? How can 
an arrangement be supervised and enforced? How can the 
exact nature of armaments be defined? The inventions of 
modern science have produced ingenious instruments which are 
as effective for defense as for attack, and what power, when 
engaged in a war & outrance, will observe an agreement not to 



employ these new weapons? Even more perplexing, how can 
the opposition of some states to the permanent acceptance of the 
status quo be surmounted? In the European society of the nine- 
teenth century, without an international executive to enforce 
engagements on recalcitrant states, disarmament was impossible. 

For one hundred years before the World War statesmen and 
pacifists, jurists and international societies, considered and dis- 
cussed plans for limiting armaments. But all their proposals, 
with a few meager exceptions limited to specific regions, failed 
because no state seriously believed in disarmament for itself. 
No one nation was exclusively responsible for the competition in 
armaments; none was innocent, for they all lived in a perpetual 
state of mutual fear and antagonism, expecting war and always 
preparing for it. If none was innocent, therefore, they were 
all more or less guilty. Finally, the failure of the powers to 
check the intense armament rivalry made war inevitable. 

Arms could not be limited without perpetuating a settlement 
intolerable to several states. Here was the crux of the whole 
problem of disarmament; here has been and always will be the 
greatest obstacle in the path to the limitation of armaments. 
For the maintenance of the status quo involves the perpetua- 
tion of a settlement unjustly imposed by the power of the 
sword, in a passion of retaliation. Its maintenance assumed a 
portentous significance after the revolutions of 1848 and still 
more after France lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Irredentist 
peoples of Europe Italians, Bohemians, Southern Slavs, Poles 
and even the French, were proud of refusing to accept the 
territorial settlements as final, biding their time for the correc- 
tion of the deeds of injustice. Disarmament and the surrender 
of the notion of altering the existing situation by force of arms 
can only be viewed with favor by those powers which not only 
accept the status quo but regard it with satisfaction. Dissatis- 
fied powers may not actually want war, may even dread it, and 
may be in practice quite as unwilling to run the risk of an appeal 
to arms as the satisfied states; but in spite of this, they will not 


voluntarily shut off all possibility of obtaining a state of things 
which will be to them more acceptable than the present. Here 
is the simple common sense of disarmament. No plan for 
limiting armaments by which the status quo would become 
stereotyped was acceptable in 1816, in 1870, in 1899, in 1907. 
Many questions in Europe, the Near East and the Orient 
remained unsettled, and no power was willing to face the future 
inadequately armed to protect its "vital interests/' Moreover, 
after 1870 the size and the efficiency of the military and naval 
establishments of a state were considered by many to be the 
best indication available of the aggregate power and wealth of 
a nation. So long as this view prevailed, the rivalry in arma- 
ments was not an accidental evil, but a fundamental necessity. 
Any proposal to limit it was considered a device to give to 
decadent and inefficient countries an artificial position which 
they did not deserve. 1 The armament competition took the 
place of actual warfare, and the superiority of Germany on land 
and of Great Britain on the sea became evident even though 
no gun was fired. 

Nevertheless, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
limitation of armaments had become one of the major problems 
facing Europe. No longer was its discussion relegated to Peace 
Society meetings. The Manchester School of economists lent 
the subject prestige through their advocacy of free trade and 
world peace. Liberals, Radicals and Nonconformists joined in 
the agitation. During the decade 1888-98 the disarmament 
movement received new impetus from the Universal Peace Con- 
gresses, the Churches, the Arbitration Alliance, economists, 
international jurists, novelists, journalists, statesmen, kings and 
emperors, until it culminated in the greatest surprise and mys- 
tification of the country the invitation from the most absolute 
sovereign of the world to meet in conference to deal with the 
"grave problem" of armaments. 

The Tsar's initiative was applauded by all lovers of peace, 

1 Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studies fa Diplomatic History, p. a66* 


for it was the most significant event up to 1898 that the peace 
movement had to its credit. While the pacifists became jubilant, 
the diplomatists remained sceptical; while the European press 
soon lost sight of the humanitarian side of the Eirenicon and, 
with a few exceptions, maintained a rather hostile attitude, the 
international jurists indicated the technical difficulties in the 
way of a limitation of armaments. In America the impression 
prevailed that not much would be accomplished in the way of 
limiting armaments but that something might be done to extend 
the use of arbitration. The Foreign Offices of all the great 
powers doubted the sincerity of Nicholas II and found his pro- 
posals extremely troublesome. Some statesmen, however, had 
to take into consideration pacific opinion and were, therefore, 
cautious in making public statements. They agreed to meet in 
conference for the sake of public opinion and for saving the 
face of the Tsar but had no intentions of limiting their forces. 
A solution of the armament problem was even more remote 
in 1899 than it had been in 18x6 and in '1870. Most of the 
powers had ambitions which they desired to gratify and which 
they would not readily renounce in the interest of peace and 
economy. As far as the French were concerned, the status of 
Alsace-Lorraine was not permanently settled; for the other 
great powers, the Eastern Question was still open, and in the 
Far East an ancient empire was in danger of division into rival 
"spheres of influence." Furthermore, most statesmen realized 
that, whatever arrangements a conference might make, the 
peace of Europe depended upon the life of one great monarch, 
Francis Joseph of AustriaT It was believed that when the 
Emperor died he was sixty-nine in 1899 a successor would 
not be found able to hold together all the dominions of the 
House of Habsburg, Internecine discord would break out, and 
Kaiser William II would probably not refuse the appeal of 
millions of Germans wanting the Anschluss; but was It con- 
ceivable that Russia and France, regardless of what arrange- 
ments were made at the Conference, would be willing quietly 


to stand aside while this change in the map of Europe was 
taking place? Would not the Czechs and Slavs of the disrupted 
Empire appeal to their great Slavonic neighbor? The approach 
of this threatening crisis In Europe, and the certainty that no 
power would be content to watch it unarmed and unprepared, 
seemed to doom to failure any attempt to limit armaments. In 
addition, the appearance at the close of the century of two new 
naval powers the United States in the New World and Japan 
in the Far East added to the difficulties of stabilizing or 
limiting armaments. 

Finally, in naming their delegates to the Conference the 
governments were shrewd and far-sighted enough to include 
among them such militarists as Sir John Fisher, Captain Mahan, 
Captain Siegel, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff and Professor 
Karl von Stengel. Admiral Fisher's previously demonstrated 
qualities as a fighter made him, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, 
particularly well qualified to serve as a British delegate to the 
Peace Conference. Captain Mahan, who had little sympathy 
with the main purposes of the Conference, was chosen by the 
United States Government because of his views on sea power* 
Baron von Stengel, whose pamphlet, Der Ewige Friede, glorified 
war as a God-given institution and derided attempts to limit 
armaments, was the Kaiser's choice as delegate. Although the 
representatives of some states demonstrated more effrontery 
and ostentation, were less diplomatic and more vehement in 
their opposition than others, most of the experts were none too 
adroit in their finesse. They pointed to technical difficulties in 
the path of disarmament which were in most cases political 
prejudices in uniform. The Conference went through the ritual 
of passing an innocuous resolution which stood before the public 
opinion of the world as a symbol of the attempted solution of 
the armament problem. 

It might have been hoped that the Conference would be the 
beginning of a new era in the history of the peace movement 
and an epoch in the history of man; but this did not prove to 


by the case. It did not result in any action of the nations for 
the purpose of claiming from their governments that this official 
meeting should be made to fulfill the purpose that the Tsar had 
proclaimed to the world in his manifesto. The Conference, like 
the movement for a limitation of armaments which preceded it, 
did not affect the public at large; it met with no general interest 
or encouragement. The world's press, after striving without 
avail to gain admission to the sessions, gave up in disgust and 
neglected the Conference, so that it was advertised only by 
Baroness von Suttner's telegrams to Vienna and W. T. Stead's 
daily bulletin to London. Jean de Block, Bertha von Suttner 
and Stead went to The Hague to use their personal influence on 
some well-meaning delegates, but the pacifists as a whole re- 
mained inactive. The Peace Conference was not sufficiently 
turned to account to win over public opinion. From a study of 
the nineteenth century movement for a limitation of armaments 
and the First Hague Conference we must conclude that there 
was then no public opinion on disarmament. Complicated fac- 
tors were involved which could not be understood without a 
thorough knowledge of events and historic background that was 
not easily available to the people. 2 

After the First Hague Conference, armament expenditure, 
instead of decreasing, increased by leaps and bounds. Two 
wars, the South African and the Spanish-American, fought far 
away from the British and American base of supplies, demon- 
strated the importance of sea power in deciding political dis- 
putes and intensified the race in naval armaments, 

Moreover, economic imperialism encouraged this competition, 
for one of the chief purposes of armaments, especially naval 
armaments, is to defend colonies against seizure and to enhance 
diplomatic prestige. These were the chief reasons Germany 
advanced for building a large navy* The British "seizure" of the 
Hamburg Mail Steamers during the course of the Boer War 
made the German Government realize their maritime defici- 

2 Charles W. Smith, Public Opinion in a Democracy, p, 503, 


encies and consider how different the course of that war might 
have been, if the German Navy had not previously been neg- 
lected. After 1900 Germany therefore set about constructing a 
battle fleet so strong that even an adversary in possession of 
the greatest sea power would attack it only at a grave risk. 

The German reasons for wanting a navy were as logical as 
those of any state for wanting armaments. Germany wanted a 
strong navy because Germany was becoming a great power. At 
the opening of the twentieth century the German fleet bore no 
reasonable proportion to Germany's growing trade and over- 
sea commerce; Germany wanted a navy to protect her large and 
increasing merchant marine; Germany with her rapidly grow- 
ing population, trading all over the world, aspired to become a 
colonial empire. Colonies she could gain and hold only with a 
navy. Her superb military forces could not help her in deciding 
disputes in the Pacific, in Asia, in Africa, where her policy was 
often rendered impotent by her weakness at sea. 

But this German desire for a navy and its rapid fulfillment 
became the principal source of antagonism between Great Brit- 
ain and Germany in the new century, and their rivalry in dread- 
nought construction after 1907 was the chief factor in the 
armament competition up to 1914. Instead of these two friendly 
powers co-operating as was advocated by the most convinced, 
energetic and influential promoters of British imperialism, Mr* 
Joseph Chamberlain and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, they chose oppo- 
site paths. The nation with the greatest army and the nation 
with the greatest navy, had they worked together, could have 
maintained their own interests and kept Europe in order, for 
the fleet and the army could not fight each other* 8 A proper 
understanding between the two Governments would have guar- 
anteed the peace of the world; but, instead of alliance^ they 
chose rivalry. 

Great Britain, whose naval supremacy had been unquestioned 

11 Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Leicester, November 30, 1899; cf, H. H. 
Asquith, The Genesis of the War (London, 1923), pp. 23-24. 


since the days of Nelson, looked upon new accessions of naval 
strength and new stirrings of naval ambitions on the other side 
of the North Sea as frankly incompatible with good Anglo- 
German relations, however eagerly some minds in both coun- 
tries might desire them. She admitted that Germany, with her 
frontiers on both the East and the West exposed to the rooted 
enmity of military powers like France and Russia, was clearly 
prudent in keeping a double-edged sword keenly sharpened to 
meet two-fold emergencies. But Germany's aspirations to 
become a great naval as well as a great military power had 
to be turned into less dangerous channels. England was willing 
to further German colonial development if that would in any 
way detract her rival's attention from her naval objective, but 
the German Admiralty, bent upon one purpose, would not 
deviate from their course for concessions that took the form of 
"problematical colonies," 

When, therefore, before the Second Hague Conference, the 
British Government announced their intention of omitting one 
ship from their forthcoming program and their willingness to 
make further reductions, if they found a similar disposition in 
other countries, Germany would have nothing to do with the 
proposition and went so far as to announce that she would 
refrain from participating in the Conference if disarmament 
were placed on the agenda. Other nations too were opposed to 
discussing a problem which they had no inclination to solve. 
Russia, after her crushing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, 
wanted to be left free to build up her armaments. Austria cer- 
tainly would not disarm or even limit her armaments so long 
as the Balkan question was unsettled and so long as militaristic 
Russia considered herself the protector of Slav minorities in 
southern Europe. Italy was unwilling to disarm before "Italia 
Irredenta" was realised, France would not seriously consider 
a limitation of her army until she had redressed the wrong of 
the past in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, while Germany was 
determined to retain by arms what arms had so successfully 


conquered for her. The United States of America, after her 
success in the Spanish-American War, a success primarily due 
to her sea power, had no intention of checking the further devel- 
opment of that power. In the future, sea power would be neces- 
sary for America to hold possessions which she had acquired, 
and sea power would also give her prestige in settling questions 
in Asia and the Pacific, for after 1900 American interests lay 
east and west as well as north and south. Nor was the United 
States Government more willing in 1907 than it had been in 
1899 to agree to any restrictions that would limit the "inventive 
genius" of the American people. 

Great Britain was the only country prepared to advocate a 
limitation of armaments at the Second Hague Conference. The 
Foreign Office felt that, first, for the sake of public opinion the 
question should be brought forward. Besides, Sir Henry Camp- 
bell-Bannerman's Liberal Government, pledged to a program 
of social reform, needed money to carry out its projects, and 
the best method of obtaining the necessary funds was through 
a reduction of naval expenditure. In 1907 British naval suprem- 
acy was unchallenged. Great Britain could agree to limit her 
armaments or to maintain the status quo without fear. She had 
just completed a revolutionary battleship, the Dreadnought, 
and had temporarily silenced battleship construction in all the 
navy yards of the world. An agreement to limit armament 
expenditure would have been of great practical value to England 
in 1907. Her superiority in old ships held good, and the more 
slowly other nations built dreadnoughts, the longer would she 
reap the benefit of the two years when she alone had built them, 
In addition to her being mistress of the seas, the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance furnished Great Britain a gmw-guarantee of the peace- 
ful occupancy of her possessions in the East; her insular posi- 
tion protected her from military assault at home. She had no 
need for a large standing army or an enlarged navy. These 
facts combined to discount her influence in appearing as an 
advocate for lessened military expenditure; it is the nature of 


power politics for a satisfied power to want disarmament of 
other countries or disarmament in the weapons which it does 
not regard as vital to itself. 

In spite of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's desire, no doubt 
genuine, to see the Conference agree on a limitation of arma- 
ment expenditure, the Admiralty, the War Office and the 
Foreign Office were certainly not prepared to advocate any 
real disarmament at The Hague. The British Admiralty were 
just as determined in 1907 as they had been in 1898 not to 
diminish the striking force of the British Navy. At the Second 
Hague Conference, England, in the face of world opposition, 
stood out for the right of capture at sea the one effective 
weapon on which she depended to bring pressure to bear upon 
a foe. Her refusal to acknowledge the inviolability of merchant 
shipping gave Germany a plausible reason for building a battle 
fleet, which she could justify to the public in her own country 
and to the world in general as necessary to protect her expanding 
commerce. The failure of the Hague Conferences to limit 
naval and military expenditure left the path open for the Anglo- 
German naval competition of the pre-war period. 

All the attempts of Great Britain and Germany between 
1908 and 1914 to arrive at an agreement to limit their navies 
failed in the final analysis because neither power was willing 
to yield anything essential. Germany considered that a political 
agreement was the necessary presupposition of a naval under- 
standing, while Great Britain laid chief stress on naval reduc- 
tions, which she argued would lead to better political relations. 
Both points of view were equally intelligible and reasonable, 
for the naval and political frictions were inextricably inter- 
woven, Germany would not consider a drastic limitation of 
her naval armaments unless Great Britain would promise neu- 
trality of a far-reaching character, for so long as she stood with 
France and Russia, Germany feared that they would cherish 
schemes of revenge and aggression. An Anglo-German under- 
standing would have meant that France and Russia would have 


lost the certainty that they could continue to count upon the 
support of England in pursuing an anti-German policy. Great 
Britain, however, would not give up the insurance provided by 
the Entente so long as Germany went on adding to her navy 
and had the protection of the Triple Alliance. "The British 
insisted on both their naval supremacy and their diplomatic 
combinations, for thus the balance of power was turned against 
Germany. To restore the balance in their favour, the Germans 
wished to retain their freedom in the matter of armaments or 
to break up the Triple Entente. The position of each was 
logical, so long as the theory of equilibrium was the mainspring 
of European diplomacy." 4 

The theory of equilibrium or the balance of power as it 
expressed itself in alliances, accentuated the armament com- 
petition. The year 1914 found Europe divided into two armed 
camps, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. Each group 
Triplice and Entente aimed at being sufficiently stronger than 
the other to dictate rather than accept results. Thus both 
increased armaments, urged on and assisted by other members 
of the group. Each country aimed not only at being secure 
but at strengthening the alliance to which it belonged. In 1907, 
a Russian loan was floated in London and a Russian cruiser was 
ordered from Vickers. At Reval in 1908, Sir John Fisher urged 
the Russians to concentrate their energies on their army and 
to strengthen their western frontiers. On July 15, 1913, M. 
Kokovtsov, Russian Minister of Finance, directed that 100,000 
francs should be paid to M. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, 
out of the Russian secret fund for influencing the French press 
in favor of the three-year term of military service, and at the 
same time he demanded "semi-official" support for Russia in 
Balkan affairs. 5 In December, 1913, the French Government 
agreed to permit Russia to float a loan in Paris, the money to be 

4 Bcrnadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War (Scribner'% New York, 
1930), I, $6. 

5 Friednch Sticve, Isvotsky and the World War (London, 1926), p. x68. 


used for building strategical railroads towards the German 
frontier. It was also expected that Russia would enlarge her 
army. In June, 1914, Russia set aside approximately $100,- 
000,000 for the year's needs of her army alone, and urged 
France to prepare herself by carrying out the three-year term 
of service. 

The three-year service in France was exploited by Germany 
as a reason for increasing her forces, while France maintained 
that the burden which she was shouldering was due to the lead 
that Germany had given. This result was only natural, for if 
there were armaments on one side there must be armaments on 
the other. While one nation or group of nations armed, other 
nations could not remain defenseless. If one nation built 
strategical railways, it had to expect other nations to do like- 
wise. The strategical railways which Russia, encouraged by 
France, built towards Germany were a reply to those that Ger- 
many had already constructed towards the French and Belgian 
frontiers. Measures taken by one government lead to counter- 
measures by others* Yet, arming and counter-arming fail to 
guarantee security. Sir Edward Grey writes that "the increase 
of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce con- 
sciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce 
these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of 
the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets 
suspicion and distrust, till each Government feels it would be 
criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every 
precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of 
every other Government as evidence of hostile intent," Thus 
armaments increased, and out of the competition there arose 
fear, suspicion and aa intense rivalry which made war inevitable, 
although it was not known by what precise date the conflict 
would be precipitated. 

War came in 1914, not necessarily because any one nation 

e Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Yem x8Q%-*x$x6 (Hodder and 

Stoughton, London, 1929: Peoples Library Edition), I, x6o-6t. 


wanted it, but because all the nations were more or less pre- 
pared for it. Four crises in less than a decade had been sur- 
mounted because one power or another, whose interests were 
affected, had not been strong enough for war or did not con- 
sider the issue worth a war. France, in 1905, was too weak to 
fight Germany unaided. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bos- 
nia-Herzegovinia in 1909, Russia was not prepared. In 1911, not 
a single nation felt that it was "quite" ready. In 1912-13 
Russia, though better prepared, did not consider a Serbian port 
on the Adriatic worth a war. 7 Each of these crises was followed 
by further military preparations, by a drawing together and a 
tightening of the alliances. After Agadir, and especially after 
the Balkan Wars, the great powers made a final effort at mili- 
tary and naval preparedness so that they would be ready when 
"the bells should ring again." If, in 1914, the European states 
had been armed only for defense there would have been no war; 
but the preparations of all the nations had gone far beyond the 
limits of defense because of the fear that other countries were 
pursuing offensive purposes. Europe was better prepared for 
war in 1914 than at any previous time in history. Each group 
of allied nations believed that it was stronger or better equipped 
than the opposing group or that its chances of winning were 
greater at that time than they would be later. Furthermore, 
most states desired something that was only to be won by a 
struggle. They did not want war, but, since war was inevitable, 
better to have it finished and thus end the ruinous armament 

Finally, there was in the pre-war world a large and influential 
body of military and naval officers, whose psychological outlook 
was colored by the possibility, if not the inevitability of an 
early war. Militarists like Sir John Fisher, Admiral Tirpite, 
Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, General von Bernhardi and 
Captain Mahan were experts at picturing the difficulties in the 
way of a limitation of armaments. They could always point to 
the fact that no unit of disarmament existed. Captain Mahan, 

7 B. B. Schmltt, op. aX, I, 53-54. 


in his book Armaments and Arbitration, defends armaments 
on the ground that arbitration cannot always take the place, 
either practically or beneficially, of the processes and results 
obtained by the free play of natural forces. "Of these/' he 
writes, "national efficiency is a chief element and armament, 
being the representative of the national strength, is the ex- 
ponent." In the Captain's appreciation, armaments represent 
the aggregation of the natural forces inherent in any community, 
armaments are "a gage of the capacities of the people not only 
to do, in all the phases of national activity, but to bear a no 
less important element of national power/' 8 Mahan was of 
opinion that "all that European civilization has to depend upon 
for its supremacy is its energy, of which international compe- 
tition and armament are not only the expressions, but essen- 
tial elements factors. When these fail and fall the end will be 
at hand. 7 ' Naturally, the militarists, especially trained to pred- 
tory habits of mind, looked forward to the opportunity of put- 
ting into practice the results of the work of preparation for war 
to which their lives had been devoted, 

Every year in every country the General Staff worked out 
detailed plans for meeting or making an attack in the shortest 
possible time. These plans were extremely technical and 
guarded in absolute secrecy. They were unknown to the national 
parliaments and to the public; their details and significance were 
not comprehended by the Foreign Ministers. Sir Edward Grey 
states that he never knew what the military experts settled, the 
position being that the Government was quite free, but that the 
military people knew what to do if the word was given. 10 
Although no political alliance existed between France, Great 
Britain and Russia, the General Staffs were given a free hand 
to work out the plans of combined action for the "inevitable" 

s A. T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (New York, 1912), pp. n-za, 

g Jbid,, pp. 13*14* 

10 Viscount Grey, op. A, 1, 164, 

u Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London, doubted whether 
a more powerful guarantee for common military operations could be found, in 
-the event of war, than the spirit of the Entente* reinforced by military conven- 
tions. (Siebert, Mntente Diplomacy and tk World, p, 720.) 


war; 11 for since war was bound to come, there must be a pre- 
determined program. When the crisis came in June- July, 1914, 
the militarists exerted tremendous pressure upon the civilians 
to accept the arrangements which had been planned long in 
advance. 12 * 

Sir Edward Grey in his Twenty-Five Years tersely sum- 
marized the effects of armaments on the European political 
situation and the part they played in bringing about the catas- 
trophe of 1914-18. He wrote: 

More than one true thing may be said about the causes of the war, 
but the statement that comprises most truth is that militarism and 
armaments inseparable from it made war inevitable. Armaments 
were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation that was 
the justification put forward in defence of them. What they really 
did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and 
hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimu- 
lates all that is bad, and depresses all that is good. 

One nation increases its Army and makes strategical railways 
towards the frontiers of neighbouring countries. The second nation 
makes counter-strategical railways and increases its army in reply. 
This first nation says this is very reasonable, because its own military 
preparations were only precautions; the second nation says that its 
preparations also were only precautions, and points out with some 
cogency, that the first nation began the competition; and so it goes 
on, till the whole Continent is an armed camp covered by strategical 

After 1870 Germany had no reason to be afraid, but she fortified 
herself with armaments and the Triple Alliance in order that she 
might never have reason to be afraid in future. France naturally 
was afraid after 1870, and she made her military preparations and 
the Dual Alliance (with Russia). Britain, with a very small Army 
and a very large Empire, became first uncomfortable and then (par- 
ticularly when Germany began a big-fleet programme) afraid of isola- 
tion. She made the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, made up her quarrels 
with France and Russia, and entered into the Entente. Finally, 
Germany became afraid that she would presently be afraid, and 
struck the blow, while she believed her power to be still Invincible. 1 * 1 

ia S, B. Fay, The Origins of the War (London, 1929), I, 41. 
18 Viscount Grey, op. dt.> II, 265-67. 


The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of 
insecurity and fear caused by them it was these that made war 
inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history, 
and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in 
the interest of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those 
who come after us. 14 



Only such references appear in the bibliography as proved 
immediately helpful and are referred to in the text. This mate- 
rial was read in various English, Continental and American 
libraries the Bodleian and Rhodes House Libraries in Oxford, 
the British Museum, the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
and the Foreign Office Libraries in London, the Bibliotheque 
Nationale in Paris, the Library of the University of Berlin, the 
League of Nations Library, the Library of the Institute Uni- 
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Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, The Origins of the World War, Two volumes. 
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Hull, William L, The Two Hague Conferences. Macmillan, London, 


Krehbiel, Edward, Nationalism, War, and Society. New York, 1916. 
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Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion. Macmillan, New York, 1921. 
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Lowell, A, Lawrence, Public Opinion and Popular Government. 

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Peace Society Papers, The Tsar and Tolstoi Played Out. London, 

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Wells, H. G., The Outline of History, New York, 1921, 
Woolf, Leonard S., International Government. London, 1923. 


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1899); XX (November, 1899). 


The Atlantic Monthly, Boston and New York, LXXXI (January, 

The Contemporary Review, London, LXV (May, 1894); LXVI 

(June, 1894); LXXIV (October, November, 1898); LXXV 

(March, 1899); CXXII 2 (November, 1922). 
The Fortnightly Review, London, LXXI (May, 1899). 
The International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, IX (January, 


The Liberal Magazine, London, VI (January, 1898). 
McClwe's Magazine, New York, III (June, 1894). 
The Nation, London, I (March 2, 1907). 
The Nation, New York, LXVII (September r, 1898) ; LXVIII (June 

i, 1899). 

The National Review, London, XXXII (October, 1898). 
The Nineteenth Century, London, XLIII (May, 1898); XLIV 

July, October, November, 1898) ; XLV (February, May, 1899) 5 

XLVI (September, 1899). 
The North American Review, Boston, CLXI (December, 1895); 

CLXVIII (February, June, 1899); CLXIX (August, 1899); 

CLXIX 2 (October, November, 1899). 
Public Opinion, New York, VIII (March 15, 1890); XVII (May 

17, 1894); XX (May 21, 1896); XXV (September 8, 1898). 
The Quarterly Review, London, CXC (October, 1899), 
Scribner's Magazine, New York, LXVII (April, 1920). 
The Spectator, London, LXXII (March 31, April 21, 1894); 

LXXXI (September 3, 1898), 
The Review of Reviews, London, vols, 1894*1899. 
Revue de Paris, Paris, III (May, 1899)- 
Revue dcs Dem Mondes, Paris, GIL, October, 1899, 4 quatre. 
Revue du Droit et de la Science Potitique en France et a I'Etranger, 

Paris, III (1895), 
War Against War> London, Special supplement to the Review of 

Reviews* XIX (January, 1899)* 



Le Figaro, Paris, April 10, 19, 1894. 

Le Temps, Paris, November 12, 1894; August 27, 28, 30, 31, 1898; 

September 3, 1898. 

The Boston Evening Transcript, Boston, February 17, 18, 1899. 
The Observer, London, April 14, 1935. 
The Pall Matt Gazette, London, August 30, 1898. 
The Standard, London, March 30, 1894; April 10, 23, 1894. 
The Times, London, December 20, 1869; November 10, 1887; 

November 10, 1888; January 12, 1891; February 24, 1891; 

January 20, 30, 1894; March 26, 1894; December 16, 1896; 

August 13, 27, 28, 31, 1898; December 7, 16, 1898; January 

14, 1899; December 13, 1899. 
The New York Times, New York, March 25, 1941. 


N.B. Page references in italics indicate cited material; F.H.C. First Hague 
Conference; I.P.U, Inter-Parliamentary Union; M. Memorial; S.H.C. Second 
Hague Conference. 

Abbott, Lyman, 212. 

Aberdeen, Countess of, 204; Address 

of British Women, 204. 
Aberdeen, Earl of, 210. 
Aberdeen, Lord, 12-13. 
Adabhoi, Sir Jecjeebhoi Merwanjeed, 

Adams, John Quincy, at Ghent, 24; 

Minister to London, 24-5 . 
Address of British Women, 204. 
Adriatic Sea, 358, 
"Advanced Liberals/* 90, 108. 
Advocate of Peace, 212. 
Aehrenthal, Baron d', 328, 
Afghanistan, 188, 189, 218, 229. 
Africa, 242, 352, 
Agadir, 358. 
Aggression, French view of, 21; Prus- 

sian view of, 21. 
Albcroni, Cardinal, 3, 
Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 8-9, 118, 


Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 18, 171. 
Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, 49, 138- 

40, 144, 145, 148, 170, 171, 263; and 

strategic railways, 183-4; on gigantic 

armies, x#. 

Algcseiras Conference, 322. 
Alliances, 322, 360* 
Alsace-Lorraine, 123, 125, 129, 142, 

232, 237, 245, 246, 250, 256, 77 

286, 3x9, 347, 349, 353, 
Alvclla, Conte 'Goblet d'. 
America, See the United States. 
American Federation of Labor, 212* 
American Monthly JRevlew of Me** 

vfettwr, x$$, 213, 236. 
Ames, Dr Charles G. axx. 
Amour propre, 231. 
Anarchiste, 250. 
Anarchists, aoa, 

Anglo -Egyptian forces, 254. 

Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, 35- 

Anglo-French relations, 13. See Panics. 

Anglo-German naval competition, 148, 
335, 344, 348, 355- 

Anglo -German relations, 353, 355-6. 

Anglo -Japanese Alliance, 354, 360. 

Anglo-Saxon race, 238. 

Annual Cyclopaedia (Hazell's), 118. 

Annual Register, 153. 

"Apotheosis of War," painting by 
Vasili Vereschagin, 225. 

Apponyi, Count, n, 12, 90, 125. 

Arbitration, 796., 99, 206, 305, 306, 
333 342, 344-5J American interest 
in, 237, 238, 276-7, 304; "Arbitra- 
tion Alliance," roo-i, 103-8; "Brit- 
ish and Foreign Arbitration Associa- 
tion" (or Alliance), 62, 1434.) 201 
3, 267; Committee of British 
Churches on, 103; compromu and 
U. S. Senate, 270, 344; compulsory, 
82-3, 344-5; F.H.C. and, 286-8; 
"International Arbitration and Peace 
Association of Great Britain and 
Ireland," 44 7o 75; LP.XL, 89, 92, 
96, 97; Lake Mohonk Conferences 
on International Arbitration, 296-7, 
313-5; limited sphere of, 79, 83, 271 ; 
model treaty of, 89; National Arbi- 
tration and Peace Congress, 79-80; 
Opinions on: Blymyer, 74; Camp- 
bell-Bannerman, 306; Field, 71; 
Fisher, a^7; Hay, $76; Headlam- 
Morley, 71, 8a$; Larimer, #0~a; 
Mahan, Sa-j; 339 ' Mlinster, 287; 
T, Roosevelt, 304; Salisbury, 269- 
70, a/jr, 286 '; White, A., ^7; 
Wffliam II, 288} 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 80, 



286, 288} status quo and, 80; trea- 
ties of, 89, 97, 270, 305; treaty be- 
tween Argentina and Chile, 294; 
Denmark and Italy, 305; Denmark 
and the Netherlands, 305; Great 
Britain and Germany, 269; Great 
Britain and other countries, 269-70; 
Great Britain and the United States, 
270; Italy and 17 Republics, 270; 
Pan-American Treaty of 1890, 270; 
Spain and Uruguay, 86n. 

"Arbitration Alliance," 100-1, 103-8. 

Arbitrator, the Pope as, 51. 

Argentine Republic, 294-5, 341. 

Armenia, 156. 

Army Bill (German), 253-5. 

Arnuad, Emile, 90, 203. 

Aryan race, 221," see also Anglo-Saxon 

Asia, 238, 242, 257, 352, 354. 

Asia Minor, 169. 

"A Soldier," 188-9, 223. 

Athenaeum, the, 154. 

Atlantic Charter, viii. 

Atlantic Monthly, the, 154. 

Austin ("Diplomaticus"), 134-5; 26on. 

Austria (Austria-Hungary and Haps- 
burg Empire), 7, 8, ir, 39-4, 148, 
349-50; Francis Joseph, Emperor 

of, 49, 61, 142, 144, 149, 349-50; 
Joseph II, Emperor of, 7; Parlia- 
mentary Peace Group in, 54; peace 
of Europe and Austria, 349-50. 

Austro -Hungarian Delegation, 85, 

Austro-Prussian War, 66. 

Averbury, Lord, 307-8, 309. 

Bagot, Sir Charles, 25; Rush-Bagot 
Agreement, 25-7, 75- 

Bailow, Herr von, 204n. 

Bajer, F,, 90. 

Balance of power, 114, 356* 

Balfour, Arthur J., 105, 207, 210, 223* 

Balkans, 14, 169, 345, 356; opposition 
to the status quo, 65, ajj, 245; 
question and territorial problems of, 
14, 263, 353 ; question at The Hague, 
353 J Slavs, 65, 124, 245, 263, 353. 

Balkan Wars, 358, 

Baltic Sea, 189, 

Baptist, 45-6. 

Bart, Thomas, 210. 

Barth, Dr., 51. 

Bartholdt, Richard, 297. 

Basili, 77n., 95-6, 174-6. 

Bath and Wells, Bishop of, 200. 

Bavarians, attitude toward Rescript, 

Beales, A.C.F., description of Die 
Waffen Nieder, 53-4. 

Bebel, August, leader of Social Demo- 
crats, 51, 23 in., 255. 

Beernaert, 90, 280. 

Begas, Reinhold, 227. 

Belgium, 65, 207; Leopold II, King of, 
207; permanent neutrality of, 64, 

Sellers, John, 3, 4. 

Beluchistan, 189. 

Benckendorff, Count, 322, 336, 35Qn. 

Benham, Rev. Canon, 102. 

Bentham, Jeremy, 3, 5. 

Berlin, 18, 39, 207, 252, 324, 326. 

Berlin National Zeitung, 229, 

Berne, 9in., 100. 

Bernhardi, General von, 358. 

Bertie, Sir F., 323. 

Besika Bay, 88. 

Bieberstein, Marschall von, 344. 

Bildt, Baron de (representing Nor- 
way and Sweden), 283-4, 288-9. 

Bille (representing Denmark), 284. 

Birmingham, 295. 

Bismarck, Count Otto vcm, 19$., 42, 
6 1 ; conversation with Crispi on dis- 
armament, jM-tf; reception of Lord 
Clarendon's proposal, ao~x, 

Black Sea, 189. 

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 


Bloch, J. von, 170-3, 2x4, 351; War 
of the Future, 170, i7i*j, 353. 

Blowitz, M, -de, 5^-7, 155, 207; in 
McClure 9 $ Magaine t 60-1! i$5J in 
the Times, $6-?* 

Blymer, M.H.C, 74-5* 

Boardman, Rev. G, Dana, 74-^ y$n> 

Boer Republic and Boers, 294. 
Bohemians, 347* 
Bosnia, 86. 

Bosnla-Herwjgovina, 358, 



Boston, 2 1 1-3, 296, 313, 314. 
Boston Association of Ministers, 211. 
Boston Evening Transcript, 213, 235, 

Boston Peace Society, 211-2. 

Bourgeois, Le"on, 277, 284-5, 318, 344. 

Boyer, Antide, 44. 

Boynton, Henry, 237-8. 

Boxer Rebellion, 297. 

Bramee, Frau, 2O4n. 

Breslau, 202. 

Brewer, Mr. Justice, 314. 

Bright, John A., and disarmament, 32, 

35-S, 38, 39, 43, 102, 108. 
Bristol, 295. 
British Admirality, 274, 300, 307, 334, 

337, 342-3, 355; letter to Foreign 

Office, 274~5* 

British Foreign Office, 274, 355. 
British and Foreign Arbitration Asso- 

ciation (Alliance), 62, 3:43-4, 201-3, 

267; M. to European Governments, 

201-3 ; M. to William II, 143-4. 
British War Office, 274-5, 355; letter 

to Foreign Office, 274-5, 
Brocqueville, de, 51. 
Brtinn, 255. 
Brunner, Sir John, 297. 
Brusa, M,, 243. 
Brussels, Conference or Declaration of 

1874, 268, 271, 272, 279. 
Bryce, James (Lord), 152, 327, 
Buchanan (British M.P.), 299, 
Buchanan, William L, 33911, 
Budapest, IJML Conference, 54, 77n,; 

Universal Peace Congress, 77 and n., 

78, P5 96. 
BUhler, von, 38, 42, 
Bulgaria, 263 ; Bulgarian atrocities, 40, 

BUlow, Prince Bernhard von, 249-50, 

251, 272, 327, 334. 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progre$s f 53. 
Bunting, Percy, ica, 
Burt, Thomas, 90, 
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 3x4, 
Byles, W, P., 4^ 4W>> 5*, $> 77, 90, 

96, 145' 

Oldwcll (British M.P.), 94- 
Calmette, Ga&tOH, jr$p 

Cambon, Jules, 323, 324. 

Campbell-nBannerman, Sir Henry, 306, 
3H> 334, 335, 342, 354, 355; Nation 
article on S.H.C., 332-3 ; on arbitra- 
tion, 306] on armaments, 311; on 
results of S.H.C., 342. 

Canadian- American frontier, 27. 

Canterbury, Dean of, 104. 

Canterbury Diocesan Conference, 99. 

Capen, Samuel B., 313-4. 

Caprivi, Count von, 147. 

Capture at sea, 337-*, 342-4? 35*-2; 
British attitude to, 337-8; effect on 
Germany, 342-4, 351-2. 

Carlisle, Bishop of, 200. 

Carmichael, Sir James, 48. 

Carnegie, Andrew, 88, 330; letter of 
T. Roosevelt to, 330. 

Carr, E, H., on public opinion, 161, 

Carroll, E. M., 318. 

Caspian Sea, 189. 

Castlereagh, Lord, 8, 24, 118; arma- 
ments on the Great Lakes, 24. 

Cadwor Program, 331. 

Cecil, Lady Gwendolyn, letter to the 
writer, 136. 

Center Party (Roman Catholic Center 
Party), 50-1, 

Century Magazine, the, 154, 236. 

Chamberlain, Joseph H., 299, 352. 

Champlain, Lake, 25. 

Channel Tunnel Bill, 334. 

Chartist Movement and armaments, 

Chicago, I.P.U. Conference, 74, 100, 


Chicago Journal, the, 235, 

Chile, treaty of arbitration and dis- 
armament with Argentina in 1902, 

China and Chinese Empire, sn., i84f ., 
229, 235, 237, 238, 251, 278; Eastern 
Chinese Railway Corporation, 185; 
Chinese railways, 184!!. 

Christian IX, King of Denmark, 48, 
61, 133, *tf->t* 

Christian Arbitration and Peace So- 
ciety, a i% 

ChrlstiamX gin, 

Chita-Vladivostok Railway, 185, 186. 

Choate, Joseph H., 339^, 344. 



Churches, Ch. V, 98-109, iS9> i99> 
200-1, 211, 225, 348; and Arbitra- 
tion Alliance, 98-109; and Tsar's 
Rescript, 199-200; Baptist, 45, 46; 
of England, 45, 200; of the United 
States, 200, 211; of Wales, 200; 
Committee of British Churches on 
Arbitration, 103-4; Congregation- 
alists, 108, 200; criticism of Chris- 
tian Churches, $8, 100; Dissenting 
Churches, 98, 99; Free Churches, 
45, 210; Free Church Federation, 
200-1; Mennonites, 98, 225; Meth- 
odist, 45, 99, 108; Moravians, 98; 
Presbyterians, 45, 101, 108; Primi- 
tive Methodist, 99, 108; Protestant 
Episcopal Church of the United 
States, 200; Wesleyans, 45, 108, 200. 

Circular of U. S. State Department, 
Oct. 21, 1904, 298; of Dec. 27, 1904, 


Civil War, 25. 

Clarendon, Lord, disarmament pro- 
posal to Prussia, 15, 18-20, 47, 246. 

Clark (British M.P.), 94- 

Clark, Francis E., 212. 

C16menceau, Georges, 88, 207, 319. 

Cleveland, President Grover, 88. 

Clifford, Rev. D., 46, 200, 210. 

Cobden, Richard, negotiates Anglo- 
French Commercial Treaty, 35-6; 
champions disarmament, 15, 32$., 

"Colossus of the North" (Russia), 237. 

Comit6 de Paris de la federation in- 
ternational de Farbitrage et de la 
paix, 70. 

Commercial blockade, British attitude 
to, 33$; see also capture at sea, 

Committee of British Churches on 
Arbitration, 103. 

Conant, Charles, ipr-2, 238, 

Conciliation and .mediation, 82, 276, 

Conference for the Reduction and 
Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 
1932-4), x, 

Conference XnterparUmentaire, 146, 

Conference interparlementaire pour 
Farbitrage international, 92* 

Conservatives, in I.P.U., 90. 
Constant, Baron d'Estournelles de, 

277, 311, 312, 316, 318, 323. 
Constantinople, 86, 148. 
Contemporary Review, 56, 137, 154, 

210; advocates "Truce of God," 

Convention of Geneva. See Geneva 

Convention Relative to the Settlement 

of International Disputes, 322. 
Coulet, Robert, 134-6 
Court, C. A., 278, 

Courtney, Leonard (Lord), 210, 309, 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 

123; Article 10, 124; Article 13, 

Cremer, Sir Randal, 40, 88, 90, 93, 

174-5, 174**,, 2 6; and I.P.U., 88, 

90, 93- 

Crewe, Marquis of, 138, 
Crimean War, g, 14, 34. 
Crispi, Count, disarmament suggestion 

to Bismarck, **; on Italian expan- 
sion, 2J4, 262. 
Cronberg, 331. 

Crozier, Captain William, 276n, 
Cuba, 236, 305. 

Cunningham, Dr. William, 212, 
Czar. See Tsar. 
Czechs, 350. 

Dahn, Felix, 227* 

Daily News, the, 45, 56, 7?n,, 95, xi8 

153, 154, 175, 207, 
Daily Telegraph, the, 4$, 56, i$4 *77* 

Darby, Dr. W. Evans, 63, 70, 73-4, 98, 

xoi, 106, xoS, 198, 206, 
Dardanelles, 86. 
Darien, Isthmus of, 7. 

Daru, Comte, 18-30; opinion on dis- 
armament, 20, 

Davis, George B., 33911. 

Declaration of Brussels, 1874, a 68, a 71, 
373, 279, 288, 345* 

Declaration of London, 1909, 279, 344* 

Dejeante (Leader of French Social- 
ists), 51* 

Delbrttck, Prof, Hans, td9aa 

Dtlcaui, M., aj-A 

Denmark, arbitration treaties, 305; 



King Christian IX of, 48, 61, 133, 

Democrats, in I.P.U., 90. 

Bering, Henry Nevill, 135. 

Des jar dins, 241. 

Desmoulins, Augusta, 41. 

Deutsche Laterne, 8$n. 

Devonshire House Conference 

(Friends), 102, 104, 108. 
Dewey, Admiral, 155, 236. 
Dicey, A. V., on public opinion, 

1 60. 
Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen 

Kabinette, 1871-1914, 137. 
Die Waff en Nieder (novel), 55-4, 175, 


Die Waff en Nieder (periodical), 54, 

Die Grenzbotcn, 228, 

Dillon, E. J,, 170, 177, i So, 183, 193-61 

iptf; Eclipse of Russia, 180, 193-6. 
Dillon, Mrs. E, J., 193. 
"Diploniaticus" <Mr. Austin), 134$, 

atio, and n, 

Disraeli, supports Cobden, 34, 36-7. 
Disestablishment, 45. 
Dissenters and Gladstone, 45, 
Dissenting Churches, 98, 99. 
Dolgorukof, Prince Peter, 225-6, 
Dollfus, Jean, 41. 
Dreadnought, the, 335, 3S4- 
Dreadnoughts, 335, 354, competition, 

344; T, Roosevelt on the size of, 

304, 3i7-8i Jjo, 
Dual Alliance (Franco-Russian), 179, 

234 3<$o. 

Dublin, Archbishops of, 104* 
Dubols, George*, 135-6, 
Dicker, Baron, 38, BS and n. 
Dufferin, Marquis of, X35-6, 141. 
Durham, .Bishop of 104. 

Eastern Chinese Railway Corporation, 

Eastern Question (Question of the Ori- 

ent), 81, lag, 182, 348, 
Edinburgh Review* 154. 
Edward VII, King of England, 331-2, 

334* 337> ^ Sir Henry Campbell- 

Bannematn*! Nation artkle, 554* 
Egypt, aS6 
Eirenicon, 5t the Tsar's Rescript 

Eliot, C. W., President of Harvard 
University, 318. 

Ellis, General, 337. 

Emeny, Brooks and Frank H, Sim- 
onds, on armaments and state poli- 
cies, 28. 

England. See Great Britain. 

English Workmen's Peace Committee, 
1870, 41, 64, 88. 

Entente, 356, 3S9n., 360. 

Episcopal Church, 200. 

Established Churches, 98, 99. 

Estournelles de Constant, Baron d', 
277> 3ii, 312, 316, 318, 323. 

Eulenburg, Count, 262. 

Eversley, Lord, 309. 

Exposition Universelle, 41. 

Far East, 218, 294, 349, 350. 

Farrer, Lord, 309, 

Fashima, Mrs., 204n* 

Fashoda incident, 167. 

Fauchille, on the disarmament prob- 
lem, 240-1, 243-4, 

Faure, Felix, 231. 

Faunce, W. H. P., President of Brown 
University, 314. 

Federation of Europe, of the United 
States and of the world, 124; possi- 
bilities of, 125, 127-8. 

Ferrero, Dr. Bella S, de, 204n. 

FIckert, Frlulein Aug., 20411. 

Field, David Dudley, 71; on large 
standing armies in Outlines of an 
International Code f in. 

Finland, 169, 176, 219-20. 

Fiore, Pasquale, 234. 

First Hague Conference, 89, 96, 98, 
ais, 214, 294, 298, 343, 35o-i. See 
Ch, XV, 347^ 

Fischhof, Dr. Adolphe, 38, 39, 40? 42, 
85 ; scheme for I.P.U., 40, 85. 

Pisher Sir John, 287, 289-90, 335, 
350, 356; at F.H.C., **?> a8<HJo; 
on arbitration, ^7; Stead's descrip- 
tion of at P JiC., %9Q> 

Fltzmaurice, Lord, 309, 

Floating mints, 345. 

Florence, 18, 39* 

Review > 154* 



Foster, John W., 313. 

Founding Fathers, 23. 


Alsace-Lorraine's recovery, 123, 125, 
129, 142, 232, 237, 245, 246, 250, 
256, 277, 286, 319? 347 5 349> 353J 
Clarendon engaged to approach 
Prussia in 1870, 18-20; Conference 
of Ambassadors proposed by Louis 
Philippe, 11-2; Conference proposal 
of Louis Napoleon, 15, 18, 36; 
F.H.C., 277-8; official opinion and 
the Rescript, 256 '; pacifists, 90; peace 
congresses and societies, Jo, 295; 
peace group, 38-9; public opinion on 
disarmament, 147, 207, 231; public 
opinion on the Rescript, 231-2; re- 
lations with England, 231; revanche 
idea, 64, 232, 319; S.H.C., 3 2 3-4J 
status quoj 123, 147-8, 221-2, 231, 
232, 24$, 246, 277, 318-9; view of 
Prussian aggression, 21; view of 
German unification, 21. 

Franco -German relations, 21. 

Franco -German War, 23, 39, 66, 81. 

Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria- 
Hungary, 61, 142, 144, I49> 349-50' 

Franklin, Benjamin, "Observations on 
War," 6-7- 

Frederick, Empress of Germany, 142, 

Frederick the Great, 7. 

Free Churches, 45, 210. 

Free Church Federation, 200-1. 

Free Evangelical Churches, 200. 

Free Traders, 32, 38. 

French pacifists, 90. 

French Peace Crusaders, 203, 

French peace group, 38-9. 

French Socialists, 19, 51, 147, 318-9. 

French view of aggression, 21, 

Fried, Alfred, 54. 

Friends, See Society of Friends. 

Fry, Joseph iS., 102, 

Fry, Sir Edward, 337, 338, 340-3:; at 
F.H.C., 340-x. 

Gaillard, Jules, 90, 93. 
Gallatin, Albert, 24. 

Gambetta, Won, 22, 
Gamier-Pages, 38. 

Gas asphyxiating, deleterious or poi- 
son, 286, 345 348. 

Gaulois, le, 232. 

Gauthier (French Conservative Dep- 
uty), 32, 147- 

Geffcken, Henry, 154. 

General Convention of Protestant 
Episcopal Church, 211. 

Geneva, 9 in. 

Geneva Convention (Geneva Rules 
and Red Cross Rules) of 1864 and 
Additional Articles of 1868, 268, 271. 
272, 279, 288, 345- 

Georgg, Marie, 158. 

Germany : 

Attitude to arbitration, 287, 288; 
attitude to capture at sea and com- 
mercial blockade, 342-4? 3S I ~ 2 J 
Army Bill, 353~5; Bismarck's atti- 
tude to Clarendon's proposal of 
1870, 18-22; Bismarck's answer to 
Crispi, 1877, 22-3; Bulow's attitude 
to disarmament, 249-50, 2$x t 272, 
327, 334-5 F.H.C., ^277, 381-3; 
Frederick the Great rejects Austria's 
proposals of 1766 and 1769; geo- 
graphical position and disarmament, 
xp, 2$-x t 237; navy and naval pol- 
icy, 251, 343-4, 360; official opinion 
and the Rescript, 226-30; 253-5; 
pacifists, 200; peace societies, 230; 
public opinion on disarmament and 
the Rescript, 226-30, 253-5; rela- 
tions with England, 335, 344, 348, 
353? 354-6; relations with France, 
231,- rumors of advocating disarma- 
ment or calling a peace conference, 
51, 134-7, 141-6 j S.H.C., 230, 33*n-i 
244-5, 35i; status quo, 65, 66, 123, 
148, 3<>o; Triple Alliance, $<) 356, 
360; view of aggression, ai; William 
II, 51, fix, 134-7, 141-6, 147* 183, 
207, j4tp-53, 39* 3*H* 33*-*> 349- 

Ghent, 34. 

Gibraltar, 7, 24. 

Giers, de, 138-40, 

Gilensky* Colonel, a8o~x, a 8 a, 283, 

Gitm, Edwin, 296, 

Gladstone, William ., xS, 34!., 45-71 
alliance with nonconformists* 45; 



and Manchester School of Econ- 
omists, 34-5, 36, 45; champion of 
liberalism j 45. 

Glasgow, 296. 

Glasgow Herald, 141. 

Gladstone, J. P., 102. 

Gleichen, Count, 330. 

Gobat, Albert, 90, 302, 318. 

Goblet (French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs), 88. 

Godkin, M,, 44. 

Godkin, E. L., 303. 

Gompers, Samuel 3 212. 

Goschen, Sir Edward, 223-4, 2 99i 37> 

Gossler, von, 254-5. 

Grasseric, Raoul de la, 78, 119-23, 131. 

Gravelotte, battle of, 42. 

Great Britain: 

Admiralty, 274, 275, 300, 307; 
Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, 
35-6; Anglo-French Entente, 356, 
359 n - 3$o; Anglo-French relations, 
13, 34, 167; Anglo-German dread- 
nought and naval competition, 148, 
335* 344> 348, 355J Anglo-German 
relations, 353, 355-6; Anglo-Jap- 
anese Alliance, 354, 360; attitude to 
arbitration, 269-70, 271, a86 9 287, 
306 \ attitude to capture at sea and 
commercial blockade, 33$, 342-4, 
351-2; Boer War, 294; Churches, 

45. 93, 99, xoo-x, 103-8, 200-1; 
Clarendon's proposal to Bismarck, 
1870, x8-d4 ; Dreadnought, 335, 354 ; 
Edward VII, 531-2, 334, 337; 
F.H.C., 269-75; Free Churches, 45, 
a 10, Free Church Federation, 200-1; 
Free Traders, 32, 38; House of 
Commons! dfearmament raised or 
supported in, 12, 33, 34, 3$, 36-8, 
42, 46, 48, 109, app-aoo, jotf-7, 3x4* 
dissenting members, 109; House of 
Lords, 91, and Declaration of Lon- 
don, 370, 344, disarmament ques- 
tion raised in, 307-9, dissenting 
members, 109; Liberal agitation for 
peace 4nd retrenchment, 31-2, 38, 

46, 64, 90, 108, i$6 210, jrf 3"> 
343 354J Manchester School of 
Economists, 31, 34-5, 3, 3481 offi- 

cial opinion and the Rescript, 256- 
60; Peace Societies, 9, 63, 70, 189-9; 
public opinion and disarmament, 
217-24, 319-20; S.H.C., 322-7, 331- 
8; satisfied with the status quo, 222, 
320, 3S4J War Office, 274-5, 355; 
workingmen, 41, 42, 64, 88; women, 

Great Design of Henry IV, 3. 

Great Lakes, limitation of armaments 
on 236% 75 and n. 

Greiss-Traut, Mme., 75 and n., 77-8, 

94- f 

Grenville, Lord, 24, 

Grensboten, 228. 

Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount Grey), 
47, So, 307, 309, 322-7, 337-8, 357, 
359> 360-1; arming and counter 
arming, 557, 360-1; causes of the 
World War, 360-1; instructions to 
delegates to S.H.C., 337-8] program 
of SJELC., 325-7 ; telegram to James 
Bryce, ,527; Twenty-Five Years, 
360-1; strategic railways, 360. 

Griscom (American Ambassador at 
Rome), 328, 

Grigorovitch, Admiral, 178. 

Guildhall, Lord Salisbury speaking, 
1887, 133; 1888, 133-4; 1897. *07, 
149-50; William II speaking, 1891, 

Hague Conferences. See First Hague 
Conference; Second Hague Confer- 

Hague, The, See The Hague, 

Hague Convention, 322* 

Hague Court. See Permanent Court 
of Arbitration. 

Haldane, Lord, 330, 335. 

Hale, Dr, Edward &, axx-a. 

Hamburg Mail Steamers, 344, 351. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 23. 

Hamlin, Charles, 314, 

Harcourt, Lady, 303. 

Harcourt, Sir William, 47, 223, 

Hardinge, -Sir Charles, 331-2, 

Hartmami, Eduard von, aa8, 

Marpefs Monthly, 154* 

Rarvwd L&w Review, 130-1. 

Hatfidd House, 135 and n., 1361 26on. 



Hatzfeldt, Count, 143, 269, 286. 

Hawaii, 305. 

Hay, John, 211; instructions to Amer- 
ican delegates to F.H.C., 276. 

Hay den, N. W. J., 213. 

Hazell's Annual Cyclopaedia, 118. 

Headlam-Morley, Sir James, on arbi- 
tration, 71, 82, 83; on status quo, 

Heidelberg, 112, 240. 

Heidelberger Zeitung, 228. 

Heilsburg, Dr., 38, 42. 

Heller, Frau Prof., 204n. 

Henry IV, 3, 4- 

Herald of Peace, on Christian Church- 
es, 08. 

Herat, 188, 189. 

Hercules, 279. 

Herford, Dean of, 104. 

Heri-Rus, 188. 

Herzegovina, 86; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

Hill, David Jayne, 33911, 

Hohenlohe, Prince, 250. 

Holland (the Netherlands), 244, 282; 
House in the Wood, 279; Nether- 
lands League of Peace, 41, 215; 
Netherlands Peace Societies, 215; 
Netherlands Women's League for 
International Disarmament, 215; 
Wilhelmina, Queen of, 279; see also 
The Hague. 

Holy Alliance, 8, 12, 171. 

Holyoake, George Jacob, 210. 

Holy See (the Pope), 209, 234, 

Hornby, Sir Edmund, 57, 

Home, Rev. Silvester, 46. 

Horst, President of the Norwegian 
Odelsthing, 90, 

Horton, Rev, Robert Forman, 46, 

House in the Wood, the, 279. 

House of Commons, disarmament 
raised or supported in, 12, jj, 34, 
35* 36-8, 42, 46, 48, 109, app-300, 
306-7 , 314] dissenting members, 

House of Lords, 91, and Declaration 
of London, 279, 344; disarmament 
question raised in, 307-$; dissenting 
members, 109. 

Howard, Rev. R. B., on disarmament, 


Howard, Sir H., 337. 
Howe, Julia Ward, 212. 
Hughes, Rev. Hugh Price, 45, 200. 
Humanitarian, the, 154. 
Humbert, King of Italy, 49, 133, 144, 


Hurd, Sir Archibald, 67. 
Hutchins, F. L., 212. 

Illingworth, A., 46-7. 

Imeretinsky, Prince, 190. 

Imperialism, 23, 236. 

Increased Armaments Protest Com- 
mittee, 63. 

India, 188-9, 218, 257. 

Ing-Kow, 184. 

Institute of International Law, no, 
in, 117, 130, 157, 240, 

International administration, La Gras- 
serie on, 121, 123. 

International Arbitration League, 88. 

International arbitration treaties, 69n., 
89, 97, 269-70, 294, 305. 

International army or police force, 
Sir Headlam-Morley on, 82; La 
Grasserie on, 120-1, 122, 123; T. 
Roosevelt on, 300, 303, 330, 

International Bureau of Peace, 76* 

International commission of peace, 62- 


International Commissions, 41, 
International Commissions of Inquiry 

(mixed commissions), 82. 

International Conference on the Labor 

Question, 63. 

International Council, 159. 
International Council of Women, 204. 
International Court of Arbitration 

(Permanent Court of Arbitration), 

80, 96, 286, 288, 381. 

International Crusade of Peace, 209; 
M., 209-10. 

itntermtioml Journal of &tkk$ 9 154, 

International jurists on the disarma- 
ment problem, Ch. VI, oof, aucl 
Ch. XIII, 339ff x$7, m 49> 347 
348, 349* 

International law, 346, code of, ao$, 
sovereignty and, 346. 



International Law Association, Lon- 
don Conference 1879, 43, no, 130, 

International Peace League of Women, 


International police force. See Inter- 
national army or police force. 

International Tribunal, 82 ; La Gras- 
serie on, 120, 123, 124. 

Inter-Parliamentary Union, Ch. IV, 
8$ff.J 534, 69, 70, 159, 205, 277, 
302; Conferences, 1889, 93-4] 1894, 
P3-4', 1896, yyn., 95-6, 297-&J 1903, 
95) 297; 1904, 297-8; 1905, 310-11; 
1906, 511-12, JTJ; disarmament 
question in., 89, 96, 97; Fischhof's 
scheme for, 85-6; Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, 89, 96; S.H.C, 297- 
8, 302-3, 325. 

Irredentism, in Europe, 347; in Italy 
("Italia Irredenta"), 245, 347, 353; 
in Serbia, 347, 353. 


Attitude to the Holy See, 234 ; arma 
ment policy, 149; Crispi on Italian 
expansion, 234, 262; Crispi suggests 
disarmament to Bismarck, 22; dis- 
satisfied with the tio&us quo, 148, 
233-4, 245 F.H.C., 278; Humbert, 
King of, 49? *33> *44> *4PJ Nigra, 
263, 278; official opinion on dis- 
armament and the Rescript, 263; 
public opinion on the Rescript, 233- 
4; S.H.C., 328; territorial problems 
of, 14, 234, atfa, 

Janssens (leader of the Roman Catho- 

lic Party m Belgium), 51. 

Japan ; 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 354, 360; 
F.H.C., 278; Japanese naval arma- 
ments and $ea power, 5191, 29 a, 297- 
8, 324, 340; official opinion and the 
Rescript, a^j-^; Russo-Japanese 
War, 298-9, 353; Stoo-J*paneae 
War, 140, 184, 54* 

Jaurb, Jean, 318, 319, 

Jay, John, tlemffitarimtion of the 
Great Lakes, 33^4, 

Jefferson, TJi0n% Umitatloa of arma- 

on the Great Lakes, 23; on 
peace, 6-7. 
Jews, 264, 

Johnson, R. M., 262. 
Jokai, Maurus, 54. 
Joseph II, of Austria, 7. 
Journal de De"bats, 232. 
Journal of Political Economy, 155-6, 


Journal of Political Science, 156. 

Journal de Saint-P&tersbourg, 18, 175, 

Juridical Review, 155. 

Jurists, jurisconsults, international, 
Ch, VI, uoff, and Ch, XIII, 239!!., 
157, 239, 249, 347, 348, 349* 

Kaiser, The. See William II. 
Kansas City Labor Convention, 201. 
Kant, Immanuel, 3, 5. 
Kamarowski, Count, in, 113, 116-7; 
on the disarmament problem, 116- 


Kapnist, Count, 174. 

Karlstad, Treaty of, 305. 

Karnebcek, Jonkherr, 282. 

Katscher, Dr. Leopold, 204. 

Kaunitz, Prince, disarmament pro- 
posal to Frederick the Great, 7. 

Kirch wey, Bean, 315. 

Kiao-Chow, 187. 

KilMoe, Bishop of, 104, 

Kimberley, Lord, 103-4. 

Kipling, Rudyard, 220, 

Klotz (French Minister of Finance), 

Knox, General, 23. 

Kokovtsov (Russian Minister of Fi- 
nance), 356. 

Kolben, Dr., 77. 

K$lni$che Volkxeitung, #ap, 

Kftlnische Zeitung, ^ap, 

Kuropatkin, General Alexy N., re- 
armament of Russian artillery, 178- 
80, 186, 193^ I9S- 

Kwantung provinces, 187* 

Labor (workers, workingmen) , 41, 42, 
51, 64, SB, 158, 201, 210 j American, 
64, aox; British, 41, 4> ^4 B8; 
Kansas City Convention, 201; So- 



cialist Congress in London 1896, 64 ; 
working class congresses, 64; Work- 
men's Peace Committee, 41, 64, 88. 

La Conference interparlementaire pour 
1'arbitrage international. See Inter- 
Parliamentary Union. 

Laeisz, Ferdinand, 227. 

La Fontaine, Henri, 90. 

Lake Mohonk Conferences on Inter- 
national Arbitration, 296-7, 313- 


Lambeth Palace, 99. 

Lammasch (German Delegate to 
S.H.C.), 344- 

Lamsdorff, Count, 175, 195. 

Lange, Christian L., 92-3, 96. 

Lansdowne, Marquis of, 223. 

Lapradelle, A, Geouffre de, 77n., 95? 

Lascelles, Sir Frank, 331. 

Laws of War. See Declaration of 
Brussels of 1874; Geneva Conven- 
tion of 1864 and Additional Articles 
of 1869. 

Lawrence, J. W., in International 
Journal of Ethics, 216, 247-8, 

Lawson, Sir Wilford, 40. 

League of Nations Covenant, 123, 
Article 10, 124; Article 13, So. 

League of Peace and Liberty, 70, 90. 

Lee, Arthur, 335. 

Leeds Mercury, the, 45, 153. 

Lefevre, Shaw, 210, 

Le Figaro, 45, 46, 144, 154, 232. 

Le Gaulois f 232, 

Le Havre, 296. 

Le MarchS financier f 192, 

Lernonnier, Charles, 70, 90. 

Leopold II, King of the Belgians, 207. 

Le Petit Journal, 319. 

Le Soir, 56. 

Le Temps, 56, 154, 231, 233, 277, 31$, 

334- ^ 

Liberalism, Gladstone and, 45; op- 
poses force and armaments, 32, 46; 
Rosebery and, 46, 137. 

Liberals, "Advanced Liberals," 90, 
108; advocates of peace and re- 
trenchment, 12, 3i-a, 38, 46, 64, 90, 
108, 157; associations, 201; British 
Liberal Government (Campbell- 

Bannerman's) , 91, 311, 3226:., 343, 
354; British liberal pacifists, 45-50, 
63, 201, 310; British Liberal Party, 
31, 45-6, 90, 109; Deputation, 210; 
and Gladstone, 34-5, 36, 45. 

Liaotung peninsula, 184-187. 

Liebknecht, W., 227. 

Ligue de la paix, la, 70. 

Ligue Internationale de la paix et de la 
liberte*, la, 41. 

Ligue internationale des femmes pour 
le desarmement ge*ne"ral, la, 158. 

Li Hung-Chang, 184-5. 

Lille, 295. 

Lippmann, Walter, on public opinion, 
155, 160-1. 

Lisbon, 205. 

LittelVs Living Age, 155, 

Livadia, 208. 

Livermore, Mary A., 212, 

Liverpool, 43. 

Living Age, 155. 

Lloyd George, David, 91. 

Lobanov-Rostovski, Prince, 184. 

Lockwood, Belva A., 73. 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 303. 

Lodge, Mrs. Henry Cabot, 303. 

Loftus, Lord, 19-21, 

London, 25, 100, 252, 324, 325, 356; 
Bishop of, 210. 

London Congregational Board of Min 
isters, 200, 

London Congress, 1899, 159, 

London Peace Society, 38, 41, 87, 98, 

Lorimer, George C,, 212, 

Larimer, James, xx$ff., n6n., on dis- 
armament and international law, 
114-16, 117. 

Louis XIV, 177. 

Louis Napoleon, See Napokon, 

Louis Philippe, 11-13; proposed Con- 
ference of Ambassadors, 11-12. 

Low, Seth, 276n. 

Low, Sidney, axg-ax. 

Lowell, A. Lawrence, on public opin- 
ion, 157- 

Lowcnthal, Br Edward, 85 and n* 

Lucerne, 296, 

Lund (President of the Norwegian 
Storthing), 90, 94* 



Luxembourg question, 18, 345. 
Lyon, 295. 

Lyons, Lord, igff.; Lord Lyons, A 
Record of British Diplomacy, ign. 

McClure's Magazine, 56, 60, 61, 155; 
de Blowitzin, 60-1. 

MacDonald (British Minister to Ser- 
bia), 263. 

MacDonell, Sir John, 309. 

MacEwan, Dr., 210. 

McKinley, William, Second Annual 
Message, Dec. 5, 1898, and the 
Rescript, 261. 

Maddison, representing labor, 201, 210. 

Magazines. See Press: magazines, 
newspapers and periodicals on dis- 

Mahan, Captain A. T., 82-3, 276n., 
28$, 20X-2, J5p; at F.H.C., 285, *pi- 
2; author of The Importance of 
Sea Power in History and The in- 
terest of America in Sea Power 
Present and Future, 291; on arbi- 
tration, 82-5, JJP; on armaments, 
285, 391, 292, 359. 

Manchester, 295. 

Manchester Examiner, 153. 

Manchester School of Economists and 
Free Traders (Manchester Peace 
Party), 31, 34, JJ* 348- 

Manchester Times f 153. 

Manchuria, 185; Manchurian levies, 
189; railways in, 188-9. 

Mann, W. J., 212, 

MarchS financier f le, 192. 

Marcoartu, Arturo de (Marquis de), 
38, 59., 86 and n. 

Mariani, -Signora Emilia, 30411. 

Martens, F. de, xx8, 279, 324-6, 328, 
342; program of the >SJELC, 324, 
3*$-4t 3^B, 343, 

Massachusetts Good Citizenship So- 
ciety, 211-12, 

Massachusetts State Federation of 
Women's Clubs, aia* 

Mazdni, Giuseppe, 3$. 

Mead, Idwfn D, 315. 

Mead, Lucia Ames, 212* 

Mediation, John Hay on, 376 9 Mar- 
quis of Salisbury on, 369-70. 

Mejoen, Frau Dr., 204n. 


Anglo-American Arbitration M., 
107-8; Arbitration Alliance M., 62, 
103-4, 137. Belgian Peace Society 
M. to Nicholas II, 203 ; British and 
Foreign Arbitration Association M. 
presented to European Govern- 
ments, 201-03; British and Foreign 
Arbitration Association M. pre- 
sented to Mr. Gladstone, 62} Brit- 
ish and Foreign Arbitration Asso- 
ciation M. presented to William II, 
143 ; British Peace Socitty M. to the 
International Conference on the 
Labor Question, 63; International 
Crusade of Peace M. to Mr. Bal- 
four, 209-10; Liberal Deputation 
M. to Nicholas II, 210; National 
M., $o, 62, 104, 105-8, 137, 1 60; 
Society of Friends M. to Lord Sal- 
isbury, 199; Workingmen and lead- 
ers of Trade Unions M. to Mr. Glad- 
stone, 64. 

Mennonites, 98, 225. 

Mrignhac, A,, 119, 127-29, 131; on 
the status quo, 128, 245. 

Mcssimy (French Deputy), 312, 

Methodists, 45, 99, xo8 ; Conference at 
Sheffield, 99; Primitive Methodists, 
99, 108. 

Metternich, Prince, 11-12. 

Met2ger, von, 228, 231. 

Mexico, 279. 

Milan, 42, 73 , 313 , 

Militarists, 350, 359, 360. 

Military service, 126, 356-7* 

Mitchell, Rev, T,, 99. 

Mobilization, period of, 66, 287, 

Moch, Gaston, 78, 90, 318, 

Mohonk. See Lake Mohonk Confer- 
ences on International Arbitration, 

Monaco, 296. 

Moneta, E. T,, 38, 42, 73, 

Mongolia, 185, 

Monkswell, Lord, aio. 

Monroe, James (Secretary of State), 
on limitation of armaments on the 
Great Lakes, 23-4, 

Monroe Doctrine, the, and limitation 
of armaments, a6i, 305. 



Monson (British Ambassador to 

France), 207. 
Montenegro, 263 ; Nicholas, Prince of, 

170, 263. 

Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois t 5~tf. 
Moore, John Bassett, 315. 
Moravians, 98. 
Morley, John, 209, 223. 
Morning Advertiser > 153. 
Morning Chronicle, 153. 
Morris, Gouverneur, 24. 
Moscheles, Felix, 206. 
Moujiks, 190. 
Mouravieff. See Muraviev. 
Moxton, Philip S., 75- 
Munich, 39? 299, 264- 
Miinster, Count, 214, 256, 278, 288] 

on arbitration, 278. 
Miinster, Peace of, 279. 
Muraviev, Count (Mouravieff), 95, 

169, 176, 178-80, 195, 252, 264, 275, 

Muraviev Circular (January u, 

1899), 267-9, 271-2, 275, 277, 289, 


Namier, L. B., 15$, 161. 

Naples, 42, 43. 

Napoleon, Louis, 15-18, 36; proposal 
for an International Congress, 16, 
17, 18. 

Napoleonic Wars, 8, 13- 

Napoleon's days, 66. 

Nation, the (London), 332-35," Camp- 
bell-Bannerrnan's article on "The 
Hague Conference and the Limita- 
tion of Armaments," 333-3. 

Nation, the (New York) , 235. 

National Arbitration and Peace Con- 
gress, New York, 1907, 315-17. 

National Citizens Force, 64, 

"National dignity," 233, 245. 

"National honor," 81, 333, 245 270, 

National Liberal Federation, 63, * 

National Memorial, 50, 62, 104, xog- 

8, 137, 160. 

Naval armament competition, 3:4$, 
291, 292, 294, 297*8, 324, 335, 340, 
344, 348, 354, 355* 

Navy Bills and Laws (German), 251, 

343-4> 352. 

Navy League (German), 2$i. 

Nelidov, President of the S.H.C., 340- 

Nelson, Lord, 290. 

Netherlands League of Peace, 41, 215. 

Netherlands Women's League for In- 
ternational Disarmament, 215. 

Neve Freie Presse, 39, 45> 203. 

Neue Hamburger Zeitung, 226-8. 

New Weiner Tageblatt, 203. 

Neutrality of Switzerland and Bel- 
gium, 245; neutralization of Den- 
mark, 90. 

Nevel, Stanford, 276. 

Newspapers. See Press; marines, 
newspapers and periodicals on dis- 

Newton, Lord, Lord Lyons, A Record 
of British Diplomacy, 85*1. 

New York City, 101, 315. 

New York fferald, the, 45, 154. 

New York Sun, the, 45? 142. 

New York Times, the, 45, 154* 

Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 263, 

Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, Ch, IX, 
167-80; 95, 96, 130, 133, 140-1, 150, 
196, igyff., 273, 288, 289, 302, 303, 
3> 3*3, 3x8, 321, 3*8, 34 348, 
349 ; attitude on strategical railways, 
186, Dillon's description of, jr77-tf; 
receives W. T, Stead, 308-9 ; see also 
The Tsar's Rescript. 

Nicholson, .Sir A., 3*6, 

Niewstadt, Frau, 20411, 

Nigra, Count, 3*5,2-3, 278, 

Nihilism, 176; Nihilists, 203, 

Nimes, 294* 

Nineteenth Century, the, i54 "9. 

Nobel, Alfred, 54-5; devotion to the 
peace movement, 54-$; Natal 
awards, 55; views on armament*, 


Nonconformists, 31, 4}-6, QQ tog* 348; 
alliance with Gladstone* 45. 

Non-justiciable disputes, 8t; jut id- 
ability, 124. 

North American Mv$ew, the, 6*, xgx* 
23$ 36. 

North German Confederation, 39, S6n 



North Sea, 335, 352. 

Norway, 283, 305-6; Odelsthing, 90; 
Storthing, 90-1. 

Notovitch, Nicholas, letter to F. D. 
Roosevelt on the origin of the Re- 
script, 77n., 95, 175, 178, j/p, 180. 

Novikoff, Mme., 102. 

Novoe Vremya, 224. 

Novosti, 224. 

Nuova Antologia, 234. 

Obruchev, Russian Chief of Staff, 186. 

O'Connor, John, 210. 

Okuma, Count, 20*3-4, 

Oldenburg, Prince Peter, 225. 

Ontario, Lake, 25. 

Orange Hall, the, in The House in the 

Wood, 279. 

Orient, questions of, 8x, 129, 182, 348. 
Qttley, Captain, 337. 
Oyster Bay, home of T, Roosevelt, 81. 

Pacific Ocean, 292, 297, 352, 354. 

Pacifists, Ch, XI, 197!.; 10, 27, 75, 109, 
1$ 7, si4-x$, 239* 249, 304, 313-18, 
347; American, 313-18; American 
pacifist opinion and the S. H, C., 
3x7-18; and Rush-Bagot Agree- 
ment, 27, 75; criticism of, xo, 2x4- 
15; 504; defense of, 215; see, also 
Peace Congresses; Peace Societies; 
Universal Peace Congresses. 

Pages, Gamier-. See Gamier-Pages. 

Paine, Dr. Robert Treat, 211-12. 

"Pallas Athene," 279, 

P&ll Mall GauMe, 206, 

Palmer, Alice Freeman, 212, 

Palrnerston, Lord, 33, 37, 38. 

Pamir Highlands, 189, 

Panama Canal, 305, 

Pan* American Treaty of 1890, 271. 

PandoM, Marquis de, 90, 93* 

Panics in England, 13; Third Panic, 


Paris, 40* 87, ioo 204, 207, 3S$- 
Paris Gauloh) le, $3*. 

Parttes, conservative and of the right, 
90 ; of the left, 90 ; see also Liberals, 
Advanced Liberals, Socialists, Social 
Democrats, Radical*, Radical So- 

Passy, Frederic, 44, 87^., 318. 
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, 274-5, 283, 
286, 2Q2\ instructions for the F.H.C., 


Peace Congresses, Ch. Ill, 69!!; 32-3, 
38, 7iff., 78-9, 205-6, 295-6; at 
Berne, 73-4; Birmingham, 295; Bos- 
ton, 296; Bristol, 295; Budapest, 
77-8, 95-6; Chicago, 74-6, 100; 
French, 295; Le Havre, 296; Lille, 
295; Lisbon, 205; London, 71-3; 
Lucerne, 296; Lyon, 295; Man- 
chester, 295; Milan, 296, 313; 
Monaco, 296; Nimes, 295,- Paris, 40, 
87, 100 ; Perugia, 296,* Rome, 100; 
Rouen, 296; Turin, 205-6, 296; 
iScheveningen, 77; see also Universal 
Peace Congresses. 

Peace Crusade, the, 211. 

Peace organizations, 206. 

Peace plans, 3-5. 

Peace Societies, 9, 23, 32, 38, 72-6, 
*S8, *S9> i9$-9i 2I4-I5) 230, 267, 
296, 348; American, 9, 70, 211-12; 
Austrian, 70; Belgian, 203; Boston, 
211-12; British, 9, 63, 70, 198-9; 
criticism and defense of, 214-15; 
French, 70, 295; German, 70, 230; 
Italian, 70, 296, 230; Milan, 70, 230; 
Netherlands, 41, 215; Russian, 163, 
225; Scandinavian, 70; Swiss, 70; 
see also Pacifists, Peace Congresses; 
Universal Peace Congresses. 

Peace Sunday, 100. 

Pease, Sir Joseph, 48-9, 108. 

Peel, Sir Robert, 12. 

Peking, 294. 

Penn, William, 3-4. 

Perin Georges, 88, 93. 

Periodicals, 5e# Press: magazines, 
newspapers and periodicals on dis- 

Permanent Commission, 63. 

Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(Hague), 89, 368, 88, 321, 

Permanent tribunal, xag, 

Penis, A. H., 63. 

Persia, 169, i$9 229, 335, 278. 

Persian Gulf, 189, 

Perugia, 296, 

Peter the Great, 183. 



Petit Journal, le, 319. 

Phelps, Christina, 10, 53; classification 
of English newspapers on disarma- 
ment, 153-4; disarmament resolu- 
tions and petitions, 10; criticism of 
early international reformers, 10. 

Philadelphia* Record, the, 235. 

Philadelphia, Universal Peace Union 
of, 41. 

Philippe, King Louis, n, 12, 13; pro- 
posed Conference of Ambassadors, 


Philippines, 155, 236, 238. 

Phillips, Mrs. Wynford, 204. 

Pierce, H. H. D,, 264. 

Pierre, Saint-, Abbe" de. See Saint- 

Fillet, on the disarmament problem, 
240-1, 243-4. 

Poland and the Poles, 169, 190, 218, 

Political Science Quarterly, the, 155, 

Poortugael, General Den Beer, 280. 

Pope, 209, 234; as arbitrator, 234. 

Port Arthur, 184, 187, 189. 

Porter, Horace, 33 gn. 

"Power Politics," 28, F. H. Simonds 
and Brooks Emeny on, 28. 

Pratt, Hodgston, 44, 62, 70, 206. 

Preparatory Commission of the Con- 
ference for the Reduction and Lim- 
itation of Armaments, x* 

Presbyterians, 45, 100-1, 108. 

Press: magazines, newspapers and 
periodicals on disarmament, Ch, 
VHI, 151*1 and Ch. XII, 217$,; 
152-6; 217!, 257$., 332-3', Ameri- 
can, 154-4, 234-38; British, 133-4, 
217-23, 25 7ff., 332-3 \ French, 231- 
2, 318-19; German, 22^-30; Ger- 
man Press Bureau, 51; Italian, 233- 
4; Russian, 224-5; see also Public 
Opinion, and under names of maga- 
zines, newspapers and periodicals. 

Press Bureau, German, 251. 

President of the French Republic, 169. 

President of the United States, 169, 
William McKinley, Mr. 

Pressense", Francis de, 319, 324. 

Preusmche Jahrbucher, 329* 

Primitive Methodist, 99, 108. 

Prince of Wales Levee, 138. 

Prince Regent (Great Britain), dis- 
armament proposal of 1816, 8-9, 25, 

Protestant Episcopal Church, General 
Convention, 211. 

Prussia, 7, 18-22; Prussian view of 
aggression and disarmament in 1870, 

Public Opinion, Ch. VIII, 15 iff., Ch, 
XII, 2iyff.; 14, 214, 325, 326, 350, 
351; American, 162, 254-8; Balfour 
on, 151; British, 162, 217-24, 257, 
319-20; 325-6; Bryce on news- 
papers, 15-2; Carr on, i<5i; creating 
and formulating, 151!!.; educated, 
14; French, 147, 162, 207, 221-2, 
231-2, 318-19; German, 162, 226- 
3> 253-5; Italian, 233-4; Lipp- 
mann on, 155, i6o-ij Lowell on, 
157; Root, i6o\ Russian, 163, 224-6; 
Serbian and South Slav, 2j0; Smith 
on, 157; see also Press: magazines, 
newspapers and periodicals on dis- 
armament and $tatit$ quo. 

Punch, 153. 

Quakers. See Society of Friends. 

Qualitative race, 68, 

Quantitative competition, 68. 

Quantum, 244. 

Quarterly Journal of Economics, the, 

156, 236. 

Quarterly Review, the, 154. 
Queen of England, Victoria, 169, 
Queen of Holland, Wilhclmina, 279, 

Radolin, Prince, 249, 
Radical Associations, aoi. 

Radicals, 31, 64, 90, 157, 319, 348; ad- 
vocates of peace and retrenchment, 
31, 64, 157, 348, 

Radical Liberals, 31, 40, 90, 

Radical Socialists, 31, 90* 

RafMovich, Arthur, 193, 

Railways, 182, 244, 251, 357, 360; 
Alexander til and, 183-4; Chita- 
Vladivostok, 185-6; Eastern Chi- 
nese, 185; Kuropatkin and, iS6; 
Liaotung, 189; Mandiurlan, 188-9; 



Nicholas II, 183-4, I S6; Russian, 

i82ff., 238, 251; strategical, 184$:., 

188, 218; Trans-Siberian, i83ff., 244, 

251, 360; Witte's railway policy, 


Remaix, de, Belgian deputy, 51. 
Randolph, Edmund, disarmament on 

. the Great Lakes, 23. 
Rauschenbusch, W., 312. 
Reay, Lord, 309, 345. 
Red Cross Statutes or Rules, 272, 

279; see also Geneva Convention. 
Reichenberger, member of German 

Center Party, 50. 
Republican bloc in France, 319. 
Reuter, J. N., 219. 
Reval, Sir John Fisher at, 356. 
Revanche idea in France, 65, 232, 319. 
Review of Reviews, 56, 5p, 137, 154. 
Review of Reviews Annual, 135, 176. 
Revolution of 1848, 14. 
Revue de droit international et de 

legislation compare, in, 112, 114, 

Revue de droit public et de la science 

polUigue en France et & Vitr anger, 

*3, x$$. 
Revue de Paris, 156. 

Revue de deux mondes, 156, 
Revue g&n&rale de droit international 
public, 125, 130, 240. 

Rhodes, Cecil, 352. 

Ricdardi, leader in disarmament move- 

ment in Italy, 38, 
Ripen, Bishop of, 104. 
Roberts, British M. P., 299. 
Robertson, J* M., 299, 309. 
Rogers, Rev, J. Guineas, 46, 
Rohn-Jaequ<imyns, Gustave Henri, 

xxa f ixj, 114, 117-18. 
Roman Catholic Center Party, 51, 
Roman Catholic clergy, 190. 
Romanovs, 23 5. 
Rome, 100. 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, letter of 

Nicholas Notovitch to, 7711., 95, 175, 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 155, 398, 300-^ 

JW* 317-18, 330, 334; calling of 
S.H.C., *p#, jew, jojj Fifth Annual 
Message of 1905, 303, 313, Fourth 

Annual Message of 1904, 500; in- 
ternational police force, 300, 303, 
330; letter to Andrew Carnegie, 
330 \ letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, 
303 ; letter to Carl Schurz, 301 ; lim- 
itation on the size of dreadnoughts, 
304, 317-18, 330-, peace and the lim- 
itation of armaments; 300-1, 304-5, 
330; program of the S.H.C., 303-4, 
3 2 5 330", Seventh Annual Message 
of 1907, 304. 

Root, Elihu, 160, 303, 315, 316-17, 
329, 338, 339-40; instructions to 
American delegates to S.H.C., 338, 
33940 ; on public opinion, 160 ; 
United States and disarmament, 315, 

3*6 3*7, 329- 

Rosebery, Lord, 46, 103-8, 133, 137- 
40, 170, 176, 223, 267; approach to 
Baron de Staal, 137-40, 170, 176; 
attitude to the Rescript, 170, 267; 
on the peace of Europe, 140. 

Rose, Uriah M., 33 9n. 

Rosen, Baron, 301, 302, 303. 

Rouen, 296. 

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 3. 5. 

Rubens, Peter Paul, Paintings in the 
Orange Hall, 279, 

Rules of War, See Declaration of 
Brussels of 1874; Geneva Conven- 
tion of 1864 and Additional Articles 
of 1868. 

Rurnbold, Sir H., 262, 

Rush-Bagot Agreement, 23$., 75 ; 1941 
revision of, 26-27. 

Rush, Richard, 25. 

Russell, Earl John (Lord), 16-17, 34- 

Russia : 

Alliance with France, 139, 234, 360? 
Army, 225-6; army officers and the 
Rescript, 226; autocracy and arma- 
ments, 148; economic and financial 
condition, igofL, Foreign Office, 
218; General Staff, 219; Imperial 
Bank, 192; official opinion and the 
F.H.C., 224, 7^-3; official opinion 
and the SJELC., 321, 3aaff,, 328; 
opposed to the status quo, 123-4, 148, 
32i ; program of the F.H.C., 272-3; 
program of the S.H.C., 324, 325-6, 
$aS, 342 ; protector of the Balkan 



Slavs, 123-4, 148, 353; public opin- 
ion, 163, 224-6; public works, 198, 
railways in Asia, 182^., 238, 251; 
relations with Finland, 169, 176, 
219-20; relations with Poland, 190, 
218; War Office, 218; war with 
Japan, 299, 353; war with Turkey, 
40, 86, 183; see also Alexander I, 
Alexander II, Alexander III, Kuro- 
patkin, P. de Martens, Nicholas II, 
Rosen, Tsar's Rescript, Witte. 

Russo -Chinese Bank, 184. 

Russo-Chinese Pact, 185. 

Russo-French Alliance (Dual Alli- 
ance), 179, 234, 360. 

Russo-Japanese War, 299, 353. 

Russo-Turkish War, 40, 86, 183. 

Saffron Walden, Friends Quarterly 
Meeting at, 199. 

Saint Croix, Mile., 204n. 

St. James's Hall, 209. 

St. Louis, Missouri, I.P.U. Conference, 

St. Martin's Hall, 210. 

St. Petersburg, 18, 324, 326. 

Saint-Pierre, Abb6 de, 3, 4. 

Salisbury, Robert, Marquis of (Lord), 
105, 107, I33ff. r 144, 149, 150, 176, 
199, 223, 257-60, 262, 269-73, 286, 
289-90, 350; attitude to Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 286', attitude 
to the Rescript, 25^-9; Friends 
memorial 10^199; Guildhall Speech 
(Lord Mayor's Day), 1887, ijj, 
257-8; 1888, 133-4; 1897, 107, 149- 
50, 258; instructions to British dele- 
gates to F.H.C., 275; on mediation 
and arbitration, 269, 270, 271, 286, 
27 j; on peace and disarmament, 
X33> W, 137, 357, ^SS, 260; on pro- 
gram of S.H.C., 2$8<~~6o f 269-72, 
2731 rumored state paper on arma- 
ments of Europe, 135-7, *76. 

Samarkand, 189. 

Sanction of force, 303 ; see also Inter- 
national Army and police force. 

Satow, Sir E., 337, 

Saxony, 39, 

Sbarbaro, Professor, 38, 42, 

SchabanGff, Anna von, 20411, 

Schilfgaarde, Mme. Wasxklewicsz van, 
203, 204 and n. 

Scheveningen, 77. 

Schmerling, Ritter von, 40. 

Schurz, Carl, 300, 303. 

Schwarzhoff, Colonel, 281, 282, 283, 
289, 350. 

Schuvaloff, Count, 145. 

Schweizer Friedengesellschaft, 70. 

Scott, Sir C., 136. 

Scribner's Magazine, 154, 236. 

Sea power, 291-2, 294, 324, 351; 
Mahan, an authority on, 291. 

Second Hague Conference, Ch. XVII, 
3 2 iff., 89, 303, 304, 306; Austrian 
attitude to, 328; American attitude 
to, 324; American pacifist opinion 
and, 317-18; British attitude to, 
319-20, 325-6; calling of, zgB 9 302, 
303; Campbell-Bannerman's Gov- 
ernment, 332, 333 t 334; Edward 
VII's attitude, 331-2, 334, 337; 
France and, 323-4; Grey and the 
program, 325-7; instructions to 
American delegates, 338, 339-40; 
instructions to British delegates, 
337-8] Italy's attitude to, 328; 
Roosevelt on the program of, 303- 
4> 325> Jjo; Root and, 315, 3x6, 317* 
329, Russian attitude to discussion 
of disarmament, 321, 322$;,, 328; 
William II and, 327, 331-3* 

Selenka, Mme., 20411. 

Serbia, Serbs and South Slavs, 65, 123, 
124, 148, 345, 263, 347, 3So, 353? 
opposed to disarmament, 363; dis- 
satisfied with the status quo> 66, 
233, 245, 347; Russia protector of, 
123-4, 148, 350, 353; territorial 
problems of, 14, 263, 353, 

Seven Years War, 7, 

Sewell, Wright-. 5ee Wrteht-Scwell. 

Shalcr, N, S., 62, 

Shaw, Dr. Robert, a 1:3, 336-7. 

Shimonoseki, Peace of, 1895, 184. 

Siegel, Captain, 291, 393, 343, 350. 

Siegfried, French deputy ckvoted to 
the disarmament movement) 88, 

Simon, Sir John, 136, 

Simon, Jutes, 50, 88, 90, 13011,, 137; 



advocates "Truce of God," 58-9 and 

n, 137. 
SImonds, Frank H. and Brooks Em- 

eny, on armaments and policies of 

states, 28. 

Sinclair, Sir John, 7, 
Sino-Japanese War, 140, 184, 254. 
Smith, Charles W., 157. 
Smith, W. H., 46, 47. 
Snape, Thomas, 90, 93-4, 102-3, *o8. 
Social Democrats, 31, 83, 86n., 90, 228, 

230, 23 in., Herr Bebel leader of, 51, 
23 in.; in I.P.U., 31. 

Socialists, 19, 38, 51, 64, 147, 264, 
318-19; advocates of peace and re- 
trenchment, 31; Congress in Lon- 
don, 1896, 64; Franch, 19, 51, 147, 
318-19; in I.P.IL, 31; status quo 
and, 318. 

Soci6t6 acade*rnique de la pafoc, la, 76, 

Socie'te' franchise de 1'arbitrage entre 
nations, la, 70, 

Socie"t6 franchise des amis de la pafoc, 
la, 41. 

Socie'foS Internationale de la paix et la 
liberty 70, 90. 

Soir, k, 56, 

Somerset, Lady Henry, 204. 

Souchon, A., 119, 125-6, 130 and n. 

South African War, 394, 344, 351. 

Sovereignty of the state and disarma- 
ment, 339-42, 

Spanish-American War, 235, 253, 254, 

6x 3$* 354* 
Spectator f the, 54, 154, 221-2; on the 

status guo f 221-2. 
Springfield Republican, the, .255. 

Staal, Baron de, 137-40, 176, 210, 
7*-3t 379^8^ 290* 

Standoff, Dr., 282, 

Standard, the, 56, 154* 

Stanhope, Philip, See Lord Weardale. 

Stanley, Lord, 18. 

Statesmen's Yew Book> ixB. 

Status guo f acquiescence in, 23, 84, 
xao, 133, 4> asi 239, 245-^1 318, 
348; and disarmament, 14, aa 23, 
*77) 347 J wwi the Rescript, 221, 223, 

231, 233, 333; Balkan opposition to, 
W *33> H5J French opposition to, 
183, I47-S, a-a 5*31, 333, HS* 

246, 277, 318-19; Germany and, 65, 
66, 123, 148, 250; Great Britain and, 
222, 320, 354; Headlam-Morley on, 
246 \ Italy dissatisfied with, 148, 
233-4, 245; Merignhac on, 128, 245; 
modification of, 106, 114; Poles and, 
347; Russia and, 123-4, I 48, 222; 
Serbia opposed to, 233, 245; Spec- 
tator on, 221-2; United States and, 
222 ; Vesnitch and, 233, 245. 

Stead, Miss Mary L, 204n. 

Stead, W. T., 50, 53, 56, 59~6o, 770., 
95, 102, 104-5, 107, 134-37, I74-S, 
2o6ff., 236, 267; at The Hague, 351; 
description of Fisher at F.H.C., 2go ; 
fostered public opinion on the Re- 
script; 2o6ff., in Contemporary Re- 
view, 59-60, 137; in Review of Re- 
views, 105, 135, 137; National Me- 
morial, 59, 104!!,, 107, 108; origin 
of the Rescript, 135, 174-6; trip to 
European Capitals, 207, 208 ', 209; 
United States of Europe, 174-5; 
War Against War, 209. 

Stengel, Baron Karl von, 229-30, 350; 
Der Ewige Fried, 230, 350. 

Stillman, W. J., 220. 

Stiness, Chief Justice .(Rhode Island), 


Stoerk, Felix, on the disarmament 
problem, 241-2. 

Stumm, Baron von, 255. 

Sturm, Dr,, 38, 42. 

Suez, Isthmus, 7. 

Sully, Due de, 3. 

Suttner, Baroness Bertha von, 5*5-4, 
*73> *97> 2Q4n,, 214, 226, 228, 351; 
acquaintance with Alfred Nobel, 54 ; 
at The Hague, a83n, 351; Die W&f- 
fen Nieder (novel), 5J-4, 173^ tt8 '; 
Die Waff en Nieder (periodical), 54; 
Memoirs, on the Tsar's Rescript, 
*73) X 97t recipient of the Nobel 
Peace Award, 54. 

Sweden, 303, 283, 305-6; demilitariza- 
tion of boundary with Norway, 305- 
6 ; peace organisations, 203 ; women, 

Swedish Peace and Arbitration Asso- 
ciation, 203. 

Swedish Women's Peace Society, 203. 



Swift's Gulliver's Travels, 53. 
Swiss Federal Council, 76. 
Switzerland, 244, 345. 

Talienwan, 187, 189. 

Tallack, William, 57. 

Tartary, 235. 

Tashkent, 189. 

Temps, le. See Le Temps. 

The Hague, 39, 77, 89, 93, no, 200, 

204, 213, 214, 278, 290, 294, 330. 
Thiaudiere, Edmond, plan for I.P.U., 


Tilling, Martha von, 53. 
Tilsit, Peace of, 332. 
Times, the, 18, 45, 5, $6, 57, 77-i 95, 

14^-1, 153) 154, I74> I75 220, 222- 


Thomas, Dr. Richard Henry, 212. 
Thomson, French Minister of Marine, 


Tirpitz, Admiral von, 251. 
Tittoni, Italian Foreign Secretary, 328. 
Tolstoi, Leo, 226. 
Tory Party, 45. 
Toulon, 13. 

Trade Unions, 69, 201, 
Transbaikalia, 185. 
Transcaspia, 193, 
Trans-Siberian railway, i85ff. 
Traut, Griess-, Mme. See Griess- 


Treaties of Vienna, 16, 17. 
Treaty of Paris, 1856, 269. 
Treaty of SMmonoseki, 1895, 184. 
Tremont Temple (Boston), 211-12. 
Triple Alliance (1882) and Triplice, 

59, 356, 360. 

Triple Entente, 356, 35911., 360, 
"Truce of God," advocated by Jules 

Simon in the Contemporary Rei)iew t 

58-9; by the Spectator, 57-8; by 

William Tallack in the Times, 57, 
Trueblood, Benjamin F., 57. 
Tsar. See Alexander I, Alexander II, 

Alexander III, Nicholas II, Peter the 

Tsar's Rescript (Eirenicon, Manifesto) 

the, Chs, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, 

XIV, 167!!; origin of; influences 

which may have moved the Tsar, 
Ch. IX, i67ff.; motives which may 
have actuated the Tsar's Ministers, 
Ch. X, 1821!; opinions, public and 
official on: 

American, 254-8, 2<?i-2; 

British, 217-24, 2S7~(5o; 

French, 231-2, 256; 

Italian, 233-4, 262-3; 

Japanese, 263-4; 

Russian, 224-6, 264] 

Serbian, 233, 263; 

Turkish, 263; 
quoted, 167-9. 
Turin, 205, 206, 296. 
Turkey, 237. 

Union interparlementaire, 88, 89, 90; 
see also Interparliamentary Union. 
Unione Lombarde, 76. 
United Society of Christian Endeavor, 


United States: 

American churches, 98, xoo-x, axx~ 
12; American labor, 64, 201; Amer- 
ican pacifists and the Rescript, 211- 
13; American pacifists and the 
Rush-Bagot Agreement, 27; Ameri- 
can pacifists and the S.H.C., 3x7- 
18; American Peace Societies, 9, 70, 
211-13; American women, 211-13; 
Anglo-American Arbitration Me- 
morial, 1 07; calling SJELC., 297-8, 
302-3; Canadian-American frontier, 
27; Congress, 297; F.H.C., 285, *86, 
287; Hay's instructions to Ameri- 
can delegates to F.H.C., 27^6', im- 
munity of private property at sea, 
342; interest in arbitration, 237, 33$, 
276-7* 304, 270, 286; naval arma- 
ments and sea power, 291, 292, 294, 
297-8, 340, 354; official opinion and 
the Rescript, atfx-*; official opinion 
and the S.'H.C, 329-50; public opin- 
ion and the Rescript, aj4-S; Rush- 
Bagot Agreement, 23-7; S.H.C., 
329-30; status quQ t aaa; m* aim 
Lake Mohonk Conferences, A. T, 
Mahan, Theodore Roowvelt and 
Elihu Root. 



Universal Peace Congresses, Ch. Ill, 
69-84, 53-4, 64, 69, 77 and n., 90, 
96, 100, 131, 159, 160, 205, 296, 298, 
313, 348; and arbitration, 79; cri- 
tique of their theory that disarma- 
ment will come through arbitration, 
79-84; evaluation of disarmament 
deliberations, 79; congresses: 

1889, Paris, 71; 

1890, London, 71-5; 

1891, Rome, 73\ 

1892, Berne, 73-4; 

1893, Chicago, 74-5, 100-1; 

1894, Antwerp, 75-6; 

1895, Scheveningen, 77; 

1896, Budapest, 77-8, 95-6; 

1897, Hamburg, 78; 

1898, Lisbon, 205; 
1901, Glasgow, 296; 
1904, 298; 

1906, Milan, 313. 
Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia, 


Utilitarianism, 160, 216. 

Utopias and Utopian, 227, 228, 264, 

293 328. 
Utrecht, Peace of, 16. 

Valbert, M. G., 156, 
Vannovaki (Wamowsky), 193. 

Varanger fiord, 189. 
Vattel, tf, 

Vaughan, Cardinal, 104. 
Vercsohagitt, Vasili, 225. 

Vcsnitch, Mllenko R., ajj, 245. 

Viekers, 356, 

Vienna, 18, 39, 204. 

Vienna, Treaties of, 16-17. 

Virchow, .Dr., 38, 29, 86-7* 

** Vital interests," 8o> 124, 344, 346, 


Vivian (Labor M.P.), 306*7. 
Vladivostok, 185, 
Voice, the, 18, 

Wadham, Captain Albion V,, 396* 
Waltersklrchea, Robert von, S$ , 
War potential, 131* 
Washington, city of, 62, an, 337, 

Washington, George, on danger of 
enormous armaments to democracy, 

Waszklewicsz van Schilfgaarde, 203, 

204 and n, 

Waterloo, Battle of, 8, 9. 
Watson, Dr. Spence, 63. 
Wavorinsky, deputy in I.P.U., 94. 
Weardale, Lord (Philip Stanhope), 89, 

90, 93, 210, 309. 
Wedel, Count Karl von, 328. 
Wehberg, Hans, 134. 
Welby, Lord, 309. 
Werner, B. von, 226. 
Wesleyans, 45, 108, 200. 
Westcott, Canon, 99. 
Westlake, Professor, 309. 
Westminster Gazette, 176. 
Westphalia, Peace of, 16. 
White, Andrew D., 214, 287, 2$i ; 

Autobiography, 214, F.H.C., 287, 


WMtehead, Sir J., 48. 

Whyte, Sir Frederick, 208. 

Wilhelraina, Queen, 279. 

Wick^rsheirner, deputy in I.P.U., 93. 

William I, of Prussia, 18, 20. 

William (Wilhelm) II, German Em- 
peror, 51, 61, i34~7) 141-6, 147) 170* 
183, 207, 183, 207, 240-52, 291, 327- 
8, Jjz-2, 349, 350; at the Guildhall, 
1891, 143-4; at Hatfield House, 
1891, 144; on the F.H.C. and Per- 
manent Court of Arbitration, 288; 
on the Rescript, 251-2; rumors of 
advocating disarmament and calling 
a peace conference, 51, 134-7; H 1 - 
<6; S.H.C, 327-8, JJJM; tekgram to 
Nicholas II concerning the Rescript, 

Winchester, Dean of, 104. 
Wkmiewsky, Princess, 204 and n* 
Witte, Count Sergei, 177, 180, iSaflf., 

191!., 208, 251, $164, 291; F.H.C., 

a^4 industrial and commercial pol- 
icy, 191-3; peace policy, 183, 186, 
193, railway policy, 183-7; rearma- 
ment policy, 194-6, ig5u 
Women, 158-9, 203-5, aia-ia; Ad^ 
dress of British Women, 204; Amer- 



lean, 212-13; British and Irish, 204- 
5; European, 203-4; of the world, 
204; International Council of 
Women, 159, 204; International Dis- 
armament League, 203; Interna- 
tional Peace League, 158; Nether- 
lands Women's League for Interna- 
tional Disarmament, 203; La Ligue 
Internationale des femmes pour le 
desarmement general, 158; lethargy 
of, 158-8; London Congress, 1899, 
159 ; Women's Association for Peace 
and Disarmament, 204; W.C.T.U., 
212; Women's Peace Crusade, 212; 
World War effects on, 158; work- 
ers, 159. 

Women's Association for Peace and 
Disarmament, 204. 

Women's Christian Temperance Union 
(W.C.T.U.), 212. 

Women's Franchise Bill, 334. 

Women's International Disarmament 
League, 203. 

Women's Peace Crusade, 212. 

Workers. See Labor (workers, work- 
ingmen) . 

Workers Associations, 42. 

Working Class congresses, 64. 

Workmen's Peace Association, 88. 

Workmen's Peace Committee, 41, 64, 

World Alliance for Peace Through the 
Churches, 109. 

World Peace Congresses. See Univer- 
sal Peace Congresses. 

World War, 26, 158, 344. 

Wright, Mrs. Jacob, 210. 

Wright^Sewell, Mrs., 2O4n. 

Yale Review, 155, 236. 
Year Book, 153. 

Zanichelli, Signor, 234. 
Zuccari, General, 283. 
Zues, 279. 
Zurich, 76. 

1 34 225